See other War, War, War Articles
Title: Violating the Constitution With an Illegal War
Source:
http://www.lewrockwell.com
URL Source: http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul57.html
Published: Oct 3, 2002
Author: Rep. Ron Paul, MD
Post Date: 2007-04-03 20:34:01 by robin
Keywords: None
Views: 2683
Comments: 267
Ron Paul in the US House of Representatives, October 3, 2002 The last time Congress declared war was on December 11, 1941, against Germany in response to its formal declaration of war against the United States. This was accomplished with wording that took less than one-third of a page, without any nitpicking arguments over precise language, yet it was a clear declaration of who the enemy was and what had to be done. And in three-and-a-half years, this was accomplished. A similar resolve came from the declaration of war against Japan three days earlier. Likewise, a clear-cut victory was achieved against Japan. Many Americans have been forced into war since that time on numerous occasions, with no congressional declaration of war and with essentially no victories. Today’s world political condition is as chaotic as ever. We’re still in Korea and we’re still fighting the Persian Gulf War that started in 1990. The process by which we’ve entered wars over the past 57 years, and the inconclusive results of each war since that time, are obviously related to Congress’ abdication of its responsibility regarding war, given to it by Article I Section 8 of the Constitution. Congress has either ignored its responsibility entirely over these years, or transferred the war power to the executive branch by a near majority vote of its Members, without consideration of it by the states as an amendment required by the Constitution. Congress is about to circumvent the Constitution and avoid the tough decision of whether war should be declared by transferring this monumental decision-making power regarding war to the President. Once again, the process is being abused. Odds are, since a clear-cut decision and commitment by the people through their representatives are not being made, the results will be as murky as before. We will be required to follow the confusing dictates of the UN, since that is where the ultimate authority to invade Iraq is coming from – rather than from the American people and the U.S. Constitution. Controversial language is being hotly debated in an effort to satisfy political constituencies and for Congress to avoid responsibility of whether to go to war. So far the proposed resolution never mentions war, only empowering the President to use force at his will to bring about peace. Rather strange language indeed! A declaration of war limits the presidential powers, narrows the focus, and implies a precise end point to the conflict. A declaration of war makes Congress assume the responsibilities directed by the Constitution for this very important decision, rather than assume that if the major decision is left to the President and a poor result occurs, it will be his fault, not that of Congress. Hiding behind the transfer of the war power to the executive through the War Powers Resolution of 1973 will hardly suffice. However, the modern way we go to war is even more complex and deceptive. We must also write language that satisfies the UN and all our allies. Congress gladly transfers the legislative prerogatives to declare war to the President, and the legislative and the executive branch both acquiesce in transferring our sovereign rights to the UN, an un-elected international government. No wonder the language of the resolution grows in length and incorporates justification for starting this war by citing UN Resolutions. In order to get more of what we want from the United Nations, we rejoined UNESCO, which Ronald Reagan had bravely gotten us out of, and promised millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer support to run this international agency started by Sir Julian Huxley. In addition, we read of promises by our administration that once we control Iraqi oil, it will be available for allies like France and Russia, who have been reluctant to join our efforts. What a difference from the days when a declaration of war was clean and precise and accomplished by a responsible Congress and an informed people! A great irony of all this is that the United Nations Charter doesn’t permit declaring war, especially against a nation that has been in a state of peace for 12 years. The UN can only declare peace. Remember, it wasn’t a war in Korea; it was only a police action to bring about peace. But at least in Korea and Vietnam there was fighting going on, so it was a bit easier to stretch the language than it is today regarding Iraq. Since Iraq doesn’t even have an Air Force or a Navy, is incapable of waging a war, and remains defenseless against the overwhelming powers of the United States and the British, it’s difficult to claim that we’re going into Iraq to restore peace. History will eventually show that if we launch this attack the real victims will be the innocent Iraqi civilians who despise Saddam Hussein and are terrified of the coming bombs that will destroy their cities. The greatest beneficiaries of the attack may well be Osama bin Ladin and the al Qaeda. Some in the media have already suggested that the al Qaeda may be encouraging the whole event. Unintended consequences will occur – what will come from this attack is still entirely unknown. It’s a well-known fact that the al Qaeda are not allies of Saddam Hussein and despise the secularization and partial westernization of Iraqi culture. They would welcome the chaos that’s about to come. This will give them a chance to influence post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The attack, many believe, will confirm to the Arab world that indeed the Christian West has once again attacked the Muslim East, providing radical fundamentalists a tremendous boost for recruitment. An up or down vote on declaring war against Iraq would not pass the Congress, and the President has no intention of asking for it. This is unfortunate, because if the process were carried out in a constitutional fashion, the American people and the U.S. Congress would vote "No" on assuming responsibility for this war. Not only is it sad that we have gone so far astray from our Constitution, but it’s also dangerous for world peace and threatens our liberties here at home. Dr. Ron Paul is a Republican member of Congress from Texas. 
Transferring authority to wage war, calling it permission to use force to fight for peace in order to satisfy the UN Charter, which replaces the Article I, Section 8 war power provision, is about as close to 1984 "newspeak" that we will ever get in the real world.
Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 255.
#1. To: robin, ALL (#0)
Can anyone point out to me the form that the Constitution says a declaration of war must have?
The Constitution gives the power to declare war to the Congress. They formally declare something like, "the state of war between the United States and ... is hereby formally declared." It is not a difficult concept once you get the hang of it. For Japan, the precise language was, "the state of war between the United states and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared...." For Germany, the precise language was, "the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany, which has thus been thrust upon the United states, is hereby formally declared...." For Italy, the precise language was, "the state of war between the United States and the Government of Italy which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared...." Below is how the declaration of war against Germany went through each house of congress. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/77-1-148/77-1-148.html [IN THE SENATE] DECLARATION OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY Mr. Connally, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported an original joint resolution (S. J. Res. 119) declaring that a state of war exists between the Government of Germany and the Government and the people of the United States, and making provision to prosecute the same, which was read the first time by its title, and the second time at length, as follows: "Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany, which has thus been thrust upon the United states, is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Government of Germany; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States." I am authorized by the Committee on Foreign Relations to say to the Senate that after consideration of the text of the joint resolution which I have reported and after mature consideration of all aspects of this matter, the membership of the Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously approve and agree to the course suggested. One member of the committee was absent, but I have authority to express his views. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the joint resolution. The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 119) declaring that a state of war exists between the Government of Germany and the Government and the people of the United States, and making provision to prosecute the same. The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution. The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was read the third time. The VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass? Mr. CONNALLY. On that question I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered, and the Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll. The result was announced yeas 88, nays 0. * * * * * * So the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 119) was passed. =========================== [IN THE HOUSE] DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY Mr. MCCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass House Joint Resolution 256, which I send to the desk and ask to have read. The Clerk read as follows. "Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Government of Germany; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States." Mr. MCCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. * * * * * * The question was taken; and there were yeas 393, answered "present" 1, not voting 36. So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended, and the resolution was agreed to. ==========================
It doesn't require that language ANYWHERE in the Constitution or US law.
The Constitution gives to the CONGRESS the power to declare war. They may do with any wording of their choosing as long as the chosen wording declares war. ---------- U.S. Supreme Court "The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry. It is not denied, nor in the course of the argument has it been denied, that congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed." ---------- U.S. Supreme Court DOUGLAS J., joined by BLACK J, concurring: "But the war power stems from a declaration of war. The Constitution by Art. I, 8, gives Congress, not the President, power '[t]o declare War.' Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide therefore what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have." ---------- Federalist #69 - Hamilton "The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union." "The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies -- all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." ---------- Federalist #41 - Madison "That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. "The powers falling within the first class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money. "Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils. "Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form." ---------- Cornell Law School In the early draft of the Constitution presented to the Convention by its Committee of Detail, Congress was empowered "to make war." [1412] Although there were solitary suggestions that the power should better be vested in the President alone, [1413] in the Senate[p.308]alone, [1414] or in the President and the Senate, [1415] the sentiment of the Convention, as best we can determine from the limited notes of the proceedings, was that the potentially momentous consequences of initiating armed hostilities should be called up only by the concurrence of the President and both Houses of Congress. [1416] In contrast to the English system, the Framers did not want the wealth and blood of the Nation committed by the decision of a single individual; [1417] in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, they did not wish to forego entirely the advantages of executive efficiency nor to entrust the matter solely to a branch so close to popular passions. [1418] The result of these conflicting considerations was that the Convention amended the clause so as to give Congress the power to "declare war." [1419] Although this change could be read to give Congress the mere formal function of recognizing a state of hostilities, in the context of the Convention proceedings it appears more likely the change was intended to insure that the President was empowered to repel sudden attacks [1420] without awaiting congressional action and to make clear that the conduct of war was vested exclusively in the President. [1421] An early controversy revolved about the issue of the President’s powers and the necessity of congressional action when hostilities are initiated against us rather than the Nation instituting armed conflict. The Bey of Tripoli, in the course of attempting to extort payment for not molesting United States shipping, declared war upon the United States, and a debate began whether Congress had to enact a formal declaration of war to create a legal status of war. President Jefferson sent a squadron of frigates to the Mediterranean to protect our ships but limited its mission to defense in the narrowest sense of the term. Attacked by a Tripolitan cruiser, one of the frigates subdued it, disarmed it, and, pursuant to instructions, released it. Jefferson in a message to Congress announced his actions as in compliance with constitutional limitations on his authority in the absence of a declaration of war. [1422] Hamilton espoused a different interpretation, contending that the Constitution vested in Congress the power to initiate war but that when another nation made war upon the United States we were already in a state of war and no declaration by Congress was needed. [1423] Congress thereafter enacted a statute authorizing the President to instruct the commanders of armed vessels of the United States to seize all vessels and goods of the Bey of Tripoli "and also to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify..." [1424] But no formal declaration of war was passed, Congress apparently accepting Hamilton’s view. [1425] Footnotes 1412 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: rev. ed. 1937), 313.
NOWHERE does it say the wording must say "declare war". And it looks like Congress and the Supreme Court agree. By the way, did you know that the law passed by Congress authorizing the use of military force in Iraq even mentioned the word WAR?
I am shocked, shocked I tell you, to discover that a Joint Resolution of Congress made pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, and which cites said War Powers Resolution four (4) times by name, contains the word war. It also contains the specific authorization involved: SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES. (a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements- (1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. (2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution. Did Iraq:
Yes. Al-Zarqawi, who was closely tied with al-Qaeda, was in Iraq long before we invaded, and in fact met with al-Qaeda members in Baghdad to fund and plan an attack on the US embassy in Amman using a chemically laced bomb. Furthermore, Iraq was asked multiple times by the Jordan and the US to apprehend al-Zarqawi and Iraq made no real attempt. But Iraq was aware that al-Zarqawi was in the country. That we know. When Iraq did manage to pick up a member of al-Zarqawi's group, they released him (on Saddam's orders, according to the CIA). And you forgot to quote the rest of that sentence: "or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." A good case can be made that one reason the chemical bomb plot failed was that al-Zarqawi was put on the run by the invasion and therefore couldn't monitor it as closely as he might have. Or perhaps the invasion even led to intelligence that allowed Jordan to intercept the terrorists before they could complete their mission. No, because unlike Iraq, Saudi Arabia's government condemned the attack, was not on speaking terms with bin Laden (in fact, bin Laden's people were trying to topple the Saudi leadership) and Saudi Arabia after 9/11 made significant efforts to destroy al-Qaeda's operations in their country. Contrast that with Iraq's government which applauded the actions of the terrorists on 9/11, was still in communication with al-Qaeda after 9/11, and instead of rounding up al-Qaeda was allowing al-Qaeda to operate freely in their country. And don't forget, preventing al-Qaeda from getting access to WMD was a major concern following an attack on 9/11 that certainly showed a willingness to cross the WMD threshold and following discovery in Afghanistan of an interest in WMD by al-Qaeda. Iraq had WMD technology ... the Saudi's did not.
Al-Zarqawi, who was closely tied with al-Qaeda, was in Iraq long before we invaded, and in fact met with al-Qaeda members in Baghdad to fund and plan an attack on the US embassy in Amman using a chemically laced bomb. Al Qaeda members were in the United States plotting. Do you propose we should have bombed the cities they were in? Saddam was Sunni. Al Qaeda is Shiite. They were not allies and they were not friends. A good case can be made that one reason the chemical bomb plot failed was that al-Zarqawi was put on the run by the invasion and therefore couldn't monitor it as closely as he might have. Or perhaps the invasion even led to intelligence that allowed Jordan to intercept the terrorists before they could complete their mission. An even better case can be made that you just make crap up. If the act was "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons," shouldn't we have attacked Saudi Arabia, or at somebody who had something to do with the attacks of September 11, 2001? No, because unlike Iraq, Saudi Arabia's government condemned the attack, was not on speaking terms with bin Laden (in fact, bin Laden's people were trying to topple the Saudi leadership) and Saudi Arabia after 9/11 made significant efforts to destroy al-Qaeda's operations in their country. Contrast that with Iraq's government which applauded the actions of the terrorists on 9/11, was still in communication with al-Qaeda after 9/11, and instead of rounding up al-Qaeda was allowing al-Qaeda to operate freely in their country. And don't forget, preventing al-Qaeda from getting access to WMD was a major concern following an attack on 9/11 that certainly showed a willingness to cross the WMD threshold and following discovery in Afghanistan of an interest in WMD by al-Qaeda. Iraq had WMD technology ... the Saudi's did not. Like rock 'n' roll, the hits just keep on coming. It was Saudi Arabians who planned the 9/11 operation, funded the 9/11 operation, and executed the 9/11 operation. It was not Iraqis. It is alright for Saudis to attack the twin towers as long as some Saudi government official says "My bad" afterwards. Retaliate against someone who had nothing to do with it because someone on television applauded. As for Al Qaeda being allowed to operate freely in Iraq, that did not occur until the Bush administration assumed responsibility for running the place. Saddam Hussein did a far better job of keeping them out than George Bush. And don't forget, preventing al-Qaeda from getting access to WMD was a major concern As Al Qaeda had no WMD and Iraq had no WMD to give them, and as Iraq and Al Qaeda were enemies and not friends, the only WMD in question were the imaginary ones that Bush and his administration lied about in order to gain public support for a war. Even GWB has given up on that pantsload. Iraq had WMD technology Israel had WMD technology, and WMD, including nuclear weapons. Resolution 487 (June 19, 1981) Further taking note of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 12 June 1981 on the "military attack on the Iraq nuclear research centre and its implications for the Agency" (S/14532), Fully aware of the fact that Iraq has been a party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons since it came into force in 1970, that in accordance with that Treaty Iraq has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities, and that the Agency has testified that these safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to date, Noting furthermore that Israel has not adhered to the nonproliferation Treaty, Deeply concerned about the danger to international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, which could at any time explode the situation in the area, with grave consequences for the vital interests of all States, Considering that, under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations," 1. Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct; 2. Calls upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof; 3. Further considers that the said attack constitutes a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime which is the foundation of the nonproliferation Treaty; 4. Fully recognises the inalienable sovereign right of Iraq, and all other States, especially the developing countries, to establish programmes of technological and nuclear development to develop their economy and industry for peaceful purposes in accordance with their present and future needs and consistent with the internationally accepted objectives of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation; 5. Calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; 6. Considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel;
After 9/11? Any specific proof of this? No? But it was not the Saudi Arabian government. And the planning of the operation didn't apparently take place in Saudi Arabia. Indeed the person funding the effort was not welcome in the country at the time and was calling for the toppling of the Saudi government. You have provided no proof that the Saudi government or anyone in the Saudi Government was involved in 9/11. FALSE. The dozen al-Qaeda put on trial and convicted in Jordan said they met al-Zarqawi in Baghdad BEFORE the invasion. There is no indication at all that al-Qaeda's movements in Iraq were restricted under Saddam. Indeed, it appears that al-Qaeda freely moved about and even used Iraqi hospitals. And one time, one was detained and then released on orders (according to the CIA and a captured Iraqi document) of Saddam. Good thing but they were definitely trying to acquire WMD. Still are, I imagine. FALSE. That binary sarin shell that turned up as an IED after the invasion proves you wrong. And there were hundreds of other shells of various types found containing materials we wouldn't want terrorists to get their hands on. Plus, you really don't know if Iraq had WMD. The ISG said they have a credible source saying WMD related items (possibly WMD) were moved to Iraq. And Saddam's regime went to a lot of trouble to sanitize files, computers and facilities of something you claim they didn't have. Plus, Iraq definitely had information and seed stock that al-Qaeda might find useful in creating WMD themselves (in a place like that camp in Northern Iraq, for instance). Odd that al-Zarqawi would pick Baghdad (seat of government of his enemy and a city filled with security types from Saddam's regime) to meet with the terrorists he was dispatching to kill tens of thousands in Jordan. Odd that al-Zarqawi would go to a Baghdad hospital to get treatment. Odd that Iraq openly applauded the actions of their enemy. Odd that Iraq had friendly contacts with the Taliban after 9/11 to warn them about a possible US attack to get bin Laden. And what is it with you and Israel?
BAC, tell me about the rabbits... then tell me about the magic vintage sarin. "The Gulf War Air Campaign - Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Al Muthanna, February 8, 1991", 19 March 2001; at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/al_muth/al_muth_s02.htm The taskforce of the Department of Defense attributed the high level of Iraqi cooperation in revealing the scale of its earlier chemical programme to the fact that the Iraqi government realised that the nerve agents it had produced were no longer viable: "We believe Iraq was largely cooperative on its latest declarations because many of its residual munitions were of little use - other than bolstering the credibility of Iraq's declaration - because of chemical agent degradation and leakage problems." "Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian Gulf War", Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, April 2002; at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/cwagents/cwpaper1.htm A similar assessment was made by the CIA in a memorandum from January 1991: "Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. Technical failures have reduced their purity and caused problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for the sarin- type nerve agents (GB and GF). These both contain hydrofluoricacid (HF), an impurity that attacks metal surfaces and catalyzes nerve agent decomposition. This leads to metal failure and leaks in the ammunition, increasing handling hazards. [...] Lower purity significantly limits shelf life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed. [...] The nerve agent should have already begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the end of March 1991." "Iraq: Potential for Chemical Weapon Use", 25 January 1991; at: http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html This assessment is repeated in the IISS strategic dossier of 9 September 2002: "As a practical matter, any nerve agent from this period [pre-1991] would have deteriorated by now.." (p.51) UNMOVIC have also acknowledged this conclusion with regard to specific substances: Tabun: "documentary evidence suggests that Tabun was produced using process technology and quality control methodologies that would result in the agent being degraded to a very low quality through the action of a resulting by-product." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.68). Sarin / Cyclosarin: "According to documents discovered by UNSCOM in Iraq, the purity of Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were on average below 60%, and dropped below Iraq’s established quality control acceptance level of 40% by purity some 3 to 12 months after production. [...] There is no evidence that any bulk Sarin-type agents remain in Iraq - gaps in accounting of these agents are related to Sarin-type agents weaponized in rocket warheads and aerial bombs. Based on the documentation found by UNSCOM during inspections in Iraq, Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were largely of low quality and as such, degraded shortly after production. Therefore, with respect to the unaccounted for weaponized Sarin-type agents, it is unlikely that they would still be viable today." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, pp.72-73).
Do you realize that nothing you posted pertains to BINARY sarin? You do know what that is, don't you? Or perhaps you don't. You see, binary sarin has an INDEFINITE shelf life.
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=164186&Disp=All#C469 nolu chan to BAC, 2006-11-21 06:20:39 ET on LP SERIAL: DIM 37-91 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ SUBJECT: IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE. DOI: 25 JAN 91 )) Key Judgments * * * 25. Binary weapons have disadvantages that would reduce their value to the Iraqis. A large part of the binary's interior is filled with nonlethal components that help mix the chemicals when the weapon is delivered. These components also help keep the chemicals separated prior to use. Because the reaction must take place while the weapon is en route to the target, the reaction does not convert all the DF to a chemical agent when the round hits its target. The round contains a mixture of agent, unreacted DF, unreacted alcohol, HF, and other impurities when it reaches the target. 26. An additional problem for the Iraqis may be the poor quality of the DF they produce. The same chemical engineering problems that have limited the purity of currently produced agents also could limit their DF quality. DF is made from an organophosphorus chemical and DF. Removing the HF is difficult: it is likely that Iraqi DF contains HF, which could catalyze decomposition.
Yet the ISG said the shell contained 40 percent sarin,
the same as you yourself claimed the shell was DESIGNED to produce in that LP
thread. So which is false? Your claim that the binary agent in the shell was
DESIGNED to produce 40% sarin or the claim that there was HF in the shell
which caused decomposition? One or the other must be false. It appears to me
that in that thread you yourself proved the shell had an indefinite shelf
life ... if your claim that the shell was DESIGNED to produce 40 percent sarin
wasn't false.
No, sarin at less than 40% purity fails to meet the minimum standard for weapons grade. The shell is designed to work with 40% pure sarin. They could, of course, try to design a shell to produce 60% pure sarin. That they were unable to produce 60% pure sarin in a lab setting might be a minor sticking point. They could design a shell to work with 20% sarin if their goal was to make wet sand. The shell was a prototype which was tested. It was never designed to have a 10- or 20-year shelf life. Iraq was unable to produce pure enough DF that it did not degrade. http://www.albionmonitor.com/0405a/sarinshell.html MONITOR Wire Services Speaking May 17 in Baghdad, General Mark Kimmitt, the coalition's senior military spokesman in Iraq, took reporters by surprise. "The Iraqi Survey Group confirmed today that a 155-millimeter artillery round containing sarin nerve agent had been found," Kimmitt said. "The round had been rigged as an IED [improvised explosive device] which was discovered by a U.S. force convoy. A detonation occurred before that IED could be rendered inoperable. This produced a very small dispersal of agent." After more than a year's search, it appeared that the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) -- the U.S. team searching for evidence of weapons of mass destruction -- had finally found something, although the amount was small, and the significance was not immediately apparent. Sarin is a clear, odorless liquid that can cause lethal convulsions in those who breathe it or get it on their skin. It was the poison used by the Aum Shinrikyo cult to kill 12 people in an attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The government of Iraq told United Nations inspectors that it had manufactured hundreds of tons of sarin, and that it used the nerve gas during its war with Iran in the 1980s. It also is believed to have been the agent used against Kurds in northern Iraq 10 years ago. The Pentagon confirmed on May 25 that the shell did contain sarin. Kimmitt said no one was seriously injured in the explosion of the shell, but that two people were treated for what he called "minor exposure" to nerve agents. The general said there were no serious injuries apparently because detonating the shell was much less effective in dispersing the nerve gas than had the shell been fired from a cannon. Nor was there any immediate evidence that more artillery shells containing nerve agents exist in Iraq, or if the discovery indicates the presence of a significant stockpile of sarin and other unconventional weapons. As for the strategic significance of the discovery, Rumsfeld said he believes the United States had good reason to conclude that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. But whether he had them just as the war began, he said, remains a mystery: "The intelligence information in our country and in other countries that have excellent intelligence-gathering capabilities was that they existed, that the government of Iraq was systematically deceiving the world about what it was doing. There was a great deal of evidence to that effect. We don't now know what actually happened [to make the weapons disappear]," Rumsfeld said. In January, Danish troops in southern Iraq discovered mortar shells they believed to contain a blister agent. But subsequent tests proved the shells, which apparently dated to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, had no chemical warfare agent. Some U.S. officials have told The Associated Press that they are concerned that there may be more weaponized sarin in Iraq, and that insurgents who use whatever weapons they can find may not be able to distinguish between ordinary explosives and shells containing deadly poisons. The agent used in the shell found on May 15 is believed to be old, and therefore lacking much of its original potency. Still, the AP quotes U.S. officials as saying insurgents may be putting themselves and others in danger simply by handling the explosives, let alone detonating them.
The ISG Annex doesn't say they discovered a 152mm binary sarin artillery projectile *of the type designed to produce 40 percent sarin*. No, it say they discovered "a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile - CONTAINING a 40 percent concentration of Sarin". It also said "The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long—lasting chemical weapons still exist.'" Evidently the ISG thought this shell was viable and a long-lasting chemical weapon. Why would insurgents use a shell that had been tested? Where'd they find it, lying on the ground somewhere? Was it buried and they had to dig it up? Why use that type of shell when (as you folks claim) there were millions of rounds of perfectly good artillery shells in unguarded bunkers around the country? It doesn't make any sense.
This is the Iraq Survey Group FINAL REPORT findings on Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program. Annex F is a copy of the Preliminary Assessment. The Introduction to the Preliminary Assessment stated, "The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile-containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin...." The Final Report contains no representation about the purity of sarin produced by Iraq, either in this shell or any other shell. "The Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US Department of Defense gave the following assessment in March 2001: "Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and degrades over time. US experts consider chemical warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be militarily ineffective. Western sources estimate the sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity, and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and 50 percent." (Link) Excerpts are presented below. The Final Report on Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program, the Intro and six sections indentified and linked below, make no mention of claim made in the Preliminary Assessment. There is no reference to Annex F about such a claim. The Preliminary Assessment, included as an Annex to the Final Report, does not represent the findings of those who issued the Final Report. The Preliminary Assessment stated the single 152mm Binary chemical IED was remotely detonated. They blew it up before testing. They found "partially detonated" IED and they remotely detonated the round to render it safe. They were only able to test “the remaining liquid” after the round was remotely detonated. There was no way to know, and there is no statement made, regarding the quantity of liquid that was in the shell prior to detonation. A key sarin degradation product was found. Just like BAC poop, and other shit, degradation happens. The "40% concentration" is in the introduction to the Preliminary Assessment, but not in the main body comments of the Final Report. There is no indication of where that information derived from. There is no explanation of how you create 40% concentration sarin by exploding a binary shell in the desert. While the 152mm and 155mm shells may have a similar payload area as unitary rounds, modification to utilize a binary payload entails using a significant portion of the payload area for the apparatus which separately stores the components and which, upon firing, releases the components and mixes them in flight. Iraq Survey Group Final Report Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program By God, spare us your evil. Pick up your goods and leave. We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the dual chemical. Let them take note of this. We have the dual chemical. It exists in Iraq. [1] [1] Saddam speaking about the Israeli, US, and UK intelligence services and Iraq's development of binary CW munitions in a speech on 2 april 1990. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service 021329 April 1990). Iraq Survey Group Final Report Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program A speech by Saddam on 2 April 1990 publicly identified Iraq’s CW research and production efforts in anticipation of the next war. Saddam claimed Iraq had a binary agent capability, an assertion that caught MSE scientists off guard, according to Iraqi declaration corroborated by documents the UN discovered at Al Muthanna. * In less than a month after Saddam’s speech, Iraq restarted its CW production lines, tested CW warheads for al Husayn missiles, and reverse-engineered special parachute-retarded bombs. [According to the FFCD, Iraq did not import any aerial bombs in 1990.] Al Muthanna filled the al-Husayn warheads and aerial bombs with a binary nerve agent component. These weapons were accompanied by Jerry cans containing the second component, a chemical that, when mixed with the weapons’ contents, produced nerve agent. This was the mix-before-flight Iraqi ‘binary’ system. Iraq deployed 1,000 binary bombs and 50 al-Husayn warheads-binary and unitary-by August 1990. -------------- In August 1995, shortly after Iraq revealed its production of bulk BW agent, Saddam’s son-in-law and head of Iraq’s WMD programs, Husayn Kamil, fled the country. Saddam made a decision at that time to declare virtually all hidden information and material they felt was significant on Iraq’s programs, turning over WMD documentation, including 12 trunks of CW documents. * The documentation turned over by Iraq, allegedly hidden by Husayn Kamil, included results of Iraqi research material up to 1988 that indicated more extensive research on VX than previously admitted. Iraq Survey Group Final Report Command and Control Iraqi scientists and engineers could maintain a minimal CW production proficiency without engaging in CW-related R&D and production because they were already experienced in key CW agent production processes. Largely based on data available in previously published technical literature, Iraq had sufficiently developed processes to produce nerve, blister, and psychological agents. * For instance, Iraqi research on VX started in 1985 with a literature survey on the preparation and production methods of VX. Based on their literature review, the best and easiest method was chosen for the preparation of VX agent, according to Iraq’s CW Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) to the UN. Iraq Survey Group Final Report Infrastructure-Research and Development Iraq Survey Group Final Report Infrastructure-Production Capability Iraq Survey Group Final Report Weaponization Iraq’s capability to produce CW munitions on a large scale ended with Desert Storm. However, Iraq retained the ability to retool existing factories to produce new munitions, and would have relied on basic fabrication techniques to weaponize agent if it had chosen to do so. ----- Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991 ISG expended considerable time and effort investigating longstanding Iraqi assertions about the fate of CW munitions known to have been in Baghdad’s possession during the Gulf war. We believe the vast majority of these munitions were destroyed, but questions remain concerning hundreds of CW munitions. Since May 2004, ISG has recovered dozens of additional chemical munitions, including artillery rounds, rockets and a binary Sarin artillery projectile (see Figure 5). In each case, the recovered munitions appear to have been part of the pre-1991 Gulf war stocks, but we can neither determine if the munitions were declared to the UN or if, as required by the UN SCR 687, Iraq attempted to destroy them. (See Annex F.) * The most significant recovered munitions was a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile which insurgents had attempted to use as an improvised explosive device. The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons An IAEA inspection led by Dr. David Kay in late June 1991 triggered Iraq’s decision to unilaterally destroy the undeclared weapons that had been concealed from the UN, according to multiple senior Iraqi officials. Dr. Kay’s inspection team was blocked from sites in Abu Ghurayb and Fallujah. The Iraqis fired warning shots over the inspectors’ heads, but Dr. Kay and his group brought back video tapes and photos that indicated Iraq was hiding undeclared uranium enrichment equipment from the inspectors. * Dr. Kay’s inspection and the international uproar surrounding it caused consternation and a measure of panic in the Regime’s leadership, particularly Husayn Kamil, and Saddam appointed a high-level committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz to deal with inspection matters, according to multiple sources. Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991 Iraq completed the destruction of its pre-1991 stockpile of CW by the end of 1991, with most items destroyed in July of that year. ISG judges that Iraq destroyed almost all prohibited weapons at that time. * ISG has obtained no evidence that contradicts our assessment that the Iraqis destroyed most of their hidden stockpile, although we recovered a small number of pre-1991 chemical munitions in early to mid 2004. Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap Chemical Resources A group of insurgents began a nascent CW effort without CW scientists or industrial-scale chemical supplies. After OIF, a group of insurgents-referred to as the al-Abud network-assembled key supplies and relevant expertise from community resources to develop a program for weaponizing CW agents for use against Coalition Forces. The al-Abud network in late 2003 recruited a Baghdad chemist-who lacked the relevant CW expertise-to develop chemical agents. The group sought and easily acquired from farmers and local shops chemicals and equipment to conduct CW experiments. An investigation of these CW attempts suggests that the al-Abud network failed to produce desired CW agents, however it remains unclear whether these failures derive from a lack of available precursors or insufficient CW expertise. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Chemical Munitions-Searching Military Depots and Caches Iraq Survey Group Final Report Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings Introduction The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile-containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin-which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist. ---------------- 16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical Improvised Explosive Device A military unit near Baghdad Airport reported a suspect IED along the main road between the airport and the Green Zone (see figure 2). The munitions were remotely detonated and the remaining liquid tested positive in ISG field labs for the nerve agent Sarin and a key Sarin degradation product. The partially detonated IED was an old prototype binary nerve agent munitions of the type Iraq declared it had field tested in the late 1980s. The munitions bear no markings, much like the sulfur mustard round reported on 2 May (see Figure 3). Insurgents may have looted or purchased the rounds believing they were conventional high explosive 155mm rounds. The use of this type of round as an IED does not allow sufficient time for mixing of the binary compounds and release in an effective manner, thus limiting the dispersal area of the chemicals. Historical context: Iraq only declared its work on binary munitions after Husayn Kamil fled Iraq in 1995, and even then only claimed to have produced a limited number of binary rounds that it used in field trials in 1988. UN investigations revealed a number of uncertainties surrounding the nature and extent of Iraq’s work with these systems and it remains unclear how many rounds it produced, tested, declared, or concealed from the UN.
Yet it references Annex F and tells the reader to "See Annex F" when the topic of that discovered munitions is mentioned. The Final Report directs the reader to "See Annex F" when the topic of the discovered munitions is mentioned. Why do that if they believe the contents of Annex F are inaccurate? There is no indication where many claims in the report derive from. Are all such claims to be dismissed now? I'm sorry but it would appear the writers of the document took great care with their wording throughout the report. And they said "projectile - containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin" when they could just as easily have said "of a type that must produce 40 percent concentration to be effective". And the assertion that this statement meant the ISG thought the shell actually contained enough agent to produce several liters of 40 percent sarin was repeated in many venues and not once denied or corrected by members of the ISG.
Those who issued the Final Report did not include your favorite information from the Preliminary Assessment. It's a tragedy, but it happened.
But they did tell readers to "See Annex F" when it came to the discussion of discovered munitions. Also, the included Annex F on the website where the Final Report was provided. You wish to ignore both, but it happened.
#259. To: BeAChooser (#255)
Sadly, your favorite bit of unsupportable information was neither stated, cited, nor referenced in any way in the final report.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
#34. To: BeAChooser, robin (#1)
Can anyone point out to me the form that the Constitution says a declaration of war must have?
"Whereas the Government of Germany has formally declared war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it
Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I shall presently ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the joint resolution just read to the Senate. Before the request is submitted, however, I desire to say that, being advised of the declaration of war upon the United States by the Governments of Germany and Italy, and anticipating a message by the President of the United States in relation thereto, and after a conference with the Secretary of State, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I called a meeting of the committee this morning and submitted to the committee the course I expected to pursue as chairman and the request which I expected to make. "Whereas the Government of Germany has formally declared war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it
The SPEAKER. The question is, Will the House suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution?
#48. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#34)
They formally declare something like, "the state of war between the United States and ... is hereby formally declared."
#56. To: BeAChooser (#48)
It doesn't require that language ANYWHERE in the Constitution or US law.
TALBOT v. SEEMAN, 5 U.S. 1 (1801)
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
Legal Information Institute
Congressional Research Service Annotated Constitution Declaration of War
----------
1413 Mr. Butler favored "vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it." Id., 318.
1414 Mr. Pinkney thought the House was too numerous for such deliberations but that the Senate would be more capable of a proper resolution and more acquainted with foreign affairs. Additionally, with the States equally represented in the Senate, the interests of all would be safeguarded. Ibid. 1415 Hamilton’s plan provided that the President was "to make war or peace, with the advice of the senate..." 1 id., 300.
1416 2 id., 318–319. In The Federalist, No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 465, Hamilton notes: "[T]he President is to be commander–in– chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies,—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." (Emphasis in original). And see id., No. 26, 164–171. Cf. C. Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States (Urbana, Ill.: 1921), ch. V.
1417 The Federalist, No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 464–465, 470. During the Convention, Gerry remarked that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: rev. ed. 1937), 318.
1418 The Articles of Confederation vested powers with regard to foreign relations in the Congress.
1419 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: rev. ed. 1937), 318–319.
1420 Jointly introducing the amendment to substitute "declare" for "make," Madison and Gerry noted the change would "leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." Id., 318.
1421 Connecticut originally voted against the amendment to substitute "declare" for "make" but "on the remark by Mr. King that ‘make’ war might be understood to ‘conduct’ it which was an Executive function, Mr. Ellsworth gave up his opposition, and the vote of Connecticut was changed...." Id., 319. The contemporary and subsequent judicial interpretation was to the understanding set out in the text. Cf. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cr. (5 U.S.), 1, 28 (1801) (Chief Justice Marshall: "The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body alone can be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry."); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2, 139 (1866).
1422 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, J. Richardson ed. (Washington: 1896), 326, 327.
1423 7 Works of Alexander Hamilton, J. Hamilton ed. (New York: 1851), 746–747.
1424 2 Stat. 129, 130 (1802) (emphasis supplied).
1425 Of course, Congress need not declare war in the all–out sense; it may provide for a limited war which, it may be, the 1802 statute recognized. Cf. Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 37 (1800).
#63. To: nolu_chan (#56)
The Constitution gives to the CONGRESS the power to declare war. They may do with any wording of their choosing as long as the chosen wording declares war.
#74. To: BeAChooser (#63)
By the way, did you know that the law passed by Congress authorizing the use of military force in Iraq even mentioned the word WAR?
Link
Let's review.
If the act was "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons," shouldn't we have attacked Saudi Arabia, or at somebody who had something to do with the attacks of September 11, 2001?
#76. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#74)
harbor organizations or persons who did the above?
If the act was "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons," shouldn't we have attacked Saudi Arabia, or at somebody who had something to do with the attacks of September 11, 2001?
#85. To: BeAChooser (#76)
Taking note of the statement made by the DirectorGeneral of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Agency's Board of Governors on the subject on 9 June 1981 and his statement to the Council at its 2288th meeting on 19 June 1981,
#87. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#85)
Al Qaeda members were in the United States plotting.
It was Saudi Arabians who planned the 9/11 operation, funded the 9/11 operation, and executed the 9/11 operation.
It is alright for Saudis to attack the twin towers as long as some Saudi government official says "My bad" afterwards.
As for Al Qaeda being allowed to operate freely in Iraq, that did not occur until the Bush administration assumed responsibility for running the place.
As Al Qaeda had no WMD
and Iraq had no WMD to give them
Iraq and Al Qaeda were enemies
#95. To: BeAChooser (#87)
That binary sarin shell
#112. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#95)
then tell me about the magic vintage sarin.
#211. To: BeAChooser (#112)
You see, binary sarin has an INDEFINITE shelf life.
http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html
The Iraqi DF, a key component of the binary shell, would catalyze and decompose while sitting on a shelf due to impurities.
#216. To: nolu_chan (#211)
The Iraqi DF, a key component of the binary shell, would
catalyze and decompose while sitting on a shelf due to impurities.
#225. To: BeAChooser (#216)
Yet the ISG said the shell contained 40 percent sarin, the same as you yourself claimed the shell was DESIGNED to produce in that LP thread.
Sarin Discovered In Iraq Was A Relic, Not A Weapon
#236. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#225)
No, sarin at less than 40% purity fails to meet the minimum standard for weapons grade. The shell is designed to work with 40% pure sarin.
The shell was a prototype which was tested.
#239. To: BeAChooser (#236)
* The documents also included papers related to new agent research, mix-in-flight binary munitions development, and previously undisclosed involvement of other organizations in CW research.
* Iraq’s CW agent purity, formulation, and production standards in the 1980s program - although inferior to Western standards with the exception of its high-grade mustard - were “good enough” to produce harmful agent proven successful during previous use.
* ISG has also recovered 155mm chemical rounds and 122mm artillery rockets which we judge came from abandoned Regime stocks.
* A senior Iraqi scientist who directed the destruction of chemical and biological munitions contends that the decision to destroy the hidden materials was made at the end of June 1991. David Kay’s inspection and the ensuing controversy prompted Iraqi concerns about renewed war with the United States, according to Dr. Mahmud Firaj Bilal. Amir Rashid contacted Dr. Bilal and ordered that all hidden chemical and biological munitions be destroyed within 48 hours. When Bilal responded that this was impossible, Rashid directed that Bilal use the resources of the Iraqi Air Force and the surface-to-surface missile force to accomplish the task. Dr. Bilal gathered his colleagues from Al Muthanna State Establishment, went to the locations of the stored munitions, and began the destruction.
* Iraq declared some of the unilateral destruction-missiles and chemical munitions-to UNSCOM in March 1992 but continued to conceal the destruction of the biological weapons program.
* These remaining pre-1991 weapons either escaped destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. More may be found in the months and years ahead.
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Annex F
Chemical Munitions-Other Finds
#248. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#239)
This is the Iraq Survey Group FINAL REPORT findings on Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program. Annex F is a copy of the Preliminary Assessment.
The Final Report contains no representation about the purity of sarin produced by Iraq,
The "40% concentration" is in the introduction to the Preliminary Assessment, but not in the main body comments of the Final Report. There is no indication of where that information derived from.
#252. To: BeAChooser (#248)
There is no indication where many claims in the report derive from. Are all such claims to be dismissed now?
#255. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#252)
Those who issued the Final Report did not include your favorite information from the Preliminary Assessment.
Replies to Comment # 255.
End Trace Mode for Comment # 255.