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Resistance See other Resistance Articles Title: Russia’s Sunken Warship Is A Warning To All Navies By The sinking of the Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva on April 14 was the first destruction of a major warship in combat since the Falklands war 40 years ago, when both the U.K. and Argentina lost large surface ships in the cold waters of the South Atlantic. For the Russians, you would have to go back to World War II to find a comparable loss. How will this dramatic event affect the war in Ukraine? And what are the lessons for navies worldwide? I have toured Russian ships on several occasions (including in Sevastopol before the Russian invasion), and the surface ships produced in the 1970s and 1980s, like the Slava-class Moskva, have several weaknesses in construction and manning. The most noticeable deficiency is a lack of the sort of combat compartmentation built into U.S. and other Western warships. Instead of multiple watertight doors that can be slammed shut when a ship is at general quarters (all hands manning their battle stations), Russian ships have little ability to divide up internally making them far more vulnerable to what is called progressive flooding, a euphemism for sinking. Related Book: To Risk It All, Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision by Admiral James Stavridis Another key shortcoming, which surprised me, is the lack of a strong corps of mid-grade professionals in the Russian navy crews. Called chief petty officers in the U.S. Navy, these are sailors with 10-15 years of seagoing experience who lead the sailors on the deck. They are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, and the absence of such a cadre is a major problem for the Russians. (The same weakness a lack of strong noncommissioned officers exists in the Russian land forces, a major factor in the problems they are encountering ashore since the Feb. 24 invasion.) I recently compared notes on the Ukraine sea war with a retired U.S. surface-warfare captain. He reminded me that when he toured a Russian cruiser, the officers wore name tags on their uniforms, while the sailors wore only numbers. This mentality a reminder that the Russian fleet is in part composed of conscripts reflects a lack of a coherent chain of command. That can work in peacetime operations, but quickly breaks down in combat. In the case of the Moskva, we dont have the accurate reporting to fully evaluate the failures, but a couple of points stand out. Most obviously, the readiness of the ship to defend itself from two incoming Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles (now confirmed by U.S. intelligence) was flawed. Whether that stemmed from a lax watch standing meaning the sailors werent at proper battle stations or that the ships anti-air defenses were technologically insufficient, we may never know. In all likelihood, it was a combination of both. Additionally, the ability of the ship to take a punch and keep itself afloat, called damage control in U.S Navy parlance, was obviously lacking. On an American warship, the crew is organized at battle stations into teams spread throughout the ship that are trained, equipped, and prepared to respond to fires, flooding, loss of electrical power, and other challenges. It appears the Moskva crew not only failed to blunt the incoming attack but could not control the combination of fires and flooding that followed. Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
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