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History See other History Articles Title: ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES POLICY [Dealing with Israel and JFK's demise] /3/Secret. Drafted by Strong and concurred in by Elwood (INR/RNA). A. Our Posture toward Israel. Within the limits (described in D. below) dictated by the necessity for a reasonably friendly relationship with most of the Arab states, in order to protect our interest in the Near East, we: (1) seek to maintain cordial and close relations with Israel; (2) contribute heavily in money or money equivalents to enable Israel to meet its security and growth (including immigration) objectives without directly implicating the United States on the sensitive aspects; (3) frequently reassure Israel that it has in effect an unwritten but effective security guarantee from the US, that the Arabs understand this, and that Israel is thus in a position to conduct a policy of restraint; (4) encourage other friendly states to assist Israel in meeting its military needs; (5) encourage Israel to expand its unilateral efforts to earn wider friendship and economic benefits in the community of nations; (6) support those UN instrumentalities in the Near East which contribute to maintenance of a peaceful condition, and demonstrate support for certain UN resolutions of importance to the world community; (7) permit Israel to buy, and provide credit for, a wide range of unclassified military equipment and supplies requiring export licenses; (8) avoid close military relationships and consultations as well as partnership with Israel in ventures outside of Israel; and (9) undertake a wide range of cultural contacts and placement of many research contracts in Israel. Each matter arising in our relationship with Israel is carefully weighed in terms of its effect on our policy of impartiality as between Israel and the Arabs and of its effect on Israel's security. Over a period of years we have come to learn what can be done on behalf of Israel without creating serious tensions with the Arabs. B. Israel's Desires and Tactics. During the first year or so of the Kennedy Administration, Israel appeared principally to watch developments, creating no major issues, but constantly probing relatively gently in such areas as a security guarantee, military equipment, military relationships, economic assistance, cooperation in technical assistance to third countries, and an Israel relationship with the Common Market and the OECD. Perhaps the opening gun of the current major offensive was the so-called "Brazzaville resolution" of December 1961 inspired originally by Israel and sponsored by 15 other members, principally African, of the General Assembly calling upon Israel and the Arabs to conduct direct peace negotiations for the settlement of the Palestine conflict. US opposition to this resolution has been a source of continuing criticism of the US Government, to a limited extent by Israeli officials, but on a considerable scale by Israel's American sympathizers. The criticism increasingly has been linked by domestic critics to President Kennedy's campaign statements calling for a comprehensive settlement in the Near East. Statements are appearing more frequently to the effect that it is time for the President to redeem his campaign pledges. A steady campaign of criticism has flowed also from the Security Council resolution of April 9 censuring Israel for its retaliatory raid and only deploring Syrian "hostile acts." Israel's action is portrayed as being necessary to defense of its security in the absence of prompt and effective UN action. In addition, fingers are pointed at the hostile propaganda conducted by the Arabs against Israel, the indoctrination of young Arabs with hatred of Israel, the increasing Soviet armaments (particularly aircraft) reportedly being acquired by the UAR and Syria, the strengthening of the UAR by expanded US economic assistance, and the declaration by the Arabs that large-scale withdrawal by Israel in 1963-64 of Jordan waters will be a casus belli. The ensemble of these arguments appears designed to point to a growing threat to Israel's security and a need for measures by the US to redress the balance. No doubt Israel is concerned that with an Algerian settlement France will reduce its support. We are sure neither the Israelis nor their supporters in the US believe it possible to achieve a peace settlement in the Near East or to eliminate hostile propaganda or teachings. We have evidence from several sources that Israel expected to be condemned for its retaliatory raid of March 16-17. We believe the Israelis intellectually understand that a better US-UAR relation is useful to Israel. While they are concerned at a possible UAR surprise air strike, they have a variety of means of assuring effective defense. They know that the UAR has the means to acquire Soviet arms whether the US assists the UAR economically or not. The Israelis also know that their water diversion system cannot be damaged seriously from the air and that Syria cannot successfully mount a ground action to destroy the pumping station. While American Jewry has concentrated on the need for an overall settlement, we believe the recent visit of Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, has brought into focus the true Israel objectives. Ambassador Harman's call on you on May 28 tends to confirm our thesis. A principal argument used by both Peres and Harman was that the US, having worsened Israel's position by aiding the UAR, should now make a compensatory gesture to Israel. The fact that Peres did not mention Israel's desire for a United States assurance on Israel's right to Jordan waters may well stem from his understanding that such an assurance will be forthcoming. Mr. Peres' principal concerns seemed to be a) an arrangement for continuing military consultations between Israel and the US, b) bolstering of Israel's air defenses by acquisition of the Hawk missile system, and the Minister of the Israeli Embassy proposed in the context of Peres' visit a c) security guarantee by letter from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. Thus, we believe that considerable pressure will be mounted against the Administration domestically in the context of the President's campaign references to the Near East and in terms of US assistance to the UAR, but that Peres' objectives are what Israel will really seek. Israel has pressed in past years for both the Hawk missile system and US- Israel military consultations, as well as for a security guarantee. It seems reasonable to assume that in this election year another "college try" will be made by Israel and its supporters here and that a serious effort will be made to show that Israel faces a situation of unusual peril in the next two to three years. C. Israel's Security Problem. The latest "Israel-Arab Situation" report prepared by the intelligence community is dated December 1961. The next revision is due in June. Dealing with military factors alone, the report of last December does indicate certain Israeli vulnerability to air attack, but points to continuation of Israeli air superiority, despite acquisition by the UAR of TU-16 bombers, as a result of Israel's purchase of Mirage III aircraft, some of which have now been delivered. Israel's clear military superiority on the ground continues. We continue to believe there are a number of political and psychological factors which will indefinitely deter the Arabs, principally the UAR and Syria, from undertaking major aggression against Israel, whether by ground attack, by air attack, or by a combination of both: (1) The Arabs have a deep fear of Israel and its military prowess. (2) The Arabs fear, with reason, Western intervention on behalf of Israel. (3) The consequences of defeat would be serious for those Arab leaders responsible for it. (4) The UAR clearly has given high priority to domestic development for some years to come. The Egyptians have consistently proved capable of calculating coldly where their interests lie and are not controlled by emotions. They now appear to be considering the problem of Israel on a long-range rather than a short-range basis. (5) A lesson learned by the Arabs in 1948 is that they cannot possibly cope with Israel if their forces are operating independently. Divisive forces in the Arab world are too deep to be overcome in a short time. (6) The Arabs have come to have more confidence in the US as the US has continued to pursue a balanced policy and to show due regard for Arab interests. As time passes and as our policy is implemented consistently, the Arabs will have greater confidence in our will to prevent expansion by Israel. (7) We plan to continue inspections of the Dimona reactor by qualified American scientists and, if possible, by "neutrals" as well, and to continue to provide the Arabs with assurances of its peaceful nature. This course of action should be sufficient to remove temptation for a surprise UAR or UAR-Syrian air raid on the reactor. The foregoing factors must be given heavy weight in assessing Israel's security situation. In our opinion, Israel is in little actual danger of an Arab assault now and is not likely to be in any real danger over the next few years. In NEA we consider this problem practically daily and are fully alert to all its aspects. D. The Rationale for Our Policy toward Israel. Our problems with Israel stem largely from: a) unrequited Israeli desires for the establishment of a special relationship between Israel and the US in matters of national security, and b) Arab-Israel frictions along Israel's borders. Although Israel has sought US sponsorship of training in Israel for third-country nationals, has proposed cooperative US- Israel ventures in technical aid to third countries, objects to our policy of suggesting to other countries that they establish diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv rather than in Jerusalem, and differs with us on the question of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias, these matters are of relatively minor consequence to the tenor of our relations. We believe that in seeking continuing military consultations with the US and in proposing periodically a US security guarantee, Israel seeks not only reassurance for its own people, but also a clear demonstration to the Arabs that the US is, in effect, allied with Israel. In requesting the US to supply the Hawk missile system Israel seeks to eliminate any vulnerability it may feel to attack by manned aircraft and thus assure the security of Israel against the Arabs until such time as offensive missile systems may be introduced into the Near East. (1) Arguments for and against a Special National Security Arrangement with Israel. a. For i. From the foreign policy standpoint, there are no advantages. ii. From a domestic point of view, the American supporters of Israel would be pleased and would be less critical of our policy. b. Against i. Would constitute a direct challenge to the Arabs by the US, destroy growing Arab confidence in our impartiality, and remove the protective covering of the UN behind which we deal with most Palestine issues. ii. Could not be counterbalanced by creation of a corresponding relationship with the Arabs. iii. Would render the US responsible in Arab eyes for every Israeli military venture. iv. Would encourage the more fanatical Arabs to seek a similar relationship with the Soviet Union and would hand the Soviets a very useful propaganda weapon. v. Would be the only US security arrangement with another country not directed against the Sino-Soviet bloc, and would cause us further problems with Pakistan in refusing to take Pakistan's side in the Kashmir dispute. vi. Would lead to increasing Israeli demands for sophisticated weapons. vii. Would put greater pressure on Arab leaders well-disposed toward the US. viii. Would be unnecessary to maintenance of Israel's security. ix. Would pose security problems for DOD. We believe Israel and its supporters should accept that a reasonably good US-Arab relationship is in Israel's interest and that Israel's proposals for a special relationship with the US would be self-defeating if executed. While rarely mentioned, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 has never been declared dead by the US and could possibly be the basis for providing additional assurances to Israel without provoking the Arabs. (2) Arguments for and against Supplying the Hawk to Israel. a. For i. From the US foreign policy standpoint, possession of the Hawk would strengthen the weak link in Israel's defenses and thereby reduce any temptation Israel may have to take preemptive offensive action. ii. From the domestic standpoint, American supporters of Israel would be pleased and would be less critical of US policy. b. Against i. Sale of the Hawk would jeopardize the security of its classified elements. ii. Although the Hawk is a defensive weapon only, its sale to Israel now would pin on the US responsibility for adding a new element of sophistication to weaponry in the Near East and would contribute to heightening of the arms race and the economic burdens attendant thereon. (At such time as the UAR and/or Syria obtains such missiles this factor will cease being a serious one.) iii. In the interest of impartiality the US would have to consider whether to offer the Hawk to Israel's Arab neighbors, whose ability to handle it is doubtful. Spreading such weapons around the Near East might place civil aviation in some jeopardy. iv. The door would be opened to further requests by sophisticated equipment such as air-to-air missiles, also allegedly defensive. We doubt that Israel would rest satisfied with having gotten the Hawk. Rather, it would set a new objective and would not have achieved appeasement or surcease of pressure by Israel. v. Deterrents against Arab surprise air attack are listed in C. above. E. How We Propose to Deal with Israel. (1) We consider it important not to give in to Israeli and domestic pressures for a special relationship in national security matters. To undertake, in effect, a military alliance with Israel would destroy the delicate balance we seek to maintain in our Near Eastern relations. (2) We believe a decision on sale of the Hawk missile to Israel should be delayed for approximately two years, or, if earlier, until a) Ground-to-air missiles have been introduced into the area by the Soviets, in which case sale of the Hawk to Israel would be more defensible. Should at any time a decision to sell Israel the Hawk be taken or become likely, we urge that NEA be allowed time to discuss the matter with the UAR and perhaps Syria with a view to reducing reaction to our decision before it becomes public knowledge. b) In the spring of 1964 Israel presumably will undertake large-scale withdrawal of water from Lake Tiberias. Since this is a matter of importance to the Arabs, we prefer to deal with it without the complications that would ensue from the early provision of the Hawk to Israel. c) Israel's Chief of Staff has stated that Israel is not afraid of the Arabs through 1966 and that the Arabs would be no real threat to Israel's existence up to 1970. If in 1964 Israel continues to have the same problems, i.e., defense against low-flying aircraft, it might prove useful in the next election year to have the Hawk available for discussion. d) We expect to be able to carry out further inspections of the Dimona reactor and thus to be able to continue to reassure the Arabs. This should serve to remove an Arab fear which might tempt the Arabs otherwise to attempt a surprise air attack on the reactor. (3) To meet with relatively small risk the Israeli desire for a security guarantee, we are exploring the possibility of a unilateral reactivation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (attached Tab B)/4/ insofar as it pertains to aggression. To do so would avoid the necessity of a new formulation with resultant complications. Tentatively we are considering oral statements to Israel and to certain of the Arabs, without publicity, perhaps tieing our approaches to the Jordan waters problem over which there already has been violence. 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#2. To: Eoghan, All (#0)
Look to the insanity - We can't fund a religious school in the USA, but we can fund the apartheid and "Jewish" State of Istael. (Yeah!) What's wrong in this picture??? Let the Pallies get sectioned off to a totally new sovereignty; and it gets that much worse. Anybody want to think outside the box?
Conclusion: Israel and organized Jewry are parasites, not to be trusted. Cry on our shoulders, knife us in back. Now...we're bled dry.
JFK's concern over Israel's nuclear bomb program likely led to his assassination. He was the last president who put American interest above that of Israel -Z- ============================================================================== The Missing Link In The JFK Assassination Conspiracy More Evidence Mossad Killed JFK Over Israeli Nukes The Missing Link In The JFK Assassination Conspiracy From John 9-28-3 (Note - The second item below is a letter from JFK to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol which makes it crystal clear JFK did NOT want the Jewish state to develop nuclear weapons and that he was demanding regular US inspections of the Dimona Nuclear facility...which, as we now know, was/is used to develop Israel's enormous inventory of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. The US Air Force white paper regarding past and ongoing Israeli thermonuclear blackmail of the US is a stunning look at how Zionism has exerted such staggering domination over the US for decades. -ed) After reading: "New JFK Assassination Theory" from WND, it is obvious that it is just more dis-information diverting attention away from the more than likely perpetrators, the Mossad. It's only fair to remind or inform your readers of the theory posed by Michael Collins Piper in 'Final Judgment'. His theory makes more sense than anything. Final Judgement Reviewed by Mark Braver There seems to be a lot of misperception of what Final Judgment does and does not say about the JFK assassination. The book does not say that "the Jews killed JFK." That's horse manure. What the book does say is that: When New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison charged businessman Clay Shaw with participation in the JFK assassination conspiracy Garrison stumbled upon the Israeli Mossad connection to the murder of President Kennedy. Shaw served on the board of a shadowy corporation known as Permindex. A primary shareholder in Permindex was the Banque De Credit International of Geneva, founded by Tibor Rosenbaum, an arms procurer and financier for the Mossad. What's more, the Mossad-sponsored Swiss bank was the chief "money laundry" for Meyer Lansky, the head of the international crime syndicate and an Israeli loyalist whose operations meshed closely on many fronts with the American CIA. The chairman of Permindex was Louis M. Bloomfield of Montreal, a key figure in the Israeli lobby and an operative of the Bronfman family of Canada, long-time Lansky associates and among Israel's primary international patrons. In the pages of "Final Judgment" the Israeli connection to the JFK assassination is explored in frightening--and fully documented--detail. For example, did you know: * That JFK was engaged in a bitter secret conflict with Israel over U.S. East policy and that Israel's prime minister resigned in disgust, saying JFK's stance threatened Israel's very survival? * That JFK's successor, Lyndon Johnson, immediately reversed America's policy toward Israel? * That the top Mafia figures often alleged to be behind the JFK assassination were only front men for Meyer Lansky? * That the CIA's liaison to the Mossad, James Angleton, was a prime mover behind the cover-up of the JFK assassination? Why didn't Oliver Stone, in his famous movie "JFK" not mention any of this? It turns out the chief financial backer of Stone's film was longtime Mossad figure, Arnon Milchan, Israel's biggest arms dealer. The very fact that the Israeli lobby has gone through such great lengths to try to smear Michael Collins Piper and to try to discredit Final Judgment gives the book great credibility. If the book was really so silly or so unconvincing, it doesn't seem likely that groups such as the Anti-Defamation League would go out of their way to try to suppress the book as they have. The fact is that Piper demonstrates that Israel did indeed have a very strong motive to want to get JFK out of the way and that numerous people who have been linked in other writings to the JFK conspiracy were (as Piper documents) also in the sphere of influence of Israel's Mossad. Not only Clay Shaw in New Orleans, but also James Angleton at the CIA, who was Israel's strongest advocate at the CIA and also the CIA's liaison to the Mossad. The Israeli connection is indeed "the missing link in the JFK assassination conspiracy." The "Reader from Chicago" who wrote the review of Final Judgment posted here is really off the beam and I suspect he (or she) is deliberately distorting what Piper's book does say in order to try to discourage people from reading it. The fact is that Piper's book documents (quite clearly, in my estimation) not only the means, opportunity and the motive for Israeli Mossad involvement in the assassination (working in conjunction with the CIA), but it is also quite fascinating and very interesting read. "Boring" is the last word I'd use to describe the book, and it is certainly not "poorly written." What's more, the book is not--I repeat--not "anti-Semitic" and the book has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the subject of the Holocaust. In fact, anybody familiar with any of the standard writings on the JFK assassination will recognize the names of some of the key players in the scenario Piper documents: Clay Shaw, David Ferrie, Guy Banister and James J. Angleton of the CIA--and none of them were Jewish. So where this reviewer gets off saying that Piper finds "a Jew under every rock" is beyond me. I have read literally hundreds of books and magazine articles and other material on the JFK assassination and not in a single one of them--with the exception of Final Judgment--did I ever learn that President John F. Kennedy was trying to stop Israel from building the nuclear bomb and that this literally touched off a "secret war" behind the scenes between JFK and Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, who resigned (among other reasons) in disgust over JFK's policies with Israel. In fact, Israeli historian Avner Cohen in his book, Israel and the Bomb, documents this quite thoroughly. And in Final Judgment Piper also outlines some interesting Israeli connections by people who have been linked to the JFK assassination and cover-up, including Clay Shaw of New Orleans. Even Israeli journalist Barry Chamish has written in an Internet review of Final Judgment that he finds Piper's Israeli connection (via Shaw and Permindex) quite convincing. There was a controversy in the Chicago area following an attempt by the Anti-Defamation League (an Israeli lobby organization) and people associated with the ADL to prevent Final Judgment from being placed in the Schaumburg Township District Library. Chances are the Reader from Chicago is probably an ADL representative! --This text refers to the Unknown Binding edition. __________ JFK's Concern Over Israel's Nuclear Bomb Program JFK's Letter To Israeli PM Eshkol July 5, 1963 Dear Mr. Prime Minister (Eshkol), It gives me great personal pleasure to extend congratulations as you assume your responsibilities as Prime Minister of Israel. You have our friendship and best wishes in your new tasks. It is on one of these that I am writing you at this time. You are aware, I am sure, of the exchange which I had with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion concerning American visits (ie: inspections -ed) to Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona. Most recently, the Prime Minister wrote to me on May 27. His words reflected a most intense personal consideration of a problem that I know is not easy for your Government, as it is not for mine. We welcomed the former Prime Minister's strong reaffirmation that Dimona will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes and the reaffirmation also of Israel's willingness to permit periodic visits (ie: inspections -ed) to Dimona. I regret having to add to your burdens so soon after your assumption of office, but I feel the crucial importance of this problem necessitates my taking up with you at this early date certain further considerations, arising out of Mr. Ben-Gurion's May 27 letter, as to the nature and scheduling of such visits. I am sure you will agree that these visits should be as nearly as possible in accord with international standards, thereby resolving all doubts as to the peaceful intent of the Dimona project. As I wrote Mr. Ben-Gurion, this Government's commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to the peace as the question of Israel's effort in the nuclear field. Therefore, I asked our scientists to review the alternative schedules of visits we and you had proposed. If Israel's purposes are to be clear beyond reasonable doubt, I believe that the schedule which would best serve our common purposes would be a visit early this summer, another visit in June 1964, and thereafter at intervals of six months. I am sure that such a schedule should not cause you any more difficulty than that which Mr. Ben-Gurion proposed in his May 27 letter. It would be essential, and I understand that Mr. Ben-Gurion's letter was in accord with this, that our scientist have access to all areas of the Dimona site and to any related part of the complex, such as fuel fabrication facilities or plutonium separation plant, and that sufficient time to be allotted for a thorough examination. Knowing that you fully appreciate the truly vital significance of this matter to the future well-being of Israel, to the United States, and internationally, I am sure our carefully considered request will have your most sympathetic attention. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy http://www.jfkmontreal.com/toc.htm Here is the US Air Force paper on Israel's nuclear blackmail of the United States and its influence on US foreign policy. One can draw additional conclusions about how such blackmail might have factored into the trillion plus US dollars that have benefited Israel since JFK's murder. Israel's 'Use' Of Nuclear Weapons Against Us Bush Must Say 'No' To Israeli Nuclear Blackmail - LaRouche Comment From George LoBuono 10-3-3 Mossad motives against JFK are probably true, but don't forget who more probably did the actual shooting and the cover-up. CIA and military-industrial fingerprints are all over the hit. Meyer Lansky may have had Permindex-Mossad ties, i.e. he sought refuge in Israel toward the end of his life, but Lansky had much more going here in the USA. For example, the United Fruit company figures in the lives of more assassination suspects than did Permindex. Col. Fletcher Prouty's naming of Gen. Ed Lansdale as the man in Dealey Plaza photos (walking past the famous hobo suspects) also points to United Fruit. Lansdale's protege in the CIA was Allen Dulles, who worked for United Fruit for years. United Fruit was owned by the Du Pont family. Incidentally, the Bronfman family which this article ties to Permindex, held a major share of Du Pont corp. stock up until a few years ago. In short, there may have been Mossad motives against JFK, but the larger hand and the triggermen appear to have been US citizens. Disclaimer Email This Article MainPage http://www.rense.com This Site Served by TheHostPros
More 'woodpile Jew' connections...ciadatabase: “Biographic Information on John Deutch indicates he was a protege of Mr. Covert Action, Colonel Lansdale. He is living up to his mentor's legacy by sponsoring paramilitary operations -- aimed at three countries -- Iraq, Libya and now the Sudan. Paramilitary operations arm civilians to kill people in target countries who oppose their goals.” “The new DCI Deutch's father, Michael Deutch, was a Russian of Jewish extraction. In 51, he went on a presidential mission as an economic adviser and became impressed with Colonel Lansdale - and became a lifelong friend of the Colonel. in 61 Lansdale recruited John Deutch for his first gvt job. at 22, he became one of Macnamara's whiz kids at the Pentagon. John spent four years in systems analysis. he later held political posts in democratic adms and went back to academic and advisory posts in republican times. he was on president Reagan's commission on nuclear strategy, Bush's foreign intelligence advisory board and six other similar panels. He became rich. the CIA he says ‘is an org suffering because it's had tremendous criticism because of its own mistakes,’ it does not want to admit. new york times mag 12/10/95 passim. The CIA, of course, is also active against Iran and probably backs the Taliban in Afghanistan.” “Covert ops as practiced by Deutch seems to be an approach that says full speed ahead -- damn the consequences. I am surprised that he is a covert cowboy rather than the reflective intellectual we were told about.”
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