See other War, War, War Articles
Title: Violating the Constitution With an Illegal War
Source:
http://www.lewrockwell.com
URL Source: http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul57.html
Published: Oct 3, 2002
Author: Rep. Ron Paul, MD
Post Date: 2007-04-03 20:34:01 by robin
Keywords: None
Views: 2694
Comments: 267
Ron Paul in the US House of Representatives, October 3, 2002 The last time Congress declared war was on December 11, 1941, against Germany in response to its formal declaration of war against the United States. This was accomplished with wording that took less than one-third of a page, without any nitpicking arguments over precise language, yet it was a clear declaration of who the enemy was and what had to be done. And in three-and-a-half years, this was accomplished. A similar resolve came from the declaration of war against Japan three days earlier. Likewise, a clear-cut victory was achieved against Japan. Many Americans have been forced into war since that time on numerous occasions, with no congressional declaration of war and with essentially no victories. Today’s world political condition is as chaotic as ever. We’re still in Korea and we’re still fighting the Persian Gulf War that started in 1990. The process by which we’ve entered wars over the past 57 years, and the inconclusive results of each war since that time, are obviously related to Congress’ abdication of its responsibility regarding war, given to it by Article I Section 8 of the Constitution. Congress has either ignored its responsibility entirely over these years, or transferred the war power to the executive branch by a near majority vote of its Members, without consideration of it by the states as an amendment required by the Constitution. Congress is about to circumvent the Constitution and avoid the tough decision of whether war should be declared by transferring this monumental decision-making power regarding war to the President. Once again, the process is being abused. Odds are, since a clear-cut decision and commitment by the people through their representatives are not being made, the results will be as murky as before. We will be required to follow the confusing dictates of the UN, since that is where the ultimate authority to invade Iraq is coming from – rather than from the American people and the U.S. Constitution. Controversial language is being hotly debated in an effort to satisfy political constituencies and for Congress to avoid responsibility of whether to go to war. So far the proposed resolution never mentions war, only empowering the President to use force at his will to bring about peace. Rather strange language indeed! A declaration of war limits the presidential powers, narrows the focus, and implies a precise end point to the conflict. A declaration of war makes Congress assume the responsibilities directed by the Constitution for this very important decision, rather than assume that if the major decision is left to the President and a poor result occurs, it will be his fault, not that of Congress. Hiding behind the transfer of the war power to the executive through the War Powers Resolution of 1973 will hardly suffice. However, the modern way we go to war is even more complex and deceptive. We must also write language that satisfies the UN and all our allies. Congress gladly transfers the legislative prerogatives to declare war to the President, and the legislative and the executive branch both acquiesce in transferring our sovereign rights to the UN, an un-elected international government. No wonder the language of the resolution grows in length and incorporates justification for starting this war by citing UN Resolutions. In order to get more of what we want from the United Nations, we rejoined UNESCO, which Ronald Reagan had bravely gotten us out of, and promised millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer support to run this international agency started by Sir Julian Huxley. In addition, we read of promises by our administration that once we control Iraqi oil, it will be available for allies like France and Russia, who have been reluctant to join our efforts. What a difference from the days when a declaration of war was clean and precise and accomplished by a responsible Congress and an informed people! A great irony of all this is that the United Nations Charter doesn’t permit declaring war, especially against a nation that has been in a state of peace for 12 years. The UN can only declare peace. Remember, it wasn’t a war in Korea; it was only a police action to bring about peace. But at least in Korea and Vietnam there was fighting going on, so it was a bit easier to stretch the language than it is today regarding Iraq. Since Iraq doesn’t even have an Air Force or a Navy, is incapable of waging a war, and remains defenseless against the overwhelming powers of the United States and the British, it’s difficult to claim that we’re going into Iraq to restore peace. History will eventually show that if we launch this attack the real victims will be the innocent Iraqi civilians who despise Saddam Hussein and are terrified of the coming bombs that will destroy their cities. The greatest beneficiaries of the attack may well be Osama bin Ladin and the al Qaeda. Some in the media have already suggested that the al Qaeda may be encouraging the whole event. Unintended consequences will occur – what will come from this attack is still entirely unknown. It’s a well-known fact that the al Qaeda are not allies of Saddam Hussein and despise the secularization and partial westernization of Iraqi culture. They would welcome the chaos that’s about to come. This will give them a chance to influence post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The attack, many believe, will confirm to the Arab world that indeed the Christian West has once again attacked the Muslim East, providing radical fundamentalists a tremendous boost for recruitment. An up or down vote on declaring war against Iraq would not pass the Congress, and the President has no intention of asking for it. This is unfortunate, because if the process were carried out in a constitutional fashion, the American people and the U.S. Congress would vote "No" on assuming responsibility for this war. Not only is it sad that we have gone so far astray from our Constitution, but it’s also dangerous for world peace and threatens our liberties here at home. Dr. Ron Paul is a Republican member of Congress from Texas. 
Transferring authority to wage war, calling it permission to use force to fight for peace in order to satisfy the UN Charter, which replaces the Article I, Section 8 war power provision, is about as close to 1984 "newspeak" that we will ever get in the real world.
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#202. To: beachooser (#201)
BAC, you're obviously doing "speed" again. Per your argumnent, where did the woman come from? From the center of all that burning fuel - NOT! Ever figure out what a "facade" was, BAC?
Your link show a purported turbo fan out on the grass -- that part of the engine bounced off the wall while the rest of the engine plowed on through. What bs.
Supporters of Bush and the Iraq war for Israel and oil are traitors to America and they hate American troops.
ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! ROTFLOL! (have i told you lately how much i despise you?)
More recycled sewage. 469. To: BeAChooser, Red Jones, FormerLurker, halfwitt, SKYDRIFTER, ALL (#467) * * * [BAC #453] We know the shell contained enough materials to make 4-5 liters of 40% pure sarin. That just happens to be about the same quantity and purity as was used in the Tokyo subway attack. Such is neither known, nor is it knowable. 16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical Improvised Explosive Device A military unit near Baghdad Airport reported a suspect IED along the main road between the airport and the Green Zone (see figure 2). The munitions were remotely detonated and the remaining liquid tested positive in ISG field labs for the nerve agent Sarin and a key Sarin degradation product. The partially detonated IED was an old prototype binary nerve agent munitions of the type Iraq declared it had field tested in the late 1980s. The munitions bear no markings, much like the sulfur mustard round reported on 2 May (see Figure 3). Insurgents may have looted or purchased the rounds believing they were conventional high explosive 155mm rounds. The use of this type of round as an IED does not allow sufficient time for mixing of the binary compounds and release in an effective manner, thus limiting the dispersal area of the chemicals. ------------- http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120268,00.html Tests Confirm Sarin in Iraqi Artillery Shell Wednesday, May 19, 2004 By Liza Porteus NEW YORK - Tests on an artillery shell that blew up in Iraq on Saturday confirm that it did contain an estimated three or four liters of the deadly nerve agent sarin (search), Defense Department officials told Fox News Tuesday. The artillery shell was being used as an improvised roadside bomb, the U.S. military said Monday. The 155-mm shell exploded before it could be rendered inoperable, and two U.S. soldiers were treated for minor exposure to the nerve agent. * * * A 155-mm shell can hold two to five liters of sarin; three to four liters is likely the right number, intelligence officials said. No actual measurement of the content of the shell was performed, nor could any measurement be performed. The "shell exploded before it could be rendered inoperable." All that was available for testing was residue. * * * [BAC #441] Thus it's a red herring since the shell in question contained binary sarin, which has an indefinite shell life according to experts. "According to experts" fails to meet the level of "rumor has it"and descends to the level of having heard it on Jeff Rense between segments on bigfoot and George W. Bush being a shapeshifting reptile. Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons In some cases, it is quite clear that any stocks that were retained no longer exist in usable form. Most chemical and biological agents are subject to processes of deterioration. A working paper by UNSCOM from January 1998 noted that: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980's" (quoted in Arms Control Today, June 2000). As discussed below, mustard constitutes an exception to this general pattern. This point was acknowledged by UNMOVIC in its 6 March 2003 working document, specifically about remaining warheads which had been filled with chemical agents, but seemingly applicable to any storage of chemical weapons: "While 155-mm projectiles filled with Mustard could be stored for decades, it is less likely that any remaining warheads filled with nerve agents would still be viable combat munitions." http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweaponsc.html Sarin / Cyclosarin: "According to documents discovered by UNSCOM in Iraq, the purity of Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were on average below 60%, and dropped below Iraq’s established quality control acceptance level of 40% by purity some 3 to 12 months after production. [...] There is no evidence that any bulk Sarin-type agents remain in Iraq - gaps in accounting of these agents are related to Sarin-type agents weaponized in rocket warheads and aerial bombs. Based on the documentation found by UNSCOM during inspections in Iraq, Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were largely of low quality and as such, degraded shortly after production. Therefore, with respect to the unaccounted for weaponized Sarin-type agents, it is unlikely that they would still be viable today." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, pp.72-73). http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html SERIAL: DIM 37-91 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ SUBJECT: IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE. DOI: 25 JAN 91 )) Key Judgments * * * 25. Binary weapons have disadvantages that would reduce their value to the Iraqis. A large part of the binary's interior is filled with nonlethal components that help mix the chemicals when the weapon is delivered. These components also help keep the chemicals separated prior to use. Because the reaction must take place while the weapon is en route to the target, the reaction does not convert all the DF to a chemical agent when the round hits its target. The round contains a mixture of agent, unreacted DF, unreacted alcohol, HF, and other impurities when it reaches the target. 26. An additional problem for the Iraqis may be the poor quality of the DF they produce. The same chemical engineering problems that have limited the purity of currently produced agents also could limit their DF quality. DF is made from an organophosphorus chemical and DF. Removing the HF is difficult: it is likely that Iraqi DF contains HF, which could catalyze decomposition. Neither the volume nor purity was known or knowable. No actual measurement of the content of the shell was performed, nor could any measurement be performed. The "shell exploded before it could be rendered inoperable." All that was available for testing was residue. It is facts such as these which make your pronouncements so entertaining. * * * nolu chan posted on 2006-11-21 06:20:39 ET
you're good ;)
Looks like nolu has you here. Why don't you make up some phoney quotes that directly contradict him and then pust links to some defunct government sites to support them? I note that you have already done this at least twice tonight already. Maybe the third time is a charm.
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Yes, I agree with Christine, its a good analysis. Chooser was giving me his binary shell crap earlier and it's nice to see the info layed out. Looks like chooser is either going to have to change the subject or insult you.
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catch that ^^
ROTFLOL! You don't even understand what you read.
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=164186&Disp=All#C469 nolu chan to BAC, 2006-11-21 06:20:39 ET on LP SERIAL: DIM 37-91 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ SUBJECT: IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE. DOI: 25 JAN 91 )) Key Judgments * * * 25. Binary weapons have disadvantages that would reduce their value to the Iraqis. A large part of the binary's interior is filled with nonlethal components that help mix the chemicals when the weapon is delivered. These components also help keep the chemicals separated prior to use. Because the reaction must take place while the weapon is en route to the target, the reaction does not convert all the DF to a chemical agent when the round hits its target. The round contains a mixture of agent, unreacted DF, unreacted alcohol, HF, and other impurities when it reaches the target. 26. An additional problem for the Iraqis may be the poor quality of the DF they produce. The same chemical engineering problems that have limited the purity of currently produced agents also could limit their DF quality. DF is made from an organophosphorus chemical and DF. Removing the HF is difficult: it is likely that Iraqi DF contains HF, which could catalyze decomposition.
Oh boy. Now that's rich. Some mysterious vortex sucked the steel-melting blast- furnace-hot fire into the inner core, leaving the perimeter of the building flame-free, habitable and cool? You can't be serious. Got any spam handy citing "experts" who support your most unusual theory? (If you really believe what you post, you need help. Psychological help. If you don't believe it, then you still need help, because that makes you a pathological liar.)
Check out my blog, America, the Bushieful.
And here's my response to you ... from the same thread: *********** From http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=164186&Disp=All#C470 470. To: nolu chan, ALL (#469) http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxF.html "The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist." NC, are you claiming the ISG report ... the Duefler report ... that you have been selectively regurgitating quotes from over and over in this thread ... is not correct in it's presentation of the facts, NC? Your desperation is palpable. And say ... how did insurgents acquire this round, NC? Hmmmmmmmmm? ROTFLOL! And thanks for posting this: True, but they know the size of the round. And just for you information, the quantity of nerve gas in a 152 mm round is about the same as in a 155 mm round. So you are worrying about the nits (I call it desperation) and missing the big picture. Priceless. So now you are claiming that Resolution 687 came from the UN in 1952? How odd, then, that you wrote in post #430 that: ROTFLOL! I can't help it if your liberal biases have blinded you to the facts, NC, or you are just too lazy to actually use your browser at something other than anti-semitic sites. They know the size of a 152mm shell. And science apparently allowed the ISG to confidently state what the purity of the sarin was, NC. Now at one point in this debate you claimed that the shell was DESIGNED to have a purity of 40%. I'm still waiting to hear your source for making this claim. Or should we just conclude you made it up in your palpable desperation on this topic? And if we accept your statement as fact, then obviously the ISG measured a purity that was the same as designed ... over a decade after the shell was produced. That, at least to a rational person, would strongly suggest a binary sarin shell has an indefinite shelf life. One doesn't even have to be an expert to see that. ROTFLOL! Speaking of pronouncements ... show us your source for claiming that the shell was DESIGNED to produce 40 percent sarin. You claimed it. Now prove it. Frankly, I think you've just been basted, Nolu. BeAChooser posted on 2006-11-21 20:22:27 ET ************ Say, nolu_chan, did you ever find the source on which you based your claim that the shell was DESIGNED to produce 40 percent sarin? No?
Yes moron, its all a conspiracy. Just like your Ron Brown kookery and the dark forces that keep Bush from using your spew to save his Presidency. Why don't you fabricate a few quotes to blow this sort of stuff away and then post a few fake links to support them? Didn't that work for you earlier this evening?
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By the way, you are hiding behind spam again. For the lurkers: I skimmed that pile of turgid shit above and it really didn't say anything. Just convoluted nit picking in Chooser's attempt to hide the fact that he has been had.
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Yet the ISG said the shell contained 40 percent sarin,
the same as you yourself claimed the shell was DESIGNED to produce in that LP
thread. So which is false? Your claim that the binary agent in the shell was
DESIGNED to produce 40% sarin or the claim that there was HF in the shell
which caused decomposition? One or the other must be false. It appears to me
that in that thread you yourself proved the shell had an indefinite shelf
life ... if your claim that the shell was DESIGNED to produce 40 percent sarin
wasn't false.
Probably the bullshit info that you pulled out of your ass and then supported with a fake link. But I am just guessing here.
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As an aside, can you give us one reason why we should believe a single word you say? You've been caught fabricating info twice tonight. Not once, but twice you were caught in a scummy bald faced lie. You now expect us to believe your lying ass. May I ask why?
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Fer godsakes, chooser, give us something more than these forlorn sarin shells and Zarquawi on the loose. For this you got: - half a trillion spent which we don't have. - a whole buncha dead guys. - even more maimed, blinded, crazed and generally damaged. - an army that is scrounging for recruits in Nigeria. - the incarnation of Nancy Armani-Pelosi in the Speaker's seat. - a whole pile of other shit that I'm too lazy to list but which our learned fellow posters may append. Don't you ever get tired chiseling around the edges? You may remonstrate endlessly about facts and events of dubious significance, but the fact remains that this little war is a sham and all the hot and cold you blow here or anywhere else doesn't change the verdict. It's all over but the shouting.
Alles Scheisse.
And here is why you were full of crap then as you are now. https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxF.html Detailed of Chemical Weapons Findings Chemical Munitions—Other Finds Introduction Detailed PreliminaryAssessment of Chemical Weapons Findings Note what BAC is doing by way of dishonesty THIS time. He is using the PRELIMINARY Assessment to rebut the final report. After the completed investigation, the final report did NOT support the PRELIMINARY assessment. All are welcome to take their choice - the final report or something in an annex to the preliminary assessment.
Sort of like the way he used the recitals in the Iraqi war resolution to support his silly opinions. The guy never ceases to amaze me. In real life I've found that only sociopaths can get busted in lie after lie without humiliation. Makes me wonder about chooser.
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So it this the final report or the preliminary report? You provided that source. It says the same thing. "The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist."
Evil is as evil does.
I think the point is that if "larger number" of these things actually did exist, but would be up on national TV right now crowing about it. The Duelfer report would have an entirely different conclusion, Bush's approval would be up about 20 points and you wouldn't be regraded as a fool by millions of people on the internet. So if your spew has merit, why doesn't Bush use it to save himself? I keep asking you this and you can't answer. That should tell you something about the crap you spew.
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No, sarin at less than 40% purity fails to meet the minimum standard for weapons grade. The shell is designed to work with 40% pure sarin. They could, of course, try to design a shell to produce 60% pure sarin. That they were unable to produce 60% pure sarin in a lab setting might be a minor sticking point. They could design a shell to work with 20% sarin if their goal was to make wet sand. The shell was a prototype which was tested. It was never designed to have a 10- or 20-year shelf life. Iraq was unable to produce pure enough DF that it did not degrade. http://www.albionmonitor.com/0405a/sarinshell.html MONITOR Wire Services Speaking May 17 in Baghdad, General Mark Kimmitt, the coalition's senior military spokesman in Iraq, took reporters by surprise. "The Iraqi Survey Group confirmed today that a 155-millimeter artillery round containing sarin nerve agent had been found," Kimmitt said. "The round had been rigged as an IED [improvised explosive device] which was discovered by a U.S. force convoy. A detonation occurred before that IED could be rendered inoperable. This produced a very small dispersal of agent." After more than a year's search, it appeared that the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) -- the U.S. team searching for evidence of weapons of mass destruction -- had finally found something, although the amount was small, and the significance was not immediately apparent. Sarin is a clear, odorless liquid that can cause lethal convulsions in those who breathe it or get it on their skin. It was the poison used by the Aum Shinrikyo cult to kill 12 people in an attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The government of Iraq told United Nations inspectors that it had manufactured hundreds of tons of sarin, and that it used the nerve gas during its war with Iran in the 1980s. It also is believed to have been the agent used against Kurds in northern Iraq 10 years ago. The Pentagon confirmed on May 25 that the shell did contain sarin. Kimmitt said no one was seriously injured in the explosion of the shell, but that two people were treated for what he called "minor exposure" to nerve agents. The general said there were no serious injuries apparently because detonating the shell was much less effective in dispersing the nerve gas than had the shell been fired from a cannon. Nor was there any immediate evidence that more artillery shells containing nerve agents exist in Iraq, or if the discovery indicates the presence of a significant stockpile of sarin and other unconventional weapons. As for the strategic significance of the discovery, Rumsfeld said he believes the United States had good reason to conclude that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. But whether he had them just as the war began, he said, remains a mystery: "The intelligence information in our country and in other countries that have excellent intelligence-gathering capabilities was that they existed, that the government of Iraq was systematically deceiving the world about what it was doing. There was a great deal of evidence to that effect. We don't now know what actually happened [to make the weapons disappear]," Rumsfeld said. In January, Danish troops in southern Iraq discovered mortar shells they believed to contain a blister agent. But subsequent tests proved the shells, which apparently dated to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, had no chemical warfare agent. Some U.S. officials have told The Associated Press that they are concerned that there may be more weaponized sarin in Iraq, and that insurgents who use whatever weapons they can find may not be able to distinguish between ordinary explosives and shells containing deadly poisons. The agent used in the shell found on May 15 is believed to be old, and therefore lacking much of its original potency. Still, the AP quotes U.S. officials as saying insurgents may be putting themselves and others in danger simply by handling the explosives, let alone detonating them.
You guys are way off topic.
"The desire to rule is the mother of heresies." -- St. John Chrysostom
It is the Preliminary Assessment as included as Annex F of the final report. It does not represent the finding of the ISG. Of course, they did not define Preliminary Assessment so perhaps it is a BAC Ultimate Finding Officially. Click the link and see what it says: Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings Try READING the INDEX for the final report: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/index.html Annexes
The ISG Final Report on Weaponization is here. Weaponization Iraq’s capability to produce CW munitions on a large scale ended with Desert Storm. However, Iraq retained the ability to retool existing factories to produce new munitions, and would have relied on basic fabrication techniques to weaponize agent if it had chosen to do so. * * * Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991 ISG expended considerable time and effort investigating longstanding Iraqi assertions about the fate of CW munitions known to have been in Baghdad’s possession during the Gulf war. We believe the vast majority of these munitions were destroyed, but questions remain concerning hundreds of CW munitions. Since May 2004, ISG has recovered dozens of additional chemical munitions, including artillery rounds, rockets and a binary Sarin artillery projectile (see Figure 5). In each case, the recovered munitions appear to have been part of the pre-1991 Gulf war stocks, but we can neither determine if the munitions were declared to the UN or if, as required by the UN SCR 687, Iraq attempted to destroy them. (See Annex F.) * The most significant recovered munitions was a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile which insurgents had attempted to use as an improvised explosive device. * * * Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991 Iraq completed the destruction of its pre-1991 stockpile of CW by the end of 1991, with most items destroyed in July of that year. ISG judges that Iraq destroyed almost all prohibited weapons at that time. * ISG has obtained no evidence that contradicts our assessment that the Iraqis destroyed most of their hidden stockpile, although we recovered a small number of pre-1991 chemical munitions in early to mid 2004. * * *
You are citing, as your expert on this particular shell, a military spokesman who was unable to accurately identify the shell he was talking about. That is desperation. [BAC] I quoted Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt saying the 155mm shell was filled with sarin (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040517-0761.html). What General Kimmitt, military spokesman, really said at the link. http://melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2004/04/67286.php WHO IS GEN. MARK KIMMITT: PR Man for Iraq War; Dad Is DC Lobbyist for Defense Industry Current Brig. Gen. Mark T. Kimmitt, US Army, is the spokesman for the US military in Iraq. He is also the deputy operations commander. He currently is the main apologist for US misdeeds in Falluja and southern Iraq. In this article we put a face on the faceless voice of the invaders, the Mouth of the Euphrates. As part of his PR efforts, he frequently employs email. His email address is kimmitt.m (at) skynet.be . He used the private Belgian ISP during his service at NATO's SHAPE headquarters in Belgium Kimmitt's father, Joseph Stanley (Stan) Kimmitt, a former Col. in Army (an artilleryman like Mark), has parlayed his military service into a Washington, DC, public relations, or lobbyist, firm -- Kimmitt, Senter, Coates, & Weinferter. As Gen. Kimmitt promotes the war in Iraq, his father represents defense contractors such as Textron Defense Systems, Talley Defense Systems, and Boeing (maker of the Army's Apache attack helicopter). The Kimmitts are a classic example of the revolving-door syndrome of U.S. military officers and defense contractors. Such double-dipping is commonplace. It is one of the things President Eisenhower meant when he referred to the dangers of the "military-industrial complex." It is a self-replicating monster that feeds on war, death, and destruction Ironically, S. Joseph Kimmitt was the secretary and close friend of Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, after Kimmitt's military service. Sen. Mansfield came to see the Vietnam war as unnecessary and would doubtless be opposed to the Iraq war if he were still alive. Gen. Kimmitt's brother, Joseph "Jay" Kimmitt, is a Washington, DC, lobbyist employed by Wisconsin-based Oshkosh Truck Corp. the No. 1 maker of concrete mixers, trash haulers and military trucks. Now it wants a bigger slice of the homeland-security pie, too. And Jay Kimmitt hired a Washington-based PR firm (not his father's) to get it. Another example of the revolving door, Jay Kimmitt served 27 years in the Army he is now selling to. ---------- http://www.iiss.org/conferences/military-leaders-forum/brigadier-general-mark-t-kimmitt The International Institute for Strategic Studies has launched the Military Leaders’ Forum, a new series of meetings with leading military practitioners from the UK and around the world. The Forum is co-hosted by the Director of Studies and the Defence Analysis Programme. The inaugural meeting took place on 6 February 2006, and featured Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, U.S. Army. Brigadier General Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) for the United States Central Command, spoke on the topic, “Iraq and Beyond: The Future of Military Operations in the Middle East.” * * * The IISS Military Leaders’ Forum is made possible through the generous support of KBR ----------
Why is anyone bothering with "IT". I think everyone is losing their focus and energy. "IT" is a LIAR. End of story.
Mark "I was real close to Building 7 when it fell down... That didn't sound like just a building falling down to me while I was running away from it. There's a lot of eyewitness testimony down there of hearing explosions. [..] and the whole time you're hearing "boom, boom, boom, boom, boom." I think I know an explosion when I hear it... — Former NYC Police Officer and 9/11 Rescue Worker Craig Bartmer
Are the what and how (did a 757 hit the pentagon; where the WTCs brought down by the planes with WTC7 colapsing from collateral damage or from pre-placed explosives; was flight 93 shot down) distracting from the much more important Why and Who?
Supporters of Bush and the Iraq war for Israel and oil are traitors to America and they hate American troops.
lol. way to dodge chooser's idiotic and wholly ridiculous assertion.
"IT" is not the topic I'm refering to. You are wasting your time by repsonding to a complete LIAR.
Mark "I was real close to Building 7 when it fell down... That didn't sound like just a building falling down to me while I was running away from it. There's a lot of eyewitness testimony down there of hearing explosions. [..] and the whole time you're hearing "boom, boom, boom, boom, boom." I think I know an explosion when I hear it... — Former NYC Police Officer and 9/11 Rescue Worker Craig Bartmer
"IT" is not the topic I'm refering to. You are wasting your time by repsonding to a complete LIAR. I'll take that as a "yes" with which I agree. It steers the conversation in the direction of what and how.
Supporters of Bush and the Iraq war for Israel and oil are traitors to America and they hate American troops.
Really? Yet you first introduced that link on this thread (post #94) and quoted from it. Why'd you do that? Why didn't you post your material from the final report if you think the preliminary assessment is wrong? And what does the ISG final report say about Annex F? It refers to it over and over. Why would it do that if the contents of the Annex are not the ISG's current view ... if they don't represent the finding of the ISG? When it comes to talking about that binary shell in the main report, what does it do? Tell the reader to "See Annex F". So I'm curious why you think Annex F is invalid in this instance?
The ISG Annex doesn't say they discovered a 152mm binary sarin artillery projectile *of the type designed to produce 40 percent sarin*. No, it say they discovered "a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile - CONTAINING a 40 percent concentration of Sarin". It also said "The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long—lasting chemical weapons still exist.'" Evidently the ISG thought this shell was viable and a long-lasting chemical weapon. Why would insurgents use a shell that had been tested? Where'd they find it, lying on the ground somewhere? Was it buried and they had to dig it up? Why use that type of shell when (as you folks claim) there were millions of rounds of perfectly good artillery shells in unguarded bunkers around the country? It doesn't make any sense.
Chooser, why don't you just make up a quote that saves your butt and then post a fake link to support it. Recall that's what you did yesterday -- on at least two occasions. And I'm surprised how you can be busted like you were yesterday and not bat an eye. In most circles what you are doing here is called pathological lying.
.
shalom fish breath. it's obvious that it is ok for you to lie as long as you are lying to a goy, but how can you be sure that the peopel you are lying to on this forum are not jewish?
This is the Iraq Survey Group FINAL REPORT findings on Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program. Annex F is a copy of the Preliminary Assessment. The Introduction to the Preliminary Assessment stated, "The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile-containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin...." The Final Report contains no representation about the purity of sarin produced by Iraq, either in this shell or any other shell. "The Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US Department of Defense gave the following assessment in March 2001: "Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and degrades over time. US experts consider chemical warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be militarily ineffective. Western sources estimate the sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity, and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and 50 percent." (Link) Excerpts are presented below. The Final Report on Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program, the Intro and six sections indentified and linked below, make no mention of claim made in the Preliminary Assessment. There is no reference to Annex F about such a claim. The Preliminary Assessment, included as an Annex to the Final Report, does not represent the findings of those who issued the Final Report. The Preliminary Assessment stated the single 152mm Binary chemical IED was remotely detonated. They blew it up before testing. They found "partially detonated" IED and they remotely detonated the round to render it safe. They were only able to test “the remaining liquid” after the round was remotely detonated. There was no way to know, and there is no statement made, regarding the quantity of liquid that was in the shell prior to detonation. A key sarin degradation product was found. Just like BAC poop, and other shit, degradation happens. The "40% concentration" is in the introduction to the Preliminary Assessment, but not in the main body comments of the Final Report. There is no indication of where that information derived from. There is no explanation of how you create 40% concentration sarin by exploding a binary shell in the desert. While the 152mm and 155mm shells may have a similar payload area as unitary rounds, modification to utilize a binary payload entails using a significant portion of the payload area for the apparatus which separately stores the components and which, upon firing, releases the components and mixes them in flight. Iraq Survey Group Final Report Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program By God, spare us your evil. Pick up your goods and leave. We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the dual chemical. Let them take note of this. We have the dual chemical. It exists in Iraq. [1] [1] Saddam speaking about the Israeli, US, and UK intelligence services and Iraq's development of binary CW munitions in a speech on 2 april 1990. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service 021329 April 1990). Iraq Survey Group Final Report Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program A speech by Saddam on 2 April 1990 publicly identified Iraq’s CW research and production efforts in anticipation of the next war. Saddam claimed Iraq had a binary agent capability, an assertion that caught MSE scientists off guard, according to Iraqi declaration corroborated by documents the UN discovered at Al Muthanna. * In less than a month after Saddam’s speech, Iraq restarted its CW production lines, tested CW warheads for al Husayn missiles, and reverse-engineered special parachute-retarded bombs. [According to the FFCD, Iraq did not import any aerial bombs in 1990.] Al Muthanna filled the al-Husayn warheads and aerial bombs with a binary nerve agent component. These weapons were accompanied by Jerry cans containing the second component, a chemical that, when mixed with the weapons’ contents, produced nerve agent. This was the mix-before-flight Iraqi ‘binary’ system. Iraq deployed 1,000 binary bombs and 50 al-Husayn warheads-binary and unitary-by August 1990. -------------- In August 1995, shortly after Iraq revealed its production of bulk BW agent, Saddam’s son-in-law and head of Iraq’s WMD programs, Husayn Kamil, fled the country. Saddam made a decision at that time to declare virtually all hidden information and material they felt was significant on Iraq’s programs, turning over WMD documentation, including 12 trunks of CW documents. * The documentation turned over by Iraq, allegedly hidden by Husayn Kamil, included results of Iraqi research material up to 1988 that indicated more extensive research on VX than previously admitted. Iraq Survey Group Final Report Command and Control Iraqi scientists and engineers could maintain a minimal CW production proficiency without engaging in CW-related R&D and production because they were already experienced in key CW agent production processes. Largely based on data available in previously published technical literature, Iraq had sufficiently developed processes to produce nerve, blister, and psychological agents. * For instance, Iraqi research on VX started in 1985 with a literature survey on the preparation and production methods of VX. Based on their literature review, the best and easiest method was chosen for the preparation of VX agent, according to Iraq’s CW Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) to the UN. Iraq Survey Group Final Report Infrastructure-Research and Development Iraq Survey Group Final Report Infrastructure-Production Capability Iraq Survey Group Final Report Weaponization Iraq’s capability to produce CW munitions on a large scale ended with Desert Storm. However, Iraq retained the ability to retool existing factories to produce new munitions, and would have relied on basic fabrication techniques to weaponize agent if it had chosen to do so. ----- Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991 ISG expended considerable time and effort investigating longstanding Iraqi assertions about the fate of CW munitions known to have been in Baghdad’s possession during the Gulf war. We believe the vast majority of these munitions were destroyed, but questions remain concerning hundreds of CW munitions. Since May 2004, ISG has recovered dozens of additional chemical munitions, including artillery rounds, rockets and a binary Sarin artillery projectile (see Figure 5). In each case, the recovered munitions appear to have been part of the pre-1991 Gulf war stocks, but we can neither determine if the munitions were declared to the UN or if, as required by the UN SCR 687, Iraq attempted to destroy them. (See Annex F.) * The most significant recovered munitions was a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile which insurgents had attempted to use as an improvised explosive device. The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons An IAEA inspection led by Dr. David Kay in late June 1991 triggered Iraq’s decision to unilaterally destroy the undeclared weapons that had been concealed from the UN, according to multiple senior Iraqi officials. Dr. Kay’s inspection team was blocked from sites in Abu Ghurayb and Fallujah. The Iraqis fired warning shots over the inspectors’ heads, but Dr. Kay and his group brought back video tapes and photos that indicated Iraq was hiding undeclared uranium enrichment equipment from the inspectors. * Dr. Kay’s inspection and the international uproar surrounding it caused consternation and a measure of panic in the Regime’s leadership, particularly Husayn Kamil, and Saddam appointed a high-level committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz to deal with inspection matters, according to multiple sources. Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991 Iraq completed the destruction of its pre-1991 stockpile of CW by the end of 1991, with most items destroyed in July of that year. ISG judges that Iraq destroyed almost all prohibited weapons at that time. * ISG has obtained no evidence that contradicts our assessment that the Iraqis destroyed most of their hidden stockpile, although we recovered a small number of pre-1991 chemical munitions in early to mid 2004. Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap Chemical Resources A group of insurgents began a nascent CW effort without CW scientists or industrial-scale chemical supplies. After OIF, a group of insurgents-referred to as the al-Abud network-assembled key supplies and relevant expertise from community resources to develop a program for weaponizing CW agents for use against Coalition Forces. The al-Abud network in late 2003 recruited a Baghdad chemist-who lacked the relevant CW expertise-to develop chemical agents. The group sought and easily acquired from farmers and local shops chemicals and equipment to conduct CW experiments. An investigation of these CW attempts suggests that the al-Abud network failed to produce desired CW agents, however it remains unclear whether these failures derive from a lack of available precursors or insufficient CW expertise. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Chemical Munitions-Searching Military Depots and Caches Iraq Survey Group Final Report Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings Introduction The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile-containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin-which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist. ---------------- 16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical Improvised Explosive Device A military unit near Baghdad Airport reported a suspect IED along the main road between the airport and the Green Zone (see figure 2). The munitions were remotely detonated and the remaining liquid tested positive in ISG field labs for the nerve agent Sarin and a key Sarin degradation product. The partially detonated IED was an old prototype binary nerve agent munitions of the type Iraq declared it had field tested in the late 1980s. The munitions bear no markings, much like the sulfur mustard round reported on 2 May (see Figure 3). Insurgents may have looted or purchased the rounds believing they were conventional high explosive 155mm rounds. The use of this type of round as an IED does not allow sufficient time for mixing of the binary compounds and release in an effective manner, thus limiting the dispersal area of the chemicals. Historical context: Iraq only declared its work on binary munitions after Husayn Kamil fled Iraq in 1995, and even then only claimed to have produced a limited number of binary rounds that it used in field trials in 1988. UN investigations revealed a number of uncertainties surrounding the nature and extent of Iraq’s work with these systems and it remains unclear how many rounds it produced, tested, declared, or concealed from the UN.
The NIE, the Senate Report, and Colin Powell The Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq of July 9, 2004 contains the following: * Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence. * The IC's bias that Iraq had active WMD programs led analysts to presume, in the absence of evidence, that if Iraq could do something to advance its WMD capabilities, it would. ===================== Colin Powell, Meet the Press, May 16, 2004
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ceased operations and closed its office on May 27, 2005. After a year of study that included the review of thousands of documents and hundreds of interviews with knowledgeable observers from both within and outside the intelligence community, the Commission presented its report to the President on March 31, 2005. Established by Executive Order 13328 and signed by President George W. Bush on February 6, 2004, the Commission was charged with assessing whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks). T he Commission examined the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of such foreign powers relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century. COMMISSION MEMBERS Charles S. Robb Laurence H. Silberman Richard C. Levin OF COUNSEL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR * * * … U.S. forces searched without success for the WMD that the Intelligence Community had predicted. Extensive post-war investigations were carried out by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). The ISG found no evidence that Iraq had tried to reconstitute its capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991; no evidence of BW agent stockpiles or of mobile biological weapons production facilities; and no substantial chemical warfare (CW) stockpiles or credible indications that Baghdad had resumed production of CW after 1991. Just about the only thing that the Intelligence Community got right was its pre-war conclusion that Iraq had deployed missiles with ranges exceeding United Nations limitations. How could the Intelligence Community have been so mistaken? That is the question the President charged this Commission with answering. … CHEMICAL WARFARE … Post-War Findings of the Iraq Survey Group … The ISG concluded-contrary to the Intelligence Community’s pre-war assessments- that Iraq had actually unilaterally destroyed its undeclared CW stockpile in 1991 and that there were no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of CW thereafter. Iraq had not regained its pre-1991 CW technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to the war. Further, pre-war concerns of Iraqi plans to use CW if Coalition forces crossed certain defensive “red lines” were groundless; the “red lines” referred to conventional military planning only. Finally, the only CW the Iraq Survey Group recovered were weapons manufactured before the first Gulf War; the ISG concluded that, after 1991, Iraq maintained only small, covert labs to research chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. … Despite having “expended considerable time and expertise searching for extant CW munitions,”-the vaunted stockpiles-the ISG concluded with “high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory.” The ISG specifically investigated 11 sites that were associated with sus pected CW transshipment activity, conducting an in-depth inspection of two of the sites, which were “assessed prior to war to have the strongest indicators of CW movement.” Neither of these sites revealed any CW munitions. Further, the ISG’s “review of documents, interviews, intelligence reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations” for pre-war transshipment activity that the Intelligence Community judged to have been CW-related. … Overall, although the vast majority of CW munitions had been destroyed, the Iraq Survey Group recognized that questions remained relating to the disposition of hundreds of pre-1991 CW munitions. Still, given that, of the dozens of CW munitions that the ISG discovered, all had been manufactured before 1991, the Intelligence Community’s 2002 assessments that Iraq had restarted its CW program turned out to have been seriously off the mark. Finally, on two ancillary issues the ISG found little or no evidence to support indications of Iraqi CW efforts. … Analysis of the Intelligence Community’s Pre-War Assessments … A small quantity of human source reporting supplied the bulk of the narrow band of intelligence supplementing the imagery intelligence. And the most striking fact about reporting on Iraq’s CW program was, as with other elements of Iraq’s weapons programs, its paucity. Yet there was more than just scarcity, for-as with sources on Iraq’s supposed BW program-many of the CW sources subsequently proved unreliable. Indeed, perhaps even more so that with the BW sources, Community analysts should have been more cautious about using the CW sources’ reporting, as much of it was deeply problematic on its face. In our view, prior to the war, analysts should have viewed at least three human sources more skeptically than they did. In addition, post-war, questions about the veracity of two other human sources have also surfaced. Sources Whose Reliability Should Have Been Questioned Prior to the NIE One source, an Iraqi defector who had worked as a chemist in Iraq through the 1990s, reported information that made its way into the NIE. This happened even though, from the start of his relations with the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Community had deemed aspects of his reporting not credible. … Indeed, analytic skepticism about the source’s claims was later confirmed by revelations about his operational history, revelations that led to the Intelligence Community deeming him a fabricator and recalling his reporting, although not all of his reporting was recalled until almost one year after the war started.… Another source, who was described as a contact with “good but historical access” but lacking “an established reporting record,” reported in July 2002 that, as of 1998, Iraq was producing mustard and binary chemical agents. At the same time, he also reported on a “wide range of disparate subjects,” including on Iraq’s missile program and nuclear and biological weapons programs. Such broad access, on its face, was inconsistent with what analysts understood to be Iraq’s well-known tendency towards compartmentation of sensitive weapons programs. Yet because of the Community’s own compartmentation-working-level analysts saw reporting on their area but not on others-they did not realize at the time that one source was reporting on a range of topics for which he was unlikely to have access. Moreover, although analysts did not know it at the time, the source obtained his information from unknown and undescribed sub-sources. Finally, a third source provided information that was technically implausible on its face. His reporting claimed that Iraq had constructed a factory for the production of castor oil that could be used for the production of sarin. Although castor beans can be used to make ricin, not sarin-a fact that analysts readily understood-analysts did not discount the information. …
UK SOURCE MIDDLE EAST REFERENCE FILE Without evidence, BAC finds that they could do better by putting the components in a shell, partially detonate the shell and let it lie in the desert for a while, detonate the shell some more to make it safe, and have the stuff mix together as a result of the two explosions of the shell. http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweaponsc.html Evaluation. The main G-agents produced by Iraq were Tabun, Sarin and Cyclosarin. It is generally accepted that Iraq stopped producing Tabun in 1986 (UNMOVIC accept that this account "is plausible and appears to be supported by UNSCOM's findings", in "Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.68), in favour of concentrating on the producing of Sarin and Cyclosarin. These agents deteriorate rapidly, especially if impurities are present in their manufacture. This seems to have been the case with Iraq's nerve agents. The Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US Department of Defense gave the following assessment in March 2001: "Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and degrades over time. US experts consider chemical warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be militarily ineffective. Western sources estimate the sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity, and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and 50 percent. Since it contained at least 40 percent impurities when manufactured, sarin produced at Al Muthanna had a short shelf life. The CIA estimates the chemical warfare agent in the rockets stored at Al Muthanna had deteriorated to approximately 18 percent purity by the time that Bunker 2 was destroyed, leaving about 1600 kilograms (1.6 metric tons) of viable sarin." "The Gulf War Air Campaign - Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Al Muthanna, February 8, 1991", 19 March 2001; http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html#about About This reference file is an inventory and critical analysis of the claims made about the weapons and programmes that Iraq is proscribed from having under the terms of Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), paragraphs 10 and 12: that is, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km. The file was compiled before UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors were withdrawn from the country on 18 March 2003, and the evaluations contained have not been altered in light of subsequent information. However, suggestions for further reading continue to be added in light of the new information that has come to light since that date. These sections are marked "Key post-war readings", and are at the end of some sub-sections on particular weapons categories. This reference file is not about Iraq's overall compliance with that resolution or subsequent resolutions on Iraq, including SCR 1441 (2002). For example, it does not attempt to analyse the extent of Iraq's obstruction of inspectors from UNSCOM, UNMOVIC or IAEA. It is instead a presentation of what is actually known about the weapons and programmes themselves. For the UN inspectors who were in Iraq, discovering what is unknown about the history and present status of these items was the task at hand. Inspectors engaged with the possibility of Iraq's retention or development of non-conventional weapons, and reported to the Security Council on this basis. However, a set of evaluations can also be made of the likelihood of Iraq's non-conventional weapons programmes, given the material available. No overall judgements are made in this reference file, but material is presented that should allow a more well informed opinion to be reached. The author of this reference file is Dr Glen Rangwala, an independent analyst at the University of Cambridge, UK. If any of the technical claims made below are incorrect or incomplete, such mistakes have not been made in a deliberate attempt to mislead the reader: corrections and clarifications would be greatly appreciated. Contact details are at the end of this page.
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Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestActually, the impact point in the WTC was probably one of the coolest places on the impacted floors by the time the woman showed up. Most of the fuel and furnishings were carried deep into the tower where they burned. The hole was cleared of such and even had a nice cool wind blowing on it.
#203. To: BeAChooser (#201)
Inside the building.
#204. To: BeAChooser (#201)
Actually, the impact point in the WTC was probably one of the coolest places on the impacted floors by the time the woman showed up. Most of the fuel and furnishings were carried deep into the tower where they burned. The hole was cleared of such and even had a nice cool wind blowing on it.
#205. To: BeAChooser (#106)
Being old doesn't mean the munitions aren't still deadly and of great interest to would be terrorists. That binary sarin shell was still viable.
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=164186&Disp=All#C469
This source has the wrong size shell. The round in question was a 152mm prototype, not the 155mm round developed later. An anonymous source, based on an incorrect assumption of the shell type, made a further wild assumption regarding the volume of the content of the round based on the capacity of a different size round. http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweaponsc.html
[BAC #434] That's why that binary weapon is so interesting. It was the best Saddam had, still above the "quality control acceptance level of 40%",
#206. To: nolu_chan (#205)
#207. To: BeAChooser (#205)
#208. To: nolu_chan (#205)
#209. To: Kamala, YertleTurtle, Destro, Critter (#201)
(Edited)
Actually, the impact point in the WTC was probably one of the coolest places on the impacted floors by the time the woman showed up. Most of the fuel and furnishings were carried deep into the tower where they burned. The hole was cleared of such and even had a nice cool wind blowing on it. ~BeAChooser
#210. To: wbales, ALL (#203)
Your link show a purported turbo fan out on the grass
#211. To: BeAChooser (#112)
You see, binary sarin has an INDEFINITE shelf life.
http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html
The Iraqi DF, a key component of the binary shell, would catalyze and decompose while sitting on a shelf due to impurities.
#212. To: BeAChooser (#201)
(Edited)
Actually, the impact point in the WTC was probably one of the coolest places on the impacted floors by the time the woman showed up. Most of the fuel and furnishings were carried deep into the tower where they burned. The hole was cleared of such and even had a nice cool wind blowing on it.
#213. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#205)
More recycled sewage.
... snip ...
[BAC #453] We know the shell contained enough materials to make 4-5 liters of 40% pure sarin. That just happens to be about the same quantity and purity as was used in the Tokyo subway attack.
Such is neither known, nor is it knowable.
-------------
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120268,00.html
Tests Confirm Sarin in Iraqi Artillery Shell
Wednesday, May 19, 2004
By Liza Porteus
NEW YORK - Tests on an artillery shell that blew up in Iraq on Saturday confirm that it did contain an estimated three or four liters of the deadly nerve agent sarin (search), Defense Department officials told Fox News Tuesday.
No actual measurement of the content of the shell was performed, nor could any measurement be performed. The "shell exploded before it could be rendered inoperable." All that was available for testing was residue.
[BAC #453] Allow me to again note that UN Resolution 687 stated that Iraq would "not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism."
The following is United Nations Resolution 687 from the seventh regular session of the UN in 1952. ... snip ... 5 December 1952 ..... INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION I guess you screwed up again.
430. To: BeAChooser (#426)
[BAC 2.0 #426] As far as that one issue is concerned, the cease-fire agreement Iraq signed did the same thing. It halted the fighting PROVIDED Iraq met the conditions of the ceas-fire. I'm not going to play semantic games or definition of "is" games with you. I'm not going to prove anything to you that is common knowledge.
I take it the poor baby is having a difficult time finding the text of the cease-fire agreement and naming the parties thereto.
Allow me to help you over this seemingly unsurmountable roadblock to overcome your self-denial.
You are looking for United Nations Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 as accepted by Iraq on April 6, 1991.
[BAC #441] Thus it's a red herring since the shell in question contained binary sarin, which has an indefinite shell life according to experts.
"According to experts" fails to meet the level of "rumor has it"and descends to the level of having heard it on Jeff Rense between segments on bigfoot and George W. Bush being a shapeshifting reptile.
Neither the volume nor purity was known or knowable. No actual measurement of the content of the shell was performed, nor could any measurement be performed. The "shell exploded before it could be rendered inoperable." All that was available for testing was residue.
It is facts such as these which make your pronouncements so entertaining.
You should consider laying low for the next few days to minimize the possibility of anyone mistakenly putting you in an oven on Thursday and roasting you.
#214. To: BeAChooser (#213)
I can't help it if your liberal biases have blinded you to the facts,
#215. To: BeAChooser (#213)
#216. To: nolu_chan (#211)
The Iraqi DF, a key component of the binary shell, would
catalyze and decompose while sitting on a shelf due to impurities.
#217. To: BeAChooser (#216)
So which is false?
#218. To: BeAChooser (#216)
#219. To: BeAChooser (#216)
#220. To: BeAChooser (#213)
And here's my response to you ... from the same thread:
Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program Annex F Iraq's WMD > Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program > Annex F
#221. To: nolu_chan (#220)
Note what BAC is doing by way of dishonesty THIS time. He is using the PRELIMINARY Assessment to rebut the final report. After the completed investigation, the final report did NOT support the PRELIMINARY assessment.
#222. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#220)
All are welcome to take their choice - the final report or something in an annex to the preliminary assessment.
#223. To: ... (#221)
#224. To: BeAChooser (#222)
#225. To: BeAChooser (#216)
Yet the ISG said the shell contained 40 percent sarin, the same as you yourself claimed the shell was DESIGNED to produce in that LP thread.
Sarin Discovered In Iraq Was A Relic, Not A Weapon
#226. To: christine (#209)
#227. To: BeAChooser (#222)
So it this the final report or the preliminary report?
Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program Annex F
A. IIS Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination 43
B. Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex 61
C. The Iraqi Industrial Committee 85
D. Tariq Company's Activities 89
E. Al-Abud Network 93
F. Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings 97
G. Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad 107
H. Summary of Key Findings at Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points 113
I. Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points
#228. To: BeAChooser (#222)
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
* ISG has also recovered 155mm chemical rounds and 122mm artillery rockets which we judge came from abandoned Regime stocks.
* These remaining pre-1991 weapons either escaped destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. More may be found in the months and years ahead.
#229. To: BeAChooser (#213)
And just for you information, the quantity of nerve gas in a 152 mm round is about the same as in a 155 mm round. So you are worrying about the nits (I call it desperation) and missing the big picture.
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=164186&Disp=All#C390
The Iraqi Survey Group confirmed today that a 155-millimeter artillery round containing sarin nerve agent had been found. The round had been rigged as an IED, which was discovered by a U.S. force convoy. A detonation occurred before the IED could be rendered inoperable. This produced a very small dispersal of agent.
----------
by Al Swalley Monday April 19, 2004 at 05:13 PM
#230. To: christine (#209)
#231. To: Kamala, christine (#230)
I think everyone is losing their focus and energy.
#232. To: Destro (#226)
You guys are way off topic.
#233. To: wbales (#231)
Are the what and how (did a 757 hit the pentagon; where the WTCs brought down by the planes with WTC7 colapsing from collateral damage or from pre-placed explosives; was flight 93 shot down) distracting from the much more important Why and Who?
#234. To: Kamala (#233)
Are the what and how (did a 757 hit the pentagon; where the WTCs brought down by the planes with WTC7 colapsing from collateral damage or from pre-placed explosives; was flight 93 shot down) distracting from the much more important Why and Who?
#235. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#227)
It is the Preliminary Assessment as included as Annex F of the final report. It does not represent the finding of the ISG.
#236. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#225)
No, sarin at less than 40% purity fails to meet the minimum standard for weapons grade. The shell is designed to work with 40% pure sarin.
The shell was a prototype which was tested.
#237. To: BeAChooser (#235)
#238. To: BeAChooser (#236)
#239. To: BeAChooser (#236)
* The documents also included papers related to new agent research, mix-in-flight binary munitions development, and previously undisclosed involvement of other organizations in CW research.
* Iraq’s CW agent purity, formulation, and production standards in the 1980s program - although inferior to Western standards with the exception of its high-grade mustard - were “good enough” to produce harmful agent proven successful during previous use.
* ISG has also recovered 155mm chemical rounds and 122mm artillery rockets which we judge came from abandoned Regime stocks.
* A senior Iraqi scientist who directed the destruction of chemical and biological munitions contends that the decision to destroy the hidden materials was made at the end of June 1991. David Kay’s inspection and the ensuing controversy prompted Iraqi concerns about renewed war with the United States, according to Dr. Mahmud Firaj Bilal. Amir Rashid contacted Dr. Bilal and ordered that all hidden chemical and biological munitions be destroyed within 48 hours. When Bilal responded that this was impossible, Rashid directed that Bilal use the resources of the Iraqi Air Force and the surface-to-surface missile force to accomplish the task. Dr. Bilal gathered his colleagues from Al Muthanna State Establishment, went to the locations of the stored munitions, and began the destruction.
* Iraq declared some of the unilateral destruction-missiles and chemical munitions-to UNSCOM in March 1992 but continued to conceal the destruction of the biological weapons program.
* These remaining pre-1991 weapons either escaped destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. More may be found in the months and years ahead.
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Annex F
Chemical Munitions-Other Finds
#240. To: BeAChooser (#236)
"But it turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases, deliberately misleading. And for that, I am disappointed and I regret it."
#241. To: BeAChooser (#236)
Co-Chairman
Co-Chairman
John McCain
Henry S. Rowen
Walter B. Slocombe
William O. Studeman
Charles M. Vest
Patricia Wald
Lloyd Cutler
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Scott Redd
#242. To: BeAChooser (#236)
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