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Religion See other Religion Articles Title: The Shi'ite-Sunni divide: Part 1: How real and how deep? The Shi'ite-Sunni divide Part 1: How real and how deep? By Sultan Shahin NEW DELHI -The majority Shi'ite backlash against the traditional dominance of the Sunni minority in Iraq that the United States hoped would bail it out of the Iraqi quagmire has not materialized. Instead, two of the main Shi'ite and Sunni leaders, known to have mass support in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr and Ahmed Kubeisi respectively, have come together to oppose the US occupation. Expectations of a Sunni-Shi'ite showdown in Iraq take on some credibility when one looks at the situation in Pakistan, where the two groups have been involved in sectarian violence for many years, although in this case the Shi'ites constitute the minority. Only last month, the Muslim sectarian divide claimed scores of lives in several incidents in Pakistan. Afghanistan, too, has a history of sectarian troubles, with the Taliban in particular coming down hard on Shi'ites. On the other hand, in India, Muslims, the second largest Islamic community in the world after Indonesia, seldom quarrel on sectarian lines. Similarly, in other countries with Muslim communities, there is little evidence of Shi'ite-Sunni violence. Indeed, in recent years there has been significant cooperation between the two groups in Lebanon. With the US, or at lest a section of its administration, seriously considering the creation of separate Shi'ite states around southern Saudi Arabian and Iraqi oil fields - that would be small enough to be run as protectorates - the Islamic world would face a major challenge in reconciling Shi'ite-Sunni ideological differences in a hurry. And even if such a hare-brained idea was not implemented, the very real possibility of a Shi'ite fundamentalist regime a la Iran eventually rising in Iraq on the ashes of the secular Sunni-led administration of Saddam has the potential to overturn the delicate sectarian balance of power in the Arab, if not the Muslim world. Which raises the question, will the world Muslim ummah (community) be able to rise to the challenge? Ultimately, it all comes down to one question: how real and how deep is the Shi'ite-Sunni divide? How much of it is ideological, and how much caused by political and social vested interests? Is there an element of tribal, ethnic and class struggle also involved? On the other hand, how much of apparent sectarian harmony is promoted by external factors - the threat from Hindu fundamentalism in the case of India, and the need to drive out the US occupation forces in Iraq? Both Shi'ites, who constitute a 15 percent-strong minority of the world's Muslims, and the rest of the Muslims who are Sunnis, follow basically the same ideology. Minor ideological differences and major misunderstandings have, however, crept into their perceptions of each other in the course of the history of their quarrels that spans almost the entire Islamic history of about 1,400 years. The genesis of the Shi'ite-Sunni divide lies in a dispute over succession to the Prophet Mohammed that started soon after his death in 632 AD, even before his funeral, and culminated in the brutal killing of his grandsons and other family members at Karbala, in modern-day Iraq. The Shi'ite-Sunni divide would have made some sense if any Sunnis justified the massacre at Karbala. No Sunnis do. The victims of Karbala are universally treated as martyrs. Both Sunnis and Shi'ites mourn their deaths in the month of Moharram and commemorate the 40th day (chehlum) of the grisly event. During the 10-day long Ashura, when each evening Shi'ites commemorate the Battle of Karbala, with a wailing imam whipping the congregation into a frenzy of tears and chest beating, the Sunnis, too, perform similar rituals. The only difference is that of intensity. While the Sunnis merely shed tears, listening to graphic descriptions of what happened at Karbala and beat their breasts with their own fists, the Shi'ites shed blood, beating their breasts and shoulders with little knives and other sharp implements. The Shi'ite-Sunni split occurred in the decades immediately following the death of the Prophet and has deepened since. Sunnis regard Hazrat Ali, a son-in-law of the Prophet, as the fourth and last of the Khulafa-e-Rashedeen (rightly-guided caliphs) - successors to Hazrat Mohammed as leader of the Muslims). He followed the first caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr (632-634), the second Hazrat Umar (634-644) and the third Hazrat Usman (644-656). Shi'ites feel that Ali should have been the first caliph and that the caliphate should pass down only to direct descendants of Mohammed via Ali and Fatima. They often refer to themselves as ahl al bayt or "people of the house" (of the Prophet). The flash points for riots, as in Pakistan at times, are usually provided by the extremist Shi'ite insistence on abusing the first three caliphs publicly, even while passing through Sunni areas in a procession during Moharram, and the Sunni insistence in turn of trying to stop this provocative practice. The Shi'ites believe that the first three caliphs usurped power which legitimately belonged to Hazrat Ali. The Sunnis revere Hazrat Ali as much as they respect the first three caliphs, and do not like the Shi'ite practice of tabarra (ritual slander of the first three caliphs). Shi'ite scholars say that tabarra is not a part of their customary practice and only misguided people indulge in it. "If some Shi'ites do slander the three caliphs, they do it out of ignorance and should ask God's forgiveness," says US-based Islamic scholar Dr Shahid Athar. Shi'ites consider that the first three caliphs as companions of the Prophet (sahaba) and administrators, though not spiritual leaders (imams). Shi'ite imam Jafar Sadiq himself was a scion of the family of first caliph Abu Bakr. But Sunnis object as they believe, wrongly, that all Shi'ites indulge in this odious practice of cursing and ridiculing the first three caliphs, if not in the streets in Sunni areas, then at their homes. It seems that Hazrat Ali himself accepted the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Hazrat Umar, without any reservations, though he may have differed with some of their policies. He became a candidate for khilafat (caliphate) only after the assassination of the second caliph. He could not reconcile himself to the elevation of Hazrat Usman as the third caliph and joined the ranks of the opposition almost immediately. A man of rigorous piety, he differed in his perceptions and interpretations of the Holy Koran and Hadith with all the three caliphs, but especially with Hazrat Usman. Khilafat was essentially an administrative position, requiring statesmanship and pragmatism more than piety and valor, even though a khalifa was both the spiritual and temporal head of state. These traits are not mutually exclusive, but they are certainly rare. Also, Sunnis believe that the Prophet could not have possibly promoted the hereditary principle as the Koran that he brought to this world repeatedly insists that heredity or race or wealth or any quality other than piety cannot bestow any superiority on any person. Hazrat Ali was held in universal esteem. The Prophet himself had described him as Babul Ilm, the Gateway to Knowledge. But one can see why the Quraish, the ruling tribe, had reservations about his elevation to khilafat following the Prophet's death when one studies the history of his own reign. Hazrat Ali's rule was marked by internecine conflict, vacillation and marked errors of judgment on his part. He became embroiled in conflict from the very first day. He had been chosen as khalifa in an extraordinary situation. The third khalifa, Hazrat Usman, had been killed by rebels, including a son of the second khalifa , Hazrat Umar, as he was reading the Koran in a mosque. He had been under siege for some time. During riots preceding the assassination, Hazrat Ali largely kept aloof and did not defend the khalifa, while acting as a spokesman for the rebels at times. Thus, when he was appointed khalifa, the very first question he faced was what to do with the killers of his predecessor. He decided not to act against them. He was, however, opposed by Hazrat Aisha, wife of the Prophet and daughter of the first caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr, who accused him of being lax in bringing Hazrat Usman's killers to justice. After Ali's army defeated Aisha's forces at the Battle of the Camel in 656, she apologized to Ali and was allowed to return to her home in Medina, where she withdrew from public life. One of Hazrat Usman's relatives, the powerful governor of Syria, Muawiya, however, would not accept this situation. He wanted the killers to be brought to justice. He also refused to pay homage to the new khalifa. Hazrat Ali marched out with his army to enforce obedience. Muawiya stopped him at Siffin. After facing each other for several months, a famous battle took place. Hazrat Ali was on the verge of victory when the treacherous Muawiya hoisted copies of the Koran on lances as a request for peace and settling the dispute through arbitration. Hazrat Ali accepted arbitration. But some of his followers thought that this was against the guidance given in the Koran and changed loyalties. These dissidents were called kharjis (rebels). Hazrat Ali's vacillation at this point proved disastrous. He agreed for arbitration against the best judgment of some of his more orthodox and pious followers, at a time when victory after a long and hard battle was in sight, but did not accept the verdict when it went against him. The arbiters appointed by both the parties decided that Hazrat Usman had been killed unjustly and, therefore, his killers should be punished. Before marching on to try and resume his campaign against Muawiya, however, he appealed to the rebels to come back. But the kharjis, most of them pious Muslims, decided that as Hazrat Ali had disobeyed the Koran by accepting arbitration, he did not deserve their obedience. When the kharjis did not listen to his appeals, Hazrat Ali proceeded to massacre them, thus turning many of his erstwhile followers into bitter enemies. He could not march against Muawiya as his followers deserted him in large numbers, accusing him of un-Islamic behavior in violating the agreement for arbitration. Subsequently, the task of appointing a khalifa was left to the same two arbiters, one of whom had been earlier nominated by Hazrat Ali himself. Neither of them was prepared to even consider him as a candidate. Ali's performance as a caliph makes it difficult to question the judgment of the early Muslims who did not consider him for the post of the first khalifa in the most trying situation in which Islam found itself with the death of the Prophet. In any case, the Prophet had virtually shown his preference for his close friend and companion Hazrat Abu Bakr during his last illness by asking him to lead the prayers which he was himself going to join for the last time before his death. After Ali's death, Muawiya declared himself caliph. Ali's elder son Hasan accepted a pension in return for not pursuing his claim to the caliphate. He died within a year, allegedly poisoned. Ali's younger son Hussein agreed to put his claim to the caliphate on hold until Muawiya's death. However, when Muawiya died in 680, his son Yazid usurped the caliphate. Hussein led an army against Yazid but, hopelessly outnumbered, he and his men were slaughtered at the Battle of Karbala. Hussein's infant son, Ali, survived, so the Prophet's line continued. Yazid formed the hereditary Umayyad dynasty. The few Muslims who remained supporters and followers of these martyrs, even under Yazid's brutal rule, called themselves Shi'iaan-e-Ali (partisans of Ali) or just Shi'ite. The silent majority of Muslims who acquiesced in Yazid's caliphate were called Sunnis. Shi'ites continued to revere those born in Mohammad's family through Ali and Hasan as imams or spiritual teachers. But the hereditary line became extinct in 873 when the last Shi'ite imam, al-Askari, disappeared within days of inheriting the title at the age of four. He had no brothers. The Shi'ites refused, however, to accept that he had died, preferring to believe that he was merely "hidden" and would return. When after several centuries he failed to return, spiritual power passed to the ulema, a council of 12 scholars who elected a supreme imam. The best known modern example of the Shi'ite supreme imam is the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran who ushered in the Islamic revolution overthrowing the US-supported Shah in 1979. The Shi'ite-Sunni split in Islam has gradually come to resemble in some ways the Catholic-Protestant split in Christianity, with the Shi'ites developing along the Catholic lines and Sunnis resembling Protestants in some respects. The Shi'ite imam has come to be imbued with Pope-like infallibility and the Shi'ite religious hierarchy is not dissimilar in structure and religious power to that of the Catholic Church. Sunni Islam, on the other hand, is even less hide-bound than the independent Protestant churches. Unlike the Shi'ites, Sunnis do not have a formal clergy. They do respect Islamic scholars and jurists, but do not feel bound by their fatwas (religious edicts). Shi'ites believe that their supreme imam is a fully spiritual guide, who has inherited some of Mohammed's inspiration ("light"). Shi'ite imams are believed to be infallible interpreters of law and tradition. Sunnis use the term imam with a small "i" to denote the prayer-leaders in their mosques. Racial and ethnic pride, too, entered into the picture later to further exacerbate relations between the sects. Inheritors of non-Arab, mainly Persian and Indian civilizations, turned to Shi'ism largely to create for themselves a separate identity and occasionally to express dissent if they felt Arab rulers were not treating them fairly. The spread of Shi'ism was not always voluntary either. Indeed, the Shi'ite Safavid dynasty in Iran imposed Shi'ism on the Sunni population in the early 16th century. R M Savory of the University of Toronto writes in the Cambridge History of Islam: "The imposition of Shi'ism on a country which, officially at least, was still predominantly Sunni, obviously could not be achieved without incurring opposition, or without a measure of persecution of those who refused to conform. Disobedience was punishable by death, and the threat of force was there from the beginning. As far as the ordinary people were concerned, the existence of this threat seems to have been sufficient. The ulema were more stubborn. Some were put to death; many more fled to areas where Sunnism still prevailed - to the Timurid court at Herat and, after the conquest of Khurasan by the Safavids, to the Ozbeg capital at Bukhara." Though there are Shi'ites everywhere in the Muslim world, the only overwhelmingly Shi'ite country is Iran. The majority of the population of Iraq, Yemen and Azerbaijan, too, is Shi'ite. There are also sizeable Shi'ite communities in Bahrain, the east coast of Saudi Arabia and in Lebanon. Hizbollah, which forced the Israelis out of southern Lebanon in 2000, is Shi'ite. * Next: A bridge over the divide
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