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Resistance See other Resistance Articles Title: Traits Shared by Successful Insurgency Movements Traits Shared by Successful Insurgency Movements. Definitions: 1. A successful insurgency movement is defined as a relatively endemic resistance or revolutionary action by a primarily native group, in the large part unsupported by a foreign power, that achieves its primary aim, toppling the current regime in power. Included within this definition, for the purposes of this analysis, are the American Colonial Rebellion (1776-1789), the French Revolution (1789-1799), the Indian Independence Movement (1857-1947 ), the Chinese Revolution (1927-1949) and Various African Insurgencies (early to mid 20th century). 2. A failed insurgency movement is similarly defined, but is delineated as having not achieved its primary objectives, although some lesser objective may or may not have been achieved. Failed insurgency movements include the Second American Revolution (1861-1865), Various Native American Insurgencies (late 1700s to late 1800s), the Mau Mau Insurgency of Kenya (1952-1960), and the Tibetan Insurgency (1960-1972). Some conflicts have been excluded from this analysis because of either the relatively high level of foreign support and guidance, such that an action may be considered not an intrinsic but an extrinsic manifestation, or the lack of an over-arching power such that the conflict takes on either the character of a military action between conflicting states or the character of a civil war. Therefore this analysis excludes the actions in the Republic of South Vietnam, the anti-Soviet Afghan Insurgency, the many Twentieth Century Insurgencies of South America, and various actions and counter-actions in the Balkans. All of the insurgencies share certain common traits. First of all, in each of the insurgent actions cited above, both successful and failed insurgencies share a core of ardent fanatics. Secondly, in each of the insurgencies these fanatics are willing to sacrifice greatly in order to achieve their ends. In each instance above, the partisans at the core of the movement were willing to die and able to arouse a significant portion of the populace to either take up arms or otherwise resist when to do so would likely lead to death. The core group of each insurgency, either successful or not, remains dedicated to the aims of the insurgency, and is tightly organized, with a shared ideology. Additionally, in each of the insurgencies noted above, the agents perceive themselves as acting in the common good, or in the welfare of a native group or oppressed group against an agency (either an occupying colonial power or a government) of a privileged and powerful minority. In each instance we find that when an authority exercises power in derogation of the rights or perceived rights of the majority, the risk of an insurgency arising is heightened. It is found that successful insurgencies, as a general rule, maintain this identification with the common throughout their persistence, and enlarge upon this identity until it is accepted and acknowledged by the majority of the populace. This is the case in each of the insurgencies accounted successful above, as well as those successful actions excluded but which might be characterized as insurgencies in the absence of extensive foreign sponsorship. In several of the failed insurgencies, however, movements that commence their existence as arguably supportive of the rights of a broad base of people across the entire area of their activity, become factionalized either regionally (as in the case of the Second American Revolution), or ethnically (The Tibetan Insurgency). This factionalisation must, therefore, be avoided in order for an insurgency to increase its chance of success. When an insurgent movement takes on the character of a regional struggle between two competing geographical areas, it is more likely to end with a third generation warfare resolution, such as a surrender. The existence of a “safe haven” where the activity of the authority power cannot reach, seems not to be determinative of success. In none of the successful insurgencies cited above were there substantial havens as such. In the failed Tibetan insurgency, by contrast, a safe haven existed within bordering Nepal. Similarly, the Native American Insurgency failed despite the presence of a broad area of sanctuary during the majority of its activity. In each of the failed insurgencies, there is a relative power disadvantage on the part of the insurgents that is not offset by some other advantage. In the American Colonial Rebellion, a military disadvantage was offset by a substantial distance between the ruling power and the insurgent base. This trait is shared by the Indian Independence Movement and the African Insurgencies leading to decolonization of the African continent. In the French Revolution and Chinese Revolution a military disadvantage was offset by a broadly supportive populace and a perceived lack of legitimacy of the ruling elite. In the Second American Revolution, by contrast, a military disadvantage was compounded by geographic distinction, such that the resisting population had no advantage to offset the military disadvantage. The Native American Insurgencies also took on the character of regional and ethnic conflicts, such that the war against him took on the character of one people conquering another. This trait is shared by the Tibetan Insurgency as well. The Mau Mau Insurgency (1960-1972) defies trait analysis, however. Here a broadly popular movement without a substantial geographic or ethnic disadvantage, was defeated by a distant colonial power. The military advantage of the British was not overwhelming, but proved decisive. This failure can be attributed to the insurgents adopting a largely third generation military strategy. They formed a standing army, attempted to hold territory, and attempted to gain control of Kenya by traditional military means. Thus the Kenyans forfeited their natural advantages by fighting the British on British terms, in the area where the British had the greatest advantages. Thus it is concluded that successful insurgencies must depend on their advantages to counter a typical military disadvantage. They must possess a core of dedicated persons. During the commencement of an insurgency, these individuals must adhere to strict discipline and coalesce around a core of common values that transcend regional, ethnic and ideological differences. They must seize and maintain public popularity, either by demonstrating the oppressiveness of the Authority or by remaining a “people’s movement”. They must avoid confronting the Authority upon its own terms (militarily, in the courts, police) unless in possession of an equal or advantageous footing; and they must not accept military defeat as determinative. As illustrated by the example of India (nearly 100 year struggle by both violent and non-violent means), there need not be continuity of persons or of methodology to keep a movement active so long as it retains moral legitimacy. Successful insurgents will identify on a values basis with the common people, blend in with the common people, serve as champions of the common people and continuously demonstrate this distinction from the Authority. One remarkable advantage of the insurgent is the ability to offset the military advantage through anonymity. A third generation military will conquer an insurgent village and find no insurgents present, only peaceful villagers. When the military moves on, the peaceful villagers retrieve their weapons or their broadcasting equipment and carry on. The corresponding reaction of the third generation militarist to this anonymity is to harshly punish the insurgent apprehended “out of uniform”. Accordingly the cellular structure of an insurgency, where one leader knows only a few members of the movement; each of whom knows others of that he does not, is essential in the infancy of the movement. Like the cells of a body, each cell must also serve, according to the willingness of its members, a particular function. Thus there are cells dedicated to winning the support of the people (speech or communication cells), cells providing services to members who are targeted by the Authority (sanctuary cells, legal services cells, medical cells), and cells dedicated to persuading, coercing or destroying the Authority or its agents (resistance cells, advocacy cells). In thus fashion the anonymity advantage is maximized, and the insurgency can escalate or de-escalate its activities in proportion to the activities of the Authority.
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#1. To: christine (#0)
Sleeper cells have risk assessment levels ranging from Low to Urgent and may or may not act on its own, collectively as a hive mind, or under instruction and when directed, can be directed at a local, regional, national or international level. Low Risk cells would be disorganized, untrained, unsupported, dissafected individuals with no special skills, no special knowledge, no access and no training but some open source information collection and discussion interests that might lead to collective action. Appropriate surveillance might include data mining and filters. Medium Risk cells would be semi-organized, paramilitary or military trained, peer supported, dissafected or criminal groups or gangs with some special skills, some special knowledge, some ability to gain access, some training and some covert source collection abilities plus a history of protesting or demonstrating against presumed grievances and/or, vandalism and/or petty crime which may have resulted in some prison gang contact with radical or extremist ideologies. Appropriate surveillance might incude data mining and behavioral analysis. High Risk cells would be organized, military trained, funded and supported, ideological groups with special skills, special knowledge, opportunistic access, training, covert source collection abilities plus no history of protesting or demonstrating against presumed grievances. Appropriate surveillance might include total information awareness, communications and control surveillance and disruption, covert observation and premptive strike preparedness. Urgent Risk cells would be self actualizing, covert military, well funded and supported, non ideological groups with a wide range of special skills, special knowledge, virtually unlimited inside access, elite training, sophisticated covert source collection abilities including counter surveillance skills, plus no history, or record of presence. An appropriate level of surveillance is impossible. This is why we are taking the wrong approach with the WOT. The best approach, and the one most likely to be effective is a law enforcement approach, not a military one.
the law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets and steal bread.
By calling it a "war" DC instantly bestowed legitimacy on the "terrorists". Whereas dealing with terrorists as just mere law breakers and hunting them down and bringing them before the normal criminal courts grants them no legitimacy whatsoever. A state confident in its own righteousness and legitimacy deals with terrorists as they would any two bit street hood- thus denying them mystique and claims to legitimacy. A state unsure of its own righteousness and legitimacy goes after terrorists exactly they way Washington has done to date.
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