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Resistance See other Resistance Articles Title: The End of the "Wars on the Cheap" for the United States With the Neocon coup against Trump now completed (at least in its main objective, that is the neutralization of Trump, the subsidiary objective, impeaching Trump and removing him from office remains something for the future) the world has to deal, yet again, with a very dangerous situation: the AngloZionist Empire is on a rapid decline, but the Neocons are back in power and they will do anything and everything in their power to stop and reverse this trend. It is also painfully obvious from their rhetoric, as well as from their past actions, that the only solution out the Neocons see is to trigger some kind of war. So the pressing question now becomes this: where will the Empire strike next?. Will it be the DPRK or Syria? Iran or Venezuela? In the Ukraine, maybe? Or do the Neocons seek war with Russia or China? Now, of course, if we assume that the Neocons are completely crazy, then everything is possible, from a US invasion of Lesotho to a simultaneous thermonuclear attack on Russia and China. I am in no way dismissing the insanity (and depravity) of the Neocons, but I also see no point in analyzing that which is clearly irrational, if only because all modern theories of deterrence always imply a rational actor and not a crazy lunatic on a suicidal amok run. For our purposes, therefore, we will assume that there is a semblance of rational thinking left in Washington DC and that even if the Neocons decide to launch some clearly crazy operation, somebody in the top levels of power will find the courage prevent this, just like Admiral Fallon did it with his not on my watch! which possibly prevented a US attack on Iran in 2007). So, assuming a modicum of rationality is still involved, where would the Empire strike next? The ideal scenario We all by now know exactly what the Empire likes to do: find some weak country, subvert it, accuse it of human right violations, slap economic sanctions, trigger riots and militarily intervene in defense of democracy, freedom and self-determination (or some other combo of equally pious and meaningless concepts). But that is only the political recipe. What I want to look into is what I call the American way of war, that is the way US commanders like to fight. During the Cold War, most of the US force planning, procurement, doctrine and training was focused on fighting a large conventional war against the Soviet Union and it was clearly understood that this conventional war could escalate into a nuclear war. Setting aside the nuclear aspect for a while (it is not relevant to our discussion), I would characterize the conventional dimension of such a war as heavy: centered on large formations (divisions, brigades), involving a lot of armor and artillery, this kind of warfare would involve immense logistical efforts on both sides and that, in turn, would involve deep-strikes on second echelon forces, supply dumps, strategic axes of communications (roads, railways, bridges, etc.) and a defense in depth in key sectors. The battlefield would be huge, hundreds of kilometers away on both sides of the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area, or front line). On all levels, tactical, operational and strategic, defenses would be prepare in two, possibly three, echelons. To give you an idea of the distances involved, the Soviet 2nd strategic echelon in Europe was deployed as far back as the Ukraine! (this is why, by the way, the Ukraine inherited huge ammo dumps from the Soviet Union, and why there never was a shortage of weapons on any side for the conduct of the Ukrainian civil war). With the collapse of the Soviet Unions Empire, this entire threat disappeared, if not overnight, then almost overnight. Of course, the Gulf War provided the US armed forces and NATO one last, but big, goodbye party (against an enemy which had absolutely no chance to prevail), but soon thereafter it became pretty clear to US strategists that the heavy war was over and that armored brigades might not be the most useful war-fighting tool in the US arsenal. This is when US strategists, mostly from Special Operation Forces, developed what I like to call war on the cheap. It works something like this: first, get the CIA to fund, arm and train some local insurgents (if needed, bring some from abroad); next embed US Special Forces with these local insurgents and provide them with FACs (forward air controllers, frontline soldiers specially trained to direct close support fixed and rotary wing aircraft to strike at enemy forces in direct contact with US and friendlies); finally, deploy enough aircraft in and around the combat zone (on aircraft carriers, in neighboring countries or even on seized local airstrips) to support combat operations day and night. The key notion is simple: provide the friendly insurgents with an overwhelming advantage in firepower. You have all seen this on YouTube: US and coalition forces advance until they get into a firefight and, unless they rapidly prevail, they call in an airstrike which results into a huge BOOM!!! following by cheering Americans and friendlies and the total disappearance of the attackers. Repeat that enough times, and you get an easy, cheap and rapid victory over a completely outgunned enemy. This basic approach can be enhanced by various supplements such as providing the insurgents with better gear (antitank weapons, night vision, communications, etc.) and bringing in some US or allied forces, including mercenaries, to take care of the really tough targets. While many in the US armed forces were deeply skeptical of this new approach, the dominance of the Special Forces types and the success, at least temporarily, of this war on the cheap in Afghanistan made it immensely popular with US politicians and propagandists. Best of all, this type of warfare resulted in very few casualties for the Americans and even provided them with a high degree of plausible deniability should something go wrong. Of course, the various three letter spooks loved it too. What so many failed to realize in the early euphoria about US invincibility was that this war on the cheap made three very risky assumptions: First and foremost, it relied on a deeply demoralized enemy who felt that, like in the series Star Trek, resistance to the Borg (aka the USA) was futile because even if the actual US forces deployed were limited in size and capabilities, the Americans would, no doubt, bring in more and more forces if needed, until the opposition was crushed. Second, this type of warfare assumes that the US can get air superiority over the entire battlefield. Americans do not like to provide close air support when they can be shot down by enemy aircraft or missiles. Third, this type of warfare requires the presence of local insurgents who can be used as boots on the ground to actually occupy and control territory. We will now see that all three of these assumptions are not necessarily true or, to put it even better, that the AngloZionists have run out of countries in which these assumptions still apply. Lets take them one by one. Hezbollah, Lebanon 2006 Okay, this war did not officially involve the USA, true, but it did involve Israel, which is more or less the same, at least for our purposes. While it is true that superior Hezbollah tactics and preparation of the battlefield did play an important role, and while it is undeniable that Russian anti- tank weapons gave Hezbollah the capability to attack and destroy even the most advanced Israeli tanks, the single most important development of this war was that for the first time in the Middle-East a rather small and comparatively weak Arab force showed no fear whatsoever when confronted with the putatively invincible Tshahal. The British reporter Robert Fisk was the first person to detect this immense change and its tremendous implications: (emphasis added) Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
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