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War, War, War See other War, War, War Articles Title: "The Withdrawal from Kiev Is Russian Escalation. It's the...Transformation from a Psychological Operation to a Textbook War" Interview with Marko Marjanovi, Editor of Anti-Empire Question 1– You think that the Russian Army was spread-too-thin to achieve its strategic objectives in Ukraine, and you point to the (Russian) army’s withdrawal around Kiev to make your point. (“Russia’s effort was very clearly too diluted over too many axes and sectors.”) But, now, you think that things have changed and Russia has started to make the correct military decisions. How have Russia’s plans changed and how will it affect upcoming clashes with the Ukrainian Army? Marko Marjanovi, Editor of Anti-Empire.com — It is undeniable that how the Russians were prosecuting the war at the start and how they are prosecuting it now is entirely different. Not just in the way they fight (small detachments vs combined arms) or advance (mad dash vs deliberate) but also on the map itself. Where before they were pouring forces into six different axes of advance they have now pulled back along many of them or even abandoned them entirely to focus on just the two Donbass axes. There are two possibilities why that is so. One is that they always intended to start by doing A and then shift to B. The other is that they tried A, saw that it wasn’t working, and came up with B that would solve the problems of A. I think the second is the correct explanation. They are trying something else now because what they tried first didn’t succeed. Yes, they had spread themselves too thin along too many axes. You could see that in the south for example where the relatively small force breaking out from Crimea then spread itself between storming Mariupol, trying to envelop Donbass from the south, and advancing across the Dnieper into southwestern Ukraine. I am not singling out the south because of its significance but because it was such a blatant example of overstretch. You have a force that already represents just 20% of the Russian maneuver strength in the theater and this force then additionally splits itself between three competing objectives. That’s crazy. It is also here that you saw the very first adjustments with much of the territory across the Dnieper abandoned to free up more units for Donbass. The reason Donbass was crying out for units so badly was that so many were headed to Kiev. Russia has five Military Districts but the Northern one is based around the Northern Fleet so only four have large land forces. All the units from two of these Districts, the Eastern and Central, were tied up in the Kiev operation as well as the premier 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western District covering their southern flank around Sumy. Fully 50% of the Russian strength was in the drive on Kiev. Now, it is true that these forces tied down Ukrainian units that could conceivably be used elsewhere, but I do not think so little of Russian generals that I think they would have sent 50% of their force on a mission no more ambitious than to “tie down” enemy forces. Especially after seeing how insanely ambitious goals were assigned to the depleted southern forces. Also, since the Russian withdrawal from Kiev is now in full swing before Donbass has even been encircled it doesn’t look like Russian generals value “tying down” enemy forces all that much. What the outcome of concentrating everything against the large Ukrainian army in Donbass will be I can not say, but I can give you some parameters. If the Russians are able to encircle it and capture thousands that will be a big victory for them. But if the Ukrainians can only be pushed out gradually and slowly that will be a victory for their side. An inconclusive outcome would be if the Ukrainians are able to flee and reposition as it would mean they had preserved their force but had not won time or inflicted attrition. What I can tell you is what the consolidation means for Twitter and the footage coming out of the war. There will be no more videos of burned Russian supply convoys or of Russians catastrophically defeated because they were sent too far ahead in a too-small package. The key takeaway is that until now the Russian military was failing because the military-political leadership was having it prosecute a bad and poorly prepared plan. It is only now that its plan is actually a good one that we will get to see how good or bad this military is at the tactical level. It may still fail but it now won’t be because of bad generalship. Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
#1. To: Ada, 4um (#0)
Ada, what's your analysis of this? I'm a little fuzzy after dealing with folks in trouble in this country. I'm sure it'd help me as well of sone other folks.
The author's anti-imperialist sentiments IMO lead him to a few incorrect conclusions but its good to read an honest opposing opinion. My guess is that the Russians will win the war militarily but might lose it at the negotiating table. KIM that if Ukraine and NATO had kept to the Minsk agreement, there would be no invasion.
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