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Title: I need Supreme Court Scholarly Help.
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Published: Feb 21, 2010
Author: me
Post Date: 2010-02-21 23:41:01 by Critter
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Views: 309
Comments: 33

My kid has a history assignment and we are at a loss for a good topic for her.

The assignment has her writing about a Supreme Court decision that has directly impacted her life.

Maybe I'm just brain dead, but I can't think of anything good at the moment. She wants something very controversial, something that might rub a bunch of nanny state sissies the wrong way. I love my kid. :)

Can anyone suggest something?

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#1. To: Critter (#0)

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a state statute denying funding for education to children who were illegal immigrants. The Court found that where states limit the rights afforded to people based on their status as aliens, this limitation must be examined under an intermediate scrutiny standard to determine whether it furthers a substantial goal of the State.

he who wants bread is the servant of the man that will feed him, if a man thus feeds a whole people, they are under his control.

DeaconBenjamin  posted on  2010-02-21   23:54:12 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

But how would that directly affect my kid, who is legal, in a school with very few if any illegals?

This is one tough assignment. :)

Critter  posted on  2010-02-21   23:58:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Gideon vs. Wainwright: guaranteed a defendant's right to legal counsel. The Supreme Court overturned the Florida felony conviction of Clarence Earl Gideon, who had defended himself after having been denied a request for free counsel. The Court held that the state's failure to provide counsel for a defendant charged with a felony violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Gideon was given another trial, and with a court-appointed lawyer defending him, he was acquitted.

Miranda v. Arizona: was another case that helped define the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. At the center of the case was Ernesto Miranda, who had confessed to a crime during police questioning without knowing he had a right to have an attorney present. Based on his confession, Miranda was convicted. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, ruling that criminal suspects must be warned of their rights before they are questioned by police. These rights are: the right to remain silent, to have an attorney present, and, if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, to have one appointed by the state. The police must also warn suspects that any statements they make can be used against them in court. Miranda was retried without the confession and convicted.

These cases impact all US citizens.......

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   0:50:11 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

This one is quite controversial AND impacts student speech:

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) was a school speech case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not prevent educators from suppressing student speech, at a school-supervised event, that is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.

Background. In 2002, high school principal Deborah Morse suspended 18-year-old Joseph Frederick after he displayed a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" across the street from the school during the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay. Frederick sued, claiming his constitutional rights to free speech were violated. His suit was dismissed by the federal district court, but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Frederick's speech rights were violated.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   0:56:28 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"

lol

wudidiz  posted on  2010-02-22   0:58:21 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d. 731 (1969) In this seminal case considering the First Amendment rights of students (John F. Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and Mary Beth Tinker) who were expelled after they wore black armbands to school in symbolic protest of the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court held that students "do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate" and that the First Amendment protects public school students' rights to express political and social views.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) In this case the Supreme Court held that burning the United States flag was a protected form of symbolic political speech, concluding that there is no legitimate government interest in protecting the U.S.flag where the sole act in question is destroying the flag in its symbolic capacity. "A bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment is that Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Right to Privacy and Anonymity

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 55, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969) A man found to possess obscene materials in his home for his private use was convicted of possessing obscene materials in violation of the state laws of Georgia. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one's privacy on the grounds that the government "cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."

McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d. 426 (1995) The Supreme Court struck down a state law banning distribution of anonymous campaign literature, emphasizing the long tradition of anonymous and pseudonymous political and literary speech and recognizing the right to exercise First Amendment rights anonymously as an "honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent."

Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. Sup. Ct., 2002) The Colorado Supreme Court reversed a court decision that required Denver's Tattered Cover Book Store to turn over information about books purchased by one of its customers. As part of an investigation, officers of the City of Thornton (Colo.) discovered two books on the manufacture of amphetamines in a suspect's residence and found a Tattered Cover mailer in the garbage. The officers, seeking to tie the books to the suspect directly, served a Drug Enforcement Agency subpoena on the Tattered Cover. The subpoena demanded the title of the books corresponding to the order and invoice numbers of the mailer, as well as information about all other books ever ordered by the suspect. The Tattered Cover then brought suit to litigate the validity of the search warrant. The court began its opinion by stating that both the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution protect an individual's fundamental right to purchase books anonymously, free from governmental interference.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   1:10:18 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

www.guncite.com/gc2ndsup.html

The Supreme Court (District of Columbia Et al. v. Heller) holds in part:

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Read the Court's opinion (and dissents).

Link to plaintiff's counsel with case background info.

++++++++

more 2A cases listed on that site.

christine  posted on  2010-02-22   1:22:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

what about Roe v Wade? that's controversial.

christine  posted on  2010-02-22   1:23:29 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

There were the two flag salute cases, this goes back more than 60 years.

Shoonra  posted on  2010-02-22   1:41:28 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

one of my favorites screeds is 'woe to you lawyers' written by law professor fred rodell about a century ago. he was 'taught' by many of the 'supreme justices' and he calls the whole thing a pig-latin type dog and pony show scam. it is a must read and he cov ers many supreme court cases in his essay. free on the web.

"if I have all faith so as to move mountains, but do not have love, I am nothing." 1 Cor 12:31—13:13
"I don't know where Bin Laden is. I truly am not that concerned about him"
George W, Bush, 3/13/02 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html

Artisan  posted on  2010-02-22   1:45:18 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

what about Roe v Wade? that's controversial.

LOL that's the one that came to my mind.

"With respect to the words general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creators."
James Madison, Letter to James Robertson, April 20, 1831

farmfriend  posted on  2010-02-22   1:45:26 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Here's a humdinger that deems term limits for CONgressmen unconstitutional:

In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), a 5-4 U.S. Supreme Court held that term limits on Arkansas congressmen were unconstitutional because they added a condition to eligibility not found in the Qualifications Clauses. In other words, the Court held that the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. Justice Stevens held that:

Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended. Justice Anthony Kennedy provided the pivotal fifth vote in a concurrence that emphasized federalism. He wrote:

There can be no doubt, if we are to respect the republican origins of the Nation and preserve its federal character, that there exists a federal right of citizenship, a relationship between the people of the Nation and their National Government, with which the States may not interfere. Because the Arkansas enactment intrudes upon this federal domain, it exceeds the boundaries of the Constitution.

That one ranks high in my Supreme Court Crapper list.........

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   1:48:53 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

One more high ranking all time crapper of a decision by the highest court in the land:

Kelo v. City of New London (2005) was a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld a taking by government of private property (someone's home) in order to give the property to a private corporation.[1] This decision federalized the recent state expansion of the concept of eminent domain from the limitation of "public use" (e.g., build a new courthouse or highway) to a much broader "public purpose" (e.g., obtain more tax revenue from a new business).

This decision opened the floodgates to any town that wants to increase tax revenues by taking people's homes and giving the property to big corporations that will pay increased taxes to the town. While the town has to pay "just compensation" for the property taken, that amount is rarely what the homeowner feels would be fair.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   1:50:48 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

One of the most important of all time: Marbury v Madison 1803

Marbury v Madison at www.landmarkcases.org

"One of the least understood strategies of the world revolution now moving rapidly toward its goal is the use of mind control as a major means of obtaining the consent of the people who will be subjects of the New World Order." K.M. Heaton, The National Educator

Original_Intent  posted on  2010-02-22   2:00:58 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Actually I agree with that one. The text of the Constitution must be binding on the states as well as the Feral Government. To do otherwise invalidates the authority of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. I just wish the Supreme Court would so strictly enforce the exact provisions in other matters - such as the "Commerce Clause" which has been so distorted out of its original meaning as to be an "Open Sesame" for virtually any intrusion upon property rights and production of goods and services. The FDA's authority to regulate medical products is predicated upon the Commerce Clause.

"One of the least understood strategies of the world revolution now moving rapidly toward its goal is the use of mind control as a major means of obtaining the consent of the people who will be subjects of the New World Order." K.M. Heaton, The National Educator

Original_Intent  posted on  2010-02-22   2:05:54 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

I'd agree with binding in the other direction.......term limits for all states. IMHO, this nation wouldn't be in such a sorry state if all states had term limits instead of life terms for these cons who work for their corporate campaign donors and not for the people. If two terms is enough for a POTUS, it's more than enough for our representatives.

I think that if this decision went the other way, more states would have opted for term limits.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   2:16:50 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

That was a landmark case.......Then there was the decision that crapped on Marbury v Madison:

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), was a case in which the Little Rock school board tried to stop school desegregation. In deciding this, the Warren Court asserted that the federal judiciary and the U.S. Supreme Court was "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution." This went far beyond the Court's previous assertion in Marbury v. Madison that they merely had authority to exposit the Constitution. Rather, it asserted the Supreme Court had authority over the other two branches of government, which was unnecessary to the resolution of the dispute in that case.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   2:20:08 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

And the precedent for that was set in 1819 in McCulloch v Maryland wherein the Supreme Court asserted, and built upon Marbury, the right to enforce Federal edict in the states.

McColloch v Maryland

"One of the least understood strategies of the world revolution now moving rapidly toward its goal is the use of mind control as a major means of obtaining the consent of the people who will be subjects of the New World Order." K.M. Heaton, The National Educator

Original_Intent  posted on  2010-02-22   2:29:10 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

I'm all in favor of term limits, but it requires an Amendment to the Constitution.

"One of the least understood strategies of the world revolution now moving rapidly toward its goal is the use of mind control as a major means of obtaining the consent of the people who will be subjects of the New World Order." K.M. Heaton, The National Educator

Original_Intent  posted on  2010-02-22   2:30:13 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

A Supreme Court case decided in 1884 with but one dissent has had an ill effect on not only your daughter but everyone alive today. I have included Justice Fields dissent. And A Plea For The Constitution written by George Bancroft is available free online. It is about this case.

Julliard v. Greenman Judgment affirmed. [110 U.S. 421, 451]

FIELD, J., dissenting.

From the judgment of the court in this case, and from all the positions advanced in its support, I dissent. The question of the power of congress to impart the quality of legal tender to the notes of the United States, and thus make them money and a standard of value, is not new here. Unfortunately, it has been too frequently before the court, and its latest decision, previous to this one, has never been entirely accepted and approved by the country. Nor should this excite surprise; for whenever it is declared that this government, ordained to establish justice, has the power to alter the condition of contracts between private parties, and authorize their payment or discharge in something different from that which the parties stipulated, thus disturbing the relations of commerce and the business of the community generally, the doctrine will not and ought not to be readily accepted. There will be many who will adhere to the teachings and abide by the faith of their fathers So the question has come again, and will continue to come until it is settled so as to uphold, and not impair, the contracts of parties, to promote and not defeat justice.

If there be anything in the history of the constitution which can be established with moral certainty, it is that the framers of that instrument intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes both by the general government and by the states, and thus prevent interference with the contracts of private parties. During the revolution and the period of the old confederation, the continental congress issued bills of credit, and upon its recommendation the states made them a legal tender, and the refusal to receive them an extinguishment of the debts for which they were offered. They also enacted severe penalties against those who refused to accept them at their nominal value, as equal to coin, in exchange for commodities. And previously, as early as January, 1776, congress had declared that if any person should be 'so lost to all virtue and regard for his country' as to refuse to receive in payment the bills then issued, he should, on conviction thereof, be 'deemed, published, and treated as an enemy of his county, and pre- [110 U.S. 421, 452] cluded from all trade and intercourse with the inhabitants of the colonies.' Yet this legislation proved ineffectual; the universal law of currency prevailed, which makes promises of money valuable only as they are convertible into coin. The notes depreciated until they became valueless in the hands of their possessors. So it always will be; legislative declaration cannot make the promise of a thing the equivalent of the thing itself.

The legislation to which the states were thus induced to resort was not confined to the attempt to make paper money a legal tender for debts; but the principle that private contracts could be legally impaired, and their obligation disregarded, being once established, other measures equally dishonest and destructive of good faith between parties were adopted. What followed is thus stated by Mr. Justice STORY, in his Commentaries: 'The history, indeed,' he says, 'of the various laws which were passed by the states, in their colonial and independent character, upon this subject, is startling at once to our morals, to our patriotism, and to our sense of justice. Not only was paper money issued and declared to be a tender in payment of debts, but laws of another character, well known under the appellation of tender laws, appraisement laws, installment laws, and suspension laws, were from time to time enacted, which prostrated all private credit and all private morals. By some of these laws the due payment of debts was suspended; debts were, in violation of the very terms of the contract, authorized to be paid by installments at different periods; property of any sort, however worthless, either real or personal, might be tendered by the debtor in payment of his debts; and the creditor was compelled to take the property of the debtor, which he might seize on execution, at an appraisement wholly disproportionate to its known value. Such grievances and oppressions, and others of a like nature, were the ordinary results of legislation during the revolutionary war and the intermediate period down to the formation of the constitution. They entailed the most enormous evils on the country, and introduced a system of fraud, chicanery, and profligacy which destroyed all private confidence and all industry and enterprise.' Vol. 2, 1371. [110 U.S. 421, 453] To put an end to this vicious system of legislation which only encouraged fraud, thus graphically described by STORY, the clauses which forbid the states from emitting bills of credit or making anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, or passing any law imparing the obligation of contracts, were inserted in the constitution. 'The attention of the convention, therefore,' says Chief Justice MARSHALL, 'was particularly directed to paper money and to acts which enable the debtor to discharge his debt otherwise than was stipulated in the contract. Had nothing more been intended, nothing more would have been expressed, but, in the opinion of the convention, much more remained to be done. The same mischief might be effected by other means. To restore public confidence completely, it was necessary, not only to prohibit the use of particular means by which it might be effected, but to prohibit the use of any means by which the same mischief might be produced. The convention appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolable.' Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 206. It would be difficult to believe, even in the absence of the historical evidence we have on the subject, that the framers of the constitution, profoundly impressed by the evils resulting from this kind of legislation, ever intended that the new government, ordained to establish justice, should possess the power of making its bills a legal tender, which they were unwilling should remain with the states, and in which the past had proved so dangerous to the peace of the community, so disturbing to the business of the people, and so destructive of their morality.

The great historian of our country has recently given to the world a history of the convention, the result of years of labor in the examination of all public documents relating to its formation and of the recorded opinions of its framers; and thus he writes: 'With the full recollection of the need or seeming need of paper money in the revolution, with the menace of danger in future time of war from its prohibition, authority to issue bills of [110 U.S. 421, 454] credit that should be legal tender was refused to the general government by the vote of nine states against New Jersey and Maryland. It was Madison who decided the vote of Virginia, and he has left his testimony that 'the pretext for paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender, either for public or private debts, was cut off.' This is the interpretation of the clause made at the time of its adoption, alike by its authors and by its opponents, accepted by all the statesmen of that age, not open to dispute because too clear for argument, and never disputed so long as any one man who took part in framing the constitution remained alive. History cannot name a man who has gained enduring honor by causing the issue of paper money. Wherever such paper has been employed it has, in every case, thrown upon its authors the burden of exculpation under the plea of pressing necessity.' Bancroft's History of the formation of the constitution of the United States, vol. 2, p. 134. And when the convention came to the prohibition upon the states, the historian says that the clause, 'No state shall make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts,' was accepted without a dissentient state. 'So the adoption of the constitution,' he adds, 'is to be the end forever of paper money, whether issued by the several states or by the United States, if the constitution shall be rightly interpreted and honestly obeyed.' Id. 137.

For nearly three-quarters of a century after the adoption of the constitution, and until the legislation during the recent civil war, no jurist and no statesman of any position in the country ever pretended that a power to impart the quality of legal tender to its notes was vested in the general government. There is no recorded word of even one in favor of its possessing the power. All conceded, as an axiom of constitutional law, that the power did not exist.

Mr. Webster, from his first entrance into public life in 1812, gave great consideration to the subject of the currency, and in an elaborate speech on that subject, made in the senate in 1836, then sitting in this room, he said: [110 U.S. 421, 455] 'Currency, in a large and perhaps just sense, includes not only gold and silver and bank bills, but bills of exchange also. it may include all that adjusts exchanges and settles balances in the operations of trade and business; but if we understand by currency the legal money of the country, and that which constitutes a legal tender for debts, and is the standard measure of value, then undoubtedly nothing is included but gold and silver. Most unquestionably there is no legal tender, and there can be no legal tender in this country, under the authority of this government or any other, but gold and silver, either the coinage of our own mints or foreign coins at rates regulated by congress. This is a constitutional principle, perfectly plain and of the highest importance. The states are expressly prohibited from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; and although no such express prohibition is applied to congress, yet, as congress has no power granted to it in this respect but to coin money and to regulate the value of foreign coins, it clearly has no power to substitute paper or anything else for coin as a tender in payment of debts and in discharge of contracts. Congress has exercised this power fully in both its branches; it has coined money and still coins it; it has regulated the value of foreign coins, and still regulates their value. The legal tender, therefore, the constitutional standard of value, is established and cannot be overthrown. To overthrow it would shake the whole system.' 4 Webster's Works, 271.

When the idea of imparting the legal-tender quality to the notes of the United States, issued under the first act of 1862, was first broached, the advocates of the measure rested their support of it on the ground that it was a war measure, to which the country was compelled to resort by the exigencies of its condition, being then sorely pressed by the confederate forces, and requiring the daily expenditure of enormons sums to maintain its army and navy and to carry on the government. The representative who introduced the bill in the house declared that it was a measure of that nature, 'one of necessity and not of choice;' that the times were extraordinary; and that extraordinary measures must be resorted to in order to save our government and preserve our nationality. Speech of Spauld- [110 U.S. 421, 456] ing, of New York; Cong. Globe, 1861-62, pt. 1, 523. Other members of the house frankly confessed their doubt as to its constitutionality, but yielded their support of it under the pressure of this supposed necessity.

In the senate also the measure was pressed for the same reasons. When the act was reported by the committee on finance, its chairman, while opposing the legal-tender provision, said: 'It is put on the ground of absolute, overwhelming necessity; that the government has now arrived at that point when it must have funds, and those funds are not to be obtained from ordinary sources, or from any of the expedients to which we have heretofore had recourse, and therefore this new, anomalous, and remarkable provision must be resorted to in order to enable the government to pay off the debt that it now owes, and afford circulation which will be available for other purposes.' Cong. Globe, 1861-62, pt. 1, 764. And upon that ground the provision was adopted, some of the senators stating that in the exigency then existing money must be had, and they therefore sustained the measure, although they apprehended danger from the experiment. 'The medicine of the constitution,' said Senator Summer, 'must not become its daily food.' Id. 800. A similar necessity was urged upon the state tribunals and this court in justification of the measure, when its validity was questioned. The dissenting opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold referred to the pressure that was upon the government at the time to enable it to raise and support an army, and to provide and maintain a navy. Chief Justice CHASE, who gave the prevailing opinion in that case, also spoke of the existence of the feeling when the bill was passed that the provision was necessary. He favored the provision on that ground when secretary of the treasury, although he had come to that conclusion with reluctance, and recommended its adoption by congress. When the question as to its validity reached this court, this expression of favor was referred to, and by many it was supposed that it would control his judicial action. But after long pondering upon the [110 U.S. 421, 457] subject, after listening to repeated arguments by able counsel, he decided against the constitutionality of the provision; and, holding in his hands the casting vote, he determined the judgment of the court. He thus preferred to preserve his integrity as a judicial officer rather than his consistency as a statesman. In his opinion he thus referred to his previous views: 'It is not surprising that amid the tumult of the late civil war, and under the influence of apprehensions for the safety of the republic almost universal, different views, never before entertained by American statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The time was not favorable to considerate reflection upon the constitutional limits of legislative or executive authority. If power was assumed from patriotic motives, the assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts. Many who doubted yielded their doubts; many who did not doubt were silent. Some who were strongly averse to making government notes a legal tender felt themselves constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advocates of the measure. Not a few who then insisted upon its necessity, or acquiesced in that view, have, since the return of peace, and under the influence of the calmer time, reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in those which we have just announced. These conclusions seem to us to be fully sanctioned by the letter and spirit of the constitution.' 8 Wall. 625.

It must be evident, however, upon reflection that, if there were any power in the government of the United States to impart the quality of legal tender to its promissory notes, it was for congress to determine when the necessity for its exercise existed; that war merely increased the urgency for money; it did not add to the powers of the government nor change their nature; that if the power existed it might be equally exercised when a loan was made to meet ordinary expenses in time of peace, as when vast sums were needed to support an army or a navy in time of war. The wants of the government could never be the measure of its powers. But in the excitement and apprehensions of the war these considerations were unheeded; the measure was passed as one of overruling [110 U.S. 421, 458] necessity in a perilous crisis of the country. Now it is no longer advocated as one of necessity, but as one that may be adopted at any time. Never before was it contended by any jurist or commentator on the constitution that the government, in full receipt of ample income, with a treasury overflowing, with more money on hand than it knows what to do with, could issue paper money as a legal tender. What was in 1862 called the 'medicine of the constitution' has now become its daily bread. So it always happens that whenever a wrong principle of conduct, political or personal, is adopted on a plea of necessity, it will be afterwards followed on a plea of convenience.

The advocates of the measure have not been consistent in the designation of the power upon which they have supported its validity, some placing it on the power to borrow money, some on the coining power, and some have claimed it as an incident to the general powers of the government. In the present case it is placed by the court upon the power to borrow money, and the alleged sovereignty of the United States over the currency. It is assumed that this power, when exercised by the government, is something different from what it is when exercised by corporations or individuals, and that the government has, by the legal tender provision, the power to enforce loans of money, because the sovereign governments of European countries have claimed and exercised such power. 'The words 'to borrow money," says the court, 'are not to receive that limited and restricted interpretation and meaning which they would have in a penal statute or in an authority conferred by law or by contract upon trustees or agents for private purposes.' And it adds that 'the power, as incident to the power of borrowing money and issuing bills or notes of the government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of private debts, was a power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution of the United States. The govern- [110 U.S. 421, 459] ments of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, had and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin,' and that 'the exercise of this power not being prohibited to congress by the constitution, it is included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the United States.'

As to the terms 'to borrow money,' where, I would ask, does the court find any authority for giving to them a different interpretation in the constitution from what they receive when used in other instruments, as in the charters of municipal bodies or of private corporations, or in the contracts of individuals? They are not ambiguous; they have a well-settled meaning in other instruments. If the court may change that in the constitution, so it may the meaning of all other clauses; and the powers which the government may exercise will be found declared, not by plain words in the organic law, but by words of a new significance resting in the minds of the judges. Until some authority beyond the alleged claim and practice of the sovereign governments of Europe be produced, I must believe that the terms have the same meaning in all instruments, wherever they are used; that they mean a power only to contract for a loan of money, upon considerations to be agreed between the parties. The conditions of the loan, or whether any particular security shall be given to the lender, are matters of arrangement between the parties; they do not concern any one else. They do not imply that the borrower can give to his promise to refund the money any security to the lender outside of property or rights which he possesses. The transaction is completed when the lender parts with his money and the borrower gives his promise to pay at the time and in the manner and with the securities agreed upon. Whatever stipulations may be made, to add to the value of the promise, or to secure its fulfillment, must necessarily be limited to the property, rights, and privileges, which the borrower possesses. Whether he can add to his promises any element which will induce others [110 U.S. 421, 460] to receive them beyond the security which he gives for their payment depends upon his power to control such element. If he has a right to put a limitation upon the use of other persons' property, or to enforce an exaction of some benefit from them, he may give such privilege to the lender; but if he has no right thus to interfere with the property or possession of others, of course he can give none. It will hardly be pretended that the government of the United States has any power to enter into an engagement that, as security for its notes, the lender shall have special privileges with respect to the visible property of others, shall be able to occupy a portion of their lands or their houses, and thus interfere with the possession and use of their property. If the government cannot do that, how can it step in and say, as a condition of loaning money, that the lender shall have a right to interfere with contracts between private parties? A large proportion of the property of the world exists in contracts, and the government has no more rignt to deprive one of their value by legislation operating directly upon them than it has a right to deprive one of the value of any visible and tangible property. No one, I think, will pretend that individuals or corporations possess the power to impart to their evidences of indebtedness any quality by which the holder will be able to affect the contracts of other parties, strangers to the loan; nor would any one pretend that congress possesses the power to impart any such quality to the notes of the United States, except from the clause authorizing it to make laws necessary and proper to the execution of its powers. That clause, however, does not enlarge the expressly designated powers; it merely states what congress could have done without its insertion in the constitution. Without it congress could have adopted any appropriate means to borrow; but that can only be appropriate for that purpose which has some relation of fitness to the end, which has respect to the terms essential to the contract, or to the securities which the borrower may furnish for the repayment of the loan. The quality of legal tender does not touch the terms of the contract; that is complete without it; nor does it stand as a security for the loan, for [110 U.S. 421, 461] a security is a thing pledged, over which the borrower has some control, or in which he holds some interest.

The argument presented by the advocates of legal tender is, in substance, this: The object of borrowing is to raise funds, the addition of the quality of legal tender to the notes of the government will induce parties to take them, and funds will thereby be more readily loaned. But the same thing may be said of the addition of any other quality which would give to the holder of the notes some advantage over the property of others, as, for instance, that the notes should serve as a pass on the public conveyances of the country, or as a ticket to places of amusement, or should exempt his property from state and municipal taxation, or entitle him to the free use of the telegraph lines, or to a percentage from the revenues of private corporations. The same consequence-a ready acceptance of the notes-would follow; and yet no one would pretend that the addition of privileges of this kind with respect to the property of others, over which the borrower has no control, would be in any sense an appropriate measure to the execution of the power to borrow. Undoubtedly the power to borrow includes the power to give evidences of the loan in bonds, treasury notes, or in such other form as may be agreed between the parties. These may be issued in such amounts as will fit them for circulation, and for that purpose may be made payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery. Experience has shown that the form best fitted to secure their ready acceptance is that of notes payable to bearer, in such amounts as may suit the ability of the lender. The government, in substance, says to parties with whom it deals: Lend us your money, or furnish us with your products or your labor, and we will ultimately pay you, and as evidence of it we will give you our notes, in such form and amount as may suit your convenience, and enable you to transfer them; we will also receive them for certain demands due to us. In all this matter there is only a dealing between the government and the individuals who trust it. The transaction concerns no others. The power which authorizes it is a very different one from a [110 U.S. 421, 462] power to deal between parties to private contracts in which the government is not interested, and to compel the receipt of these promises to pay in place of the money for which the contracts stipulated. This latter power is not an incident to the former; it is a distinct and far greater power. There is no legal connection between the two-between the power to borrow from those willing to lend and the power to interfere with the independent contracts of others. The possession of this latter power would justify the interference of the government with any rights of property of other parties, under the pretense that its allowance to the holders of the notes would lead to their more ready acceptance, and thus furnish the needed means.

The power vested in congress to coin money does not in my judgment fortify the position of the court, as its opinion affirms. So far from deducing from that power any authority to impress the notes of the government with the quality of legal tender, its existence seems to me inconsistent with a power to make anything but coin a legal tender. The meaning of the terms 'to coin money' is not at all doubtful. It is to mould metallic substances into forms convenient for circulation and to stamp them with the impress of the government authority indicating their value with reference to the unit of value established by law. Coins are pieces of metal of definite weight and value, stamped such by the authority of the government. If any doubt could exist that the power has reference to metallic substances only it would be removed by the language which immediately follows, authorizing congress to regulate the value of money thus coined and of foreign coin, and also by clauses making a distinction between coin and the obligations of the general government and of the states. Thus, in the clause authorizing congress 'to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States,' a distinction is made between the obligations and the coin of the government.

Money is not only a medium of exchange, but it is a standard of value. Nothing can be such standard which has not intrin- [110 U.S. 421, 463] sic value, or which is subject to frequent changes in value. From the earliest period in the history of civilized nations we find pieces of gold and silver used as money. These metals are scattered over the world in small quantities; they are susceptible of division, capable of easy impression, have more value in proportion to weight and size, and are less subject to loss by wear and abrasion than any other material possessing these qualities. It requires labor to obtain them; they are not dependent upon legislation or the caprices of the multitude; they cannot be manufactured or decreed into existence; and they do not perish by lapse of time. They have, therefore, naturally, if not necessarily, become throughout the world a standard of value. In exchange for pieces of them, products requiring an equal amount of labor are readily given. When the product and the piece of metal represent the same labor, or an approximation to it, they are freely exchanged. There can be no adequate substitute for these metals. Says Mr. Webster, in a speech made in the house of representatives in 1815: 'The circulating medium of a commercial community must be that which is also the circulating medium of other commercial communities, or must be capable of being converted into that medium without loss. It must also be able not only to pass in payments and receipts among individuals of the same society and nation, but to adjust and discharge the balance of exchanges between different nations. It must be something which has a value abroad as well as at home, by which foreign as well as domestic debts can be satisfied. The precious metals alone answer these purposes. They alone, therefore, are money, and whatever else is to perform the functions of money must be their representative, and capable of being turned into them at will. So long as bank paper retains this quality it is a substitute for money; divested of this, nothing can give it that character.' 3 Webster's Works, 41. The clause to coin money must be read in connection with the prohibition upon the states to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The two taken to- [110 U.S. 421, 464] gether clearly show that the coins to be fabricated under the authority of the general government, and as such to be a legal tender for debts, are to be composed principally, if not entirely, of the metals of gold and silver. Coins of such metals are necessarily a legal tender to the amount of their respective values, without any legislative enactment, and the statute of the United States providing that they shall be such tender is only declaratory of their effect when offered in payment.

When the constitution says, therefore, that congress shall have the power to coin money, interpreting that clause with the prohibition upon the states, it says it shall have the power to make coins of the precious metals a legal tender, for that alone which is money can be a legal tender. If this be the true import of the language, nothing else can be made a legal tender. We all know that the value of the notes of the government in the market, and in the commercial world generally, depends upon their convertibility on demand into coin; and as confidence in such convertibility increases or diminishes, so does the exchangeable value of the notes vary. So far from becoming themselves standards of value by reason of the legislative declaration to that effect, their own value is measured by the facility with which they can be exchanged into that which alone is regarded as money by the commercial world. They are promises of money, but they are not money in the sense of the constitution. The term 'money' is used in that instrument in several clauses,-in the one authorizing congress 'to borrow money;' in the one authorizing congress 'to coin money;' in the one declaring that 'no money' shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and in the one declaring that no state shall 'coin money.' And it is a settled rule of interpretation that the same term occurring in different parts of the same instrument shall be taken in the same sense, unless there is something in the context indicating that a different meaning was intended. Now, to coin money is, as I have said, to make coins out of metallic substances, and the only money the value of which congress can regulate is coined money, either of our mints, or of foreign [110 U.S. 421, 465] countries. It should seem, therefore, that to borrow money, is to obtain a loan of coin money; that is, money composed of the precious metals, representing value in the purchase of property and payment of debts. Between the promises of the government, designated as its securities, and this money, the constitution draws a distinction, which disappears in the opinion of the court. The opinion not only declares that it is in the power of congress to make the notes of the government a legal tender and a standard of value, but that under the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, congress may issue coins of the same denominations as those now already current, but of less intrinsic value, by reason of containing a less weight of the precious metals, and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by payment of coins of less real value. This doctrine is put forth as in some way a justification of the legislation authorizing the tender of nominal money in place of real money in payment of debts. Undoubtedly congress has power to alter the value of coins issued, either by increasing or diminishing the alloy they contain; so it may alter, at its pleasure, their denominations; it may hereafter call a dollar an eagle, and it may call an eagle a dollar. But if it be intended to assert that congress can make the coins changed the equivalent of those having a greater value in their previous condition, and compel parties contracting for the latter to receive coins with diminished value, I must be permitted to deny any such authority. Any such declaration on its part would be not only utterly inoperative in fact, but a shameful disregard of its constitutional duty. As I said on a former occasion: 'The power to coin money, as declared by this court, is a great trust devolved upon congress, carrying with it the duty of creating and maintaining a uniform standard of value throughout the Union, and it would be a manifest abuse of this trust to give to the coins issued by its authority any other than their real value. By debasing the coins, when once the standard is fixed, is meant giving to the coins by their form and impress a certificate of their having a relation to that standard different from that which in truth [110 U.S. 421, 466] they possess; in other words, giving to the coins a false certificate of their value. Arbitrary and profligate governments have often resorted to this miserable scheme of robbery, which Mill designates as a shallow and impudent artifice, the 'least covert of all modes of knavery, which consists in calling a shilling a pound, that a debt of one hundred pounds may be canceled by the payment of one hundred shillings." No such debasement has ever been attempted in this country, and none ever will be so long as any sentiment of honor influences the governing power of the nation. The changes from time to time in the quantity of alloy in the different coins has been made to preserve the proper relative value between gold and silver, or to prevent exportation, and not with a view of debasing them. Whatever power may be vested in the government of the United States, it has none to perpetrate such monstrous iniquity. One of the great purposes of its creation, as expressed in the preamble of the constitution, was the establishment of justice, and not a line nor a word is found in that instrument which sanctions any intentional wrong to the citizen, either in war or in peace.

But beyond and above all the objections which I have stated to the decision recognizing a power in congress to impart the legal-tender quality to the notes of the government, is my objection to the rule of construction, adopted by the court to reach its conclusions-a rule which, fully carried out, would change the whole nature of our constitution, and break down the barriers which separate a government of limited from one of unlimited powers. When the constitution came before the conventions of the several states for adoption, apprehension existed that other powers than those designated might be claimed; and it led to the first 10 amendments. When these were presented to the states they were preceded by a preamble stating that the conventions of a number of the states had, at the time of adopting the constitution, expressed a desire, 'in order to prevent misconception or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added.' One of them is found in the tenth amendment, which declares [110 U.S. 421, 467] that 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' The framers of the constitution, as I have said, were profoundly impressed with the evils which had resulted from the vicious legislation of the states making notes a legal tender, and they determined that such a power should not exist any longer. They therefore prohibited the states from exercising it, and they refused to grant it to the new government which they created. Of what purpose is it, then, to refer to the exercise of the power by the absolute or the limited governments of Europe, or by the states previous to our constitution? Congress can exercise no power by virtue of any supposed inherent sovereignty in the general government. Indeed, it may be doubted whether the power can be correctly said to appertain to sovereignty in any proper sense, as an attribute of an independent political community. The power to commit violence, perpetrate injustice, take private property by force without compensation to the owner, and compel the receipt of promises to pay in place of money, may be exercised, as it often has been, by irresponsible authority, but it cannot be considered as belonging to a government founded upon law. But be that as it may, there is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere, but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their constitution, intrusted to it; all else is withheld. It seems, however, to be supposed that, as the power was taken from the states, it could not have been intended that it should disappear entirely, and therefore it must, in some way, adhere to the general government, notwithstanding the tenth amendment and the nature of the constitution. The doctrine that a power not expressly forbidden may be exercised would, as I have observed, change the character of our government. If I have read the constitution aright, if there is any weight to be given to the uniform teachings of our great jurists and of commen- [110 U.S. 421, 468] tators previous to the late civil war, the true doctrine is the very opposite of this. If the power is not in terms granted, and is not necessary and proper for the exercise of a power which is thus granted, it does not exist. And in determining what measures may be adopted in executing the powers granted, Chief Justice MARSHALL declares that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the end, not prohibited, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution. Now, all through that instrument we find limitations upon the power, both of the general government and the state governments, so as to prevent oppression and injustice. No legislation, therefore, tending to promote either can consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution. A law which interferes with the contracts of others, and compels one of the parties to receive in satisfaction something different from that stipulated, without reference to its actual value in the market, necessarily works such injustice and wrong.

There is, it is true, no provision in the constitution of the United States forbidding in direct terms the passing of laws by congress impairing the obligation of contracts, and there are many express powers conferred, such as the power to declare war, levy duties, and regulate commerce, the exercise of which affects more or less the value of contracts. Thus, war necessarily suspends intercourse between the citizens or subjects of belligerent nations, and the performance during its continuance of previous contracts. The imposition of duties upon goods may affect the prices of articles imported or manufactured, so as to materially alter the value of previous contracts respecting them. But these incidental consequences arising from the exercise of such powers were contemplated in the grant of them. As there can be no solid objection to legislation under them, no just complaint can be made of such consequences. But far different is the case when the impairment of the contract does not follow incidentally, but is directly and in terms allowed and enacted. Legislation operating directly upon private contracts, changing their conditions, is forbidden to the states; and no power to alter the stipulations of such contracts by direct legis- [110 U.S. 421, 469] lation is conferred upon congress. There are also many considerations, outside of the fact that there is no grant of the power, which show that the framers of the constitution never intended that such power should be exercised. One of the great objects of the constitution, as already observed, was to establish justice, and what was meant by that in its relations to contracts, as said by the late chief justice in his opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold, was not left to interference or conjecture. And in support of this statement he refers to the fact that when the constitution was undergoing discussion in the convention, the congress of the confederation was engaged in framing the ordinance for the government of the Northwest territory, in which certain articles of compact were established between the people of the original states and the people of the territory 'for the purposes,' as expressed in the instrument, 'of extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, whereon these republics, [the states united under the confederation,] their laws and constitutions, are erected.' That congress was also alive to the evils which the loose legislation of the states had created by interfering with the obligation of private contracts and making notes a legal tender for debts; and the ordinance declared that in the just preservation of rights and property no law 'ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously formed.' This principle, said the chief justice, found more condensed expression in the prohibition upon the states against impairing the obligation of contracts, which has always been recognized 'as an efficient safeguard against injustice;' and the court was then of opinion that 'it is clear that those who framed and those who adopted the constitution intended that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of legislation, and that the justice which the constitution was ordained to establish was not thought by them to be compatible with legislation of an opposite tendency.' Soon after the constitution was adopted the case of Calder v. Bull came before this court, and it was [110 U.S. 421, 470] there said that there were acts which the federal and state legislatures could not do without exceeding their authority; and among them was mentioned a law which punished a citizen for an innocent act, and a law which destroyed or impaired the lawful private contracts of citizens. 'It is against all reason and justice,' it was added, 'for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it.' 3 Dall. 388. And Mr. Madison, in one of the articles in the Federalist, declared that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. Yet this court holds that a measure directly operating upon and necessarily impairing private contracts, may be adopted in the execution of powers specifically granted for other purposes because it is not in terms prohibited, and that it is consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.

From the decision of the court I see only evil likely to follow. There have been times within the memory of all of us when the legal-tender notes of the United States were not exchangeable for more than one-half of their nominal value. The possibility of such depreciation will always attend paper money. This inborn infirmity no mere legislative declaration can cure. If congress has the power to make the notes a legal tender and to pass as money or its equivalent, why should not a sufficient amount be issued to pay the bonds of the United States as they nature? Why pay interest on the millions of dollars of bonds now due when congress can in one day make the money to pay the principal? And why should there be any restraint upon unlimited appropriations by the government for all imaginary schemes of public improvement, if the printing-press can furnish the money that is needed for them?

Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton

James Deffenbach  posted on  2010-02-22   3:42:11 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

I think we have a winner! :)

Thanks to all, but this one has definitely had an a major impact on the kid's quality of life.

Critter  posted on  2010-02-22   6:44:31 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

what about Roe v Wade?

but my kid wasn't roe v waded. :)

Critter  posted on  2010-02-22   7:00:06 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

You may want to cite all three:

The Legal Tender Cases were a series of United States Supreme Court cases in the latter part of the nineteenth century that affirmed the constitutionality of paper money. In the 1870 case of Hepburn v. Griswold, the Court had held that paper money violated the United States Constitution. The Legal Tender Cases reversed Hepburn, beginning with Knox v. Lee 79 U.S. 457 (1871) and Parker v. Davis in 1871, and then Juilliard v. Greenman 110 U.S. 421 (1884)

The Legal Tender Cases primarily involved the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act of 1862 enacted during the Civil War.[3] In Hepburn, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase held for a 4-3 majority of the Court that the Act was an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment. Ironically, Chief Justice Chase had played a role in formulating the Legal Tender Act of 1862, in his previous position as Secretary of the Treasury. On the same day that Hepburn was decided, President Ulysses Grant nominated two new justices to the Court, Joseph Bradley and William Strong, although Grant later denied that he had known about the decision in Hepburn when the nominations were made.[4] Bradley and Strong subsequently voted to reverse the Hepburn decision, in Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, by votes of 5-4. The constitutionality of the Act was more broadly upheld thirteen years later in Juilliard v. Greenman.

he who wants bread is the servant of the man that will feed him, if a man thus feeds a whole people, they are under his control.

DeaconBenjamin  posted on  2010-02-22   7:59:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

I think we have a winner! :)

Thanks to all, but this one has definitely had an a major impact on the kid's quality of life.

Thank you Critter.

Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton

James Deffenbach  posted on  2010-02-22   7:59:09 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

So it always will be; legislative declaration cannot make the promise of a thing the equivalent of the thing itself.

So it always happens that whenever a wrong principle of conduct, political or personal, is adopted on a plea of necessity, it will be afterwards followed on a plea of convenience.

It would be difficult to believe, even in the absence of the historical evidence we have on the subject, that the framers of the constitution, profoundly impressed by the evils resulting from this kind of legislation, ever intended that the new government, ordained to establish justice, should possess the power of making its bills a legal tender, which they were unwilling should remain with the states, and in which the past had proved so dangerous to the peace of the community, so disturbing to the business of the people, and so destructive of their morality.

Great Post JD.

Where can we find men of priciple such as scribed this dissent if not amongst ourselves.

Morality is the key and requires self-discipline not legislative mandate.

Prior to the Federal Reserve Act, no political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American People into one common mass of slaves. Yet, this is exactly what has happened under Social Security, by creating a revenue base for the collection of interest on a fictitious national debt owed to the Federal Reserve banks, in other words, slavery to the national debt under the so-called 14th Amendment.

noone222  posted on  2010-02-22   8:21:32 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Thanks OI, I missed that one. : )

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   10:15:27 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

yep, that's a good one, JD.

christine  posted on  2010-02-22   10:28:43 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

So it always will be; legislative declaration cannot make the promise of a thing the equivalent of the thing itself.

Thank you very much. I made a note to myself as I read this wonderful dissent (a long time ago) that if it were possible to make the promise of something the thing itself no one should ever go hungry or lack transportation (as just two examples). If a note for a thing were in fact the thing itself then we could eat banana notes and drive Cadillac notes. And I can recall that at some point one patriot group made up some "Banana Notes" to show how people were being conned into thinking that a piece of paper was actually a "dollar."

Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton

James Deffenbach  posted on  2010-02-22   10:35:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Thank you, Christine. Justice Fields wonderful and well-thought-out dissent in this case and Bancroft's little book taught me a lot about the evils of government.

Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton

James Deffenbach  posted on  2010-02-22   10:37:30 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Oh, I see how it is.....Mr. Deffenbach rolls in late on the thread and steals the thunder.

Great case JD!! : )

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. ... We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." Edward Bernays, Father of Public Relations

abraxas  posted on  2010-02-22   11:54:36 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

And I can recall that at some point one patriot group made up some "Banana Notes" to show how people were being conned into thinking that a piece of paper was actually a "dollar."

Well I'll be a MONKEY'S UNCLE !!!

Prior to the Federal Reserve Act, no political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American People into one common mass of slaves. Yet, this is exactly what has happened under Social Security, by creating a revenue base for the collection of interest on a fictitious national debt owed to the Federal Reserve banks, in other words, slavery to the national debt under the so-called 14th Amendment.

noone222  posted on  2010-02-22   13:19:32 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Oh, I see how it is.....Mr. Deffenbach rolls in late on the thread and steals the thunder.

LOL! That's how I roll. And thank you.

Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton

James Deffenbach  posted on  2010-02-22   13:23:59 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

Well I'll be a MONKEY'S UNCLE !!!

Ah? For real? ahaha.

Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.
Lord Acton

James Deffenbach  posted on  2010-02-22   13:24:48 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply  

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