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Business/Finance See other Business/Finance Articles Title: This Is The Government: Your Legal Right To Redeem Your Money Market Account Has Been Denied - The Sequel Two years ago, in January 2010, Zero Hedge wrote "This Is The Government: Your Legal Right To Redeem Your Money Market Account Has Been Denied" which became one of our most read stories of the year. The reason? Perhaps something to do with an implicit attempt at capital controls by the government on one of the primary forms of cash aggregation available: $2.7 trillion in US money market funds. The proximal catalyst back then were new proposed regulations seeking to pull one of these three core pillars (these being no volatility, instantaneous liquidity, and redeemability) from the foundation of the entire money market industry, by changing the primary assumptions of the key Money Market Rule 2a-7. A key proposal would give money market fund managers the option to "suspend redemptions to allow for the orderly liquidation of fund assets." In other words: an attempt to prevent money market runs (the same thing that crushed Lehman when the Reserve Fund broke the buck). This idea, which previously had been implicitly backed by the all important Group of 30 which is basically the shadow central planners of the world (don't believe us? check out the roster of current members), did not get too far, and was quickly forgotten. Until today, when the New York Fed decided to bring it back from the dead by publishing "The Minimum Balance At Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market Funds". Now it is well known that any attempt to prevent a bank runs achieves nothing but merely accelerating just that (as Europe recently learned). But this coming from central planners - who never can accurately predict a rational response - is not surprising. What is surprising is that this proposal is reincarnated now. The question becomes: why now? What does the Fed know about market liquidity conditions that it does not want to share, and more importantly, is the Fed seeing a rapid deterioration in liquidity conditions in the future, that may and/or will prompt retail investors to pull their money in another Lehman-like bank run repeat? Here is how the Fed frames the problem in the abstract: And further: The motivation for an MBR is to diminish the benefits of redeeming MMF shares quickly when a fund is in trouble and to reduce the potential costs that others redemptions impose on non? redeeming shareholders. Thus, the MBR would be an effective deterrent to runs because, in the event that an MMF breaks the buck (and only in such an event), the MBR would ensure a fairer allocation of losses among investors. Poster Comment: This Federal Reserve proposal brought to mind an old Bachman-Turner Overdrive song: Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
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