Transcript:
[…] Now I come to the main point of my speech tonight. One of the results of the July (2006) war is the establishment of a balance of deterrence in the struggle against the Israeli enemy, between Lebanon and the enemy entity. These equations, this balance… Of course, I am not talking about a balance of forces in terms of the number of our respective soldiers, our respective naval power or our respective air forces. That’s not what I’m talking about. I’m talking about a balance of deterrence, a balance of fear, a balance of terror. It’s a different kind of equation (than a strict balance of power).
For the past 16 years, that is, from 2006 to the present, Lebanon has enjoyed an excellent security situation with regard to the fight against the Israeli enemy, if we compare it to what used to happen before. The enemy has been unable to include Lebanon in its strategy of “the battle between wars” (conducting episodic strikes without starting a war, as it does in Syria), and Israel thinks a thousand times before taking any military action against Lebanon, knowing that there would be retaliation (from Hezbollah). That is why when Israel tries to do something (in Lebanon), it tries to carry out security operations (against Hezbollah) trying as much as possible not to leave any footprints, any traces (of its involvement). This achievement (of the Resistance) is still valid.