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Title: Apartheid South African intelligence meetings on foreign activities, including support for Jack Abramoff's Washington operations, were code-named "Sanhedrin."
Source:
Wayne Madsen Report
URL Source: http://waynemadsenreport.com/
Published: Jan 29, 2006
Author: Wayne Madsen
Post Date: 2006-01-29 09:06:07 by Zipporah
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Keywords: intelligence, "Sanhedrin.", activities,
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Comments: 2
January 28, 2006 -- Apartheid South African intelligence meetings on foreign activities, including support for Jack Abramoff's Washington operations, were code-named "Sanhedrin." WMR can reveal that according to government files obtained from South African sources, the South African apartheid military intelligence service, which supported Jack Abramoff's International Freedom Foundation (IFF) in Washington during the Reagan administration, held a number of secret operational meetings. The meetings, divided into senior level and junior-level sessions, were code-named "Sanhedrin." Was Jack Abramoff's International Freedom Foundation taking orders from the "Sanhedrin"? South African documents indicate so. The following exchanges took place before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in Johannesburg on September 11 and 23, 1998. Former South African super-spy Craig Williamson, the person who ran Abramoff as an agent in Washington, testified on the secret meetings (Note how the Commission Chairperson studiously steered the commision away from the topic of "Sanhedrin" in the second hearing and how the questioner in the first hearing kept inquiring why the term "Sanhedrin" was used by the intelligence services): September 11, 1998 hearing: MR BIZOS: When you became a security policeman at the Security Police Headquarters what year was that? MR WILLIAMSON: During 1980 Mr Chairman, MR BIZOS: During 1980? And when did you attend the first Sanhedrin meeting? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I would imagine relatively soon. MR BIZOS: Thereafter? MR WILLIAMSON: Probably in the first, sometime in the first quarter of 1980 or mid 1980. MR BIZOS: And how often did the Sanhedrin meet? MR WILLIAMSON: The Sanhedrin was - I think there were basically two Sanhedrins. One was a more in depth one on a weekly basis but I think, if I'm not wrong Mr Chairman, that's what was termed the Sanhedrin and then we had a daily meeting as well. MR BIZOS: The daily meeting which was a junior Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: I would - yes I think, but here I stand under correction but I think it could be the junior Sanhedrin. MR BIZOS: The junior Sanhedrin, yes, very good. Now tell us who were the ex official members of the main Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman as far as I know this was a meeting of the staff officers of security headquarters which would then be the commander, the deputy commander. MR BIZOS: No, just give us names from 1980 to 1984 please when you attended the main Sanhedrin meetings? MR WILLIAMSON: I would imagine 1980, certainly General Coetzee. MR BIZOS: Did he preside over the main Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: At times. MR BIZOS: Regularly? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. MR BIZOS: Yes and who else would be there regularly? MR WILLIAMSON: The deputy who at that time was Brigadier du Preez. MR BIZOS: Du Preez, yes? MR WILLIAMSON: And then group heads and some section heads. MR BIZOS: Give us the group heads that were there at the time please, from 1980 to approximately 1984. There may have been changes we understand but the familiar faces on the main Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I'd have to get some type of an organogram or something to get all the names but I'd say obviously my group head, Brigadier Goosen, would be there. MR BIZOS: Brigadier Goosen would be there, yes? MR WILLIAMSON: And then as I said, if I go down the passage ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Let me help you. Let me help you. MR WILLIAMSON: Thank you Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Colonel Heuér? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, possibly. MR BIZOS: You see there's not all documents ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can you repeat that name? MR BIZOS: H-e-u-é-r. His initials are A.N. Heuér, Heuér, Brigadier, sometimes called Colonel or it's Brigadier. You see not all documents were destroyed. Then F.W. Schoon? MR WILLIAMSON: That's correct, he would be there. MR BIZOS: Yes and then B.F. Kotze, Brigadier? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I'm prepared to say yes, Mr Chairman, I remember him vaguely. MR BIZOS: You remember him vaguely, alright. Colonel later Brigadier J.C. Broodryk? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, he was the legal section. MR BIZOS: Then Brigadier C.J.W. du Plooy? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, he was training section. MR BIZOS: Colonel H.J.J. Smit? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I think he was also in the training section in the library, I'm not sure. MR BIZOS: Yes, we had a representative from Namibia here for the sake of completeness didn't we? MR WILLIAMSON: In the Sanhedrin? MR BIZOS: Yes. MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, we had also military intelligence. MR BIZOS: Yes, we'll come to them. MR WILLIAMSON: We also had Railway Police. MR BIZOS: But here H.J.J. Smit was from South West Africa - I beg your pardon, he was dealing with the South West African section? MR WILLIAMSON: He was South West African, yes. MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you. Yes, yes I must be careful. Lieutenant Colonel Joubert of Group H? MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I - was he Church? Churches? MR BIZOS: No, no I don't see that but everyone that was head of a group was there? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes the group heads were there, would be there but there would also be section heads. MR BIZOS: Section heads? MR WILLIAMSON: At times. MR BIZOS: And you were a section head? MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct. MR BIZOS: At times. How often did you attend this Sanhedrin meeting? MR WILLIAMSON: I often attended the weekly meeting because there was something called the "Insum", the "inligtings summary" and I presented ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Yes so you would then - you presented that to the ....[intervention] MR WILLIAMSON: Not the whole thing, I would present something from my side. MR BIZOS: From your side? MR WILLIAMSON: Which then would be ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: So ...[intervention] MR WILLIAMSON: Listened to by the meeting and a decision would be made as to whether this was believed by the meeting to be accurate and then it would be approved basically for transmission up the channels. MR BIZOS: And what was the day on which the Sanhedrin met? What day of the week? MR WILLIAMSON: I wanted to say immediately Friday, Mr Chairman, but I'm sure one of my colleagues can easily tell me. MR BIZOS: Yes, well it doesn't matter really for my purposes at this stage, it met regularly every week? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. MR BIZOS: And it was probably the most important co-ordinating meeting of the Security Police that was to be held and generally speaking it was presided over by General Coetzee or if he was not available for some reason or other, his deputy? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, it was presided over by General Coetzee or whoever else was at the time the commanding officer. MR BIZOS: Yes? MR WILLIAMSON: So between 1980 and the end of 1985, General Coetzee would only have presided over it ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Until 1983? MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct. MR BIZOS: Did you attend the daily Sanhedrin meetings? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, on occasion I attended them but that was, ja, I think I often attended. MR BIZOS: You often attended and to which Sanhedrin meeting was the death of Ruth First reported? MR WILLIAMSON: I have no idea Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: You don't remember? MR WILLIAMSON: No. MR BIZOS: Very well. MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know whether it was a daily one or the weekly "Insum" meeting. MR BIZOS: Yes. Please tell us in your own words and for as long as you like what was the main function of these Sanhedrins? MR WILLIAMSON: Sanhedrin. MR BIZOS: Sanhedrin, okay. MR WILLIAMSON: It was - the name Sanhedrin was a nickname, I'm sure there was an official name but everybody referred it to Sanhedrin: "Jy moet vanoggend Sanhedrin toe gaan of more Sanhedrin toe gaan". I believe that the main purpose of the meeting in my experience was to get input from the section heads and group heads dealing with various problem areas on what had occurred either the day before or the week, in the past week, so obviously at the weekly meeting this would be a broader discussion. At the morning meeting it was just a discussion about "Last night they blew up Sasol -what happened, who went there, are there any clues" da-da da-da because - and then some type of a report was drawn up which, once that meeting had given that report, it was really a report back. That meeting was, I would imagine, formerly reporting to the head of the Security Branch and he then would report to the Commissioner, the Commissioner to the Minister, the Minister to the Cabinet and obviously also on a weekly basis there was a document, the "Insum" was a written. I think maybe even everyday there were also - yes there was but it was on an A4 paper type of report but on a weekly basis there was a little booklet brought out, an A5 booklet type of thing which had a much more detailed basic summary of what was going on and in particular what could be expected to be going on in the next week and my responsibility from intelligence was to put my input and the people listening to the input and whichever people were there or this wasn't only a report by all of us, just to the commanding officer who would then go up to the top structures, it was also so we could each be informed from the different desks what was going on. MR BIZOS: Yes, you told us about Sasol being blown up. What about the other way, what about the successes of the "manne" during the week or during the day against the enemy? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, what about them? MR BIZOS: Wasn't there a report about that? MR WILLIAMSON: There were at times I'm sure reports about that. MR BIZOS: No, don't say I'm sure, you were there, you attended the meetings regularly. MR WILLIAMSON: Absolutely, I mean if there had been - how would one term it, some type of a confrontation or a shoot-out or contact yes, it was reported. MR BIZOS: Or elimination? MR WILLIAMSON: No. To my knowledge no clandestine operation would have been reported, no. MR BIZOS: Why not? Particularly in the weekly Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I don't even know whether the question's actually really serious because you know it's just maybe, the culture is just so different but I spent all these years in this culture of intelligence in security and it was need to know and if this wasn't such a serious matter it would actually be laughable to suggest that any member of the Sanhedrin would come to the meeting and say: "General, yesterday in Maputo we blew up a car and six ANC died". It may have come as a factual report: "Yesterday there was an explosion at the corner of such and such a street in Maputo and such and such a member of the ANC is believed to have died or was injured" etc. etc. That was - a report would have just come through in that way. MR BIZOS: Let us question you on that basis, Mr Williamson. How many reports were made either to the big Sanhedrin or the small Sanhedrin about ANC activists, who you would have called terrorists of course, were killed in the country and outside the country. How many reports of deaths were made to the main and/or subsidiary Sanhedrin? MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, there's absolutely no way that I could put a number to it. When it came to deaths outside South Africa in the area for which I was responsible to gather information, I for example remember specifically reporting on Joe Gwabe's death. MR BIZOS: Yes? MR WILLIAMSON: So it was done Mr Chairman and I used to hear from the South West Africa desk, there was a contact, so many people were killed. That was on a daily basis what was going on. MR BIZOS: Let us just expand that, let us expand that a little. How many chief representatives of the ANC's death were reported to the Sanhedrin in your presence? We know that the Swaziland head of mission of the ANC was killed, was that reported? MR WILLIAMSON: I didn't report it, I believe it should have been reported yes. We can accept it was reported. MR BIZOS: No I asked, and it - we can accept that within this culture with which you were so familiar and which we are so unfamiliar with, that that would have been reported. MR WILLIAMSON: I accept that it's one of the things that ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: Yes, we know that the ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON: It would have been extremely important, certainly? *** September 28 hearing: MR WILLIAMSON: But my role in the Defence Force as I said, was as SO1 in charge of "ander lande" which was, I was dealing with the geopolitical implications of Soviet power, etc Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: A document was put to you, Exhibit W about Sanhedrin, do you have it or can I put one in front of you? MR WILLIAMSON: I am sure I have it here somewhere. MR LEVINE: Let me put one in front of you. MR WILLIAMSON: We have it here Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: Did you coin the name Sanhedrin for the meetings? MR WILLIAMSON: No Mr Chairman, I am sure that name existed possibly even before I was born Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: Mr Bizos sought to suggest that some sort of death sentences were dealt with at these Sanhedrin meetings, what do you say about that? MR WILLIAMSON: I think as I said Mr Chairman, in my evidence, the Sanhedrin was almost a rapid fire, quick report back meeting Mr Chairman, and there was no discussion or death sentences passed Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: Where does the term Sanhedrin come from? MR WILLIAMSON: Well, I at the time thought it was a Biblical term, but I have now actually seen that it is an old Rabbinical term from what I read here Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: If you read the first paragraph of Sanhedrin, you will see that it is a (indistinct) of the Greek, Synédrion, meaning assembly? MR WILLIAMSON: I see that Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: Yes. Now, do you have any knowledge about the Jewish (indistinct) laws? MR WILLIAMSON: No Mr Chairman, but perhaps my legal advisor can assist me in that area Mr Chairman. MR LEVINE: It could be a very costly opinion Mr Chairman. Mr Williamson, read the last paragraph please to yourself of Exhibit W. Tell us what that sets out as being the purpose of the Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: From in the course of Jewish history? CHAIRPERSON *** MR BIZOS: No, this is our information as well that it was brief and to the point and it must be over in half an hour because it was an overall situation and the head of the security police had a lot of work to do and the section head had a lot to do so that it had to be over but, let me just ask you this. Would you agree and you were present during our examination of your mentor, Mr Coetzee, that hundreds of such deaths of the enemy, in your terminology, were reported at the Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: Well again Mr Chairman, I really - I said before, I can't go into numbers, you know I didn't keep score, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Yes. MR WILLIAMSON: Deaths were reported on an ongoing basis as they occurred, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Dozens, fifty, seventy, a hundred, a hundred and fifty, two hundred? How many would you say such deaths of the enemy were reported to the Sanhedrin? MR WILLIAMSON: I have absolutely no idea how many. All I can say is a number, many. MR BIZOS: Yes. Would you accept the figure that was given by my colleagues amounted to approximately a hundred of the enemy that were killed for political reasons, inside and outside the country? MR WILLIAMSON: I think we're talking over a period of years which came down to forty or fifty in a year and you've got to understand that these weren't the only deaths that were being reported in this. The South West African war was on, the deaths there were being reported so there were probably much more than that reported. MR BIZOS: Yes. And this hundred do not include those killed by Mr de Kock's Vlakplaas unit, which is now being counted and we will put on record, but numerous deaths of the enemy were reported. MR WILLIAMSON: Well I don't know whether it wouldn't have included, Mr Chairman, because if one of the intelligence gathering units somewhere was doing his job and something happened in Swaziland or Lesotho or wherever it was and some ANC people were killed, and a source reported that being, even if that source is for example, a police officer in that country, gave information and said X,Y,Z incident happened but without reference to Mr de Kock or anybody else that information would have come in because the incident happened. It wouldn't have said there who had done the incident, it was just a very short sharp thing: "Vier mans is, vermoedelik aan die ANC verbonde is in 'n ontploffing in Swaziland dood". MR BIZOS: Let me ask what I consider the vital question and I hope that you will give us an answer, an honest answer Mr Williamson. The members of the Sanhedrin could not have believed that forces other than their own were mainly responsible for the elimination of their enemy? MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, first of all I must say I can't tell you what other members of the Sanhedrin should or should not, or did or did not believe. During my time in the Security Forces, I certainly was of the opinion that it was as I've said before, not only in this forum but publicly, that I didn't believe that it was the fairies Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Yes. MR WILLIAMSON: And I believe that there was a co-ordinated counter-insurgency strategy being applied against the enemy and this co-ordinated strategy included not only my or our organisation's Security Police, it included numerous other agencies of the state. MR BIZOS: Which co-operated and co-ordinated ...[intervention] MR WILLIAMSON: Which worked together and which sat at that Sanhedrin or representatives of it sat at that Sanhedrin, so theoretically if somebody got killed somewhere at it was the Railway Police who'd done it, theoretically the person who was sitting there from the Railway Police would fit into the description you gave, yes. MR BIZOS: Yes. Let us take Mr Joe Gwabe as an example. You knew that he was a close associate of Ruth First in the '50's and a couple of years of the '60's whilst newspapers on Ruth First were still allowed to be printed. MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I knew he had a - how should I put it, he was one of the senior members, he had a background from the '50's, he wasn't a new person on the scene. MR BIZOS: Yes, and yet he had served five years on Robben Island for recruiting people and then when he came out he continued the struggle, he was convicted at the Old Synagogue in Pretoria, he got 12 years imprisonment, he went and served it on Robben Island and he came out. Shortly after he came out he was appointed the Chief Representative of the ANC in Zimbabwe, you knew that? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: And he was then killed, shortly after his appointment. MR WILLIAMSON: That's correct Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: In your honest opinion, did you believe that he suffered that fate at the hands of the officers commanded by the people who attended that Sanhedrin the following, the appropriate day after his death? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I believed when Joe Gwabe was killed that an element of the South African State, a unit of one of the Security Forces had killed him. MR BIZOS: You believed it. MR WILLIAMSON: And I - in which case a member of the overall organisation of which this small unit would have ultimately been part was probably at the Sanhedrin. MR BIZOS: Represented at the Sanhedrin. MR WILLIAMSON: But I must say that I don't believe that the South African Police were involved in that operation. MR BIZOS: Well, as long as they were all represented. For the purposes of my question we can continue with ...[intervention] MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, that's why I'm saying, for purposes of the question, somebody at that meeting would have been a member of an organisation of which the unit was part that was involved in that attack. MR BIZOS: Very well. And of course it would have been a betrayal of the trust that the head of the Security Police head in all the other members that attended the Sanhedrin Meeting, to keep him in the dark? MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman. Need to know clandestine operations had nothing to do with betrayal of trust Mr Chairman, and there's no way, and in fact I doubt, I seriously doubt that if this, the unit that killed Joe Gwabe was one of the units of the South African Security Forces and that there was a member of one of that organisation present at that Sanhedrin, whether that person would have known that his organisation had ultimately been responsible for the murder of Joe Gwabe. MR BIZOS: Well but let's take about those immediately under the command of the Commissioner. What would have been - I can understand the need to know vertically downwards or horizontally, but what would have been the purpose of keeping the man having the responsibility of securing the country, being kept in the dark about what his "manne", I think that's the expression which was used in those circles, were doing? *** MR BIZOS: Let's come back to it a little later. Let me round off this Sanhedrin situation. Do you who was responsible for naming these meetings, the Sanhedrin Meetings? MR WILLIAMSON: For naming them, Mr Chairman? MR BIZOS: Yes. MR WILLIAMSON: You mean for coining the term: "Sanhedrin"? MR BIZOS: Yes. MR WILLIAMSON: Absolutely no idea. MR BIZOS: Did you ever - wasn't your curiosity aroused as to why they were called Sanhedrin Meetings? MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, as I said, you know I've absolutely no idea, I never bothered to even think about it, that was the name. You know, we called Section A,B,C,G, whatever you know, that was the name. I've got no idea. It's an Afrikaans term that even today I'm not entirely familiar with. I believe it's some type of an upper structure in, referred to somewhere in the Bible. MR BIZOS: Well you see, whoever gave it that name was spot on for what we will suggest you were doing. MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I can't comment. I'm sure the term: "Sanhedrin" probably existed when I was a child, that it was even then called the Sanhedrin. MR BIZOS: Oh, much longer than that Mr Williamson, much longer. MR WILLIAMSON: Well the original Sanhedrin, obviously much longer but I'm talking about the Security Police Sanhedrin. MR BIZOS: Yes. Well it must have come along, it must have been adopted when you were a bit older than a child, when they decided to become a sort of superior court. MR WILLIAMSON: Superior? MR BIZOS: Court. MR WILLIAMSON: Court or Port? MR BIZOS: Yes. MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: I want to hand in Mr Chairman, from the 1963 edition of the encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 19 and page 946A, what the Sanhedrin was and whoever chose the name may have known more than the witness is prepared to tell us. "Sanhedrin, sometimes incorrectly written Sinedrium(?) ...[intervention] ADV DE JAGER: Do you suggest the Security Police actually went to the encyclopaedia, Britannica or did they look at what or the Afrikaans ...[intervention] MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, what we are going to argue is that they chose the name. Usually people that choose a name try to find an aim which represents more or less what they are doing, and whoever did it knew what it meant, Mr Chairman. "Sanhedrin, sometimes incorrectly written Sinedrium or Sanhedrin, the Supreme Rabbinic Court in Jerusalem during second commonwealth era. The term is a hybridisation(?) of the Greek Sinedriun meaning assembly. The term also is used for the Hieropegus in Athens". Do you know that the Hieropegus was the highest court established by the Gods? MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman, I don't have your advantage in terms of Greek mythology. MR BIZOS: That's a pity. Rabbinic sources speak of a great Sanhedrin of 71 members and smaller Sanhedrin trial courts of 23 members judging criminal cases or violations of Jewish law. Now you will agree that the Security Police, never mind who had what knowledge, had set themselves up as the Judges of who could live and who could die? MR WILLIAMSON: No, I can't agree to that at all Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Well, they had a meeting to which reports were made, they had a Target Selection Committee and they allowed their people, like yourself, to arrange for the elimination of people. Now why do you quarrel that the name was deliberately chosen as suggested by the person who wrote the article for this encyclopaedia, Britannica. MR WILLIAMSON: Well I don't see any reference here to the Sanhedrin passing Judgment and deciding who must live and die, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Judging criminal cases. MR WILLIAMSON: That's not deciding who's going to live or die, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Well, in some criminal cases the decision is made as to who should live and die, and certainly during the period that you were a security policeman. MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I - this is very interesting information but I really have absolutely no idea who coined the term Sanhedrin, who decided it would be what the committee was called, Mr Chairman. It wasn't even a committee, it was a group. I really can't make any further statement or suggestion. MR BIZOS: Yes. It is further described lower down: "Dalmoedic tradition pictures the great Sanhedrin as the highest legislative and judicial court". When a person decides that Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon must die as with a letter bomb, isn't that like a sentence of death that the highest court has the power to impose? MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, I certainly - again there was never any such decision or sentence passed at any Sanhedrin that I was present at, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: I'm going to put to you Mr Williamson, that your description of this fleeting communications between members is so highly improbable that the only conclusion that we will ask the Committee to draw is that the conspiracy of silence that there was at the time is continuing with you, without wanting to disclose who really decided, what preparations were made by whom, and who executed it, for the purposes of protecting your colleagues or erstwhile colleagues and more particularly, General Coetzee. MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, all I can say is that all I can do is say what I know happened when I was involved in what happened. I cannot comment on Sanhedrins and passing of sentences, things that you know, might be something that comes from the fiction around, and by fiction I mean the writings in fiction, around spying and these types of operations. But the reality was different Mr Chairman, and I do not believe that a conspiracy of silence - if remember the Sanhedrin and the assembly that we had ever morning and the number of people who were there and the number of different people who were there on different occasions and the number of different organisations that were there and the number of different individuals to whom they went and reported, I believe that this would have to be a rather incredible conspiracy of silence to maintain, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Well we only have now your word. And what I want to ask you before the adjournment Mr Williamson, have you got any yardstick which you can suggest to the Committee that it should use as to whether you can be believed or not, having regard to your admitted deceptions almost throughout a lifetime? MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman. All I can say is that this Committee and nobody else would have known anything about these operations if it hadn't been for me. MR BIZOS: You're giving yourself too much credit Major Williamson. MR WILLIAMSON: Well. MR BIZOS: Others spoke before you and you know that. MR WILLIAMSON: Other spoke about these operations before me? MR BIZOS: No, about the manner in which people were eliminated, killed, brutalised, assassinated. MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, nobody spoke about these operations before me and nobody would have known anything about these operations if it hadn't been for me. MR BIZOS: Oh. So you had absolute faith that your colleagues would ...[indistinct] the conspiracy of silence? MR WILLIAMSON: I don't understand how that follows what I said, Mr Chairman. MR BIZOS: Yes. You only spoke about them when it became clear to you that you may have to go to prison for these acts unless you could manage to persuade the Committee or the Commission even before you spoke, to give you amnesty, to try to trade your information for your freedom. You didn't do it out of any sense of humanity or devoid of personal interest. *** Another witness, South African intelligence bomb expert Roger Raven testified how South African covert teams pioneered in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in targeting anti-apartheid leaders. U.S. military intelligence sources report that the IEDs being used in Iraq by insurgents are of the same design as those used by South African intelligence in the 1980s. For other testimony and documentation click here.
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#1. To: Zipporah (#0)
Check the Catholic Encyclopedia Basically, the Sanhedrin was a religious group that was a self-appointed a death squad, and may have carried out Christ's execution. Among others, the Sanhedrin killed St. Stephan, they made him a martyr.
"We don't need no stinkin' badges!" -Gold Hat, now starring Alberto Gonzales That struck me so odd.. if you read the transcript.. the questioner pressed hard to find out exactly what it was.. but either the guy was totally ignorant or lying ..??
Jack Abramoff's Washington operations, were code-named "Sanhedrin."
#2. To: robin (#1)
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