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Dead Constitution See other Dead Constitution Articles Title: NRA et al v. City of Chicago and a Permanent Remedy ANNALYSIS AND INTERPRETAION OF ILLINOIS FIREARM LAW & REMEDY “The very essence of slavery is, to put a man defenceless into the hands of another.” -SLAVERY by William E. Channing (pg. 17) After careful review of ILLINOIS (1970) 430 ILCS 65 Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID) Affiant has observed that the subject matter of the act is commercial activity (not be confused with any natural right by any stretch of the imagination or legal theory): The term “transport” when used in the 430 ILCS 65 Firearm Owners Identification Card Act is synonymous with the terms "interstate or foreign commerce" Affiant has observed the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) has appeared to usurp, trespass upon or otherwise violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine as the power to regulate Interstate Commerce is exclusive to the Congress. Affiant believes the legislator of ILLINOIS (1970) has employed cleverly crafted terms of art to disguise or otherwise conceal the commercial nature or subject matter of FOID and the territorial relationship to the Federal Government. Affiant believes very few if any STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) Residents are actually engaged in the commercial activity of “interstate or foreign commerce” defined as transporting firearms in the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) FOID Act when Keeping and Bearing Arms. “The power to regulate commerce is exclusively in Congress and not in the States” - Eastern Motor Express v. United States, 103 Fed. Supra, 694 Appen. 73 S. Ct. 307, 344 U.S. 298. - " Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 p. 442 "An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Affiant believes that the FOID Act makes no claim to regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Arms and/or the Natural Right of Self Preservation (the clear subject matter of DC v Heller applying the same rational to two classes of citizens). If it were the instant case claiming the regulatory authority over the natural right of self preservaion, the FOID Act would clearly say so and it does not. Affiant believes the legislator of ILLINOIS (1970) has used cleverly crafted terms of art to disguise or otherwise conceal the nature or subject matter of FOID by the use of terms of art and obfuscation. Affiant believes that the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) has obfuscated the commercial nature of FOID as a cleverly crafted method for the purpose oppressing STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) and the CHICAGO CORPORATION’S Residents under the color of law1 and as special law2. In Hertado v. California, 110 US 516, the U.S Supreme Court states very plainly: "The state cannot diminish rights of the people." And in Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldw 60, "Statutes that violate the plain and obvious principles of common right and common reason are null and void." "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491. "The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller v. US, 230 F 486, at 489. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." Sherer v. Cullen, 481 F 946 “The Act exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause authority. First, although this Court has upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have such a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) Article Six of the U.S. Constitution: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary not one word withstanding." Affiant also believes the 430 ILCS 65 Firearm Owners Identification Card Act territorial jurisdiction claim to be limited to the Territorial Jurisdiction claim found within the definitions section of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 USC Sec. 921) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) and is identical to The State of Illinois definition of “State” found at 5 ILCS 70 Statute on Statutes. To wit: GENERAL PROVISIONS(5 ILCS 70/) Statute on Statutes. (5 ILCS 70/0.01) (from Ch. 1, par. 1000) Sec. 0.01. Short title. This Act may be cited as the Statute on Statutes. (Source: P.A. 86 4; 86 451.) (5 ILCS 70/1.14) (from Ch. 1, par. 1015) Sec. 1.14. "State," when applied to different parts of the United States, may be construed to include the District of Columbia and the several territories, and the words "United States" may be construed to include the said district and territories. (Source: Laws 1945, p. 1717.) Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The express mention of one thing excludes all others) Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. Noscitur a sociis (A word is known by the company it keeps) When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute. Ejusdem generis (Of the same kinds, class, or nature) When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where "cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles" are mentioned, the word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense (therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes). [Note: all fifty federal territorial states share the same territorial jurisdiction within their Statutes and/or codes] Affiant believes the legislator of ILLINOIS (1970) has used cleverly crafted terms of art to disguise or otherwise conceal the exclusive Federal Territorial jurisdictional claim defined in FOID by employing terms of art and obfuscation. Affiant believes the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) Legislator acts under the color of law by when citing the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 the employing carefully crafted constructive fraud to deceive ILLINOIS (1970) Residents giving them reason to believe FOID is enforceable within the De jure Union State of Illinois (1818) when in fact it is not and never has been. Affiant believes ILLINOIS (1970) Residents enter the federal territorial jurisdiction when they agree to License under FOID, apply for Social Security benefits, Drivers Licensing etc. (all sharing the same federal territorial jurisdiction). Regarding the matter “the appearance of reality for reality itself” or the appearance of “one territorial jurisdiction” (STATE OF ILLINOIS 1970) appearing to be superimposed upon another (Incorporated Union state of Illinois 1818) a careful review of the example of the same given below in Downes v Bidwell 182 U.S. 244 (1901) is in order. In this instant case the federal jurisdiction (Federal Zone of the District of Columbia) is superimposed (like a transparency) over Virginia and Maryland. Does one Jurisdiction (District of Columbia being Federal) void or otherwise nullify the other(s) it overlays or otherwise superimposed upon being the incorporated states of the Union? Absolutely not and the Supreme Court explains exactly why in Downes v Bidwell (See also the Insular Cases) this is so: “There could be no doubt as to the correctness of this conclusion, so far, at least, as it applied to the District of Columbia. This District had been a part of the states of Maryland and [182 U.S. 244, 261] Virginia. It had been subject to the Constitution, and was a part of the United States. The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably. There are steps which can never be taken backward. The tie that bound the states of Maryland and Virginia to the Constitution could not be dissolved, without at least the consent of the Federal and state governments to a formal separation. The mere cession of the District of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished the authority of the states, but it did not take it out of the United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution. Neither party had ever consented to that construction of the cession. If, before the District was set off, Congress had passed an unconstitutional act affecting its inhabitants, it would have been void. If done after the District was created, it would have been equally void; in other words, Congress could not do indirectly, by carving out the District, what it could not do directly. The District still remained a part of the United States, protected by the Constitution. Indeed, it would have been a fanciful construction to hold that territory which had been once a part of the United States ceased to be such by being ceded directly to the Federal government.” (Downs v Bidwell 182 U.S. 244 (1901)) Affiant believes the personal jurisdiction claim of FOID to be exclusive to Fourteenth Amendment citizens whom are presumed to be engaged in commercial activity. Affiant denies being such citizen and has no reason to believe the 14th Amendment was lawfully amended into the Constitution of the United States of America (1787). Affiant believes that if THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) Legislator possessed inherent authority to regulate the commercial transportation of firearms (or any other Federal Commercial Licensing scheme) the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) Legislators would have no need to cite the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 as authority to act. Affiant’s beliefs regarding the “lack of inherent authority” to enforce Federal Licensing schemes within the Incorporated Union state of Illinois (1818) (defined in attached Enabling Acts) are in agreement with constitutional law professors George D. Braden and Rubin G. Cohn. Their Biographical data is found in THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION; AN ANNOTATED and COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS by George D. Braden and Rubin G. Cohn at pg. xiii (1969). Mr. Braden and Mr. Rubin were tasked by the STATE OF ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION in September of 1969 (See attached STATE OF ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION letter dated September 1969 for Conventioneer listing after cover page) to provide a detailed study of the then current Constitution of Illinois (1870) with recommendations for changes for the new Constitution for THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970). This is what Law Professors Braden and Ruben had to say regarding the instant matter of Federal Licensing schemes being 100% unenforceable within the fifty Incorporated Union states: “In Jewell v. Carpentier (22 III. 2d 145 (1961)), an ingenious argument was offered to the effect that because Article I defined the "boundaries and jurisdiction" of the state, an Illinois driver's license could not be suspended on the basis of an accident occurring in Indiana. The Supreme Court gave the argument short shrift. In fact, the argument could have been made equally well in the absence of the word "jurisdiction'' in Article 1 and equally well in the absence of a Boundaries Article. The problem in the case was whether Illinois could exercise jurisdiction inside its own boundaries in the manner in which it acted. (Emphasis added) [The above reference of “short shrift” by the Illinois Supreme Court was made because Jewel did in fact have a License and had agreed to participate in a constructive fraud. In short, Jewel was “Ashwandered”, see The Ashwander rules, articulated by Justice Brandeis, are a set of principles used by the United States Supreme Court for avoiding constitutional rulings. Rule 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.](See Jewell v. Carpentier (22 III. 2d 145 ((1961)) as Exhibit ?????) Affiant believes that THE ILLINOIS STATE (1970) Legislator has no authority to act, pass legislation, or regulate commerce within Illinois (1818) in the manner in which FOID is acted (See Enabling Act defining Affiant’s state of Illinois as on equal footing with original states of the Union, defining territorial jurisdiction, etc as Exhibit ?????). Affiant believes that Respondent’s STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) is foreign to Affiant’s state of Illinois (1818) in the same sense that the “United States”, which means a federal corporation (28 USCA §3002(15)(A))is foreign to the state of Illinois (1818). Affiant also believes Respondent’s STATE OF ILLINOIS (1818) is a federal subdivision and/or territory of the District of Columbia. Affiant believes this because Respondent’s STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) does not politically recognize state Citizens or Citizens of a State (collectively known as WE THE PEOPLE), does not have a state Militia, no longer Republican in Nature, does not share the same territorial jurisdiction claim found in Enabling Acts etc. Should Respondents believe that Affiant is incorrect in his beliefs, please provide evidence that rebuts Affiant’s understanding of the matter. Affiant observes that the CHICAGO Corporation also relies on FOID for authority to ban their Resident’s Natural Right of Self Preservation in the same manner as THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) and has done so in the cruelest of fashions. Affiant believes that the CHICAGO CORPORATION is acting outside the spirit and letter of DC v Heller which clearly defines the Right to Keep and Bear Arms as the Natural Right of Self Preservation. Affiant also believes that the CHICAGO CORPORATION shares the same “legal plane” as the District of Columbia and therefore subject to the District of Columbia’s jurisdiction regardless of any 14th Amendment incorporation theory. Affiant believes that a condition of Apartheid exists within the CHICAGO Corporations alleged city limits as City Officials, City Enforcement Officers and the “well connected” enjoy the Natural Right of Self Preservation and the Residents do not. Affiant believes that CHICAGO CORPORATION’S Residents are denied this natural right under Special Law expressed as an Ordinance(as Elected Officials and Enforcement Officers are exempted) and have done so under the color of law by the use of constructive fraud. Affiant also observes the circumstance of Tyranny defined in DC v Heller as one and the same within the Community of STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) and CHICAGO CORP’S Residence. "The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22, at 24 Affiant has carefully reviewed the findings found in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 404 (1856) and draws several parallels or similarities as the instant matter applies to the Slaves defined in Dred Scot v. Stamford 19 How. 404 (1856)and the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970)/CHICAGO CORP.’s Residents. “And it appears by the case of Crandall v. The State, reported in 10 Conn. Rep., 340, that upon an information filed against Prudence Crandall for a violation of this law, one of the points raised in the defence was, that the law was a violation of the Constitution of the United States; and that the persons instructed, although of the African race, were citizens of other States, and therefore entitled to the rights and privileges of citizens in the State of Connecticut. But Chief Justice Dagget, before whom the case was tried, held, that persons of that description were not citizens of a State, within the meaning of the word citizen in the Constitution of the United States, and were not therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in other States.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 404 (1856) NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. CITY OF CHICAGO AND VILLAGE OF OAK PARK, Respondents.Nos. 08-1497 and 08-1521 WILSON- “This Court has repeatedly held that Bill of Rights provisions are not imposed upon the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Court first construed the Fourteenth Amendment phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” in the seminal Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). The Court ruled that this Clause includes only those rights that “are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State.” Id. at 80. These national citizenship rights include the right to “free access to its seaports,” to “use the navigable waters,” to “peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,” and to “become a citizen of any state.” Id. at 79-80. In Presser, the Court held that a pre-existing right like the Second Amendment right “to keep and bear arms” is not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship because it is not “in any manner dependent upon [the Constitution] for its existence.” –City of Chicago/Village of Oak Park (Respondents) “is not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship because it is not “in any manner dependent upon [the Constitution] for its existence.” –City of Chicago/Village of Oak Park (Respondents) Affiant understands the statement above made by City of Chicago’s Attorneys to mean that a commercial relationship exists between the Federal Government and 14th citizens. This relationship is not dependent upon the Constitution and is thus contractual. Affiant understands this to mean an American becomes a 14th Amendment citizen by accepting Social Security and other Federal Benefits that are “outside” the Federal Government’s 17 enumerated powers. Affiant observes that the citizenship classification Citizen of a State remains “outside the fray” as Affiant’s natural rights pre-exists any Constitution as they are God Given and Unalienable and may not be taken without due process of law. Affiant does not accept and is otherwise ineligible to receive Social Security or any other of the Federal Governments 40 benefits because of Citizenship status. Affiant observes there is only one remedy for those Americans that are bound by 14th Amendment 2nd Class citizen status and do not wish to remain so burdened. First it should be noted that today’s modern states do not have a “State Citizen” eligibility Clauses (only Resident status is recognized as the modern States function as Territories (See A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1867) by Joel Tiffany at Chapter titled GOVERNMENT OF THE STATES for characteristics of a Federal Territory v that of a State of the Union). This being said, nothing can stop this citizen from exercising his natural right of Political Self Determination (ancient and forgotten as was the natural right of self preservation) by declaring himself a Citizen of a State and acting within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Illinois (1818) and refusing ALL FEDERAL BENEFITS. This act of self determination (rights are not self effectuating and no court can give one what they didn’t have in the first place) of course would mitigate or otherwise nullify the controversy now before the Supreme Court (no 14th Amendment citizens .. no controversy). Affiant observes the condition (14th Amendment status) as a condition that is voluntary (no one can be forced into this status), see attached Did the “Fourteenth Amendment Do Away with State Citizenship” by Daniel Joseph Goodman (the answer of course is absolutely not). Affiant observes that if one may expatriate from a nation (certainly not recommending this), then one could just as easily Politically Self Determine out from ILLINOIS (1970) & Chicago Resident status (by severing legal and political relationships) without having to back a bag. Affiant believes that the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) and the CHICAGO CORPORATION have the distinguished reputation of being the most restrictive in this Nation as the instant matter relates to Firearm Legislation. Affiant understands this to mean the STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) and the CHICAGO CORPORATION as the most oppressive in today’s modern American States operating under federal territorial municipal law. Affiant believes this circumstance is beneath the dignity of those whom represent these privately owned concerns (see Dun & Bradstreet Inc. at http://www.dnb.com/us/). “Constitutions bind governments and never the natural rights of the people, statutes bind people while presuming commercial activity where there is none.” –Affiant Respectfully Submitted, Patrick Henry
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