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Title: Why I Don't Have Any Use for Truthers
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Published: Jul 9, 2010
Author: Turtle
Post Date: 2010-07-09 11:35:19 by Turtle
Keywords: None
Views: 27388
Comments: 879
Poster Comment: This woman had sulfuric acid thrown in her face by guess who? Someone engaging in Typical Negro Behavior. They do this out of envy. "I can't get this woman, so nobody can have her." He got life in prison. These are the real problems, not hallucinations abour remote-controlled airplanes and bombs in towers.
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#458. To: Flintlock (#456)
LOL I presented a "Over the Rainbow" song for Eric. I wish him well. Are you going to say that the 9-11 terrorist bombing is a direct result of and about the US government?
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Absolutely! 911 was clearly an inside job. I read the PNAC documents years ago. The neocons would have done ANYTHING to get us involved in a land war in the ME and they did.
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
Buck wants everybody to go to sleep because he's tired and wants the last word.
Complete Summary of 911 NORAD Communications - Not CT Selective Edit Cut & Paste Executive Summary: Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. Of all four hijacked aircraft, this nine minutes was the most time that NEADS had to respond The protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that: 9/11 The FAA's Boston Center and other air traffic control centers alerted NEADS of the four hijackings, though with little or no advance notice for NEADS and NORAD to mount a response. At most, NEADS had 9 minutes advance notice of the first hijacking (American Airlines Flight 11) NEADS was notified about United Airlines Flight 175 at 9:03 a.m. - the same time that it crashed into the World Trade Center's south tower. NEADS had four minutes advance notice of American Airlines Flight 77. NEADS was notified about United Airlines Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. - after it already had crashed. NEADS received notification of the hijacking 9 minutes before American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. Of all four hijacked aircraft, this nine minutes was the most time that NEADS had to respond. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane's failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft. The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11.108 At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport. The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words "we have some planes." The next transmission came seconds later: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet. The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the flight's altitude. Because the controller didn't understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to "pull the tape" of the radio transmission, listen to it closely, and report back. Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked. At 8:28, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center's airspace. By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters. The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort. The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening. At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11: Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves. In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to ascertain the altitude of the southbound flight. FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out. NEADS (Jeremy Powell): Is this real-world or exercise? FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call. At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD's Continental Region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to "go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get authorities later." General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. At this point, NEADS sees this as an ordinary hijacking until 8:39 a.m., with this exchange: 08:39:58 - (NEADS) WATSON: It's the inbound to J.F.K.? FAA BOSTON CENTER: We—we don't know. NEADS - WATSON: You don't know where he is at all? FAA BOSTON CENTER: He's being hijacked. The pilot's having a hard time talking to the—I mean, we don't know. We don't know where he's goin'. NEADS - WATSON: If you could please give us a call and let us know—you know any information, that'd be great. FAA BOSTON CENTER: Okay. Right now, I guess we're trying to work on—I guess there's been some threats in the cockpit. The pilot— NEADS - WATSON: There's been what?! I'm sorry. NEADS - UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Threat to the … ? FAA BOSTON CENTER: We'll call you right back as soon as we know more info. At 8:40 am, someone at NEADS, who was listening in on this exchange, informs the rest of the room at NEADS, which ratchets up tensions. NEADS - DOOLEY: O.K., he said threat to the cockpit! At this point, NEADS "tracker techs" still could not locate American Airlines Flight 11 on the radar. "In order to find a hijacked airliner—or any airplane—military controllers need either the plane's beacon code (broadcast from an electronic transponder on board) or the plane's exact coordinates. When the hijackers on American 11 turned the beacon off, intentionally losing themselves in the dense sea of airplanes already flying over the U.S. that morning (a tactic that would be repeated, with some variations, on all the hijacked flights), the NEADS controllers were at a loss." "You would see thousands of green blips on your scope," Nasypany said, "and now you have to pick and choose. Which is the bad guy out there? Which is the hijacked aircraft? And without that information from F.A.A., it's a needle in a haystack." At this point in the morning, more than 3,000 jetliners are already in the air over the continental United States, and the Boston controller's direction— "35 miles north of Kennedy"—doesn't help the NEADS controllers at all." [1] 08:44:59 - (OTIS) FOX: M.C.C. [Mission Crew Commander], I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination— NEADS - NASYPANY: O.K., I'm gonna give you the Z point [coordinate]. It's just north of—New York City. OTIS - FOX: I got this lat long, 41-15, 74-36, or 73-46. NEADS - NASYPANY: Head 'em in that direction. OTIS - FOX: Copy that. NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information: "I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel continued searching their radar scopes during the next few minutes for the primary radar return. At 08:46:36, Major Nasypany speaks with Colonel Marr, the battle commander and Nasypany's superior. NASYPANY: Hi, sir. O.K., what—what we're doing, we're tryin' to locate this guy. We can't find him via I.F.F. [the Identification Friend or Foe system]. What we're gonna do, we're gonna hit up every track within a 25-mile radius of this Z-point [coordinate] that we put on the scope. Twenty-nine thousand [feet] heading 1-9-0 [east]. We're just gonna do—we're gonna try to find this guy. They can't find him. There's supposedly been threats to the cockpit. So we're just doing the thing … [off-mic conversation] True. And probably right now with what's going on in the cockpit it's probably really crazy. So, it probably needs to—that will simmer down and we'll probably get some better information. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. At 8:51 a.m., NEADS learned from the FAA Boston Center that a plane crashed into the World Trade Center. 08:51:11 - ROUNTREE: A plane just hit the World Trade Center. WATSON: What? NEW YORK CENTER: I'm sorry?! WATSON: Being hit by an aircraft. NEW YORK CENTER: You're kidding. WATSON: It's on the world news. At this point, in regards to the Otis scramble of fighter jets, Nasypany was thinking "I'm not gonna stop what I initially started with scrambling Otis— getting Otis over New York City." [2] Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to "hold as needed. "From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern. At 8:55 a.m., NEADS spoke with Boston Center to confirm that American Airlines Flight 11 did indeed crash into the World Trade Center. 08:55:18 - BOSTON CENTER (Scoggins): Yeah, he crashed into the World Trade Center. 08:56:31 - MALE NEADS TECH: I never heard them say American Airlines Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center. I heard it was a civilian aircraft. DOOLEY (to Boston): Master Sergeant Dooley here. We need to have—are you giving confirmation that American 11 was the one— “ In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes' notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings. ” NEADS was first notified about United Airlines Flight 175 at 9:03 a.m., the same time that it crashed into the World Trade Center's south tower. They had zero advanced notice. One of the last transmissions from United Airlines Flight 175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 8:40, controllers at the FAA's New York Center were seeking information on American 11. At approximately 8:42, shortly after entering New York Center's airspace, the pilot of United 175 broke in with the following transmission: UAL 175: New York UAL 175 heavy. At 8:48, while the controller was still trying to locate American 11, a New York Center manager provided the following report on a Command Center teleconference about American 11: Manager, New York Center: Okay. This is New York Center. We're watching the airplane. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they've told us that they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft, and that's all the information they have right now. At 8:51, the controller noticed the transponder change from United 175 and tried to contact the aircraft. There was no response. Beginning at 8:52, the controller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response. The controller checked his radio equipment and contacted another controller at 8:53, saying that "we may have a hijack" Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed in with "reports over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center." The controller spent the next several minutes handing off the other flights on his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified aircraft (believed to be United 175) as it moved southwest and then turned northeast toward New York City. At about 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that they were discussing a hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed. At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New York controller "we might have a hijack over here, two of them." Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told the Command Center in Herndon: Manager, New York Center: We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us.. . . We're, we're involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here. While the Command Center was told about this "other aircraft" at 9:01, New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and asked for help in locating United 175. Terminal: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks like he's going into one of the small airports down there. Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center reported that they had deciphered what they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions from American 11: Boston Center: Hey . . . you still there? Boston Center immediately advised the New England Region that it was going to stop all departures at airports under its control. At 9:05, Boston Center confirmed for both the FAA Command Center and the New England Region that the hijackers aboard American 11 said "we have planes." At the same time, NewYork Center declared "ATC zero"-meaning that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through New York Center's airspace until further notice. Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its controllers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of the events in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide. We have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert. By 9:08, the mission crew commander at NEADS learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military airspace away from Manhattan: Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to talk to FAA. We need to tell 'em if this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put 'em over Manhattan. That's best thing, that's the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell 'em if there's more out there, which we don't know, let's get 'em over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup. The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09. NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked. “ NEADS was informed about American Airlines Flight 77 at 9:34 a.m., four minutes before it crashed into the Pentagon. ” American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane's projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the air-line. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone. Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24. By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation. The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying. According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east-where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77. In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C. By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stop." While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25. The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. The aircraft's identity or type was unknown. Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower: "looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir." Scoggins explained to Vanity Fair, "When we phoned United [after the second tower was hit], they confirmed that United 175 was down, and I think they confirmed that within two or three minutes," Scoggins, the go-to guy at Boston Center for all things military, later told me. "With American Airlines, we could never confirm if it was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds." At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA: FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards-heading towards Washington. The mention of a "third aircraft" was not a reference to American 77.There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne. We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information. Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him. After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23: Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area.. . . [I]f they're there then we'll run on them.. . .These guys are smart. Despite the orders to head towards the Washington/Baltimore area, the Langley aircraft headed due east, out to sea "into a military-training airspace called Whiskey 386." The Langley pilots were not briefed as to why they were being scrambled, so they followed their training flight plan, which was premised on Cold War threats. They did not receive information on distance to the target or the target's location when they were ordered to scramble. At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: 09:34:01 - WASHINGTON CENTER: Now, let me tell you this. I—I'll—we've been looking. We're—also lost American 77— WATSON: American 77? If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77. The FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it.. . . Okay. Push them back." 09:34:12 - NAVY A.T.C.: You've got [the fighters] moving east in airspace. Now you want 'em to go to Baltimore? HUCKABONE: Yes, sir. We're not gonna take 'em in Whiskey 386 [military training airspace over the ocean]. NAVY A.T.C.: O.K., once he goes to Baltimore, what are we supposed to do? HUCKABONE: Have him contact us on auxiliary frequency 2-3-4 decimal 6. Instead of taking handoffs to us and us handing 'em back, just tell Center they've got to go to Baltimore. After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland? "This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times, with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to determine if they had heard the screaming; several said they had. At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood, but chose to respond: "Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable. Say again, slowly." He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters. FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all its centers about suspect aircraft. The Command Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that "United 93 may have a bomb on board. "At 9:34, the Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA headquarters. At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue. Between 9:34 and 9:38, the Cleveland controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response. Then, at 9:39, a fourth radio transmission was heard from United 93: Ziad Jarrah: Uh, this is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet. The controller responded: "United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead." The flight did not respond. From 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided frequent updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93's transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south. At 9:42, the Command Center learned from news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Center's national operations manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest airport. This was an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident. At 9:46 the Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United 93 was now "twenty-nine minutes out of Washington, D.C." At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about getting military help, the Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance: FAA Headquarters: They're pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93. At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft. Then the Command Center informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area. Within seconds, the Command Center received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 "waving his wings." The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers' efforts to defeat the passengers' counterattack. United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington, D.C. The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute. The 10:03:11 impact time is supported by previous National Transportation Safety Board analysis and by evidence from the Commission staff's analysis of radar, the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, infrared satellite data, and air traffic control transmissions. Five minutes later, the Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters: Command Center: O.K. Uh, there is now on that United 93. FAA Headquarters: Yes. Command Center: There is a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown. FAA Headquarters: From the airplane or from the ground? Command Center: Uh, they're speculating it's from the aircraft. FAA Headquarters: Okay. Command Center: Uh, who, it hit the ground. That's what they're speculating, that's speculation only. The aircraft that spotted the "black smoke" was the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Pentagon 27 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from the crash of United 93, less than two minutes after the plane went down. At 10:17, the Command Center advised headquarters of its conclusion that United 93 had indeed crashed. Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military. Military Notification and Response NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. 10:07:16 - CLEVELAND CENTER: We got a United 93 out here. Are you aware of that? Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground. The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at NEADS. The air defenders searched for United 93's primary radar return and tried to locate other fighters to scramble. At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington, D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: "negative- negative clearance to shoot" aircraft over the nation's capital. At 10:15 a.m., NEADS called Washington Center to report: NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up, Washington. Some conspiracy theorists point to the 1999 NORAD intercept of Payne Stewart's Learjet before it crashed. There was already a F-16 in flight, on training, and available. Unlike the hijacked 9/11 aircraft, the transponder in the Learjet was never turned off. These two facts made it possible to make the intercept. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
Oh c'mon, not you too. I can't believe some of the brightest here on 4um could actually suggest they believe that theory. Now, I can understand sentiment about the government having indirect capability. But, that is because of ineptitude, blunders and too much political BS. But this is no reason to believe the government in any branch or level would commit an act of treason and tyranny and outright murder and destruction costing the US taxpayer trillions upon trillions of dollars. Can you realistically cite one serious qualified witness about all this tragedy that government was complicit in a planning activity for 911?
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Holy Spamination.
My reference to 20,000 gallons was to WTC 7, illiterate.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
Oh c'mon, not you too. I can't believe some of the brightest here on 4um could actually suggest they believe that theory. Maybe if you spent less time trying to sound smart and more time thinking smart, you'd understand.
It was a nice pretty day in NYC on September 11, 2001. Not a chemtrail in the sky ..........
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
That's a real world NORAD transcript with inferences and commentary by knowledgeable subject matter experts. Not a CT one paragraph puffball simple enough for k00ks to glom onto and parrot back and forth to each other in groupthink sessions. Such is life.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
This is true. However they had some willing accomplices with the OBL movement, so he did exactly what both the USG and the jihadis wanted - for different reasons, each thinking they would come out on top. Ever heard the saying "it takes two to fight?" OBL had already destroyed 2 US Embassies in Africa, had issued many statements including fatwahs and press conferences in the 1990's on various media outlets, and ran training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border to get visitors ready to take the jihad back to their home or residence countries. All these factors were known years before 911.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
Fine, but it's kinda long, you could've just linked to it. Like anyone's gonna read that. :-) lol
Yeah, and all Bill Clinton got was an aspirin tablet factory and a school/church in two separate incidents. America paid dearly for both of these failed missions.
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Seriously, how many people would wade through that off-site? Anyway it's done.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
Why don't you go out right now .... lay down on the grass facing up to the sky and blow the chemtrails away?
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Witness or investigator? Yeah, Jesse Ventura But not now or on this thread. Gov shill boy has spammed it up and nobody is ever going to read it. Lets just say they couldn't find the "black boxes" (Ventura did) but they COULD find some patsy's passport (ink still wet no doubt). LOL, yeah, right. Some guy with only flight simulator time executes a perfect 30+ degree (aerobatic) turn after finding the building, then scores a bulls-eye?. Yeah, right, LOL There's a lot more but I hate wasting my time on this thread.
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
Why don't you go out and buy a big crack toke, come home, do it and tell us if it made you any cleverer?
Ever heard the saying you're a gov plant and stooge?
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
Oh ... just GREAT! A has-been wrestler, failed Governor ... He wasn't in NYC on the government planning to destroy ANYTHING. I wager he was getting his face make-up creating some political statement for and about himself that day. He has no inside knowledge. If he did, he would have admitted his sources.
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Is that what you do in Canada?
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Six Percenter now saying that NORAD transcripts contradicting back of the envelope NORAD airspeed k00kulations are spam. Surprise!
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
Watch the show Here's part #1
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
The illegal alien terrorists had plenty of actual flight training... in fact, several were in US flight schools receiving American taxpayer support for that same training. You should feel cheated and defiled and lied to. I do. But that is not a direct connection towards government complicity about 9-11.
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Hey kOOKaNuTTer, if you travel 130 miles, and the travel time is 25 minutes, how fast are you going?
Soft Porn Break..... >
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
Nothing surprises me on the Internet. I have been here way too long ... with very thick skin, BTW. I will say this, you are a breath of fresh aire on 4um. Some of your posts are well researched and take quite a bit of time to find, authenticate and format. Thank you, AG.
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
If you're typing, you're lying
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
Only 2 out of the 4 hijacked planes on 911 hit their targets fully successful, so you can say there was not complete hijacker competence. The Pentagon hit was an attempt to get a plane in a diving power turn to hit the building at all - it got too much lift going down to hit the north side, and ended up going in from the back at an oblique angle, not straight on, into a section that was being renovated and not Rumsfeld's offices facing the Potomac. The Pennsylvania crash was a complete failure to hit the target, leaving the 2 NY hits as the only completely successful attacks, with extra bonus from WTC 7 going down and serious damage to other buildings from the Twin Tower consequences .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
Buck, are you down to one brain cell? You're acting like it
WWGPD? - (What Would General Pinochet Do?)
I think you're confusing your skin with your head.
I already gave you timetable saying the max time between notification and crashes was 8 minutes, not 25, and the fighters were over the Atlantic and unable to get precise vectors to what or where they were supposed to be intercepting, due to transponders not transmitting IFF's.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ One of the major consequences of the 9/11 movement has been to draw enormous amounts of energy and effort away from activism directed to real and ongoing crimes of state, and their institutional background, crimes that are far more serious than blowing up the WTC would be, if there were any credibility to that thesis. That is, I suspect, why the 9/11 movement is treated far more tolerantly by centers of power than is the norm for serious critical and activist work. Noam Chomsky
I found her while searching for "This thread sucks" and thought she belonged here. Is that wrong?
They were too nervous ... they were about to receive their 78 virgins in heaven, remember? They were probably coming in their pants commanding airships out of their training.
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
LOL
Name calling is juvenile.
If loving her is wrong, I don't wanna be right!!
You're acting like it Thanks for the one vote of confidence.
"we ought to lay off the criticism" -- Pinguinite, circa 2010-05-26 22:17:22 ET
Oh lookit that. Don't see that too often.
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#459. To: buckeroo (#458)
Are you going to say that the 9-11 terrorist bombing is a direct result of and about the US government?
#460. To: James Deffenbach, buckeroo (#455)
Why not go to beddy-bye
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#461. To: FormerLurker, buckeroo, turtle, critter (#432)
(Edited)
The last hijacking to occur in the United States was in 1991. [5] Since then, the air marshal program had been downsized, with only 33 in 2001 - none on domestic duty on 9/11.[6]
[7] The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
When NORAD fighter jets were "scrambled", that meant that they were to "establish a presence in the air.
There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
Hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
The pilots are trained to Trail the hijacked plane at a distance of about five miles, out of sight, following it until, presumably, it lands.
If necessary, they can show themselves, flying up close to establish visual contact, and,
If the situation demands, maneuver to force the plane to land." On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol for hijackings was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. The defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
American Airlines Flight 11 Main article: American Airlines Flight 11
Military Notification and Response Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked:
Otis F-15 fighters are scrambled Though, NEADS was still unable to locate American Airlines Flight 11, Major Nasypany orders the fighters from Otis to scramble anyway.
United Airlines Flight 175
WATSON: Being hit by an aircraft?
ROUNTREE: That is the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center?
BOSTON CENTER (Scoggins): Yup. Disregard the—disregard the tail number [given earlier for American 11].
ROUNTREE: Disregard the tail number? He did crash into the World Trade Center?
BOSTON CENTER (Scoggins): That's—that's what we believe, yes.
Though, there was still some confusion at NEADS about what had crashed into the World Trade Center.
Boston Center believed it was American Airlines Flight 11, but not with enough certainty to give confirmation to NEADS.
BOSTON CENTER (Scoggins): No, we're not gonna confirm that at this time. We just know an aircraft crashed in and …
DOOLEY: You—are you—can you say—is anyone up there tracking primary on this guy still?
BOSTON CENTER (Scoggins): No. The last [radar sighting] we have was about 15 miles east of J.F.K., or eight miles east of J.F.K. was our last primary hit.
He did slow down in speed. The primary that we had, it slowed down below— around to 300 knots.
DOOLEY: And then you lost 'em?
BOSTON CENTER (Scoggins): Yeah, and then we lost 'em.
Scoggins explained to Vanity Fair "that American Airlines refused to confirm for several hours that its plane had hit the tower." This caused uncertainty and complicated the situation for NEADS and Boston Center. The airlines have the ability to monitor the position of their own aircraft and to communicate with the aircraft. Vanity Fair explained that [the airlines] "routinely go into information lockdown in a crisis." Main article: United Airlines Flight 175
Military Notification and Response
FAA: UAL 175 go ahead.
UAL 175: Yeah. We figured we'd wait to go to your center. Ah, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said ah everyone ah stay in your seats.
FAA: Oh, okay. I'll pass that along over here.
Minutes later, United 175 turned southwest without clearance from air traffic control. At 8:47, seconds after the impact of American 11, United 175's transponder code changed, and then changed again. These changes were not noticed for several minutes, however, because the same New York Center controller was assigned to both American 11 and United 175.The controller knew American 11 was hijacked; he was focused on searching for it after the aircraft disappeared at 8:46.
The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed.
The "other aircraft" referred to by New York Center was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash that there had been a second hijacking.
Center: Hold on a second. I'm trying to bring him up here and get you-There he is right there. Hold on.
Terminal: Got him just out of 9,500-9,000 now.
Center: Do you know who he is?
Terminal: We're just, we just we don't know who he is.We're just picking him up now. Center (at 9:02): Alright. Heads up man, it looks like another one coming in.
The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data terminated over Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, United 175 crashed into the South Tower.
New England Region: Yes, I am.
Boston Center: . . . as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that "we have planes." Now, I don't know if it was because it was the accent, or if there's more than one, but I'm gonna, I'm gonna reconfirm that for you, and I'll get back to you real quick. Okay?
New England Region: Appreciate it.
Unidentified Female Voice: They have what?
Boston Center: Planes, as in plural.
Boston Center: It sounds like, we're talking to New York, that there's another one aimed at the World Trade Center.
New England Region: There's another aircraft?
Boston Center: A second one just hit the Trade Center.
New England Region: Okay. Yeah, we gotta get-we gotta alert the military real quick on this.
“ The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03. The notice came at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. ”
American Airlines Flight 77
The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived in New York City at 9:25 (22 minutes after Flight 175 crashed) and established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city. Main article: American Airlines Flight 77
Military Notification and Response NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed: American 11.
Langley jets scrambled
NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
FAA: That was another-it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.
That's the latest report we have.
NEADS: Okay.
FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?
FAA: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS: He-American 11 is a hijack?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: And he's heading into Washington?
FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircraft. The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to the NEADS battle commander:
Delta Airlines Flight 1989
That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24.
Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.
DOOLEY: American 77's lost—
WATSON: Where was it proposed to head, sir?
WASHINGTON CENTER: Okay, he was going to L.A. also—
WATSON: From where, sir?
WASHINGTON CENTER: I think he was from Boston also. Now let me tell you this story here. Indianapolis Center was working this guy—
WATSON: What guy?
WASHINGTON CENTER: American 77, at flight level 3-5-0 [35,000 feet]. However, they lost radar with him. They lost contact with him. They lost everything.
And they don't have any idea where he is or what happened.
The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing.
NAVY A.T.C.: All right, man. Stand by. We'll get back to you.
CITINO: What do you mean, "We'll get back to you"? Just do it!
HUCKABONE: I'm gonna choke that guy!
CITINO: Be very professional, Huck.
HUCKABONE: O.K.
CITINO: All right, Huck. Let's get our act together here. Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
United Airlines Flight 93 Main article: United Airlines Flight 93 “ NEADS was notified about United Airlines Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m., after it already had crashed. ”
Military intercepts Theory The military is perfectly capable of intercepting commercial aircraft.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don't know.
Command Center: Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.
WATSON: United 93?
CLEVELAND CENTER: That has a bomb on board.
WATSON: A bomb on board?! And this is confirmed? You have a [beacon code], sir?
CLEVELAND CENTER: No, we lost his transponder.
FAA (DC): Go ahead.
NEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that yet?
FAA: Yeah, he's down.
NEADS: He's down?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: When did he land? 'Cause we have got confirmation-
FAA: He did not land.
NEADS: Oh, he's down? Down?
FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David.
NEADS: Northeast of Camp David.
FAA: That's the last report. They don't know exactly where.
The NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes. The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked. Fact The hijackers turned of the aircraft transponders, making it much more difficult to locate the aircraft (as radar blips, among all the many radar blips from all aircraft). Further, bureaucratic problems and incompetency inhibited the government from a quick, efficient, timely response to the hijackings.
#462. To: Flintlock (#459)
911 was clearly an inside job.
#463. To: AGAviator, FormerLurker (#461)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#464. To: FormerLurker (#453)
Wrong asswipe. You stated that the towers were burning for hours with tens of thousands of (something, I assumed gallons) of diesel fuel, where there were only about 3500 gallons of JET fuel available for the fires
#465. To: buckeroo, Flintlock (#462)
911 was clearly an inside job.
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#466. To: wudidiz (#460)
Buck wants everybody to go to sleep because he's tired and wants the last word.
#467. To: wudidiz (#463)
(Edited)
Holy Spamination.
#468. To: Flintlock, buckeroo (#459)
(Edited)
The neocons would have done ANYTHING to get us involved in a land war in the ME and they did.
#469. To: AGAviator (#467)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#470. To: AGAviator (#468)
OBL had already destroyed 2 US Embassies in Africa, had issued many statements includingfatwahs and press conferences in the 1990's on various media outlets, and ran training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border to get visitors ready to take the jihad back to their home or residence countries. All these factors were known years before 911.
#471. To: wudidiz (#469)
Fine, but it's kinda long, you could've just linked to it.
#472. To: wudidiz (#469)
Like anyone's gonna read that.
#473. To: buckeroo (#462)
Can you realistically cite one serious qualified witness about all this tragedy that government was complicit in a planning activity for 911?
#474. To: buckeroo (#472)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#475. To: AGAviator (#468)
Ever heard the saying "it takes two to fight?"
#476. To: Flintlock (#473)
Witness or investigator? Yeah, Jesse Ventura
#477. To: wudidiz (#474)
Why don't you go out and buy a big crack toke, come home, do it and tell us if it made you any cleverer?
#478. To: buckeroo, Flintlock (#473)
Spammed it up and nobody is ever going to read it.
#479. To: buckeroo (#476)
#480. To: Flintlock (#475)
#481. To: Flintlock (#473)
Some guy with only flight simulator time executes a perfect 30+ degree (aerobatic) turn after finding the building, then scores a bulls-eye?. Yeah, right, LOL
#482. To: Flintlock (#473)
There's a lot more but I hate wasting my time on this thread.
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#483. To: AGAviator (#478)
"The real deal is this: the ‘royalty’ controlling the court, the ones with the power, the ones with the ability to make a difference, with the ability to change our course, the ones who will live in infamy if we pass the tipping points, are the captains of industry, CEOs in fossil fuel companies such as EXXON/Mobil, automobile manufacturers, utilities, all of the leaders who have placed short-term profit above the fate of the planet and the well-being of our children." - James Hansen
#484. To: All (#482)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#485. To: All (#479)
(Edited)
#486. To: AGAviator (#478)
Surprise!
#487. To: AGAviator (#480)
#488. To: buckeroo (#481)
The illegal alien terrorists had plenty of actual flight training... in fact, several were in US flight schools receiving American taxpayer support for that same training.
#489. To: buckeroo (#486)
I will say this, you are a breath of fresh aire on 4um
#490. To: buckeroo (#486)
with very thick skin
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#491. To: FormerLurker (#483)
(Edited)
Hey kOOKaNuTTer, if you travel 130 miles, and the travel time is 25 minutes, how fast are you going?
#492. To: All (#484)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#493. To: AGAviator (#488)
Only 2 out of the 4 hijacked planes on 911 hit their targets fully successful, so you can say there was not complete hijacker competence.
#494. To: wudidiz (#484)
#495. To: farmfriend (#494)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#496. To: Flintlock (#489)
Buck, are you down to one brain cell?
#497. To: farmfriend, All (#495)
02:00:00
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
#498. To: Turtle (#497)
“It has been said, 'time heals all wounds.' I do not agree. The wounds remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar tissue and the pain lessens, but it is never gone.” ~ Rose F. Kennedy
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