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Title: Why Does North Korea Want Nukes?
Source: [None]
URL Source: http://www.counterpunch.org/2017/04 ... y-does-north-korea-want-nukes/
Published: Apr 25, 2017
Author: PAUL ATWOOD
Post Date: 2017-04-25 19:22:04 by Ada
Keywords: None
Views: 77
Comments: 4

We are fighting in Korea so we won’t have to fight in Wichita, or in Chicago, or in New Orleans, or in San Francisco Bay.

— President Harry S Truman, 1952

Why has this tiny nation of 24 million people invested so much of its limited resources in acquiring nuclear weapons? North Korea is universally condemned as a bizarre and failed state, its nuclear posture denounced as irrational.

Yet North Korea’s stance cannot be separated out from its turbulent history during the 20th Century, especially its four decade long occupation by Japan, the forced division of the Korean peninsula after World War II, and, of course, the subsequent utterly devastating war with the United States from 1950-1953 that ended in an armistice in which a technical state of war still exists.

Korea is an ancient nation and culture, achieving national unity in 608 CE, and despite its near envelopment by gigantic China it has retained its own unique language and traditions throughout its recorded history. National independence came to an end in 1910 after five years of war when Japan, taking advantage of Chinese weakness, invaded and occupied Korea using impressed labor for the industries Japan created for the benefit of its own economy. As always the case for colonization the Japanese easily found collaborators among the Korean elite Koreans to manage their first colony.

Naturally a nationalist resistance movement emerged rapidly and, given the history of the early 20th Century, it was not long before communists began to play a significant role in Korea’s effort to regain its independence. The primary form of resistance came in the form of “peoples’ committees” which became deeply rooted throughout the entire peninsula, pointedly in the south as well. It was from these deeply political and nationalistic village and city committees that guerrilla groups engaged the Japanese throughout WWII. The parallels with similar organizations in Vietnam against the Japanese, and later against the French and Americans, are obvious. Another analogous similarity is that Franklin Roosevelt also wanted a Great Power trusteeship for Korea, as for Vietnam. Needless to say both Britain and France objected to this plan.

When Russia entered the war against Japanese in August of 1945 the end of Japanese rule was at hand regardless of the atomic bomb. As events turned out Japan surrendered on 15 August when Soviet troops had occupied much of the northern peninsula. It should be noted that American forces played no role in the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule. However, because the Soviets, as allies of the U.S., wished to remain on friendly terms they agreed to the division of Korea between Soviet and American forces. The young Dean Rusk, later to become Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson, arbitrarily drew a line of division across the 38th Parallel because, as he said, that would leave the capital city, Seoul, in the American zone.

Written reports at the time criticized Washington for “allowing” the Red Army into Korea but the fact was it was the other way around. The Soviets could easily have occupied the entirety of Korea but chose not to do so, instead opting for a negotiated settlement with the U.S. over the future of Korea. Theoretically the peninsula would be reunited after some agreement between the two victors at some future date.

However, the U.S. immediately began to favor those Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese in the exploitation of their own country and its people, largely the landed elites, and Washington began to arm the provisional government it set up to root out the peoples’ committees. For their part the Soviets supported the communist nationalist leader, Kim Il- Sung who had led the guerrilla army against Japan at great cost in lives.

In 1947 the United Nations authorized elections in Korea, but the election monitors were all American allies so the Soviets and communist Koreans refused to participate. By then the Cold War was in full swing, the critical alliance between Washington and Moscow that had defeated Nazi Germany had already been sundered. As would later also occur in Vietnam in 1956, the U.S. oversaw elections only in the south of Korea and only those candidates approved by Washington. Syngman Rhee became South Korea’s first president protected by the new American armed and trained Army of the Republic of Korea. This ROK was commanded by officers who had served the Japanese occupation including one who had been decorated by Emperor Hirohito himself and who had tried to track down and kill Kim Il Sung for the Japanese.

With Korea thus seemingly divided permanently both Russian and American troops withdrew in 1948 though they left “advisers” behind. On both sides of the new artificial border pressures mounted for a forcible reunification. The fact remained that much of rural southern Korea was still loyal to the peoples committees. This did not necessarily mean that they were committed communists but they were virulent nationalists who recognized the role that Kim’s forces had played against the Japanese. Rhee’s forces then began to systematically root out Kim’s supporters. Meanwhile the American advisers had constantly to keep Rhee’s forces from crossing the border to invade the north.

In 1948 guerrilla war broke out against the Rhee regime on the southern island of Cheju, the population of which ultimately rose in wholesale revolt. The suppression of the rebellion was guided by many American agents soon to become part of the Central Intelligence Agency and by military advisers. Eventually the entire population was removed to the coast and kept in guarded compounds and between 20,000 and 30,000 villagers died. Simultaneously elements of the ROK army refused to participate in this war against their own people and this mutiny was brutally suppressed by those ROK soldiers who would obey such orders. Over one thousand of the mutineers escaped to join Kim’s guerrillas in the mountains.

Though Washington claimed that these rebellions were fomented by the communists no evidence surfaced that the Soviets provided anything other than moral support. Most of the rebels captured or killed had Japanese or American weapons.

In North Korea the political system had evolved in response to decades of foreign occupation and war. Though it was always assumed to be a Soviet satellite, North Korea more nearly bears comparison to Tito’s Yugoslavia. The North Koreans were always able to balance the tensions between the Soviets and the Chinese to their own advantage. During the period when the Comintern exercised most influence over national communist parties not a single Korean communist served in any capacity and the number of Soviet advisers in the north was never high.

Nineteen forty-nine marked a watershed year. The Chinese Communist Revolution, the Soviet Atomic Bomb, the massive reorganization of the National Security State in the U.S. all occurred that year. In 1950 Washington issued its famous National Security Paper-68 (NSC-68) which outlined the agenda for a global anti-communist campaign, requiring the tripling of the American defense budget. Congress balked at this all- encompassing blueprint when in the deathless words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson “Thank God! Korea came along.” Only months before Acheson had made a speech in which he pointedly omitted Korea from America’s “Defense perimeter.”

The Korean War seemed to vindicate everything written and said about the” international communist conspiracy. In popular myth on June 25, 1950 the North Korean Army suddenly attacked without warning, overwhelming surprised ROK defenders. In fact the entire 38th Parallel had been progressively militarized and there had been numerous cross border incursions by both sides going back to 1949. On numerous occasions Syngman Rhee had to be restrained by American advisers from invading the north. The Korean civil war was all but inevitable. Given postwar American plans for access globally to resources, markets and cheaper labor power any form of national liberation, communist or liberal democratic, was to be opposed. Acheson and his second, Dean Rusk, told President Truman that “we must draw the line here!” Truman decided to request authorization for American intervention from the United Nations and bypassed Congress thereby leading to widespread opposition and, later, a return to Republican rule under Dwight Eisenhower..

Among the remaining mysteries of the UN decision to undertake the American led military effort to reject North Korea from the south was the USSR’s failure to make use of its veto in the Security Council. The Soviet ambassador was ostensibly boycotting the meetings in protest of the UN’s refusal to seat the Chinese communists as China’s official delegation. According to Bruce Cumings though, evidence exists that Stalin ordered the Soviet ambassador to abstain. Why? The UN resolution authorizing war could have been prevented. At that moment the Sino-Soviet split was already in evidence and Stalin may have wished to weaken China, something which actually happened as a result of that nation’s subsequent entry into the war. Or he may have wished that cloaking the UN mission under the U.S. flag would have revealed the UN to be largely under the control of the United States, which indeed it was. What is known is that Stalin refused to allow Soviet combat troops and reduced shipments of arms to Kim’s forces. Later, however Soviet pilots would engage Americans in the air. The Chinese were quick to condemn the UN action as “American imperialism” and warned of dire consequences if China itself were threatened.

The war went badly at first for the U.S. despite numerical advantages in forces. Rout after rout followed with the ROK in full retreat. Meanwhile tens of thousands of southern guerrillas who had originated in peoples’ committees fought the Americans and the ROK. At one point the North Koreans were in control of Seoul and seemed about to drive American forces into the sea. At that point the commander- in-chief of all UN forces, General Douglas MacArthur, announced that he saw unique opportunities for the deployment of atomic weapons. This call was taken up by many in Congress.

Truman was loathe to introduce nukes and instead authorized MacArthur to conduct the famous landings at Inchon in September 1950 with few losses by the Marine Corps vaunted 1st Division. This threw North Korean troops into disarray and MacArthur began pushing them back across the 38th Parallel, the mandate imposed by the UN resolution. But the State Department claimed that the border was not recognized under international law and therefore the UN mandate had no real legal bearing. It was this that MacArthur claimed gave him the right to take the war into the north. Though the North Koreans had suffered a resounding defeat in the south, they withdrew into northern mountain redoubts forcing the American forces that followed them into bloody and costly combat, led Americans into a trap.

The Chinese had said from the beginning that any approach of foreign troops toward their border would result in “dire consequences.” Fearing an invasion of Manchuria to crush the nascent communist revolution the Chinese foreign minister, Zhou En-Lai declared that China “will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors invaded by the imperialists.” MacArthur sneered at this warning. “… They have no airforce…if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be a great slaughter…we are the best.” He then ordered airstrikes to lay waste thousands of square miles of northern Korea bordering China and ordered infantry divisions ever closer to its border.

It was the terrible devastation of this bombing campaign, worse than anything seen during World War II short of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that to this day dominates North Korea’s relations with the United States and drives its determination never to submit to any American diktat.

General Curtis Lemay directed this onslaught. It was he who had firebombed Tokyo in March 1945 saying it was “about time we stopped swatting at flies and gone after the manure pile.” It was he who later said that the US “ought to bomb North Vietnam back into the stone age.” Remarking about his desire to lay waste to North Korea he said “We burned down every town in North Korea and South Korea too.” Lemay was by no means exaggerating.

On November 27, 1950 hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops suddenly crossed the border into North Korea completely overwhelming US forces. Acheson said this was the “worst defeat of American forces since Bull Run.” One famous incident was the battle at the Chosin Reservoir, where 50,000 US marines were surrounded. As they escaped their enclosure they said they were “advancing to the rear” but in fact all American forces were being routed.

Panic took hold in Washington. Truman now said use of A-bombs was under “active consideration.” MacArthur demanded the bombs… As he put it in his memoirs:

I would have dropped between thirty and fifty atomic bombs…strung across the neck of Manchuria…and spread behind us – from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea- a belt of radioactive cobalt. It has an active life of between 60 and 120 years.

Cobalt it should be noted is at least 100 times more radioactive than uranium.

He also expressed a desire for chemicals and gas.

It is well known that MacArthur was fired for insubordination for publically announcing his desire to use nukes. Actually, Truman himself put the nukes at ready and threatened to use them if China launched air raids against American forces. But he did not want to put them under MacArthur’s command because he feared MacArthur would conduct a preemptive strike against China anyway.

By June 1951, one year after the beginning of the war, the communists had pushed UN forces back across the 38th parallel. Chinese ground forces might have been able to push the entire UN force off the peninsula entirely but that would not have negated US naval and air forces, and would have probably resulted in nuclear strikes against the Chinese mainland and that brought the real risk of Soviet entry and all out nuclear exchanges. So from this point on the war became one of attrition, much like the trench warfare of World War I. casualties continued to be high on both sides for the duration of the war which lasted until 1953 when an armistice without reunification was signed.

Of course the victims suffering worst were the civilians. In 1951 the U.S. initiated “Operation Strangle” which officialls estimated killed at least 3 million people on both sides of the 38th parallel, but the figure is probably closer to 4 million. We do not know how many Chinese died – either solders or civilians killed in cross border bombings.

The question of whether the U.S. carried out germ warfare has been raised but has never been fully proved or disproved. The North accused the U.S. of dropping bombs laden with cholera, anthrax, plague, and encephalitis and hemorrhagic fever, all of which turned up among soldiers and civilians in the north. Some American prisoners of war confessed to such war crimes but these were dismissed as evidence of torture by North Korea on Americans. However, none of the U.S. POWs who did confess and were later repatriated were allowed to meet the press. A number of investigations were carried out by scientists from friendly western countries. One of the most prominent concluded the charges were true. At this time the US was engaged in top secret germ-warfare research with captured Nazi and Japanese germ warfare experts, and also experimenting with Sarin, despite its ban by the Geneva Convention. Washington accused the communists of introducing germ warfare.

Napalm was used extensively, completely and utterly destroying the northern capital of Pyongyang. By 1953 American pilots were returning to carriers and bases claiming there were no longer any significant targets in all of North Korea to bomb. In fact a very large percentage of the northern population was by then living in tunnels dug by hand underground. A British journalist wrote that the northern population was living “a troglodyte existence.”In the Spring of 1953 US warplanes hit five of the largest dams along the Yalu river completely inundating and killing Pyongyang’s harvest of rice. Air Force documents reveal calculated premeditation saying that “Attacks in May will be most effective psychologically because it was the end of the rice- transplanting season before the roots could become completely embedded.” Flash floods scooped out hundreds of square miles of vital food producing valleys and killed untold numbers of farmers.

At Nuremberg after WWII, Nazi officers who carried out similar attacks on the dikes of Holland, creating a mass famine in 1944, were tried as criminals and some were executed for their crimes.

So after a horrific war Korea returned to the status quo ante bellum in terms of political boundaries but it was completely devastated, especially the north.

I submit that it is the collective memory of all of what I’ve described that animates North Korea’s policies toward the US today which has nuclear weapons on constant alert and stations almost 30,000 forces at the ready. Remember, a state of war still exists and has since 1953.

While South Korea received heavy American investment in the industries fleeing the United States in search of cheaper labor and new markets it was nevertheless ruled until quite recently by military dictatorships scarcely different than those of the north. For its part the north constructed its economy along five-year plans and collectivized its agriculture. While it never enjoyed the sort of consumer society that now characterizes some of South Korea, its GDP grew substantially until the collapse of communism globally brought about the withdrawal of all foreign aid to north Korea.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as some American policymakers took note of the north’s growing weakness Secretary of Defense Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz talked openly of using force finally to settle the question of Korean reunification and the claimed threat to international peace posed by North Korea.

In 1993 the Clinton Administration discovered that North Korea was constructing a nuclear processing plant and also developing medium range missiles. The Pentagon desired to destroy these facilities but that would mean wholesale war so the administration fostered an agreement whereby North Korea would stand down in return for the provision of oil and other economic aid. When in 2001, after the events of 9-11, the Bush II neo-conservatives militarized policy and declared North Korea to be an element of the “axis of evil.” All bets were now off. In that context North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, reasoning that nuclear weapons were the only way possible to prevent a full scale attack by the US in the future. Given a stark choice between another war with the US and all that would entail this decision seems hardly surprising. Under no circumstances could any westerner reasonably expect, after all the history I’ve described, that the North Korean regime would simply submit to any ultimatums by the US, by far the worst enemy Korea ever had measured by the damage inflicted on the entirety of the Korean peninsula.

(Acknowledgement to Bruce Cumings and I.F. Stone)

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#1. To: Ada (#0)

I submit that it is the collective memory of all of what I’ve described that animates North Korea’s policies toward the US today which has nuclear weapons on constant alert and stations almost 30,000 forces at the ready. Remember, a state of war still exists and has since 1953.

While South Korea received heavy American investment in the industries fleeing the United States in search of cheaper labor and new markets it was nevertheless ruled until quite recently by military dictatorships scarcely different than those of the north. For its part the north constructed its economy along five-year plans and collectivized its agriculture. While it never enjoyed the sort of consumer society that now characterizes some of South Korea, its GDP grew substantially until the collapse of communism globally brought about the withdrawal of all foreign aid to north Korea.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as some American policymakers took note of the north’s growing weakness Secretary of Defense Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz talked openly of using force finally to settle the question of Korean reunification and the claimed threat to international peace posed by North Korea.

In 1993 the Clinton Administration discovered that North Korea was constructing a nuclear processing plant and also developing medium range missiles. The Pentagon desired to destroy these facilities but that would mean wholesale war so the administration fostered an agreement whereby North Korea would stand down in return for the provision of oil and other economic aid. When in 2001, after the events of 9-11, the Bush II neo-conservatives militarized policy and declared North Korea to be an element of the “axis of evil.” All bets were now off. In that context North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, reasoning that nuclear weapons were the only way possible to prevent a full scale attack by the US in the future. Given a stark choice between another war with the US and all that would entail this decision seems hardly surprising. Under no circumstances could any westerner reasonably expect, after all the history I’ve described, that the North Korean regime would simply submit to any ultimatums by the US, by far the worst enemy Korea ever had measured by the damage inflicted on the entirety of the Korean peninsula.

A brief history of North Korea's nuclear program and the failed US campaign to stop it - vox.com Jan 7, 2016

Very late on Tuesday, North Korea claimed that it had tested a hydrogen bomb, an especially powerful type of nuclear weapon. Experts are skeptical that the North Koreans actually detonated a full hydrogen bomb, but the evidence does suggest that some kind of smaller nuclear weapon went off.

To understand why North Korea would do this, why it even has a nuclear program, and what this program means for it and the world, you need to understand the history of North Korea's program: where it came from and how it's changed over the years. So here's a brief guide to that program, written to help you put Tuesday's test in context.

1991: The collapse of the Soviet Union

From the division of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of North Korea in 1945 up until 1991, Moscow was its ally and sponsor. The Soviets provided North Korea with huge amounts of economic aid and security assistance, propping up the country. As a superpower patron, the Soviet also provided North Korea with diplomatic and military support.

So when the Soviet Union began collapsing in 1989, and ultimately dissolved in 1991, North Korea was left a precarious position. China filled in the void somewhat, but the North knew that China had no real affection for it and so wouldn't provide the same level of protection as the Soviet Union did.

This is why Johns Hopkins's Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn date the origins of North Korea's modern nuclear program to 1989 (the regime had done nuclear research as early as the 1950s).

"With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost its main protector. Its turn to developing nuclear weapons made a lot of sense," Keir Lieber, a professor at Georgetown who has studied the thinking behind North Korea's nuclear program, told me. "What does it have that can counter conventional US power? The answer is obvious: nuclear weapons."

1994: The Clinton administration makes a deal with North Korea

The international crisis over North Korea's nuclear program has been around almost as long as North Korea's modern nuclear program. In March 1993, the country announced it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bars non-nuclear states from starting nuclear weapons programs. A month later, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it could no longer verify that North Korea was using its nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

The Clinton administration sat down with North Korea to try to negotiate a deal that would prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1994, the US and North Korea announced [an arms control] deal called the Agreed Framework. North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear reactors and accept wide-ranging inspections in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions from the United States.

From North Korea's point of view, this was a way to take advantage of its nuclear program without actually building nukes. "Pyongyang chose to capitalize on the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons by accepting crippling limits on its plutonium-based fissile material program in return for a better relationship with the United States that would diminish external security threats," Wit and Ahn explain.

But the deal was far from an inevitable success. In order for it to work, North Korea had to continue believing that adhering to the deal was a better way to protect North Korea's security interests than flouting it would be. And this didn't last forever.

1994–1998: North Korea's famine and the Songun policy

In 1994, North Korea's longtime dictator Kim Il Sung died and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il. At the same time, North Korea suffered a famine so severe that much of the population died. (Reliable estimates of the famine's death toll are hard to come by, but estimates range between 600,000 and 2.5 million during the '90s.). The collapse in Soviet aid and trade after 1991, together with a series of droughts and floods in the early '90s, collapsed North Korea's food provision system. What happened next is very important to understanding North Korea, and the nuclear program in particular.

Faced with a question of how to secure the North Korean state in the wake of the Soviet collapse, new leader Kim Jong Il developed something called the Songun, or military-first, doctrine. Songun differed from previous North Korean ideology in that it put the military at the heart of the North Korean state.

Under Songun, "the military is not just an institution designed to perform the function of defending the country from external hostility," South Korean scholar Han S. Park writes. "Instead, it provides all of the other institutions of the government with legitimacy."

On this theory, North Koreans' dire poverty is a necessary condition of the state's strength, not a problem. The military needs everything society has to offer in order to protect North Korea from outsiders; civilians' sacrifices are necessary to preserve the state that protects them.

The practical effect of Songun was that the military got all resources first — including rations during the famine while the rest of North Korea starved.

What does this have to do with the nuclear program? It illustrates just how central militarism became to North Korean strategic doctrine — and because the state thus needed an external threat to justify Songun and the civilian sacrifices it called for. The Kim regime clearly concluded that even in the face of utter economic calamity, fully funding the military was the key to the regime's continued survival. Convincing the people that the military was their savior, not economic or social reform, would allow the North Korean regime to stay in place.

That explains why the North, in the coming years, became so attached to the idea of a nuclear weapon. If the nation's legitimacy depended on the vitality of its military, then acquiring the world's most powerful military weapon became important for more than just foreign policy reasons. It was also a way to show the North Korean people that their military was a powerful protector they could count on for their security.

1998: North Korea tests a long-range missile

In 1994, North Korea's longtime dictator Kim Il Sung died and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il. At the same time, North Korea suffered a famine so severe that much of the population died. (Reliable estimates of the famine's death toll are hard to come by, but estimates range between 600,000 and 2.5 million during the '90s.). The collapse in Soviet aid and trade after 1991, together with a series of droughts and floods in the early '90s, collapsed North Korea's food provision system. What happened next is very important to understanding North Korea, and the nuclear program in particular.

Faced with a question of how to secure the North Korean state in the wake of the Soviet collapse, new leader Kim Jong Il developed something called the Songun, or military-first, doctrine. Songun differed from previous North Korean ideology in that it put the military at the heart of the North Korean state.

Under Songun, "the military is not just an institution designed to perform the function of defending the country from external hostility," South Korean scholar Han S. Park writes. "Instead, it provides all of the other institutions of the government with legitimacy."

On this theory, North Koreans' dire poverty is a necessary condition of the state's strength, not a problem. The military needs everything society has to offer in order to protect North Korea from outsiders; civilians' sacrifices are necessary to preserve the state that protects them.

The practical effect of Songun was that the military got all resources first — including rations during the famine while the rest of North Korea starved.

What does this have to do with the nuclear program? It illustrates just how central militarism became to North Korean strategic doctrine — and because the state thus needed an external threat to justify Songun and the civilian sacrifices it called for. The Kim regime clearly concluded that even in the face of utter economic calamity, fully funding the military was the key to the regime's continued survival. Convincing the people that the military was their savior, not economic or social reform, would allow the North Korean regime to stay in place.

That explains why the North, in the coming years, became so attached to the idea of a nuclear weapon. If the nation's legitimacy depended on the vitality of its military, then acquiring the world's most powerful military weapon became important for more than just foreign policy reasons. It was also a way to show the North Korean people that their military was a powerful protector they could count on for their security.

1998: North Korea tests a long-range missile

A Taepodong-class missile on display in 2013. (Ed Jones/AFP/Getty Images) In November 2015, North Korea fired a test missile of a new type, called the Taepodong-1 — over Japan. This new missile's maximum range was roughly twice that of the North's next-biggest weapon, the Rodong.

This kind of medium-range missile could potentially hold a nuclear payload, if North Korea figured out how to both build and then miniaturize a nuclear bomb. As such, the international community saw this as a profound provocation: Testing a nuclear-capable weapon at a time when negotiations over North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs were still ongoing suggested a clear lack of intent to adhere to the deal's spirit and perhaps letter.

The Taepodong-1 test reveals two important things about the North Korean program. First, North Korea is quite willing to provoke the West when it wants to, even if it jeopardizes international negotiations. This could be either because North Korea is trying to extract concessions or simply because it wants to strengthen its military; scholars disagree. But the point is that it's not obvious how committed North Korea ever was to good-faith negotiations.

"Even in 1994, there's still a question as to whether North Korea was ever committed to abiding by the Agreed Framework," Lieber told me.

Second, North Korea lies about its technological capabilities — a lot. North Korean state media claimed the Taepodong launch put a satellite into orbit; independent data suggested no such satellite reached orbit. It looked like North Korea had tried to send up a satellite, but the object had most likely been blown up when its own fuel tank exploded.

This may seem ridiculous, given that it's easy to verify whether North Korea is lying about stuff like this. But it actually makes a certain amount of sense: North Korea maintains a really tight grip on the media domestically. Exaggerating its military strength helps make the military stronger, thus solidifying the regime's legitimacy in Songun terms.

2001: Bush takes office, US policy shifts

When George W. Bush became president, America's North Korea policy shifted dramatically. While the Clinton administration took an essentially carrot-and-stick approach to North Korea's nuclear program — if you give them some stuff, and threaten other stuff, maybe you can shape their behavior — the Bush team disdained negotiations.

"At its outset, the Bush Administration was generally disinclined to test the incentives-for-denuclearization hypothesis that the Clinton team had explored," Evans J.R. Revere, a Korea expert at Brookings, writes. "Many in the new administration were convinced that North Korea had no intention of giving up its nuclear program at any price. Many were also opposed in principle to providing incentives or 'rewards' to North Korea, a regime they detested, even if this might yield some progress."

As a result, the Agreed Framework — always on tenuous footing given the nature of the North Korean regime — collapsed. "Before the end of 2002, North Korea removed the seals on the 5-megawatt reactor and other facilities at Yongbyon, evicted IAEA monitors, and began the process of restarting its nuclear weapons program," Revere explains.

According to Revere, some Bush officials internally advocated for renewing negotiations, and by 2003 they succeeded. The US and four other interested powers (South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia) — sat down with North Korea to discuss a nuclear agreement. They made some progress: In 2005, North Korea agreed in principle to give up its nuclear weapons program.

But the new agreement, unlike the Agreed Framework, didn't involve temporarily freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons while a final agreement was hashed out. As negotiations dragged on, North Korean research on a bomb continued.

You can read this one of two ways. You could say the Bush administration screwed up a good thing the Clinton team had put in place. Or you could say it showed that North Korea had entered negotiations in bad faith and was always going to pursue a bomb regardless.

Revere thinks it's the latter: "In retrospect, the US inability to attain [an end to the program] owes much more to North Korea’s dogged determination to possess nuclear weapons than to any other factor," he concludes.

It probably didn't help, though, that the Bush administration had launched an invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein for his supposed weapons of mass destruction — and that Bush had named North Korea alongside Iraq as part of the "axis of evil," perhaps contributing to North Korea's desire for a nuclear deterrent.

2006: North Korea tests its first nuclear weapon


Full text of the article at vox.com

-------

"They're on our left, they're on our right, they're in front of us, they're behind us...they can't get away this time." -- Col. Puller, USMC

GreyLmist  posted on  2017-05-03   13:05:51 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  


#2. To: All (#1)

1994: The Clinton administration makes a deal with North Korea

2001: Bush takes office, US policy shifts

2006: North Korea tests its first nuclear weapon


Full text of the article at vox.com

http://www2.gsu.edu/~poljsd/4460/Balance%20Sheet%20Cirincione.pdf

Page 1

1 LESSONS OF THE IRAQ WAR: HOW THE BUSH DOCTRINE MADE PROLIFERATION WORSE

by JOSEPH CIRINICIONE


Before the War

From the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945 until start of the Iraq War, efforts by the United States and most other nations to prevent the use and spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons rested on a combination of international agreements, alliance systems and security commitments. Treaties prohibiting or limiting these weapons were coupled with export controls to limit key technologies, positive security assurances to defend nations that did not acquire these weapons and threats to retaliate against those that would dare use such weapons. In the jargon of international relation theorists, this means that for most of the past six decades policies and programs have been based on a “liberal internationalist” view of the world, coupled with a realist understanding of national interests and the importance of military force.

This approach enjoyed broad bipartisan support. After amassing arsenals far in excess of any rational security need, American presidents focused on eliminating the enormous stockpiles through treaty constraints. The weapons themselves were seen as the problem: as long as they existed, they would be used. “The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us, ” President John F. Kennedy declared before the United Nations in September, 1961. “The mere existence of modern weapons…is a source of horror and discord and distrust.” 1 This belief led Kennedy to start, Lyndon Johnson to complete, and Richard Nixon to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty bound the nuclear powers to eventual disarmament while non-nuclear states agreed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons.

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Failure with North Korea

In October 2002, a U.S. official confronted North Korea with evidence of a covert uranium-enrichment program, a clear violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. After angry denunciations, North Korea relented, admitting to violating the Agreed Framework and offering to negotiate a new agreement to give up its program. The Bush administration refused to meet with North Korea, demanding unilateral concessions before talks could begin (a similar tactic being used against Iran currently). North Korea offered to put everything on the negotiating table, not just their enrichment program, but administration officials remained unbending in their demands. While the U.S. had effectively blocked diplomacy with both Iran and North Korea, it was unable to mount any credible policy to replace the status quo. U.S. forces were bogged down in an increasingly violent insurgency, sapping the main tool of the Bush Doctrine, U.S. military might. After confronting North Korea in 2002, the administration policy floundered. The U.S. stood aside as the North abandoned the Agreed Framework and kicked out international inspectors.

In 2005, the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and North Korea negotiated a pact to end North Korea’s nuclear program. The chief US negotiator at the talks, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, praised the agreement as a “win-win situation.” Indeed, all successful negotiations have to be so. The parties must be able to leave the table declaring victory and returning to their countries and peoples with tangible achievements.

On the heels of this agreement, the United States froze significant amounts of North Korea’s assets, North Korea objected and the original Six Party talk agreement collapsed. The squeeze move was enough to infuriate the North Koreans—and convince some that the US was intent on ending the regime, not ending the nuclear program—but not enough to force them to capitulate. Instead, North Korea upped the ante, refused to come back to the talks and proceeded step by step to a nuclear test, proving its capability to the world.

Reversing Course

The nuclear test broke the bureaucratic logjam in Washington. Pragmatic realists threw their weight behind diplomacy, working with the North’s neighbors to force it back to the negotiating table. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Hill forged an international united front to isolate North Korea and then followed up with the direct talks with North Korea organized by China. Beijing stepped up to the plate, too, cutting off oil supplies and talking tough with the Kim regime in the days prior to direct talks between Hill and his North Korean counterpart, vice foreign minister Kim Gye-gwan.

Finally, in February, 2007 an agreement was reached with North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, verifiably dismantle it and provide the U.S. with information on all its past proliferation activities. In return, the North Koreans got a security guarantee from the United States, aid, and the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries if North Korea compiled with eh agreement. Thus, the administration policy that ended this crisis was the exact opposite of the policy prescription of the Bush Doctrine.

North Korea was not invaded and Kim Jong Il was not deposed. Carrots and sticks were used to press the North Koreans into granting major concessions, allowing unprecedented international access to their nuclear program. The shift was part of an overall swing in the administration toward a centrist pragmatism. The Washington Post concluded “the fist-shaking that characterized much of the first six years of the Bush administration’s North Korea policy has been replaced by a dogged insistence on negotiations and by offers of aid and other concessions—contingent on verified moves to get rid of nuclear facilities.” 45

Neoconservatives attempted to strike the deal dead, with John Bolton leading the charge, calling the Six-Party agreement a “bad deal.” 46 The National Review editors questioned whether any deal could be reached with Kim John Il and Elliott Abrams, a deputy national security adviser, sent angry comments to fellow officials in Washington, questioning the deal. 47 However, the deal, while obviously not perfect, is on its way to reversing the damage done by years of U.S. disengagement with the North. A closer look at the various elements contributing to this apparent nonproliferation success with North Korea provides a clearer understanding of both the policy reversal and the broader policy trends.

The first element was the situation of North Korea itself. A poor, isolated country that produces little save fear and tyranny, it was in a weak strategic position. The multilateral sanctions and economic incentives clearly played a part in the decision of the Korean leadership to compromise.

Second was the unanimity of the other five nations in the six-party talks. All five wanted to stop a nuclear-armed North Korea from emerging. Their tactics differed, but were united in their efforts to stop Pyongyang from trying to perfect the flawed nuclear device it tested in October 2006. That unity extended to the unanimous declaration of the Security Council condemning North Korea and imposing sanctions on the regime after its October nuclear test.

The third element contributing to the shift was the more assertive role played by China. The October 9 test surprised and angered China, upsetting its greater strategic plans. China does not want North Korea destabilizing its borders or provoking Japan, and that is just what happened after the test. Japan started a public debate over whether they should get their own nuclear weapons—the last thing China wants. State Counselor Tang Jiaxuan, China’s third highest-ranking official, quickly visited Pyongyang to deliver a message asserting China’s displeasure directly to North Korean leaders. China cannot dictate North Korea’s actions, but the pressure brought a halt to North Korean nuclear tests and an agreement to return to negotiations. China also convinced the United States to come to the table, choreographing talks in Beijing that produced the first of several breakthrough bilateral sessions.

Fourth was the power shift in Congress as a result of the November 2006 elections. The Democratic control of Congress flipped the pressures on the Bush administration, with immediate effect. Shortly after the elections, at a November House International Relations Committee hearing still under Republican rule, members led by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) hammered Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns over the failed administration policy, cajoling him into engaging in direct talks with North Korea.

Fifth was the change in Defense Department leadership. Donald Rumsfeld, an ardent opponent of direct negotiations with North Korea, resigned as defense secretary, and was replaced by pragmatist Robert Gates, who is more inclined to engage in the direct negotiations previously seen as appeasement. Vice President Dick Cheney alone among the senior ranks remained opposed to dealing with Pyongyang—and he was distracted with the trial of his former aide Scooter Libby, which threatened to implicate him in a scandal that had exposed a covert CIA agent’s identity.

Sixth, the political fortunes of the president of the United States had deteriorated. In the end, it was the president’s call: deal or no deal. Formerly, President Bush lined up with Cheney, Rumsfeld, and UN Ambassador Bolton, but with these officials gone and badly in need of some success for his beleaguered administration, the president tilted toward pragmatism. North Korea was one of the few possibilities for a foreign policy victory during the remainder of his term.

The North Korea agreement shares key similarities with the deal struck between the U.S. and Libya, and offers similar lessons for future policy.

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"They're on our left, they're on our right, they're in front of us, they're behind us...they can't get away this time." -- Col. Puller, USMC

GreyLmist  posted on  2017-05-03   13:55:42 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  


#3. To: All (#2)

WHO GAVE NORTH KOREA NUKES IN THE FIRST PLACE? by Paul Joseph Watson - infowars.com April 12, 2013

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"They're on our left, they're on our right, they're in front of us, they're behind us...they can't get away this time." -- Col. Puller, USMC

GreyLmist  posted on  2017-05-03   14:04:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  


#4. To: Ada (#0)

I submit that it is the collective memory of all of what I’ve described that animates North Korea’s policies toward the US today which has nuclear weapons on constant alert and stations almost 30,000 forces at the ready. Remember, a state of war still exists and has since 1953. While South Korea received heavy American investment in the industries fleeing the United States in search of cheaper labor and new markets it was nevertheless ruled until quite recently by military dictatorships scarcely different than those of the north. For its part the north constructed its economy along five-year plans and collectivized its agriculture. While it never enjoyed the sort of consumer society that now characterizes some of South Korea, its GDP grew substantially until the collapse of communism globally brought about the withdrawal of all foreign aid to north Korea.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as some American policymakers took note of the north’s growing weakness Secretary of Defense Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz talked openly of using force finally to settle the question of Korean reunification and the claimed threat to international peace posed by North Korea.

In 1993 the Clinton Administration discovered that North Korea was constructing a nuclear processing plant and also developing medium range missiles. The Pentagon desired to destroy these facilities but that would mean wholesale war so the administration fostered an agreement whereby North Korea would stand down in return for the provision of oil and other economic aid. When in 2001, after the events of 9-11, the Bush II neo-conservatives militarized policy and declared North Korea to be an element of the “axis of evil.” All bets were now off. In that context North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, reasoning that nuclear weapons were the only way possible to prevent a full scale attack by the US in the future. Given a stark choice between another war with the US and all that would entail this decision seems hardly surprising. Under no circumstances could any westerner reasonably expect, after all the history I’ve described, that the North Korean regime would simply submit to any ultimatums by the US, by far the worst enemy Korea ever had measured by the damage inflicted on the entirety of the Korean peninsula.

[Article source: Why Does North Korea Want Nukes? - counterpunch.org April 21, 2017]

Condensed reprint of Post #1 to remove text duplication:

A brief history of North Korea's nuclear program and the failed US campaign to stop it - vox.com Jan 7, 2016

Very late on Tuesday, North Korea claimed that it had tested a hydrogen bomb, an especially powerful type of nuclear weapon. Experts are skeptical that the North Koreans actually detonated a full hydrogen bomb, but the evidence does suggest that some kind of smaller nuclear weapon went off.

To understand why North Korea would do this, why it even has a nuclear program, and what this program means for it and the world, you need to understand the history of North Korea's program: where it came from and how it's changed over the years. So here's a brief guide to that program, written to help you put Tuesday's test in context.

1991: The collapse of the Soviet Union

From the division of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of North Korea in 1945 up until 1991, Moscow was its ally and sponsor. The Soviets provided North Korea with huge amounts of economic aid and security assistance, propping up the country. As a superpower patron, the Soviet also provided North Korea with diplomatic and military support.

So when the Soviet Union began collapsing in 1989, and ultimately dissolved in 1991, North Korea was left a precarious position. China filled in the void somewhat, but the North knew that China had no real affection for it and so wouldn't provide the same level of protection as the Soviet Union did.

This is why Johns Hopkins's Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn date the origins of North Korea's modern nuclear program to 1989 (the regime had done nuclear research as early as the 1950s).

"With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost its main protector. Its turn to developing nuclear weapons made a lot of sense," Keir Lieber, a professor at Georgetown who has studied the thinking behind North Korea's nuclear program, told me. "What does it have that can counter conventional US power? The answer is obvious: nuclear weapons."

1994: The Clinton administration makes a deal with North Korea

The international crisis over North Korea's nuclear program has been around almost as long as North Korea's modern nuclear program. In March 1993, the country announced it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bars non-nuclear states from starting nuclear weapons programs. A month later, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it could no longer verify that North Korea was using its nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

The Clinton administration sat down with North Korea to try to negotiate a deal that would prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1994, the US and North Korea announced [an arms control] deal called the Agreed Framework. North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear reactors and accept wide-ranging inspections in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions from the United States.

From North Korea's point of view, this was a way to take advantage of its nuclear program without actually building nukes. "Pyongyang chose to capitalize on the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons by accepting crippling limits on its plutonium-based fissile material program in return for a better relationship with the United States that would diminish external security threats," Wit and Ahn explain.

But the deal was far from an inevitable success. In order for it to work, North Korea had to continue believing that adhering to the deal was a better way to protect North Korea's security interests than flouting it would be. And this didn't last forever.

1994–1998: North Korea's famine and the Songun policy

In 1994, North Korea's longtime dictator Kim Il Sung died and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il. At the same time, North Korea suffered a famine so severe that much of the population died. (Reliable estimates of the famine's death toll are hard to come by, but estimates range between 600,000 and 2.5 million during the '90s.). The collapse in Soviet aid and trade after 1991, together with a series of droughts and floods in the early '90s, collapsed North Korea's food provision system. What happened next is very important to understanding North Korea, and the nuclear program in particular.

Faced with a question of how to secure the North Korean state in the wake of the Soviet collapse, new leader Kim Jong Il developed something called the Songun, or military-first, doctrine. Songun differed from previous North Korean ideology in that it put the military at the heart of the North Korean state.

Under Songun, "the military is not just an institution designed to perform the function of defending the country from external hostility," South Korean scholar Han S. Park writes. "Instead, it provides all of the other institutions of the government with legitimacy."

On this theory, North Koreans' dire poverty is a necessary condition of the state's strength, not a problem. The military needs everything society has to offer in order to protect North Korea from outsiders; civilians' sacrifices are necessary to preserve the state that protects them.

The practical effect of Songun was that the military got all resources first — including rations during the famine while the rest of North Korea starved.

What does this have to do with the nuclear program? It illustrates just how central militarism became to North Korean strategic doctrine — and because the state thus needed an external threat to justify Songun and the civilian sacrifices it called for. The Kim regime clearly concluded that even in the face of utter economic calamity, fully funding the military was the key to the regime's continued survival. Convincing the people that the military was their savior, not economic or social reform, would allow the North Korean regime to stay in place.

That explains why the North, in the coming years, became so attached to the idea of a nuclear weapon. If the nation's legitimacy depended on the vitality of its military, then acquiring the world's most powerful military weapon became important for more than just foreign policy reasons. It was also a way to show the North Korean people that their military was a powerful protector they could count on for their security.

1998: North Korea tests a long-range missile

In November 2015, North Korea fired a test missile of a new type, called the Taepodong-1 — over Japan. This new missile's maximum range was roughly twice that of the North's next-biggest weapon, the Rodong.

This kind of medium-range missile could potentially hold a nuclear payload, if North Korea figured out how to both build and then miniaturize a nuclear bomb. As such, the international community saw this as a profound provocation: Testing a nuclear-capable weapon at a time when negotiations over North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs were still ongoing suggested a clear lack of intent to adhere to the deal's spirit and perhaps letter.

The Taepodong-1 test reveals two important things about the North Korean program. First, North Korea is quite willing to provoke the West when it wants to, even if it jeopardizes international negotiations. This could be either because North Korea is trying to extract concessions or simply because it wants to strengthen its military; scholars disagree. But the point is that it's not obvious how committed North Korea ever was to good-faith negotiations.

"Even in 1994, there's still a question as to whether North Korea was ever committed to abiding by the Agreed Framework," Lieber told me.

Second, North Korea lies about its technological capabilities — a lot. North Korean state media claimed the Taepodong launch put a satellite into orbit; independent data suggested no such satellite reached orbit. It looked like North Korea had tried to send up a satellite, but the object had most likely been blown up when its own fuel tank exploded.

This may seem ridiculous, given that it's easy to verify whether North Korea is lying about stuff like this. But it actually makes a certain amount of sense: North Korea maintains a really tight grip on the media domestically. Exaggerating its military strength helps make the military stronger, thus solidifying the regime's legitimacy in Songun terms.

2001: Bush takes office, US policy shifts

When George W. Bush became president, America's North Korea policy shifted dramatically. While the Clinton administration took an essentially carrot-and-stick approach to North Korea's nuclear program — if you give them some stuff, and threaten other stuff, maybe you can shape their behavior — the Bush team disdained negotiations.

"At its outset, the Bush Administration was generally disinclined to test the incentives-for-denuclearization hypothesis that the Clinton team had explored," Evans J.R. Revere, a Korea expert at Brookings, writes. "Many in the new administration were convinced that North Korea had no intention of giving up its nuclear program at any price. Many were also opposed in principle to providing incentives or 'rewards' to North Korea, a regime they detested, even if this might yield some progress."

As a result, the Agreed Framework — always on tenuous footing given the nature of the North Korean regime — collapsed. "Before the end of 2002, North Korea removed the seals on the 5-megawatt reactor and other facilities at Yongbyon, evicted IAEA monitors, and began the process of restarting its nuclear weapons program," Revere explains.

According to Revere, some Bush officials internally advocated for renewing negotiations, and by 2003 they succeeded. The US and four other interested powers (South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia) — sat down with North Korea to discuss a nuclear agreement. They made some progress: In 2005, North Korea agreed in principle to give up its nuclear weapons program.

But the new agreement, unlike the Agreed Framework, didn't involve temporarily freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons while a final agreement was hashed out. As negotiations dragged on, North Korean research on a bomb continued.

You can read this one of two ways. You could say the Bush administration screwed up a good thing the Clinton team had put in place. Or you could say it showed that North Korea had entered negotiations in bad faith and was always going to pursue a bomb regardless.

Revere thinks it's the latter: "In retrospect, the US inability to attain [an end to the program] owes much more to North Korea’s dogged determination to possess nuclear weapons than to any other factor," he concludes.

It probably didn't help, though, that the Bush administration had launched an invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein for his supposed weapons of mass destruction — and that Bush had named North Korea alongside Iraq as part of the "axis of evil," perhaps contributing to North Korea's desire for a nuclear deterrent.

2006: North Korea tests its first nuclear weapon


Full text of the article at vox.com


Appending Post #2, excerpt source:

LESSONS OF THE IRAQ WAR: HOW THE BUSH DOCTRINE MADE PROLIFERATION WORSE
http://www2.gsu.edu/~poljsd/4460/Balance%20Sheet%20Cirincione.pdf


Appending Post #3, article source:

WHO GAVE NORTH KOREA NUKES IN THE FIRST PLACE? by Paul Joseph Watson - infowars.com April 12, 2013

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"They're on our left, they're on our right, they're in front of us, they're behind us...they can't get away this time." -- Col. Puller, USMC

GreyLmist  posted on  2017-05-16   12:51:31 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  


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