[Home]  [Headlines]  [Latest Articles]  [Latest Comments]  [Post]  [Sign-in]  [Mail]  [Setup]  [Help]  [Register] 

Status: Not Logged In; Sign In

These Are The Worlds Top 10 Tax Havens UN General Assembly Passes Resolution Demanding Israel Pull Out Of Palestinian Areas Within 12 Months US Navy Chief Unveils Plan To Be Ready for War With China By 2027 Black Illegal Immigrant Arrested For Killing Entire Family Recorded As White In Crime Stats Ukrainian Instructors Arrive in Idlib to Train Terrorists to Make Drones - Syrian Source Thousands of Gaza amputees to receive prosthetic limbs in Jordan-led project FBI goes to Springfield, Ohio to deal with 'Haitian problem' - but they're actually targeting AMERICANS?!?! Gaza: Doctor dies in Israeli custody after being abducted from al-Shifa Hospital, officials say Small Town Alabama Residents Silenced For Questioning Sudden Flood Of Haitian Migrants Cuomo Red-Pilled: Former CNN Anchor Tells Trump He's Ashamed Of The Media "Blow Your Mind": Ex-WSJ Journo Uncovers Hub Of An Alleged Migrant Trafficking Network In Springfield, Ohio Israel bombed a residential block in Gaza. Then drones shot at anyone trying to rescue the survivors I Thought Economists Didn't Believe Immigrants Take Americans' Jobs From the New York Post: ump urges Republicans to shut down the government as funding bill with ban on noncitizen voting FAILS Its All Coming Out! Thousands Left Disabled After Covid Vaccines "We can't take this anymore" IT HAS TO STOP!! (Now They're Butchering Horses) Pentagon fears Israel is plotting ground war in Lebanon soon - merica's Airborne Anti-hero - Jake "McNasty" McNiece “Under SIEGE” Second Assassination Attempt Made On Donald Trump Ukrainian Commanders Urged Zelensky Not To Invade Kursk J..D. Vance Dunks on New York Times ‘ReporterÂ’ with Brilliant Response After Media Jackal Tries to Smear Him Over Regarding Haitian Migrants Democrats Block Common Sense: Has Nassim Taleb's Black Swan Been Spotted? Explosive Device Reportedly Discovered Near Trump Rally in Uniondale, New York After Second Trump Assassination Attempt Train conductors in Germany have been instructed not to check for tickets from migrants in order to keep the peace. Emasculation Nation Indy ranks 19th in Top Rodent Cities in the U.S. The Laboratory of the Apocalypse Veteran CIA officer who drugged and sexually assaulted dozens of women gets 30 years in prison Poll: How Will Diddy [and Trump's latest wannabe assassin] Get Suicided in Jail?

War, War, War
See other War, War, War Articles

Title: The "Green Peril": Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat
Source: cato.org, Policy Analysis no. 177
URL Source: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1037
Published: Aug 27, 1992
Author: Leon T. Hadar
Post Date: 2010-09-14 06:34:28 by GreyLmist
Keywords: foreign policy, bogeymen, Christendom, Islam
Views: 48
Comments: 2

Leon T. Hadar, a former bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post, is an adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute.

Published on August 27, 1992

Now that the Cold War is becoming a memory, America's foreign policy establishment has begun searching for new enemies. Possible new villains include "instability" in Europe--ranging from German resurgence to new Russian imperialism--the "vanishing" ozone layer, nuclear proliferation, and narcoterrorism. Topping the list of potential new global bogeymen, however, are the Yellow Peril, the alleged threat to American economic security emanating from East Asia, and the so-called Green Peril (green is the color of Islam). That peril is symbolized by the Middle Eastern Moslem fundamentalist--the "Fundie," to use a term coined by The Economist[1]--a Khomeini-like creature, armed with a radical ideology, equipped with nuclear weapons, and intent on launching a violent jihad against Western civilization.

George Will even suggested that the 1,000-year battle between Christendom and Islam might be breaking out once more when he asked, "Could it be that 20 years from now we will be saying, not that they're at the gates of Vienna again, but that, in fact, the birth of Mohammed is at least as important as the birth of Christ, that Islamic vitality could be one of the big stories of the next generations?"[2]

Download the PDF of Policy Analysis no. 177 (103 KB)
Get Adobe Reader

Click for Full Text!

Poster Comment:

This 1992 "designer villains" report at the end of George HW Bush's presidential term is 24 pages long and can be viewed at the linked Cato site but the print is very small there: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1037. Will copy another excerpt below from the pdf format.

Post Comment   Private Reply   Ignore Thread  

Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 1.

#1. To: All (#0)

Soon after this report was published, the 1993 WTC bombing occurred at the start of Clinton's 1st term and the USS Cole occured near the end of his 2nd term -- almost like customized "Green Peril" bookends for a "colorful" Prez who was sold on the Cold War substitute theme to "gift" like hand-me-downs to the next so-called "Decider" who would engrave them with the numbers of 9/11.

Continuining with the next excerpt up to pg. 10:

A New Cold War?

Indeed, "a new specter is haunting America, one that some Americans consider more sinister than Marxism-Leninism," according to Douglas E. Streusand. "That specter is Islam."[3] The rise of political Islam in North Africa, especially the recent electoral strength of anti-liberal Islamic fundamentalist groups in Algeria; the birth of several independent Moslem republics in Central Asia whose political orientation is unclear; and the regional and international ties fostered by Islamic governments in Iran and Sudan are all producing, as Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland put it, an "urge to identify Islam as an inherently anti-democratic force that is America's new global enemy now that the Cold War is over."[4]

"Islamic fundamentalism is an aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist,and Nazi movements of the past," according to Amos Perlmutter. It is "authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular, "and cannot be reconciled with the "Christian-secular universe" and its goal is the establishment of a "totalitarian Islamic state" in the Middle East, he argued, suggesting that the United States should make sure the movement is "stifled at birth."[5]

The Islam vs. West paradigm, reflected in such observations, is beginning to infect Washington. That development recalls the efforts by some of Washington's iron triangles as well as by foreign players during the months leading up to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis. Their use of the media succeeded in building up Saddam Hussein as the "most dangerous man in the world"[6] and as one of America's first new post-Cold War bogeymen. Those efforts, including allegations that Iraq had plans to dominate the Middle East, helped to condition the American public and elites for the U.S. intervention in the gulf. [7]

There is a major difference between the Saddam-the-bogeyman caricature and the Green Peril. Notwithstanding the Saddam-is-Hitler rhetoric, the Iraqi leader was perceived as merely a dangerous "thug" who broke the rules of the game and whom Washington could suppress by military force. Saddam's Iraq was a threat to a regional balance of power, not to the American way of life.

The alleged threat from Iran and militant Islam is different. The struggle between that force and the West is portrayed as a zero-sum game that can end only in the defeat of one of the sides. The Iranian ayatollahs and their allies- -"revolutionary," "fanatic," and "suicidal" people that they are--cannot be co- opted into balance-of-power arrangementsby rewards and are even seen as immune to military and diplomatic threats. One can reach a tactical compromise withthem--such as the agreement with Lebanese Shi'ite groups to release the American hostages--but on the strategic level the expectation is for a long, drawn-out battle.

Indeed, like the Red Menace of the Cold War era, the Green Peril is perceived as a cancer spreading around the globe,undermining the legitimacy of Western values and political systems. The cosmic importance of the confrontation would make it necessary for Washington to adopt a longterm diplomatic and military strategy; to forge new and solid alliances; to prepare the American people for a neverending struggle that will test their resolve; and to develop new containment policies, new doctrines, and a new foreign policy elite with its "wise men" and "experts."

There are dangerous signs that the process of creating a monolithic threat out of isolated events and trends in the Moslem world is already beginning. The Green Peril thesis is now being used to explain diverse and unrelated events in that region, with Tehran replacing Moscow as the center of ideological subversion and military expansionism and Islam substituting for the spiritual energy of communism.

Islam does seem to fit the bill as the ideal post-Cold War villain. "It's big; it's scary; it's anti-Western; it feeds on poverty and discontent," wrote David Ignatius, adding that Islam "spreads across vast swaths of the globe that can be colored green on the television maps in the same way that communist countries used to be colored red."[8]

Foreign policy experts are already using the familiar Cold War jargon to describe the coming struggle with Islam. There is talk about the need to "contain" Iranian influence around the globe, especially in Central Asia, which seemed to be the main reason for Secretary of State James A. Baker III's February stop in that region.[9] Strategists are beginning to draw a "red line" for the fundamentalist leaders of Sudan, as evidenced by a U.S. diplomat's statement last November warning Khartoum to refrain from "exporting" revolution and terrorism.[10] Washington's policymakers even applauded the January 1992 Algerian "iron fist" military coup that prevented an Islamic group from winning the elections. The notion that we have to stop the fundamentalists somewhere echoes the Cold War's domino theory.

"Geopolitically, Iran's targets are four--the Central Asian republics, the Maghreb or North Africa, Egypt and other neighboring Arab countries, and the Persian Gulf states," explained Hoover Institution senior fellow Arnold Beichman, who is raising the Moslem alarm. Beichman suggested that "the first major target" for radical Iran and its militant strategy would be "oil-rich, militarily weak Saudi Arabia, keeper of Islam's holy places and OPEC's decisionmaker onworld oil prices."[11] If the West does not meet that challenge, a Green Curtain will be drawn across the crescent of instability, and "the Middle East and the once Soviet Central Asian republics could become in a few years the cultural and political dependencies of the most expansionist militarized regime in the world today, a regime for which terrorism is a governing norm," he warned.[12]

The Making of a "Peril"

The Islamic threat argument is becoming increasingly popular with some segments of the American foreign policye stablishment. They are encouraged by foreign governments who, for reasons of self-interest, want to see Washington embroiled in the coming West vs. Islam confrontation. The result is the construction of the new peril, a process that does not reflect any grand conspiracy but that nevertheless has its own logic, rules and timetables.

The creation of a peril usually starts with mysterious "sources" and unnamed officials who leak information, float trial balloons, and warn about the coming threat. Those sources reflect debates and discussions taking place within government. Their information is then augmented by colorful intelligence reports that finger exotic and conspiratorial terrorists and military advisers. Journalists then search for the named and other villains. The media end up finding corroboration from foreign sources who form an informal coalition with the sources in the U.S. government and help the press uncover further information substantiating the threat coming from the new bad guys.

In addition, think tanks studies and op-ed pieces add momentum to the official spin. Their publication is followed by congressional hearings, policy conferences, and public press briefings. A governmental policy debate ensues, producing studies, working papers, and eventually doctrines and policies that become part of the media's spin. The new villain is now ready to be integrated into the popular culture to help to mobilize public support for a new crusade. In the case of the Green Peril, that process has been under way for several months.[13]

A series of leaks, signals, and trial balloons is already beginning to shape U.S. agenda and policy. Congress is about to conduct several hearings on the global threat of Islamic fundamentalism.[14] The Bush administration has been trying to devise policies and establish new alliances to counter Iranian influence: building up Islamic but secular and pro-Western Turkey as a countervailing force in Central Asia, expanding U.S. commitments to Saudi Arabia, warning Sudan that it faces grave consequences as a result of its policies, and even shoring up a socialist military dictatorship in Algeria.

Regional Powers Exploit U.S. Fears

Not surprisingly, foreign governments, including those of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, India, and Pakistan, have reacted to the evidence of U.S. fear. With the end of the Cold War they are concerned about a continued U.S. commitment to them and are trying to exploit the menace of Islamic fundamentalism to secure military support, economic aid, and political backing from Washington as well as to advance their own domestic and regional agendas. The Gulf War has already provided the Turks, Saudis, Egyptians, and Israelis with an opportunity to revive the American engagement in the Middle East and their own roles as Washington's regional surrogates. Now that the Iraqi danger has been diminished, the Islamic fundamentalist threat is a new vehicle for achieving those goals.

Pakistan, which lost its strategic value to the United States as a conduit of military aid to the guerrillas in Afghanistan, and India, whose Cold War Soviet ally has disintegrated, are both competing for American favors by using the Islamic card in their struggle for power in Southwest Asia. That struggle involves such issues as the Kashmir problem and an accelerating nuclear arms race.[15]

Even such disparate entities as Australia and the Iranian Mojahedin opposition forces are conducting public relations and lobbying efforts in the United States based on the Islamic fundamentalist threat. Colin Rubenstein recently discussed the need to maintain an American military presence in Asia to contain the power of the Moslem government in Malaysia, which according to him has adopted increasingly repressive measures at home and has been developing military ties with Libya as part of a strategy to spread its radical Islamic message in Asia. If Washington refuses to project its diplomatic and military power to contain the Malaysian-produced Islamic threat in Asia, there is a danger that the United States and Australia will soon face anti-American and anti-Israeli blocs, Rubenstein insisted.[16]

The Iranian opposition group, which in the past has subscribed to socialist and anti-American positions, is now interested in maintaining U.S. pressure on the government of President Hashemi Rafsanjani and in winning Western public support. To achieve those goals it is playing up the possibility of a Tehran- led political terrorist campaign aimed at creating an "Islamic bloc" in Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa and suggesting that to avoid such a campaign Washington should back the Mojahedin in Tehran.[17]

Even Washington's long-time nemesis--the hard-core Marxist and former Soviet ally, former president Mohammad Najibullah of Afghanistan, against whom the United States helped sponsor Pakistani-directed guerrilla warfare--a few days before his ouster from power offered his services in the new struggle against the radical Islamic threat. "We have a common task, Afghanistan, the United States of America, and the civilized world, to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism," he explained. Najibullah warned Washington that unless he was kept in power, Islamic fundamentalists would take over Afghanistan and turn it into a "center of world smuggling for narcotic drugs" and a"center for terrorism."[18]

The Beneficiaries and Their Motives

Growing American fears about the Green Peril are playing into the hands of governments and groups who, interestingly enough, tend to regard the Islamic threat as exaggerated. The behavior of those groups and governments recalls the way Third World countries exploited the U.S. obsession with the Red Menace during the Cold War despite their own skepticism about its long-term power. Pakistani officials, for example, reportedly "regard with some amusement Washington's seeming frenzied concern about the spread of fundamentalism in Central Asia, fears they hope to exploit by presenting themselves as sober pragmatists who happen to be Muslims." Indeed, the Pakistani government, like the Turkish government, has expressed the hope that Washington will adopt it as a new strategic ally and is encouraging Washington "to regard Islamabad as a partner in the Central Asian republics, and in the process [limit] the influence of Iran."[19]

Similarly, India, with its growing Hindu nationalist elements, its continuing conflict with Pakistan, and its foreign policy disorientation at the end of the Cold War, has begun to present itself as the countervailing force to the Islamic menace in Asia and Pakistan.[20]

The Israeli government and its supporters in Washington are also trying to play the Islamic card. The specter of Central Asian republics and Iran equipped with nuclear weapons helps Israel to reduce any potential international pressure on it to place its own nuclear capabilities and strategy on the negotiating table. More important, perhaps, the Green Peril could revive, in the long run, Israel's role as America's strategic asset, which was eroded as a result of the end of the Cold War and was seriously questioned during the Gulf War.[21]

Israel could become the contemporary crusader nation, a bastion of the West in the struggle against the new transnational enemy, Islamic fundamentalism. According to Daniel Doron, "With the momentous upheavals rocking the Muslim World, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a sideshow with little geopolitical significance." It is a derivative conflict in which Israel is "the target of convenience for Islam's great sense of hurt and obsessive hostility towards the West."[22]

The operational message is that the United States "must refocus its policy on the basic problems facing the Islamic world rather than only the Arab-Israeli conflict."[23] Jerusalem's attempts to turn that conflict into a Jewish- Moslem confrontation and to place America on its side to help contain radical Moslem forces in the region may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The result is likely to be strengthened anti-American feelings in the Middle East and anti- American terrorist acts, which, in turn, will invite a new round of American military intervention.

Egypt's role in the Gulf War has produced some economic benefits, including forgiveness of its $7 billion debt to the United States, and its agreement with Israel has improved Cairo's position as a mediator in the peace process. However, Washington's post-Desert Storm expectation that Cairo would play an active role in the new security arrangement in the gulf has proven unrealistic. Saudi Arabia and other conservative gulf monarchies have been less than enthusiastic about Egypt's playing a military role in the region. Since it cannot become a U.S. surrogate in the gulf, Cairo is focusing on its neighbor, Sudan, as a new bogeyman, or radical threat, in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Presumably, Cairo hopes thereby to gain new significance in the American global perspective. Exaggerating the threat also gives Cairo an environment conducive to military action against Sudan that could fulfill the historical Egyptian goal of turning that country into a protectorate of Cairo.

Sudan: A New Scapegoat

The danger of Sudan's becoming a center of subversion is greatly exaggerated. It is true that Khartoum is ruled today by a military government controlled by the National Islamic Front whose leader, Hassan el-Turabi, wishes to spread his version of fundamentalist Islam in Africa and the Middle East.[24] It is also possible that some Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists visit or even reside in Sudan.[25] But American and Egyptian denunciation of Sudan's "harboring terrorists" is hypocritical considering Washington's ties with its Gulf War "ally" Syria, home to several terrorist groups, and Cairo's current diplomatic romance with Libya, another center of international terrorism.

Iranian officials, including President Rafsanjani, did visit Sudan several times as part of Tehran's efforts to break the diplomatic isolation imposed on it by Washington. That is hardly evidence of a Khartoum-Tehran political axis, however. The Sudanese seem interested mainly in Iranian economic aid, including subsidized oil. It is not clear that the two countries have common political objectives or that either regime's goals are consistently hostile to U.S. interests. During the gulf crisis, the Iranians tried to convince the leaders in Khartoum to join them in isolating Saddam--not an"anti-American" move--but the Sudanese declined. In contrast to Tehran, Khartoum supports the Palestine Liberation Organization and the U.S.-brokered Middle East peace process. The Sudanese also supported the Washington-backed rebel groups that came to power in Ethiopia and Eritrea.[26]

Moreover, Sudan is one of the world's most miserable economic basket cases. It has a relatively weak military that is no match for the Egyptian army and is embroiled in suppressing a bloody civil war in the south. The notion that Sudan has the power to destabilize the countries of Africa and the Middle East is far-fetched.

An "Iranian Scenario" in Saudi Arabia?

As has that of Egypt and Israel, Saudi Arabia's use of the Green Peril to mobilize U.S. support has been characterized by confusion, ironies, and paradoxes, the most dramatic of which has been the kingdom's own commitment to Islamic fundamentalism. With the elimination of Iraq as a regional military power, the Saudi royal family, worried about the rise of Tehran as a hegemonic player in the gulf, has been fanning the anti-fundamentalist and anti-Iranian mood in Washington. The Saudis have indicated that they are interested in countering Iranian influence in Central Asia. Ironically, they are doing what they accuse Tehran of-- spending lavishly to establish political and religious influence. Riyadh has spent more than $1 billion to promote the Saudi brand of Islam.[27] Along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia has also been supporting the Somali president against a faction, supported by Iran, that is trying to overthrow him. [28]

The Saudi Propaganda Campaign

A series of reports about resurgent militant Islamic forces in Saudi Arabia (which also portrayed the royal family as a politically reformist regime and active supporter of the U.S.-led peace process) has been used to try to mobilize American support for the Saudis as a "moderate pillar" and anti- fundamentalist force in the gulf, the Middle East, and Central Asia.[29]

The problem with that campaign is that the legitimacy of the Saudi regime is based on its own Islamic fundamentalist principles. The Saudi government is actually more rigid in its application of Islamic law and more repressive in many respects than the one in Tehran. For example, Saudi Arabia has no form of popular representation, and political rights are totally denied women and non- Moslems. The Saudi regime has been able to stay in power largely because it has had both direct and indirect American military support, most recently during the Gulf War. To paraphrase President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Saudis are Islamic fundamentalists--but they are our Islamic fundamentalists.[30]

The recent celebrated Saudi foreign policy "assertiveness" and domestic "moderation" are little more than public relations gimmicks orchestrated by Riyadh's flamboyant ambassador to Washington and supported by King Fahd. They are intended to win brownie points with the American public. The Saudi interest in signing huge arms deals with U.S. companies, for example, could help to secure the survival of the dwindling American defense industry and provide "jobs, jobs, jobs." The administration has abetted that strategy. In spite of Bush's post-Gulf War rhetoric, the administration has announced that it is providing arms packages to the Middle East totaling $4 billion, of which close to $1 billion in aircraft-delivered bombs, cluster bombs, air-to- air missiles, and military vehicles is destined for Saudi Arabia.[31]

The participation of the Saudis in the Madrid peace conference, although it had a very marginal effect on the outcome of the negotiations, helped to strengthen Bush's political popularity at home by suggesting that the Gulf War did achieve "something." The recent meetings between Saudi officials and American Jewish leaders, including the invitation extended leaders of American Jewish organizations to travel to Saudi Arabia, must be viewed in that context. Such conciliatory gestures can also be seen as part of an effort to neutralize the Israeli lobby's Capitol Hill opposition to arms sales to the kingdom.[32]

Prerevolutionary Conditions in Saudi Arabia

There are clear indications of continuing domestic opposition to the Saudi royal family. The House of Saud has resisted any move toward serious political and economic reforms proposed by Westernized Saudi elites. That intransigence reflects a catch-22 dilemma facing the House of Saud, which was accentuated by the American military intervention in the gulf. On the one hand, the regime's raison d'‡tre is its commitment to strict, anti-Western Islamic tenets, including support for Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Third World. On the other hand, to survive, the House of Saud needs the support of the West's prime power, the United States, which invites criticism from the conservative elements in the kingdom.

With Westernized opposition silenced, the only viable opposition to the royal family tends to be found in religious elements who enjoy relative autonomy in the Saudi system and focus on the discrepancy between the Saudi regime's Islamic pretensions and its ties with America. The numbers of fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia have grown considerably since the Persian Gulf crisis and, according to one observer, "are now estimated to include tens of thousands of younger radical religious leaders, Islamic university teachers and students."[33] Those leaders criticized the arrival of the American troops during the Gulf War and have attacked Saudi support for the Arab-Israeli peace process as well as the political and personal conduct of the Saudi leadership.

Washington, through its public rhetoric during the Gulf War, heightened expectations for democratic reforms in the Arab states of the gulf, only to collaborate later with the Saudis in stifling any possible moves in that direction. The Bush administration and the Saudis helped to restore the emir of Kuwait, whose government immediately resumed its harassment of proponents of democracy and launched a campaign of repression against and expulsion of the Palestinians living there. The Saudis were also apparently behind the American effort to prevent the weakening of the central government in Baghdad and the possible emergence of a Kurdish state or Iraqi Shi'ite autonomy.[34] Washington should, therefore, not be surprised if, as the provider of the main mercenary forces for the Saudi regime and its interests in the region, it ends up being the focus of hostility for the opposition groups in Saudi Arabia and the Arab gulf states.

The cosmetic political reforms announced in early March 1991, including the creation of a Consultive Council (to be chosen by the king himself), were portrayed in the American press as signs of a Saudi version of perestroika. In reality, the new measures do not introduce any elements of Western-style democracy; they are more akin to streamlining voting procedures in the Communist party in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. They are certainly not going to solve the regime's legitimacy problem.[35]

Article 19, a London-based freedom-of-expression watchdog group, reported recently that since the Gulf War there has been no lessening of the Saudi government's control over all aspects of life. What is permissible in Saudi Arabia is synonymous with the wishes of the current ruler, King Fahd, and "anything contradicting the origins or the jurisdiction of Islam, undermining the sanctity of Islam . . . or harming public morality" is subject to censorship. Artistic andacademic freedoms, for example, are severely limited or nonexistent, and the media are under total government control.[36]

Dangers to the United States

It is not the Green Peril that the United States is facing in the gulf but the peril embodied in its own policies. The pre-Gulf War Saudi debility stemmed from a willingness to secure the kingdom's interests through the preservation of an inter-Arab diplomatic framework for solving regional problems and the maintenance of a regional military balance of power. The American intervention in the gulf completely destroyed those two mechanisms. It led to the collapse of the Arab diplomatic order as a mechanism for dealing with crises and to the destruction of the balance of power in the gulf. It turned Washington into a local diplomatic hegemonic power and military "balancer." Those developments have made the Saudis not more "assertive" but more dependent for their survival, domestically and regionally, on American power. The fact that Saudi Arabia is for all practical purposes an American dependent today is perhaps one of the most dramatic results of the war. The perceived Saudi willingness to take "risks," such as attending the Madrid peace conference and refusing to subsidize the PLO, is largely based on the expectation that Washington will secure Saudi interests by, for example, "delivering" Israel to the negotiating table or deterring potential anti-Saudi Palestinian terrorism.

The current American-Saudi relationship resembles the U.S.-Iranian relationship during the shah's rule. In exchangef or granting access to oil supplies and military installations and showing a willingness to make the politically correct moves on Israel, the Saudi regime receives security protection masquerading as an "alliance" with Washington. That arrangement, however, lacks the clear definitions of obligations and rules of the game that characterize formal alliances.

Indeed, the "alliance" seems to involve an open-ended commitment on the part of Washington to continue supporting the Saudis, without a clear quid pro quo on their part. As was the case with the shah's Iran (and Israel today), Saudi Arabia's chief perquisite of being America's client state is the "freedom of enjoying a commitment without paying a penalty of being an ally."[37]

The U.S.-Saudi relationship produces destructive domestic political consequences for both countries. Washington is tying its interests to the survival of the repressive Saudi regime, while allowing the latter--through the control of oil prices, the buying of American military equipment, and cooperation in U.S. covert operations--to exert leverage on American policy and politics.

The specter of Iran does hang over Saudi Arabia, but not the way Riyadh is framing it, that is, as a consequence of subversive activity by an external power. The original revolution in Tehran, which was the first mass urban uprising in the Middle East and led to the establishment of Western-derived political institutions, was very much a product of American policies. If a revolutionary regime comes to power in Saudi Arabia and subordinates its institutions and mechanics to an anti-Western theocratic expression of nationalist ideology, U.S. policy, not the "exporting of radical Islam" from Iran, will be the culprit.

Iran

The foreign policy that has been pursued since the end of the Iran-Iraq War by the leadership in Tehran, headed by the reform-minded President Rafsanjani and the so-called "pragmatic group of revolutionary clerics,"[38] has reflected an effort to advance Iranian national interest more by regaining that state's traditional role as a gulf power and strengthening its economy than by orchestrating a regional or global messianic crusade. Iranian policies have stressed diplomatic pragmatism and military caution coupled with an effort to liberalize and privatize Iran's centralized economy, expand its trade relationships, alleviate its huge foreign debt problems, and satisfy its need for infrastructure.

Signs of Moderation

While the Saudi regime has pursued very superficial political and economic reforms, the government in Tehran has removed many of the religious restrictions, especially those on women, and helped to reinvigorate a quite lively parliamentary and political debate, which culminated in the critical parliamentary election in April 1992. Iran, according to Eric Hooglund, "compared to its Arab neighbors, does appear to have some political characteristics typical of democratic governments."[39]

Rafsanjani, himself from a wealthy pistachio-growing family, has sided with the wealthy merchants who ran Iran's economy in the years before the revolution brought nationalization and state control. He has welcomed foreigninvestment and called on Iranian expatriates to return and invest in the country.[40] Iran's economy after the war with Iraq was depressed and contorted by artificial controls. Since then, the governmenthas launched a major program to demilitarize the economy. "Fortunately, we don't have any serious military threat, "explained the governor of Iran's central bank. "The threat we do have is economic," he argued. "If you don't have enough food, even if you have the most sophisticated tank, how are you going to use it?"[41]

A Conventional Foreign Policy

Iran's policies during the gulf crisis and the war that followed were an example of textbook realpolitik diplomacy. The Iranian leadership was able to separate its ideological and historical baggage, including its resentment of both Washington and Baghdad--after all, Saddam invaded Iran in 1979 with a green light from the United States and the United Nations--from its vital, hard- core national interests.

Criticizing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and rejecting the permanent presence of U.S. military forces in the gulf, Tehran remained neutral during the crisis and the war that ensued. It took advantage of the developments in the gulf to sign apeace agreement with Iraq; to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Arab countries in the allied camp, above all with Saudi Arabia; and to improve its relations with countries that supported Iraq, especially Sudan.[42]

However, during the crisis Iran refrained from exploiting the weakness of the central government in Baghdad, except in the most cautious fashion. Its support for efforts to oust Saddam among Iraq's Shi'ite majority remained surprisingly limited. Similarly, Tehran did not take advantage of the anti-American feeling in the region to incite the Moslem world against the U.S. presence in the gulf. Rafsanjani's government even offered its services as a mediator between the United States and Iraq. Iran supported American, Saudi, and Turkish policies intended to replace Saddam with a more benign Iraqi leader and, like those states, expressed its interest in preventing the disintegration of Iraq after Operation Desert Storm.

Despite its anti-Israeli rhetoric, Iran supported the U.S. position that the Palestinian-Israeli problem and gulf security issues, including the invasion of Kuwait, should not be linked (as Saddam had demanded). In addition, after years of boycotting the UN Security Council, Tehran expressed an interest in becoming a member. It also reestablished diplomatic relations with Great Britain and expanded relations with other Western countries.[43] All of those actions were consistent with a conventional state's advancing its foreign policy interests, not a messianic state's seeking to foment revolution.

Postwar Initiatives

In the aftermath of the war, Iran has played a stabilizing role in the Middle East. Tehran pressured radical Shi'ite groups to release U.S. hostages in Lebanon, dispatched diplomats to mend its relationship with Saudi Arabia, and even sent fire fighters to the oil fields of Kuwait. More significant, perhaps, Iran launched plans for reintegrating itself into the gulf security system, a move intended to strengthen its own interests while providing the Arab gulf states with a countervailing force against a future threat from Iraq. Iranian spokesmen stated the need to replace "ideological radicalism" with "pragmatic politics" and argued that the fragile balance of power in the gulf, which was responsible for the outbreak of both the Iran-Iraq war and the Persian Gulf War, should be replaced with "clear lines and frameworks for a new approach to security issues of the region."[44] The Iranians presented a far-reaching plan for a regional collective security arrangement based on cooperation between the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC), noninterference of regional countries in each other's internal affairs, confidence-building measures, arms control structures, and economic reconstruction programs.[45]

Notwithstanding alarming U.S. intelligence reports, Iranian policy toward the Central Asian and Caucacus republicshas been confined to efforts to gradually establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with some of the newly independent states, especially with those, such as Azerbaijan, that have large Shi'ite populations. There are no indications that Tehran is engaged in political and religious "subversion" of the region, unless one considers helping set up mosques or religious schools subversive.[46]

While proposing ideas for regional security and trade cooperation, Iran has rejected efforts to exclude it from post-Desert Storm security arrangements through the creation of an exclusive Arab-dominated system there and, on a more general level, has expressed its opposition to a Pax Americana in the region. The latter is seen by Iranians as anachronistic at a time when the Soviet threat has disappeared. They believe that regional threats can be contained by regional powers and that foreign intervention is destabilizing. Indeed, Iran's message to the Saudis and the six-member GCC has been simple and straightforward. Iran is willing to play a positive role in the security of the gulf but will reject "extraregional arrangements" involving nongulf Arabstates, such as Egypt, or the continuing presence of Western, especially American, military forces in the region.[47]

Iran's position was one factor in Saudi Arabia's decision to reject a U.S.- supported proposal embodied in the so-called Damascus Declaration of early 1991. That declaration proposed that Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states base their security on the continuing presence of an Arab regional defense force led by Egypt and Syria. Tehran made it clear that it regarded such an arrangement as a hostile Pan-Arabist move.[48] The Iranian objective appears to be a Middle Eastern security system that would not be exclusively Arab but would include Pakistan and Turkey.

An Inconsistent U.S. Policy

Although Washington has never made clear its vision of a gulf security arrangement--it has supported such diverse ideas as a "Middle Eastern NATO" as well as the Damascus Declaration--its policy and statements suggest that it sees its interests in the region secured through a "strategic consensus" involving four pillars--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey,and Israel. An "occasional United States presence" would supplement their efforts and ensure that the oil resources of the region would "not be controlled by somebody fundamentally hostile to our interests."[49] It is not surprising that, from their vantage point, the Iranian leadership perceives those American plans and the continued U.S. military presence in the region as directed against them.

Washington has responded to the positive signals coming from Iran with mixed messages. On the one hand, the U.S.government is gradually trying to take advantage of Rafsanjani's moves toward a free-market economy and to expand economic relations with Tehran. Initially, the Bush administration had restricted U.S. trade with Iran and had even tried to keep other countries from investing in that country. It was only last year that the administration removed some trade restrictions. The result was that trade between Iran and the United States leaped 300 percent as the United States became the sixth-largest exporter to Iran, with more than $5 million in exports. Moreover, the administration recently withdrew its objections to the sale of European-made Airbus passenger jets, which use U.S.-made engines, to Iran.[50]

On the other hand, when it comes to the diplomatic and military arenas, Washington seems to be intent on treating Iran as a pariah state, a "strategic enemy," as Patrick Clawson put it.[51] The Bush administration has rejected Iran's reintegration into the gulf security system and has denounced alleged Iranian pursuit of a nuclear military path.

The Issue of Nuclear Weapons

Washington's reports about Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear capability are denied by Tehran, and the evidence is ambiguous. Even if Iran does have nuclear ambitions, such Iranian moves are not necessarily a reflection of "radical" foreign policy goals. Avner Yaniv, an Israeli military analyst, suggested recently that "as the leaders in Tehran see it, since Pakistan for all practical purposes is a nuclear military power and Iraq, notwithstanding U.S. efforts, is moving in that direction--and the main target of Saddam's nuclear efforts is Tehran--Iran is now surrounded by a circle of nuclear threats." Rafsanjani's attempt to acquire nuclear capability is defensive in nature, and "any other regime in Tehran would have taken similar steps," concluded Yaniv (indeed, it was America's friend the shah who initiated Iran's nuclear arms program).

Yaniv raised another interesting point. Some observers expressed concern that Iran's overtures to Kazakhstan might be part of an effort to try to take advantage of that Moslem state's nuclear military capability. He argued that, if anything,a nuclear Kazakhstan--which with 1,500 nuclear warheads has a larger arsenal than France--is actually perceived by Iran as a major threat to its security, not as a source of support for its own nuclear program.[52] Certainly, American efforts to isolate Iran only strengthen its sense of insecurity and may accelerate its nuclear drive. At the same time, Iran's ideas for regional security arrangements--rejected by Washington--have at least the potential for creating some mechanism for controlling arms, including nuclear arms.

Moreover, by continuing to try to isolate Iran, Washington is weakening the forces of Rafsanjani and the more pragmatic wing of the current Iranian regime that won a massive victory in the parliamentary elections on April 10,1992. Without a large flow of foreign investment and in a continuing hostile diplomatic environment, Rafsanjani and his allies in the parliament will find it difficult to continue their efforts to demilitarize and reform the economy and to pursue a moderate diplomatic path.

American hostility toward Iran is understandable given the anti-Western nature of the Iranian revolution, the 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, the threat to assassinate author Salman Rushdie, and the ties between Iran and radical Moslem groups.

However, Iranian behavior should be seen in its historical context. The legacy of U.S. intervention in Iran after WorldWar II, especially Washington's support for the repressive regime of the shah, left a residue of hostility toward American policy, not only among Islamic radicals, but also among more secular and Westernized Iranians. That hostility was only strengthened after what was seen in Iran as U.S. support for the Iraqi invasion of Iran and American efforts to prevent an Iranian victory in the war with Baghdad.

Constraints on Iranian Power

The image of Iran as the new regional bogeyman is exaggerated. Iranian foreign policy seems to project a pragmatic understanding of world and regional politics and a careful application of diplomatic and military means. Even if one assumes that Iran is intent in spreading Islamic radicalism and creating a huge monolithic bloc stretching from North Africa to India, it is obvious that Tehran does not have the power to achieve that goal and will be prevented from doing so by such powerful states as Russia, Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt, even without American prodding. [end excerpt]

GreyLmist  posted on  2010-09-14   8:33:00 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  

#2. To: All (#1)

This article was written at the start of the Clinton era, shortly after the one above, and similarly warns against manufacturing a "Green Peril" Islamic stand- in to replace the Cold War Red Menace.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48754/leon-t-hadar/what-green- peril

What Green Peril?
By Leon T. Hadar
Spring 1993

Summary:

With the end of the Cold War many at home and abroad are urging the United States to prepare for a new long struggle against radical Islam. But Islam is neither a threat to the United States nor a unified political phenomenon. Iran, the supposed center of Islamic fundamentalism, has pursued a foreign policy dominated by geopolitics, not religion. In the rest of the Middle East, Islam has become the language of political opposition to a thoroughly corrupt status quo. By blindly supporting autocratic Arab regimes against these popular movements, the United States will turn the threat of Islamic fundamentalism into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Fanning the Fear of Islam

From home and abroad voices have begun to counsel the Clinton administration that with communism's death, America must prepare for a new global threat-- radical Islam. This specter is symbolized by the Middle Eastern Muslim fundamentalist, a Khomeini-like creature armed with a radical ideology and nuclear weapons, intent on launching a jihad against Western civilization.

In the search for new doctrines for a new world, this image of a worldwide threat from militant Islam could filter deep into the policymaking processes of the new administration. In the way that the perception of danger from Soviet communism helped to define U.S. foreign policy for more than four decades, the fear of Islam could embroil Washington in a second Cold War.

This policy, however, would rest on utterly fallacious assumptions: Islam is neither unified nor a threat to the United States. Were America to let these phobias drive its foreign policy it would be forced into long and costly battles with various, unrelated regional phenomena. In the Middle East, the principal battleground of this struggle, it would place America in the position of maintaining a corrupt, reactionary and unstable status quo. In short, such a policy would run against the long-term interests of the peoples of America and the Middle East.

Conjuring up a New Menace

Like the Red Menace of the Cold War era, the Green Peril--green being the color of Islam--is described as a cancer spreading around the globe, undermining the legitimacy of Western values and threatening the national security of the United States. Tehran is the center of this ideological subversion, the world's new Comintern. The goal of the Iranian-led global intifada is said to be support for anti-Western regimes stretching from North Africa across the Near East and the Persian Gulf to Central Asia. Tehran's aim is to control the oil- rich gulf, destroy Israel and threaten areas on the periphery of a new "arc of crisis"--the Horn of Africa, southern Europe, the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent.

This is a premium article

You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. [my note: Which I'm not, so can't print more from the article than that.]

GreyLmist  posted on  2010-09-14 09:04:05 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  

Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest

[Home]  [Headlines]  [Latest Articles]  [Latest Comments]  [Post]  [Sign-in]  [Mail]  [Setup]  [Help]  [Register]