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Title: Why the towers fell: Two theories [by a civil engineer]
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URL Source: http://www.vermontguardian.com/commentary/032007/TwinTowers.shtml
Published: Mar 1, 2007
Author: William Rice
Post Date: 2007-04-17 16:30:39 by honway
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Why the towers fell: Two theories By William Rice William Rice, P.E., is a registered professional civil engineer who worked on structural steel (and concrete) buildings in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. He was also a professor at Vermont Technical College where he taught engineering materials, structures lab, and other building related courses, Posted March 1, 2007 Having worked on structural steel buildings as a civil engineer in the era when the Twin Towers were designed and constructed, I found some disturbing discrepancies and omissions concerning their collapse on 9/11. I was particularly interested in the two PBS documentaries that explained the prevailing theories as determined by two government agencies, FEMA and NIST (National Institute of Science and Technology). The first (2002) PBS documentary, Why the Towers Fell, discussed how the floor truss connectors failed and caused a “progressive pancake collapse.” The subsequent 2006 repackaged documentary Building on Ground Zero explained that the connectors held, but that the columns failed, which is also unlikely. Without mentioning the word “concrete,” the latter documentary compared the three-second collapse of the concrete Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building with that of the Twin Towers that were of structural steel. The collapse of a concrete-framed building cannot be compared with that of a structural steel-framed building. Since neither documentary addressed many of the pertinent facts, I took the time to review available material, combine it with scientific and historic facts, and submit the following two theories for consideration. The prevailing theory The prevailing theory for the collapse of the 110-story, award-winning Twin Towers is that when jetliners flew into the 95th and 80th floors of the North and South Towers respectively, they severed several of each building’s columns and weakened other columns with the burning of jet fuel/kerosene (and office combustibles). However, unlike concrete buildings, structural steel buildings redistribute the stress when several columns are removed and the undamaged structural framework acts as a truss network to bridge over the missing columns. After the 1993 car bomb explosion destroyed columns in the North Tower, John Skilling, the head structural engineer for the Twin Towers, was asked about an airplane strike. He explained that the Twin Towers were originally designed to withstand the impact of a Boeing 707 (similar in size to the Boeing 767). He went on to say that there would be a horrendous fire from the jet fuel, but “the building structure would still be there.” The 10,000 gallons of jet fuel (half capacity) in each jetliner did cause horrendous fires over several floors, but it would not cause the steel members to melt or even lose sufficient strength to cause a collapse. This is because the short-duration jet fuel fires and office combustible fires cannot create (or transmit to the steel) temperatures hot enough. If a structural steel building could collapse because of fire, it would do so slowly as the various steel members gradually relinquished their structural strength. However, in the 100-year history of structural-steel framed buildings, there is no evidence of any structural steel framed building having collapsed because of fire. Let’s assume the unlikelihood that these fires could weaken all of the columns to the same degree of heat intensity and thus remove their structural strength equally over the entire floor, or floors, in order to cause the top 30-floor building segment (South Tower WTC #2) to drop vertically and evenly onto the supporting 79th floor. The 30 floors from above would then combine with the 79th floor and fall onto the next level down (78th floor) crushing its columns evenly and so on down into the seven levels below the street level. The interesting fact is that each of these 110-story Twin Towers fell upon itself in about ten seconds at nearly free-fall speed. This violates Newton’s Law of Conservation of Momentum that would require that as the stationary inertia of each floor is overcome by being hit, the mass (weight) increases and the free-fall speed decreases. Even if Newton’s Law is ignored, the prevailing theory would have us believe that each of the Twin Towers inexplicably collapsed upon itself crushing all 287 massive columns on each floor while maintaining a free-fall speed as if the 100,000, or more, tons of supporting structural-steel framework underneath didn’t exist. The politically unthinkable theory Controlled demolition is so politically unthinkable that the media not only demeans the messenger but also ridicules and “debunks” the message rather than provide investigative reporting. Curiously, it took 441 days for the president’s 9/11 Commission to start an “investigation” into a tragedy where more than 2,500 WTC lives were taken. The Commission’s investigation also didn’t include the possibility of controlled-demolition, nor did it include an investigation into the “unusual and unprecedented” manner in which WTC Building #7 collapsed. The media has basically kept the collapse of WTC Building #7 hidden from public view. However, instead of the Twin Towers, let’s consider this building now. Building #7 was a 47-story structural steel World Trade Center Building that also collapsed onto itself at free-fall speed on 9/11. This structural steel building was not hit by a jetliner, and collapsed seven hours after the Twin Towers collapsed and five hours after the firemen had been ordered to vacate the building and a collapse safety zone had been cordoned off. Both of the landmark buildings on either side received relatively little structural damage and both continue in use today. Contrary to the sudden collapse of the Twin Towers and Building #7, the four other smaller World Trade Center buildings #3, #4, #5, and #6, which were severely damaged and engulfed in flames on 9/11, still remained standing. There were no reports of multiple explosions. The buildings had no pools of molten metal (a byproduct of explosives) at the base of their elevator shafts. They created no huge caustic concrete/cement and asbestos dust clouds (only explosives will pulverize concrete into a fine dust cloud), and they propelled no heavy steel beams horizontally for three hundred feet or more. The collapse of WTC building #7, which housed the offices of the CIA, the Secret Service, and the Department of Defense, among others, was omitted from the government’s 9/11 Commission Report, and its collapse has yet to be investigated. Perhaps it is time for these and other unanswered questions surrounding 9/11 to be thoroughly investigated. Let’s start by contacting our congressional delegation. William Rice, P.E., is a registered professional civil engineer who worked on structural steel (and concrete) buildings in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. He was also a professor at Vermont Technical College where he taught engineering materials, structures lab, and other building related courses.
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#1. To: honway, ALL (#0)
First of all John Skilling was NOT the head structural engineer for the WTC towers. Leslie Robertson is the head structural engineer of record. He was the one who moved to New York to do the design. Mr Skilling remained in Seattle. Second, did Mr Rice fail to note the difference in the speed of the planes assumed in the design and the ones that hit the towers? That difference corresponds to a factor of 7 (or more) difference in the impact energy of the planes. There was NO consideration of fire after the plane impact in the design. Leslie Robertson stated that fire resulting from a plane impact was NOT considered in the design. If Mr Rice thinks otherwise, he is wrong. Melting of steel is not the theory of NIST. Wrong again. First, the fires were NOT of short duration (didn't he read the NIST report like he claimed?) and second how hot does he think the temperatures have to get to weaken steel? The fires in the Windsor Tower in Madrid reached 1400 F and that was without jet fuel to start it. There are plenty of examples of temperatures in fires in ordinary office building reaching those temperatures or even higher. Or does Mr Rice actually think steel strength is unaffected at these temperatures? If so, then I question his credentials. Also, does he think the numerous engineers who did analysis with codes that are generally agreed to be the state of the art in fire engineering are incompetent or wrong when they concluded temperatures in the towers reached nearly 2000 F? Apparently Mr Rice overlooked the likelihood that fireproofing in the towers was extensively damaged by the impacts? And how fast does Mr Rice think unprotected steel strength responds to temperatures of ... say ... 1400 F or higher? This is the silliest statement yet. If that were the case, then why are there fire codes on steel structures? Why is there so much effort (and cost) to protect steel members from fire? The fact is that steel framed building HAVE collapsed due to fire. Mr Rice is simply WRONG. Again, we find Mr Rice claiming a theory that NIST does not promote. What Mr Rice is doing is putting forth a STRAWMAN ... something false to knock down. In fact, if Mr Rice had done as much research of the matter as he claims, he'd know that the theory is that sagging floors broke sections of the outer wall columns and THAT is what led to the collapse. Obviously, he didn't. ROTFLOL! Where has this guy been the last 5 years? How can he claim the towers collapsed in ten seconds if he read the NIST reports as he claimed? If he looked at ANY non-conspiracy website he'd see the towers took 15 seconds or so to collapse. Videos and photos prove this. Even some conspiracy leaning websites admit this. And he should know this IF he's done ANY research besides visiting the more extreme conspiracy websites. This alone is good reason to doubt this individuals competence or opinion. The collapse of WTC 7 was not sudden. Firemen have said they knew it was going to collapse hours before it did because they could see it deforming. This is more conspiracy nonsense. NO ONE who was an eyewitness has said they found POOLS of molten metal at the base of the elevator shafts. If this is so, why hasn't ONE demolition expert in the entire world come forward to say it? Afterall, it should be so obvious when someone like Mr Rice even knows it. Does Mr Rice think they are all part of the conspiracy? ROTFLOL! honway, can you provide proof that any of this is true? Can you perhaps point me to a resume or a university where he got his degree? And who did he work for while working on those structures? Pardon me if I'm now a little skeptical. Let's see what the Vermont Technical College website says. His name isn't listed as faculty or staff: http://catalog.vtc.edu/content.php?catoid=12&navoid=225 . Why is that? In fact, a search of their website doesn't turn up the name William Rice anywhere. Why is that?
[BAC] First of all John Skilling was NOT the head structural engineer for the WTC towers. Leslie Robertson is the head structural engineer of record. He was the one who moved to New York to do the design. Mr Skilling remained in Seattle. As usual, BAC's source is missing. My source is not. NIST Report, Chapter 1, page 1, paragraph 1.1, reads in relevant part: NIST Report, Chapter 1, page 6, reads in relevant part: ------- [BAC] did Mr Rice fail to note the difference in the speed of the planes assumed in the design and the ones that hit the towers? That difference corresponds to a factor of 7 (or more) difference in the impact energy of the planes. BAC, exactly how much in excess of 600 mph did you determine that the planes were moving when they struck the towers? According to the NIST Report, Chapter 2, page 20, paragraph 2-3, WTC-1 was hit by a plane "[m]oving at about 440 mph..." According to the NIST Report, Chapter 3, page 38, paragraph 3-2, WTC-2 was hit by a plane moving "540 mph...." ------- [BAC] He went on to say that there would be a horrendous fire from the jet fuel, but “the building structure would still be there.” There was NO consideration of fire after the plane impact in the design. Leslie Robertson stated that fire resulting from a plane impact was NOT considered in the design. If Mr Rice thinks otherwise, he is wrong. Do recall that, "(Some time after completion of the construction, Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, and Robertson, and then Leslie E. Robertson Associates (LERA) assumed that role. [structural engineer])" ------- [BAC] The 10,000 gallons of jet fuel (half capacity) in each jetliner did cause horrendous fires over several floors, but it would not cause the steel members to melt or even lose sufficient strength to cause a collapse. Melting of steel is not the theory of NIST. Melting steel happened. Relevant theories attempt to explain how it happened. -------
Rather than dishonest and snide remarks, you should pay more attention to the facts and what's been posted on this forum. I've provided links to back my assertion up over and over in previous threads here at 4um (not to mention uncounted times at LP). If you weren't paying attention, NC, that's your problem. You didn't even use your browser because if you had you would know I was right. The fact is Leslie Robertson was the LEAD STRUCTURAL ENGINEER. Skillings ran the company and was not even in NYC where the design was done. http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/CGOZ-58NLCB?OpenDocument "Reflections on the World Trade Center, Leslie E. Robertson, ... snip ... The lead structural engineer reflects on the rise and fall of the World Trade Center towers." http://web.mit.edu/civenv/wtc/PDFfiles/Chapter%20I%20History.pdf "Robertson was the most influential engineer on the project and assumed the position of lead structural designer of the towers. Robertson had as much influence on the form of the building as anyone apart from Yamasaki himself." http://www.asce.org/pressroom/news/display_press.cfm?uid=1349 "Leslie E. Robertson, lead structural engineer for the World Trade Center Towers, will be honored with a 2003 Outstanding Projects and Leaders (OPAL) award for lifetime contributions in design. The award will be presented on Thursday, May 1, at the American Society of Civil Engineers' (ASCE) fourth annual OPAL awards gala at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wtc/about.html ""Building on Ground Zero" features candid interviews with leading construction and safety experts, investigators, architects, and engineers—including Leslie Robertson, lead structural engineer of the original World Trade Center and Shanghai's new World Financial Center, and Jake Pauls, occupants advocate and evacuation specialist. And there are dozens more where that came from. Does NOT say that Shillings was the lead structural engineer. Skilling got mentioned because he owned the company. It was Robertson and those under him who were responsible for 99% of the actual design. This was a back of the envelope calculation done AFTER the design was complete. Robertson is on the record stating that the towers were DESIGNED for an impact in fog at low speed (180 mph). http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/CGOZ-58NLCB?OpenDocument "Reflections on the World Trade Center, Leslie E. Robertson, ... snip ... The lead structural engineer reflects on the rise and fall of the World Trade Center towers. ... snip ... It was assumed that the jetliner would be lost in the fog, seeking to land at JFK or at Newark. To the best of our knowledge, little was known about the effects of a fire from such an aircraft, and no designs were prepared for that circumstance. Indeed, at that time, no fireproofing systems were available to control the effects of such fires." You might want to read the history of what went on back then before sticking your foot further in your mouth: http://scott-juris.blogspot.com/The%20Height%20of%20Ambition%20Part%20Four.pdf "The Height of Ambition: Part Four September 8, 2002 By JAMES GLANZ and ERIC LIPTON ... snip ... But Robertson still had one more set of structural calculations to perform. Lawrence Wien, who was continuing his fight against the towers, had begun to remind New Yorkers publicly of a Saturday morning in July 1945, when a B-25 bomber, lost in the fog, barreled into the 79th floor of the Empire State Building. Most of the 14 people who died were incinerated by a fireball created when the plane's fuel ignited, even though the fire was quickly contained. The following year,another plane crashed into the 72-story skyscraper at 40 Wall Street, and yet another one narrowly missed the Empire State Building, terrifying sightseers on the observation deck. Wien and his committee charged that the twin towers, with their broader and higher tops, would represent an even greater risk of mid air collision. They ran a nearly full-page ad in The Times with an artist's rendition of a commercial airliner about to ram one of the towers. ''Unfortunately, we rarely recognize how serious these problems are until it's too late to do anything,'' the caption said. The Port Authority was already trying to line up the thousands of tenants it would need to fill the acres of office space in the towers. Such a frightful vision could not be left unchallenged. Robertson says that he never saw the ad and was ignorant of the political battle behind it. Still, he recalls that he addressed the question of an airplane collision, if only to satisfy his engineer's curiosity. For whatever reason, Robertson took the time to calculate how well his towers would handle the impact from a Boeing 707, the largest jetliner in service at the time. He says that his calculations assumed a plane lost in a fog while searching for an airport at relatively low speed, like the B-25 bomber. He concluded that the towers would remain standing despite the force of the impact and the hole it would punch out. The new technologies he had installed after the motion experiments and wind-tunnel work had created a structure more than strong enough to withstand such a blow. Exactly how Robertson performed these calculations is apparently lost - he says he cannot find a copy of the report. Several engineers who worked with him at the time, including the director of his computer department, say they have no recollection of ever seeing the study. But the Port Authority, eager to mount a counter attack against Wien, seized on the results -- and may in fact have exaggerated them. One architect working for the Port Authority issued a statement to the press, covered in a prominent article in The Times, explaining that Robertson's study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 miles an hour. That was perhaps three times the speed that Robertson had considered. If Robertson saw the article in the paper, he never spoke up about the discrepancy. No one else issued a correction, and the question was answered in many people's minds: the towers were as safe as could be expected, even in the most cataclysmic of circumstances. There were only two problems. The first, of course, was that no study of the impact of a 600-mile-an-hour plane ever existed. ''That's got nothing to do with the reality of what we did,'' Robertson snapped when shown the Port Authority architect's statement more than three decades later." First of all, BAC did not say that. That was a quote from the thread's article to which I responded. THIS was my response. All of which is true. After the plane impacts (even at close to 600 mph) the building structure was still there. It was the fuel induced FIRE that caused the problem. It was "horrendous". It did kill a lot of people. And it ultimately collapsed the damaged structure. Skilling NEVER said that they analyzed what that fire would do to the towers or whether they would survive that fire. Indeed, at that time they did the design of the towers, they did not have the tools to determine that. Again, I did not say that. I was quoting an assertion in the article. That is true. NISTs theory for the collapse of the towers does not require melting steel. Perhaps. Likely. But when did it melt? And what caused that melting. The odd thing is that not one expert in fire or steel anywhere in the world has come forward to express the impossibility of ORDINARY fires in the rubble melting that steel. And I'm still waiting to hear your theory for what kept that steel molten for 6 weeks or more. Because it sure wasn't the thermite bombs you seem to believe went off on 9/11. Thermite bombs don't work that way.
It is a White Paper from 1964. Groundbreaking occurred two years later in 1966. http://wtc.nist.gov/media/Public%20Transcript%20021204%20Final1_withlinks.pdf Transcript of NIST Public Meeting in New York City - February 12, 2004 Shyam Sunder, National Institute of Standards and Technology the lead investigator for the federal building and fire safety investigation of the World Trade Center disaster: We have some documents from 1964 that suggest that. The impact scenario that was considered is a Boeing 707 traveling at 600 miles an hour. There's another document a month later that considers an aircraft impact at the 80th floor of one of the towers. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Center Construction Groundbreaking for the construction of the World Trade Center was on August 5, 1966. In 1970, construction was completed on One World Trade Center, with its first tenants moving into the building in December, 1970. Tenants first moved into Two World Trade Center in January 1972. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_paper A white paper is an authoritative report. White papers are used to educate customers, collect leads for a company or help people make decisions. They can also be a government report outlining policy.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_and_construction_of_the_World_Trade_Center "On September 20, 1962, the Port Authority announced the selection of Minoru Yamasaki as lead architect, and Emery Roth & Sons as associate architects.[26] Yamasaki came up with the idea of twin towers. To meet the Port Authority's requirement to build 10 million square feet of office space, the towers would each be 110-stories tall. Yamasaki remarked that the "obvious alternative, a group of several large buildings, would have looked like a housing project".[27] Yamasaki's design for the World Trade Center was unveiled to the public on January 18, 1964, with an eight-foot model.[27] So there is NO POSSIBLE WAY that any White Paper from 1964 affected the DESIGN. You don't know what you are talking about nolu_chan.
So there is NO POSSIBLE WAY that any White Paper from 1964 affected the DESIGN. Yamasaki was the architect. He did not do the engineering. The design of the building did not end with the display of an 8-foot model. But if you say so... After the design was BAC-complete, engineering concepts were explained to the New York Architectural League by the Big Boss Structural Engineer, John Skilling, a partner in Worthington, Skilling, Helle and Jackson. From Engineering News Record The concept was explained to the New York Architectural League by John Skilling, a partner in Worthington, Skilling, Helle and Jackson, of Seattle, consulting structural engineers on the World Trade Center (see p. 124). April 2, 1964
And you think they wait to determine what the underlying major structure is until AFTER the Architect unveils the DESIGN to the public? ROTFLOL! Here are some signs from the same article that the design was well underway much earlier than 1964. "The exterior walls will comprise giant Vierendeel trusses, designed to act like huge cantilevered hollow tubes. They will be pre-assembled in units two stories high and about 10 ft wide, spliced at mid-height of the columns and midspan of the deep spandrel beams. The closely spaced columns will consist of 14-inch-sq hollow box sections, providing high torsional and bending resistance. ... snip ... July 9, 1964" Well clearly the design was well underway by July 1964. "Four New York City construction companies will independently review construction techniques planned for the two 110-story towers at the World Trade Center ... snip ... April 16, 1964" Gee, in April 1964 they are already awarding bids to construction folks to REVIEW construction techniques. So they must know what they were going to build. "The Port of New York Authority will. pay architects Minoru Yamasaki & Associates and Emery Roth & Sons an extra $800,000 over the initial $1.5-million fee for designing the World Trade Center in New York City. The new contract covers further design refinements for the superstructure of the twin 110-story towers, studies of integration of the PATH railroad station into the project. October 15, 1964" Hmmm ... in October 1964, they were already awarding more money for REFINEMENTS of the design. "HOW COLUMNS WILL BE DESIGNED FOR 110-STORY BUILDINGS ... snip ... April 2, 1964" Gosh, according to that article in April 1964 they already have all the major dimensions that we know about the structure ... the size of its members ... the response to loads ... the variations in steel strength over the height. So what did Skillling really do? "NEW YORK'S 110-STORY TOWERS ... Most local designers and builders want to know more about the New York World Trade Center and its sky-shattering heights (ENR Jan. 23, p. 33), but they generally like what they've seen so far. ... snip ... James Ruderman, consulting structural engineer "The structural design of the tower buildings shows a commendable job of rethinking, where ideas were given a lot of thought and not just treated routinely." ... snip ... January 30, 1964." Oh my gosh ... in January of 1964 a structural engineer is commenting on the structural design. He must have had something to comment on. Here's a real puzzler for you, NC. The White Paper written by Skilling that you are making such a big deal about was released February 3, 1964. So if the concept was just being explained to Skilling in APRIL of that year, how did he manage to do a detailed analysis to show that the structure could survive a 600 mph commercial jet impact back in February? Hmmmmmmm???? I anticipate that question will go just as unanswered as my question about what kept the molten steel molten 6 weeks after the collapse ... or my question about whether that photo of debris proves Steven Jones is a liar. ROTFLOL!
No moron. You said at #34, "So there is NO POSSIBLE WAY that any White Paper from 1964 affected the DESIGN." A whole bunch of things could, and most certainly did, change in the design after 1964. What I said at #36 was, "The design of the building did not end with the display of an 8-foot model." In your idiocy, you asserted that prior to the White Paper in 1964, the design had been COMPLETED. Now in a bait and switch, in order to try to extract your sorry butt from your display of gross public dumb, you assert, "some signs from the same article that the design was well underway much earlier than 1964." Referring to the White Paper of February 3, 1964, you blathered at #18, "This was a back of the envelope calculation done AFTER the design was complete." That the design was UNDERWAY prior to 1964 would in no way support your prior claim that "there is NO POSSIBLE WAY that any White Paper from 1964 affected the DESIGN." Also, at #18, you did not say the design was UNDERWAY prior to the White Paper, you explicitly stated the White Paper was "done AFTER the design was complete." [BAC upper case emphasis.] AFTER 1964, Robertson's original engineering design plan had to be scrapped because tests in 1965 showed the buildings would sway beyond the limits of human tolerance. As Glanz and Lipton wrote in the New York Times, "Even today, Robertson has no trouble conjuring what two towers full of seasick office workers would have meant: 'A billion dollars right down the tube.' So he went back to work." The Height of Ambition: Part Four * * * Using exterior columns rather than interior ones for lateral stiffness not only increased the building's floor space; it also let Robertson reduce the total amount of structural steel in the building by at least 30 percent. The steel in the tightly spaced columns became as thin as a quarter-inch toward the top, where it had less load to carry. Robertson had succeeded in achieving his main goals for these exotic steel trees. But in designing what would become the feathery branches of those trees -- the floors -- he pushed even further toward lightweightness and cost savings. Rather than the massive beams or heavy framings that serve as horizontal floor supports in virtually every large steel office tower, Robertson chose bar-joist trusses -- airy, weblike networks of thin steel bars and angle irons topped with corrugated decking. Those trusses, which spanned as much as 60 feet, had two critical roles: they held up the concrete floors, and they provided lateral support to the exterior columns, keeping them from buckling under the load they carried. According to Robertson's figures, the trusses worked as well as heavy traditional girders and beams in performing those roles under ordinary circumstances. What he did not take into account was the extraordinary conditions of an intense, violent fire. Girders and beams would be far superior under those circumstances. Thin steel elements heat up and soften faster than thick ones. But in recent conversations, Robertson has said that architects generally handle anything dealing with fire in building projects, not engineers, so he did not think about this reduction in safety. Robertson and the Port Authority made another choice that proved fateful decades later. They chose not to use thick masonry or cement to encase the three escape stairways in each tower but rather light sheets of gypsum. Although the gypsum was extremely resistant to fire, and less likely than masonry to crack when the building swayed in the wind, it would work only if it remained intact -- and it was much more susceptible to being shaken loose or damaged by an explosion or any other kind of unexpected impact. There was another factor that Robertson had to take into account: the swaying motion of his buildings. The lightweight steel skeletons would not only put people unnaturally high in the air, as all skyscrapers do. They would let the buildings sway back and forth in the wind, like the biggest, leafiest trees ever planted. Heavy masonry-clad high-rises like the Empire State Building had never had to deal with this problem. For that reason, engineers had never measured how much swaying motion humans could stand before they became dizzy, seasick, frightened or disoriented. To answer that question, Robertson turned to an expert in human perception in Eugene, Ore. -- a spot as far removed from the New York press as he could find. Paul Hoffman, a psychologist, agreed to perform a secret series of experiments to find out just how much swaying motion was too much. Hoffman purchased a small office building in downtown Eugene and in the summer of 1965 put an ad in the local paper offering free eye checkups at a ''vision research center.'' But it was actually an elaborate ruse: the optometrist who conducted the eye exams was one of Hoffman's employees, Paul R. Eskildsen. And as each patient stared at triangles projected on the wall, a hidden technician would trigger a giant set of hydraulics underneath the room that heaved it back and forth like a big saltshaker. ''This is a strange room,'' one patient said, according to Eskildsen's detailed notes. ''I suppose it's because I don't have my glasses on. Is it rigged or something? It really feels funny.'' Patient after patient reacted the same way -- becoming dizzy and confused soon after the eye exam began. Humans, Hoffman discovered, were much more sensitive to motion than anyone had realized. A few inches of sway over 5 or 10 seconds set off psychophysical alarm bells. ''The people who were most surprised of all were the engineering firm and the Port Authority,'' Hoffman says. First, Port Authority officials trooped out to Eugene. Old photos show them milling around the little optometrist's office, looking flummoxed. Then they insisted on redoing the experiments by swinging a makeshift office on cables inside one of the Lincoln Tunnel's ventilation towers on Manhattan's West Side. ''It was a big packing crate, is what it was, that they had dolled up to look like an office,'' says Eskildsen, who traveled to New York for the new round. ''I had two guys outside who pushed the room. It was hilarious.'' About 40 Port Authority officials rode in the contraption. The results were the same. Wind-tunnel experiments in Fort Collins, Colo., confirmed that Robertson's initial design would sway far beyond those human tolerances, says Jack Cermak, then a professor of civil engineering and the director of the wind-tunnel laboratory at Colorado State University. Even today, Robertson has no trouble conjuring what two towers full of seasick office workers would have meant: ''A billion dollars right down the tube.'' So he went back to work. * * * But Robertson still had one more set of structural calculations to perform. Lawrence Wien, who was continuing his fight against the towers, had begun to remind New Yorkers publicly of a Saturday morning in July 1945, when a B-25 bomber, lost in the fog, barreled into the 79th floor of the Empire State Building. Most of the 14 people who died were incinerated by a fireball created when the plane's fuel ignited, even though the fire was quickly contained. The following year, another plane crashed into the 72-story skyscraper at 40 Wall Street, and yet another one narrowly missed the Empire State Building, terrifying sightseers on the observation deck. Wien and his committee charged that the twin towers, with their broader and higher tops, would represent an even greater risk of midair collision. They ran a nearly full-page ad in The Times with an artist's rendition of a commercial airliner about to ram one of the towers. ''Unfortunately, we rarely recognize how serious these problems are until it's too late to do anything,'' the caption said. The Port Authority was already trying to line up the thousands of tenants it would need to fill the acres of office space in the towers. Such a frightful vision could not be left unchallenged. Robertson says that he never saw the ad and was ignorant of the political battle behind it. Still, he recalls that he addressed the question of an airplane collision, if only to satisfy his engineer's curiosity. For whatever reason, Robertson took the time to calculate how well his towers would handle the impact from a Boeing 707, the largest jetliner in service at the time. He says that his calculations assumed a plane lost in a fog while searching for an airport at relatively low speed, like the B-25 bomber. He concluded that the towers would remain standing despite the force of the impact and the hole it would punch out. The new technologies he had installed after the motion experiments and wind-tunnel work had created a structure more than strong enough to withstand such a blow. Exactly how Robertson performed these calculations is apparently lost -- he says he cannot find a copy of the report. Several engineers who worked with him at the time, including the director of his computer department, say they have no recollection of ever seeing the study. But the Port Authority, eager to mount a counterattack against Wien, seized on the results -- and may in fact have exaggerated them. One architect working for the Port Authority issued a statement to the press, covered in a prominent article in The Times, explaining that Robertson's study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 miles an hour. That was perhaps three times the speed that Robertson had considered. If Robertson saw the article in the paper, he never spoke up about the discrepancy. No one else issued a correction, and the question was answered in many people's minds: the towers were as safe as could be expected, even in the most cataclysmic of circumstances. There were only two problems. The first, of course, was that no study of the impact of a 600-mile-an-hour plane ever existed. ''That's got nothing to do with the reality of what we did,'' Robertson snapped when shown the Port Authority architect's statement more than three decades later. The second problem was that no one thought to take into account the fires that would inevitably break out when the jetliner's fuel exploded, exactly as the B-25's had. And if Wien was the trade center's Cassandra, fire protection would become its Achilles' heel. * * * [nc - there are at least a few more problems. Robertson's assertion of being unaware of the Wein ad and the political battle is not credible. Perhaps Robertson performed only an imaginary study consisting of nothing more than some propaganda released to the press, or he blew smoke at the architect. A prominent article in the New York Times explained that Robertson's study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 miles an hour. There can be no credible assertion of unawareness by all concerned in the building of the WTC and no correction was issued. Robertson's three decades late assertion that he considered only a plane going 180 mph is not credible.] Compare with BAC drivel at #18
The design of the major structural elements of the towers surely had to have been completed by February 1964. Otherwise, Skilling could not possibly have completed an analysis of the structure's ability to survive a high speed plane crash that he published a White Paper about on February 3, 1964. You can't have it both ways NC. Either the White Paper is simply nonsense based on an incomplete design or the design (as far as what would be necessary to determine the resistance of the towers to plane impact) was completed by February 3, 1964. And since it must have taken some time to do the analysis that is claimed and write the White Paper, that would imply the design was essentially finished before January 1964. But he didn't change the essential structure during that revision. The revision must have consisted of very few changes because the articles you linked and quoted from 1964 and earlier show design details (size of columns, spacing, steel strengths, etc) that agree quite well with the final design. And indeed, the article you quote doesn't say the revision involved changes in the major structure. Your article is telling us that contrary to what the CT community has been saying, the WTC tower design was MORE vulnerable to fire than other steel skyscrapers (which usually uses girders and beams)? Well ... perhaps that explains why they were the first skyscrapers to collapse due to fire. Oh my goodness ... yet another difference between the WTC tower design and most other skyscraper designs. One that again makes the towers MORE vulnerable to fire if a plane crash has occurred. Are you finally admitting that it was Robertson's design ... not Skilling's. Good for you. Again, what YOU posted says Robertson did look at the tower's performance for a low speed plane lost in fog, not a high speed impact. And one more point ... this points out that Robertson, like Skilling, did an analysis AFTER the design was done. Crash of planes into the towers was apparently not a DESIGN LOAD so it is incorrect to claim that the towers were DESIGNED for even this plane crash. It's just fortuitous for them that calculations showed the towers would survive a plane impact. Otherwise, they might have had to redesign the whole tower. Right? New technologies? That doesn't sound like he just added thickness to steel members or increased the steel strengths, does it? Let's see ... what could they be talking about? Maybe the outrigger space frame which linked the outside wall to the services core? No ... that was part of the initial concept. Wait! I know what they are talking about. http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/CGOZ-58NLCB "A viscoelastic damping system was invented and patented to ameliorate the wind-induced dynamic component of building motion by dissipating much of the energy of that motion . . . acting more or less like shock absorbers in an automobile. With these dampers, we could control the swaying motion without having to use large quantities of structural steel. This was the first time engineered dampers were used to resist the wind-induced swaying motion of a building." Now my question to you is this. Do you think those viscoelastic dampers significantly affected the resistance of the towers to plane impact? Or increased it's fire resistance? Or affected the way the tower would collapse once fire did its thing? No? Then I don't know why you even bring this up in this debate other than muddy the waters and keep folks from seeing the essential issues. Fine. If you want to claim that no study of the tower's resistance to aircraft impact was performed, that's ok with me. Because I thought it is the CT community that insists the towers were DESIGNED to survive multiple high speed plane crashes. What are you going to do, NC ... just ignore the real mystery here? The link YOU PROVIDED tells us that the concept for the towers was just explained to Skilling in April of 2004. Yet he published his White Paper (where you claim he did a design analysis of the towers) in February 3, 1964. Impossible? Yes.
Actually, it was the architects and engineers, per a white paper and an unchallenged article in the New York Times, by which questions about the safety of the soon to be built WTC were addressed to assuage the public. They claimed that the building would withstand a hit by a Boeing 707 at 600 mph. Maybe they lied, or maybe they actually designed the WTC to sustain a hit by the largest jetliner then in the sky going at 600 mph. It is only repeating what was said contemporaneously and publicly. Either they did it or they lied about doing it.
And it did. At least close to a 600 mph impact by a comparably sized plane. Nope. They didn't. We have proof. The towers survived the impact. Nope. They did not. The lead structural engineer states that the structure was designed for a 180 mph impact. The ANALYSIS that was done to see it might survive a 600 mph impact was done AFTER the design of the major structural elements. I think I proved that. You tried to pull a fast one here, NC, AND YOU GOT CAUGHT.
[nolu_chan #49] [BAC #51] Nope. They didn't. We have proof. The towers survived the impact. ----- BAC, you are still a lying piece of crap. As an editor, however, you are quite creative. ... Such a frightful vision could not be left unchallenged. Robertson says that he never saw the ad and was ignorant of the political battle behind it. Still, he recalls that he addressed the question of an airplane collision, if only to satisfy his engineer's curiosity. For whatever reason, Robertson took the time to calculate how well his towers would handle the impact from a Boeing 707, the largest jetliner in service at the time. ... Exactly how Robertson performed these calculations is apparently lost -- he says he cannot find a copy of the report. Several engineers who worked with him at the time, including the director of his computer department, say they have no recollection of ever seeing the study. ... One architect working for the Port Authority issued a statement to the press, covered in a prominent article in The Times, explaining that Robertson's study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 miles an hour. ... If Robertson saw the article in the paper, he never spoke up about the discrepancy. No one else issued a correction, and the question was answered in many people's minds: the towers were as safe as could be expected, even in the most cataclysmic of circumstances. There were only two problems. The first, of course, was that no study of the impact of a 600-mile-an-hour plane ever existed. "That's got nothing to do with the reality of what we did," Robertson snapped when shown the Port Authority architect's statement more than three decades later. The second problem was that no one thought to take into account the fires that would inevitably break out when the jetliner's fuel exploded, exactly as the B-25's had. [BAC] The ANALYSIS that was done to see it might survive a 600 mph impact was done AFTER the design of the major structural elements. I think I proved that. No. The press release about a purported analysis, the report of which seems to have been eaten by the dog, occurred in response to a near full-page ad in the New York Times challenging the safety of the WTC design. I think I've proved that.
If you want us to believe that, then prove to us the Skilling's White Paper actually says they DESIGNED the towers for those loads. All the sources I've seen that claim first hand knowledge of the paper's contents simply say it said they did an ANALYSIS of the towers for that case. There is a difference. And you have two choices where the White Paper is concerned given the date it was released ... February 3, 1964. Either it analyzed a structure whose major dimensions had already be determined (in which case how much effect could it have had on the design?) or it was a wag that ASSUMED dimensions that had not yet been determined (in which case, how good could that analysis really be)? One more thing. The Skilling paper was 3 pages long. How detailed an analysis could it possibly be given such a short length? And what tools did they actually use to do that analysis? The truth is that you don't know. In fact, have you actually seen the Skilling White Paper? Well here: http://pilotsfor911truth.org/WTC.html "I found photostat images of WTC designer John Skilling's 3 page 1964 White Paper on a German website and posted the links over on the UK911 board. ... snip ... Lucky I saved them" Well what do you know. That paper wasn't ONLY about a plane crash calculation. In fact, it contained eleven numbered points, and only ONE, pertained to that subject. And ALL it said is this: "3. The buildings have been investigated and found to be safe in an assumed collision with a large jet airliner (Boeing 707-DC 8) traveling at 600 miles per hour. Analysis indicates that such collision would result in only local damage which could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building and would not endanger the lives and safety of occupants not in the immediate area of impact." That's ALL. There are NO details given to show the nature of that analysis (and considering how limited impact analysis tools were in those days, perhaps much of that analysis was actually hand waving designed to satisfy the customer and public). The word DESIGN is not used in that paragraph. It says the buildings have been INVESTIGATED and found to be safe. Which seems to imply an analysis AFTER the design was completed. And I don't challenge that possibility or the conclusion that Skillings reached. After all, the towers did survive the impact of the planes. The local damage from the impact did NOT cause collapse. It was the fires combined with that damage that NIST (and modern analysis tools) say caused the collapse. And curiously enough, that white paper doesn't even mention the threat of fire from the impact. Yet the CT community has been trying to suggest Skilling said the structure was also designed to handle the fire from that airplane crash. Well, having discounted Robertson's statements, the only piece of physical evidence you have to even prove an analysis was done for a commercial jet doesn't even mention the word fire. And also note that the paper, dated February 3, 1964, states: "The structural analysis carried out by the firm of Worthington, Skilling, Helle and Jackson is the most complete and detailed of any ever made for any building structure. The preliminary calculations alone cover 1200 pages and involve over 100 detailed drawings." It goes on to talk about the towers being "designed" for different loads. The word "designed" is used repeatedly. And you wanted us to believe that the essential dimensions of the structure hadn't already been determined by the start of 1964. I think this memo proves you wrong, NC. Robertson also said: http://scott-juris.blogspot.com/The%20Height%20of%20Ambition%20Part%20Four.pdf "He says that his calculations assumed a plane lost in a fog while searching for an airport at relatively low speed, like the B-25 bomber. He concluded that the towers would remain standing despite the force of the impact and the hole it would punch out. " Sure, NC. Based on a white paper that has ONE paragraph claiming that but where, again, there appear to be no other documents proving such a calculation actually took place. A paper that clearly appears to be a public relations ploy to alleviate concerns about the towers. And a white paper that doesn't say the towers were DESIGNED for that load. Oh ... and one more thing. SO WHAT? The truth is that if the towers were designed for a plane impact (like the CT community insists without actually being able to prove it), then the towers performed as expected. But nowhere in either Robertson's or Skilling's account is there evidence that the towers were designed to handle the fire that would result from such a collision. Indeed, designers in those days simply did not have the analysis tools to address such a problem with any confidence. That is the part of the story that the CT community simply leaves out in their haste to make the government and bombs the culprit in the collapse. Actually, it is only a part of the story they leave out. Fine. If you want to claim no Robertson study was done, that's ok with me. But remember, the CT community is the one that insists the towers were *designed* to withstand multiple jet impacts (which none of the actual participants in the design claimed). And if you discount the Robertson claim, all you are left as evidence is that one paragraph in Skilling's 3 page White Paper. Which is dated February 3, 1964. Which doesn't appear to have actually used the word "design". Which has no details about that analysis either. And here is yet another source for you to ignore and discount: http://www.skyscrapersafety.org/html/article_11092001.html "Skilling's firm got the commission, and Robertson, then thirty-five, moved to New York to open a new office, and to supervise the structural aspects of the building's construction. In 1983, the Seattle office and the New York office split, becoming two separate firms. Skilling (who died in 1998) and Robertson later argued about who was more responsible for the structure of the towers. "These are guys with big egos, and things got a little testy between them regarding who was ultimately responsible for the design," says Jon Magnusson, the chairman and C.E.O. of the Seattle-based firm, which is now called Skilling Ward Magnusson Barkshire. "Skilling said, 'It was me,' Robertson said, 'It was me,' but I think the truth is that both of them made a significant contribution." ... snip ... "He also designed the buildings so they would be able to absorb the impact of a jet airliner: "I'm sort of a methodical person, so I listed all the bad things that could happen to a building and tried to design for them. I thought of the B-25 bomber, lost in the fog, that hit the Empire State Building in 1945. The 707 was the state-of-the-art airplane then, and the Port Authority was quite amenable to considering the effect of an airplane as a design criterion. We studied it, and designed for the impact of such an aircraft. The next step would have been to think about the fuel load, and I've been searching my brain, but I don't know what happened there, whether in all our testing we thought about it. Now we know what happens-it explodes. I don't know if we considered the fire damage that would cause. Anyway, the architect, not the engineer, is the one who specifies the fire system."
[BAC post of SKILLING White Paper] "The buildings have been investigated and found to be safe in an assumed collision with a large jet airliner (Boeing 707 - DC 8) travelling at 600 miles per hour. Analysis indicates that such collision would result in only local damage which could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building and would not endanger the lives and safety of occupants not in the immediate area of impact." [nc quoting] "* A prominent story appears in the New York Times explains that study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 miles an hour." [BAC] Sure, NC. Based on a white paper that has ONE paragraph claiming that but where, again, there appear to be no other documents proving such a calculation actually took place. ------- SKILLING's White Paper says "the buildings have been investigated." It does not say SKILLING performed the investigation. SKILLING's White Paper says "Analysis indicates...." It does not say SKILLING performed the analysis. The New York Times report, sourced to an architect working on the WTC, attributes the study to . ROBERTSON now claims he cannot find the ROBERTSON study analysis report. If you want the report, ask ROBERTSON what ROBERTSON did with the ROBERTSON study analysis report. By the way, the White Paper also contains the following:
There is a difference between analysis and design. One can do an analysis of something after the design of that something is essentially done. When one designs, one sizes members, etc to carry DESIGN loads. But in this case, it sounds more like they did an analysis after the fact to determine if the already designed structure would survive a load that was not part of the design. And it is true that it doesn't say that Skilling performed the analysis (although the CT community has been trying to claim that's what the White Paper was ... HIS work as an expert). Perhaps Skilling was just referring to the analysis that Robertson did ... and misreported the speed of the aircraft wrong. Afterall, it wouldn't the first time that a CEO has misrepresented the work done by underlings. Fine, this would fit the above scenario. So it turns out there wasn't ever a Skilling analysis? ROTFLOL! And Robertson is VERY CLEAR about his work having related to a plane lost in fog flying at 180 mph ... not 600 mph on a clear day. It's been 40 years. Do you keep everything you've ever written, Nolu? Really?
For such a project it is mandatory BAC. If you knew much about the legal requirements of such projects you would know this. BAC, WTC7 says the government did it and that you are their whore. I hope the 30 pieces of silver were worth it for you.
It's probably a good idea to keep such documents, but I challenge you to prove there is any legal requirement that calculations in the design phase of a skyscraper must be kept at all or kept indefinitely. And have you ever heard of a "statute of repose"? It's the number of years after a project is completed after which the designers and contractors cannot be held responsible for damages or problems that may subsequently occur. THAT is the period during which engineering firms PROBABLY SHOULD (again, show me where it says MUST) keep all records if they are smart. Now for New York the statute of limitations/repose on product liability is 3 years, however, personal injury cases currently have an indefinite liability in that for three years after an injury the building builder/owners can be sued. However, that has been successfully contested in court cases recently and architects in New York are currently trying to get a maximum 10 year repose statute passed for personal liability cases. So yes, it would be smart if builders under the current NY laws kept important design documents for a long time ... perhaps indefinitely ... but I know of no laws that state it is mandatory. Go ahead, Ricky ... prove me wrong.
You do not seriously purport that there is a product liability issue, do you?
Do you suppose that architect might have
gotten his information from Skilling's White Paper? And you still don't have
the name of this architect, do you? Actually,
I don't care whether Robertson did a study or not, NC. It is the *truth*
movement that wants there to have been a study ... one proving the towers were
designed to survive plane crashes. It doesn't matter to me whether there were
or weren't because the fact is the towers did survive a high speed impact by
big commercial jets. But at least it appears you've now dispensed with the
claim they were "designed" rather than just analyzed after the fact. And that
they were designed to survive the fires from a plane crash. Or do you wish to
contest that further? ROTFLOL! Not
ordinarily. But if you put aside terrorism, I can't think of any reason a
commercial jet would be flying at 600 mph 1000 feet above Manhattan. But the
notion of being lost in fog (given that such a thing has happened there
before) isn't all that irrational.
Strawman. Robertson said he assumed the plane was LOST IN FOG, just like the
other plane that had hit a skyscraper in NYC before the WTC was designed.
You are claiming the building was
designed for plane impact and fire so it shouldn't have collapsed. If it was,
then yes, this would be a product liability issue. If it wasn't, then this is
a case of fraud ... and the statute of limitation in that case is 7 years or
so. Now NY is special in that it allows for an indefinite time to the injury
before starting the clock in personal injury cases. Of course lately, courts
have ruled against that indefinite period in several cases and bills are
pending to set the time of repose to 10 years. Either way, you and Ricky still
haven't proven that by law builders MUST keep records for ANY length of time.
That is what was claimed. Care to try now or do you wish to continue focusing
on the irrelevant and strawmen?
Do you suppose that architect might have gotten his information from Skilling's White Paper? No. It is impossible to read Skilling's White Paper and determine that the study was done by Robertson. But at least it appears you've now dispensed with the claim they were "designed" rather than just analyzed after the fact. And that they were designed to survive the fires from a plane crash. Or do you wish to contest that further? ROTFLOL! Before the building was built, the PANYNJ and the public were assured in 1964 that "The buildings have been investigated and found to be safe in an assumed collision with a large jet airliner (Boeing 707 - DC 8) travelling at 600 miles per hour. Analysis indicates that such collision would result in only local damage which could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building and would not endanger the lives and safety of occupants not in the immediate area of impact." 1964 is before the buildings were built. The area had not yet been cleared of existing buildings. He could only be talking about the future buildings, as designed. You are claiming the building was designed for plane impact and fire so it shouldn't have collapsed. If it was, then yes, this would be a product liability issue. If it wasn't, then this is a case of fraud ... and the statute of limitation in that case is 7 years or so. Counselor, you do not know what you are talking about. All cases brought in court will use a theory of NEGLIGENCE.
That doesn't say they were DESIGNED for an airplane
impact. Only that an analysis (rudimentary as it would have had to have been
in 1964, given the tools they had to work with back then) showed the towers
would survive an impact. I'm not disputing that. And it doesn't say anything
about the towers surviving the fires that would result. Indeed, the sources
you've quoted on this thread indicates they thought that the fires were THE
PROBLEM. But not before they were designed. There is a difference
between design and analysis, as I've already pointed out. A design includes
safety factors. A analysis just looks at what will likely happen.
I suggest it is you who doesn't know what you are talking about. I suggest you
look up the term "statue of repose". And I notice neither you or Ricky have
yet offered any proof that calculations MUST be retained as was claimed. tick
tick tick ....
I think you mean "statute of repose," beachy. Spellcheck ain't gonna help you with your vocabulary.
[BAC-side #115] I suggest it is you who doesn't know what you are talking about. I suggest you look up the term "statue of repose". I suggest you look up the term "statue of repose". [bluedogtxn #117] I think you mean "statute of repose," beachy. No, beachy hasn't got a clue and has no idea what the hell he means. It appears that he should not be allowed to play with long words or legal terms of art. B. Possible Plaintiffs While the response to an inquiry about possible plaintiffs in personal injury actions occasioned by the September 11 attacks may seem fairly straightforward, recent developments are cause for alarm among insurers and New York City. Possible claims for toxic tort injuries have been noted recently in the media and among legal professionals. [34] In that regard, there is great uncertainty about possible adverse health effects from toxic agents released into the air following collapse of the buildings. The victims’ compensation fund does not entertain the possibility that large numbers of rescue workers, clean-up crews, construction workers and New York City residents may have been exposed to toxic chemicals that would increase their chances of contracting diseases such as cancer or suffering long term neurological defects. Researchers have identified asbestos, lead, fiberglass, PCBs, mercury and other potentially harmful substances in the air and dust that surround the disaster site. Thus, the list of potential defendants may grow commensurately with the list of harmful substances. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that one study found dust in the neighborhood as caustic as drain cleaner. [35] However, reports about the extent of contamination vary drastically. The Environmental Protection Agency has been monitoring the downtown area for asbestos, particulates and other contaminants typically found in large building fire and collapse situations since September 11. It has detected no pollutants from the fire and building collapses that are cause for concern to the general public. Within one block of the World Trade Center, the EPA is finding low levels of asbestos in the dust from the building collapse. [36] There have been approximately 1,300 notices of claim served on New York City by firefighters and other rescue workers who claim that breathing the air at the disaster site has made them sick. [37] With the high concentration of persons living and working in the downtown New York City area, the potential for toxic tort claimants could be staggering. There has been insufficient research to determine whether or to what extent people were exposed to toxic chemicals in the hours, days and months following the attack. Further scientific research should provide a clearer picture of potential toxic tort claims. IV. Theories of Recovery and Applicable Legal Standards Pursuant to the ATSSA, the law to be applied in suits arising from September 11th events will derive from state law (including choice of law principles), where the crash occurred. Thus, suits arising out of the World Trade Center attack will be governed by New York law. Negligence will likely predominate theories of action for civil suits brought against the above-mentioned parties. To sustain an action for negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) that the breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) damages. The most critical elements applicable to any suit emanating from the September 11th attacks are duty and proximate causation. Generally, the law of negligence in New York is similar to the law of other jurisdictions. Thus, to the extent that the law of other states, such as Pennsylvania, is applied in lawsuits arising from the September 11th attacks, the foregoing legal principles will be generally applied. (Author’s Bio) Mr. Thurm, who is counsel to the firm of Molod, Spitz, DeSantis & Stark, P.C. in New York City, has been associated with the insurance industry as a practicing lawyer defending companies and their insureds for over 40 years. He is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School (1958) and is admitted to practice in New York (1959) and Florida (1975). He is also admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and all four federal district courts in the State of New York. He has actively litigated a broad spectrum of insurance-related matters including: primary and excess policies; direct and reinsurance contracts and coverage issues dealing with allocation of loss; late notice of claim and suit; and the assault and battery exclusion. He has defended dozens of municipal entities in all types of civil rights cases including land use, excessive force and employment discrimination. He has been a member of the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel since 1984 and is the immediate past Chair of its Excess and Surplus Line Section. He is an associate member of the Excess and Surplus Line Claims Association and NAPSLO. He also holds membership in the Defense Research Institute, the New York State Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Legal Offices Section). He is a frequent speaker and contributor of articles on insurance-related matters. After a specified period of time following construction, the statute of repose will cut off a cause of action against an architect or engineer for product liability. THAT is WHY the actions regarding the WTC will not be brought against the architect or engineer for product liability. I suggest that beachy read about the statute of repose and learn why his purported cause of action is impossible. While the statute of repose tolls against an action for product liability against the architect or engineer, it does not prevent an action for negligence or violation of state statute. The New York statute of limitations for personal injury is 3 years, and for wrongful death it is 2 years from the date of death. This 2004 ruling http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/2nd/037698p.pdf describes a case brought by multiple plaintiffs against THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY and THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and WORLD TRADE CENTER PROPERTIES LLC, sued as SILVERSTEIN PROPERTIES. Product liability. ... However, the term "products liability" normally contemplates injury or damage caused by a defective product, and if loss occurs as a result of a condition on the premises, or as a result of a service, as distinguished from loss occasioned by a defective product, a products liability claim does not ordinarily arise, even though a product may be involved. For statutory time limits in bringing products liability actions, see Statute (Statute of repose). Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition Unless the Statute of Repose extends back to the construction of the building, beachy will have a very difficult time getting a court to accept his products liability argument. His argument may be stale by about 30 years. National Society of Professional Engineers Model Architect and Engineer Liability Laws Statute of Repose Summary Architects and engineers face a substantial degree of liability exposure for property damage, economic damages, bodily injury, and wrongful death resulting from their alleged negligence in the design of improvements to real property that have long since been completed and for which the architect or engineer should not be held responsible due to reasons outside their realm of control. Once insulated from liability exposure by the concept of "privity" (derivative rights and responsibilities based on contract), a 1957 decision by a New York appeals court, Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority (3 N.Y. 2d 137, 143 N.E. 2d 895), stripped architects and engineers of this protection. In Inman, the court found an architect and engineer liable to parties to which they were not in privity. As a consequence of Inman, suits against architects and engineers proliferated. Architects and engineers found themselves owing a duty of care to a variety of parties to whom no duty had been previously owed, nor ever contemplated. Eventually, the state legislatures responded to this perilous situation by adopting laws known as statutes of repose. Statutes of repose bar actions against architects and engineers after a certain period of time following the completion of services or the substantial completion of construction. Statutes of repose do not totally absolve the architect and engineer of any liability, but merely prevent them from having to defend an action brought many years after they have completed the project. The statutes are based on the general legal principle that a potential defendant in a lawsuit should not be required to defend him/herself against "stale" claims that could easily be based upon faded memories, lost evidence, or witnesses who have since disappeared. "Stale" claims are a particular possibility in the construction industry where the real property for which services have been provided may last several decades and over which the designer has no effective control. Statutes of repose differ from statutes of limitations in terms of the point of time from which the limitation is measured. Statutes of limitation begin at the date of injury or discovery of the deficiency. Since the discovery of an injury or a deficiency could occur at any time, the exposure to a claim could theoretically run indefinitely. Statutes of repose, on the other hand, begin at a period of time following the completion of services or the substantial completion of construction. These statutes, therefore, limit the total period of time during which the architect or engineer is exposed to liability, and thus statutes of repose are preferable to, but not in lieu of, statutes of limitation. 1. Except as otherwise provided in Section 2, no action to recover damages for injury to a person or for wrongful death or for damage to property, nor any statute for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury or wrongful death or damage to property arising from any defect, error or omission in the structure or improvement resulting from the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be brought against a registered architect or professional engineer more than seven years after the substantial completion of such improvement. 2. If by reason of such defect, an injury to the person or an injury causing wrongful death or an injury to property occurs during the seventh year after substantial completion, an action to recover damages for such injury or wrongful death or damage to property may be brought within one year after the date on which such injury occurred, but in no event may such action be brought more than eight years after the substantial completion of the improvement. 3. The limitations prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense by any owner, tenant, or other person in actual possession or control of such an improvement where the improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death. 4. For purposes of this section an improvement shall be deemed to be "substantially completed" when the construction is sufficiently complete so that an improvement may be utilized by its owners or lawful possessor for the purposes intended. In the case of a phased project with more than one substantial completion date, the seven-year period of limitations for actions involving systems designed to serve the entire project shall begin at the substantial completion of the earliest phase. Liability and Other Issues Arising Out Of the World Trade Center Tragedy † Milton Thurm I. Introduction The World Trade Center tragedy of September 11, 2001 has already spawned a number of lawsuits between the owners and operators of the World Trade Center and their various insurers. In the main, this litigation deals with insurance coverage issues; the most prominent among them is the number of occurrences involved in the incident. Other issues pending in related litigation concern arbitration clauses that exist in various policies, the extent of property damage coverage on the mall within the World Trade Center, and a host of business interruption issues. While this litigation is mammoth in proportion and involves hundreds of millions of dollars, it is probably just the tip of the proverbial iceberg in the continuum of insurance-related claims that the industry will face down the road. What has yet to surface are the thousands of claims for bodily injury brought by those who survived the horror of that day and the claims for conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death brought by the immediate kin of those who did not. This article seeks to examine some of these potential claims, thereby alerting the industry to what lies ahead. In this regard, federal legislation and prior litigation surrounding other terrorist attacks or disasters may provide the best outcome indicators. II. Federal Statutes Enacted in the Wake of September 11 Immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center, the federal government enacted the Airline Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (“ATSSA”) on September 22, 2001. [1] The ATSSA provides $15 billion in subsidies to ensure the solvency of the airlines. It has been described by one scholar as “one of the largest tort reforms ever imposed by the federal government.” [2] The legislation affects litigation emanating from the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in two ways. First, it limits the total liability of air carriers (the airlines) for claims arising out of the September 11 airline crashes and fixes the jurisdiction and applicable substantive law for litigation arising out of these attacks. [3] Second, it establishes a victims’ compensation fund which provides an alternative process by which any injured individual or the survivors of a deceased victim can seek compensation. The most important feature of the legislation is that it offers the victims of September 11 a choice: victims who opt to make claim against the victims’ compensation fund waive their right to “file a civil action (or to be a party to an action), in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” [4] In the event victims choose to seek compensation in the courts, the ATSSA’s liability-limiting provisions are straightforward: “liability for all claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages, arising from the terrorist related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against any air carrier shall not be in an amount greater that the limits of liability coverage maintained by the air carrier.” [5] Additionally, the ATSSA provides that “the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” The ATSSA also provides that the applicable substantive law in the litigation “shall be derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law.” Finally, the ATSSA expressly precludes the waiver and liability-limiting provisions from compromising suits against “any person who is a knowing participant in any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist act.” [6] To date, there are at least three such lawsuits pending. One of them is a class action suit where victims have opted to sue the individuals and organizations, as well as their state supporters, who are widely acknowledged as responsible for the attack. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”) was later enacted in November, 2001, amending the ATSSA. [7] The ATSA extended the tort reform provisions of the ATSSA, limiting liability resulting from the attacks for airplane manufactures, airports, and anyone with a property interest in the World Trade Center. The ATSA also limited New York City’s liability to the greater of the city’s insurance coverage or $350 million. [8] However, the new Act specifically states that its provisions will not extend to the private security agencies which checked bags and screened passengers on September 11, 2001. Immediately after the enactment of the ATSSA, however, one commentator noted that it is extremely vague regarding how victims will be compensated. [9] The details governing distribution of the victims’ compensation fund rest solely on the judgment of the special master, providing the special master with authority to design a system that allows victims to submit claims. In mid-November, Attorney General John Ashcroft appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg as special master for the victims’ compensation fund. Mr. Feinberg is perhaps best known for his role as special master in the Agent Orange cases. He brings a wealth of experience in mass tort resolution, including work on the asbestos litigation, a class action involving the Shoreham nuclear power plant in Suffolk County, New York, and breast implant litigation. Most recently, he filled the high profile role of arbitrating negotiations that led to the settlement of claims by victims of the German Holocaust. [10] On December 20, 2001, the United States Department of Justice released Mr. Feinberg’s Interim Final Regulations for the distribution of the victims’ compensation fund. [11] Following extensive public comment and meetings with victims, victims’ families and other groups, the Department of Justice then released the Final Regulations on March 13, 2002. [12] A list of claimants is accessible on the United State Department of Justice Victims’ Compensation Fund website and indicates that close to one thousand victims have filed claims under the federal victims’ compensation fund, waiving their right to bring suit in federal court. [13] While claims on the fund offer the advantage of monetary awards to the victims within months, public comments following release of the Interim Final Rules indicated widespread dissatisfaction with the special master’s compensation plan. [14] The most contentious and controversial aspects of the Interim Final Rules involved provisions dealing with the reduction of awards based on collateral sources. Among the critical voices was Elliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, who issued a press release on December 20, 2001 calling the regulations “flawed.” [15] When likewise asked about the regulations, John Lynch, spokesman for the “9-11 Widows and Victims’ Families Association,” a group that represents families of civilians and rescue workers killed in the attacks, was quoted in the National Law Journal as saying, “I think it is a disgrace.” [16] Similarly reacting to the bitter sentiment of the victims, Senators Jon C. Corzine and Robert G. Torricelli introduced a bill to repeal the provisions of the ATSSA that allow for reduced compensation based on collateral source. [17] Despite criticism regarding the collateral source compensation rules, the Final Rule incorporated no drastic changes to the Interim Rule. Summarizing the Final Rule, Special Master Feinberg reiterated that he held no power to disregard the Congressional mandate factoring collateral sources into distribution of the fund. Moreover, the Final Rule specifically notes that collateral source compensation can include life insurance, pension funds, death benefits programs, and payments by federal, state, or local governments. However, several changes were made to the collateral source provisions of the rules demonstrating that discretion was available to the Special Master when distributing the fund. The Final Rule, for example, clarifies the definition of collateral source compensation, expressly noting that certain benefits, including tax relief, contingent Social Security benefits, and contingent workers’ compensation benefits are not to be treated as collateral source compensation. The Final Rule also clarifies the provision that excludes charitable donations from the definition of collateral source compensation. In most instances, money received from privately funded charitable entities will not constitute collateral source compensation. Lastly, the Final Rule affords significant discretion to the Special Master when valuing collateral sources. While the Special Master has indicated that “it will be very rare that a claimant will receive less than $250,000.00," there is a possibility, expressly acknowledged in the summary to the Final Rule, that a victim or a victim’s family would not recover any money from the victims’ compensation fund based on the collateral source rules. In light of this possibility, some victims or victims’ families with significant collateral sources may take their claims to court. In fact, it was reported recently that a suit was commenced against American Airlines on behalf of Ms. Bonnie Shihadeh Smithwick, a highly-paid portfolio manager who was killed when the first World Trade Center Tower collapsed. Apparently, Ms. Smithwick’s family would receive no compensation under the victims’ compensation fund because she held a large life insurance policy for her family. [18] The other predominant factor in determining whether victims will commence civil suits is their ability to prevail in such actions. Whether the plaintiffs can recover involves several questions, including: Finally, it is worth mentioning here the latest proposed federal legislation -- a bill to amend the Terrorism Risk Protection Act to ensure the continued financial capacity of the insurers in order to provide coverage risks for terrorism. The bill proposes that the federal government will cover up to 90% of claims exceeding $25 billion in the event of an “act of terrorism.” It also proposes to further amend the ATSSA to cover any tort claim arising out of or relating to an act of terrorism. The bill would bar recovery for punitive damages, eliminate joint and several liability for non-economic damages, require that all damages be off-set by collateral sources such as insurance or gifts, and limit lawyers’ fees to 20% of any award. [19] III. Suits Arising out of the World Trade Center Tragedy A. Possible Defendants There are numerous possible defendants for suits arising out of the September 11 terrorist attacks. As discussed above, the airline companies, the aircraft manufacturers, airport owners and operators, New York City [20] and anyone else with a property interest in the World Trade Center are protected by federal legislation, limiting their liability to the terms of their insurance coverage. However, as the victims grow less and less enamored with the special master’s plan under the federal victims’ compensation fund, even with its liability limitations, a lawsuit against those parties may become more attractive, especially since those parties generally are sufficiently insured to cover the kinds of injuries and loss of life that occurred on September 11th. For instance, the airlines have an estimated $1.5 billion worth of coverage for each airplane. [21] With $3 billion in coverage for the airplanes that were flown into the World Trade Center Towers, the airlines might prove an attractive target for victims. As noted earlier, federal legislation does not protect airline security firms or the actual individuals and parties who perpetrated the terrorist attacks. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which was amended in 1996, allows American citizens to sue specified nations for death or injuries arising out of terrorism. [22] Several nations currently are identified by statute as subject to suit. These include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. [23] The 1996 amendment was intended to permit suits on behalf of those killed in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, against the government of Libya, the alleged perpetrator. [24] This statute may be invoked to sue other nations if proof can be amassed that the terrorist attack was aided by that nation. There are currently at least two civil suits by victims of the September 11 attacks already pending against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Doe v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, [25] was commenced against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and several members of the Taliban leadership. The plaintiff, “Jane Doe,” seeks recovery for the loss of her husband, who was killed while working at his job in the financial industry at One World Trade Center when Flight 11 struck the building. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, [26] also filed in the Southern District of New York, is a suit brought against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and several members of the Taliban leadership by Raymond Smith, the brother of George E. Smith, who was killed when U.S. Airways Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center. [27] Both complaints allege state causes of action for wrongful death, survival, assault, battery, false imprisonment and civil RICO claims. The Doe suit also includes claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, on February 20, a class action suit was filed by a mother and six widows of other victims, seeking billions of dollars. [28] Among other possible defendants mentioned in the media since the attacks are the architects who designed the World Trade Center, as well as asbestos manufacturers, companies involved in constructing the World Trade Center, elevator maintenance companies, the Florida flight schools that trained the terrorists, jet fuel producers, the City of Portland (ME), and manufacturers of the structural steel used in the World Trade Center. [29] There are at least two civil suits brought by passengers in the hijacked jets against the airlines. These include Mariani v. United Airlines, filed in the Southern District of New York on December 20, 2001, which names United Airlines as the defendant and alleges wrongful death, and a survival action against the same defendant based on the breach of duty of care for safety and security of its passengers. As discussed above, because of the collateral source compensation reductions in the victims’ compensation fund, more suits will follow. As noted further, the suit brought on behalf of Ms. Bonnie Shihadeh Smithwick was only initiated after issuance of the Final Rule. The fact that her family would not have received compensation under the victims’ compensation fund surely prompted the litigation. [30] Prior suits commenced in the wake of disasters demonstrate that a number of other unanticipated entities might be subject to suit. For instance, suits brought by the victims of the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas, Nevada, included products liability claims against such defendants as B.F. Goodrich, Conoco, and Pantsaote, Inc. [31] The claims against these parties alleged that the gases produced by the combustion of PVC vinyl-coated materials were toxic and unreasonably dangerous. Similar claims surfaced in suits from the 1986 Du Pont Plaza Hotel fire in San Juan, Puerto Rico, that killed 97 people, [32] and from the 1990 arson fire of the Happy Land Social Club in the Bronx, New York that killed 87 people. [33] B. Possible Plaintiffs While the response to an inquiry about possible plaintiffs in personal injury actions occasioned by the September 11 attacks may seem fairly straightforward, recent developments are cause for alarm among insurers and New York City. Possible claims for toxic tort injuries have been noted recently in the media and among legal professionals. [34] In that regard, there is great uncertainty about possible adverse health effects from toxic agents released into the air following collapse of the buildings. The victims’ compensation fund does not entertain the possibility that large numbers of rescue workers, clean-up crews, construction workers and New York City residents may have been exposed to toxic chemicals that would increase their chances of contracting diseases such as cancer or suffering long term neurological defects. Researchers have identified asbestos, lead, fiberglass, PCBs, mercury and other potentially harmful substances in the air and dust that surround the disaster site. Thus, the list of potential defendants may grow commensurately with the list of harmful substances. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that one study found dust in the neighborhood as caustic as drain cleaner. [35] However, reports about the extent of contamination vary drastically. The Environmental Protection Agency has been monitoring the downtown area for asbestos, particulates and other contaminants typically found in large building fire and collapse situations since September 11. It has detected no pollutants from the fire and building collapses that are cause for concern to the general public. Within one block of the World Trade Center, the EPA is finding low levels of asbestos in the dust from the building collapse. [36] There have been approximately 1,300 notices of claim served on New York City by firefighters and other rescue workers who claim that breathing the air at the disaster site has made them sick. [37] With the high concentration of persons living and working in the downtown New York City area, the potential for toxic tort claimants could be staggering. There has been insufficient research to determine whether or to what extent people were exposed to toxic chemicals in the hours, days and months following the attack. Further scientific research should provide a clearer picture of potential toxic tort claims. IV. Theories of Recovery and Applicable Legal Standards Pursuant to the ATSSA, the law to be applied in suits arising from September 11th events will derive from state law (including choice of law principles), where the crash occurred. Thus, suits arising out of the World Trade Center attack will be governed by New York law. Negligence will likely predominate theories of action for civil suits brought against the above-mentioned parties. To sustain an action for negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) that the breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) damages. The most critical elements applicable to any suit emanating from the September 11th attacks are duty and proximate causation. Generally, the law of negligence in New York is similar to the law of other jurisdictions. Thus, to the extent that the law of other states, such as Pennsylvania, is applied in lawsuits arising from the September 11th attacks, the foregoing legal principles will be generally applied. A. Duty Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, i.e., the violation of a right. [38] The issue whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty is purely a legal question for the courts. The New York Court of Appeals has addressed the element of duty in a case alleging negligence and noted that: “ [t]he existence and scope of an alleged tortfeasor’s duty, at the threshold, is a legal, policy-laden determination dependent on consideration of different forces, including logic, science, competing socioeconomic policies, and contractual assumptions of responsibility.” [39] Thus, whether the victims can sustain causes of action in negligence against the potential defendants noted above will depend largely on a legal determination -- a policy-driven line of demarcation drawn around the concept of duty. In determining whether a duty exists and in determining its scope, New York courts have been influenced by public policy concerns such as avoiding limitless liability, mass litigation, and fraudulent claims. The court of appeals has even held that it is "bound to consider the larger social consequences of decisions” affecting duties in negligence under the law. [40] A duty may arise from a special relationship that requires the defendant to protect against the risk of harm to the plaintiff. For example, landowners have a duty to protect tenants, patrons and invitees from foreseeable harm caused by the criminal conduct of others while they are on the premises; their special relationship puts them in the best position to protect against that risk. [41] The duty to protect against foreseeable criminal activity, however, does not extend to members of the general public. [42] Furthermore, while the forseeability of harm may affect a determination of causation, the foreseeability of harm does not define duty. Absent a duty running directly to the injured person, there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm. For instance, in Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., [43] the court of appeals considered whether a utility owed a duty to a plaintiff injured in a fall on a darkened staircase during a citywide blackout. While the injuries were logically foreseeable, there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the utility to provide lighting for the common areas in the building. The court restricted liability for damages in negligence to direct customers of the utility in order to avoid a crushing exposure to suit by millions of electricity consumers in New York City and Westchester. B. Proximate Causation Beyond the existence of a duty, it is essential that the breach of a duty be the “proximate cause” of the injury suffered in order to sustain a cause of action for negligence. Generally, an act or omission is the proximate cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. [44] Stated another way, an act or omission is the proximate cause of an injury if it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable people would regard it as the cause of the injury. [45] A proximate cause must be one which, in view of all surrounding circumstances, might readily have been foreseen by an ordinary and prudent person as likely to result in injury. While there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury, an intervening act will constitute a superseding cause of the injury and will sever liability when the act is extraordinary in nature. [46] Stated conversely, the causative link between the defendant’s act or omission and the plaintiff’s injury is not broken by the negligent or deliberate conduct of a third person when such conduct is normal or foreseeable under the circumstances. [47] The crucial aspect of this inquiry is a determination of how far the first wrongdoer should be charged with forecasting the future results of his or her conduct. V. Prior Litigation Arising out of Disasters or Injuries Caused by Terrorists A. Oklahoma City Bombing In Gaines-Tabb v. ICE Explosives, USA, Inc., [48] victims of the terrorist bombing brought a class action against the manufacturer of ammonium nitrate that was sold as fertilizer and allegedly used to construct the bomb that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The plaintiffs’ principal causes of action were negligence and products liability. As their negligence claim, plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer of ammonium nitrate was negligent in making explosive grade ammonium nitrate available to the perpetrators of the terrorist act. Without reaching the issue of whether the manufacturer owed a duty to the victims, the court held that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim for negligence because they could not show, as a matter of law, that the defendants’ conduct was the proximate cause of their injuries. The court held that “the conduct of the bomber or bombers was unforeseeable, independent of the acts of the defendants, and adequate by itself to bring about plaintiffs’ injuries [;] the criminal activities of the bombers acted as the supervening cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.” [49] In rendering its decision, the court noted that ammonium nitrate bombs were used for illegal acts on only two occasions in the last twenty years, and that it was extremely difficult to properly manufacture ammonium nitrate bombs; only a small percentage of the population would possess the knowledge to do so. B. Hijacking In the case of Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., [50] the plaintiffs were three American diplomats who were also passengers aboard Kuwait Airways Flight KU221 when the airplane was hijacked by four terrorists. Plaintiffs were tortured over six days, and one of the plaintiffs was murdered before Iranian commandos thwarted the hijacking. Plaintiffs commenced a negligence action against Middle East Airlines Airliban, S.A. (MEA), alleging that MEA had a duty to use due care to avoid the risk of hijacking. The facts are convoluted, but are worthy of brief mention considering the likelihood of claims against airline security firms arising out of the September 11th attacks. On December 2, 1984, four hijackers purchased “interline” tickets from MEA for travel from Beirut to Bangkok, Thailand, via the cities of Dubai and Karachi. At Dubai, the flight connected with another airline. The court was careful to note that the hijackers “had a stench about them.” [51] Their one-way tickets were purchased with cash on very short notice and the itinerary they chose was strange. There were regularly scheduled direct flights from Beirut to Bangkok. If the hijackers had taken the next flight from Beirut they could have avoided a 24-hour layover in Karachi and arrived in Bangkok at the same time. Perhaps the most suspicious aspect of the hijackers’ conduct was their failure to check baggage for the long-distance flight. On the first stopover in Dubai, the hijackers boarded the MEA flight, armed with pistols, explosives and other weapons. The hijackers and other passengers were held on the tarmac, which was poorly lit and largely unguarded, during the` stopover. The hijacking occurred after the flight departed Dubai. Addressing the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, the court first ascertained whether a duty existed on the part of MEA as owed to the victims. The court reiterated the broad legal principles discussed above, and held that MEA had a duty to protect the plaintiffs from the unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm. The court specifically held that MEA, as a first leg interline carrier, had a duty to protect passengers on other connecting interline flights from unreasonable risk or harm through the use of reasonable precautions in the face of reasonably foreseeable risks. The court also rejected MEA’s claim that, as a matter of law, the criminal acts of the hijackers and/or the negligence of the other interline carrier were intervening superceding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries, leaving the issue to the jury for determination. VI. Conclusion The September 11th attacks were unprecedented in all respects. From a legal standpoint, the issue of compensating victims of the attack is fraught with uncertainty. The immediate issues concern whether victims will elect to participate in the victims’ compensation fund or take their chances pursuing compensation under tort law in civil litigation. As stated, the possibility of large scale litigation by the September 11 victims depends largely on the success of the victims’ compensation program. In the event the victims elect to litigate their claims, judicial application of such concepts as “duty,” “foreseeability” and “proximate causation” to the extraordinary factual circumstances of September 11 will take center stage. As set forth above, these decisions not only will have immediate financial consequences, they will also have larger social consequences for reasons articulated by the New York Court of Appeals. Because of the extraordinary nature of the September 11th attacks, prior litigation and cases such as the Oklahoma City bombing offer only limited precedent as models by which to predict success or failure in the courts. Under any circumstances, the insurance industry must be prepared to engage a host of claims from many different insureds on a panoply of legal theories. ENDNOTES † Submitted by the author on behalf of the FDCC Excess & Surplus Lines Section. Mr. Thurm acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Frank Santoro, Esq., in the preparation of this article. [1] P.L. 107-42 (2001) (full text of the statute available on the FDCC website at http://www.thefederation.org/index.html). [2] Anthony Sebok, Assessing the New Airline Law, http://Findlaw.com Commentary, at http://www.writ.news.findlaw.com.scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page+sebok/20010924.html (last visited 1/15/02). [3] “The term ‘air carrier’ means a citizen of the United States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation and includes employees and agents of such citizen.” P.L. 107-42 § 402(1). [4] P.L. 107-42 § 405 (c)(3)(B)(i) (2001). [5] Id. § 408 (a) (2001). [6] Id. § 408 (c) (2001) (summary of the statute is available on the FDCC website). [7] P.L. 107-71 §201 (2001). [8] Id. § 201 (a)(3). [9] Sebok, supra note 2. [10] Tamara Loomis, Ashcroft Names Special Master for Sept. 11 Compensation Fund, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at 1. [11] 28 CFR § 104, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/viccompfedreg.htm (last visited January 29, 2002). [12] Id. [13] http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/victimrepresentatives.pdf (last visited April 8, 2002). [14] Robert F. Worth, Ground Zero: Compensation; Families of Victims Rally for Higher Federal Awards, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2002, at B4. [15] Attorney General Spitzer's objections to the regulations are available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec20c01.htm. He identified what he considered "numerous fundamental flaws in the DOJ regulations" contained in the Interim Final Rules. Several of his criticisms were addressed by the Final Rule. 1. Attorney General Spitzer was concerned that in order to be eligible for compensation, the Interim Final Rule required contemporaneous records demonstrating medical treatment within 24 hours after the attack, even though: (a) there are no records for the hundreds of injured victims treated at emergency triage locations on September 11th; and (b) many other victims first sought to reunite with their families and did not seek medical treatment for their injuries until September 12th. The Final Rule addressed this concern by expanding the time limits to 72 hours for victims and a time limit within the discretion of the Special Master for rescue workers. 2. Attorney General Spitzer was also dissatisfied that the Interim Final Rule effectively precluded recovery by unmarried life partners. The Final Rule was not altered to include recovery by unmarried life partners. The Final Rule relies on state law to determine who is a personal representative entitled to recover from the fund. This reliance is purportedly mandated for consistency, in order to avoid a situation where a representative as defined in the regulation recovers under the fund, and a representative under state law is still free to commence a lawsuit. The Preamble to the Final Rule suggests that criticism of state law concerning the determination of a personal representative is best directed to respective state legislatures. 3. Attorney General Spitzer also felt that the Interim Rule ignored the statutory mandate that victims be able to present evidence of their losses. Instead it determined that all individuals killed in the attacks were presumed to have suffered exactly $250,000 in "non-economic" losses, regardless of individual circumstances, and permitted increases only upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." The Final Rule remains the same. The Special Master recognized the problems inherent in placing a value on non-economic losses, but opted for consistency and fairness in order to avoid “playing Solomon” on a case-by-case basis. 4. Attorney General Spitzer also was concerned that under the Interim Rule, awards were reduced by the amount of collateral compensation that the claimant received, even if the collateral compensation was unrelated to the damages for which recovery was sought. The Interim Rule states that charitable donations will not be counted as "collateral source" payments resulting in reduced awards, but at the same time authorizes the Special Master to determine that charitable payments are collateral sources, which will deter charities from providing immediate payment to the victims. As to the how the Final Rule addresses these concerns, see text. [16] Bob Van Voris, Compensation Plan May Shut Out Sept. 11 Rescuers, Nat’l L. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A1. [17] Senator Jon C. Corzine, Fix the Victims’ Fund, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2002, at A14. [18] Robert F. Worth, Airline Sued in Tower Death, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2002, at A16. [19] H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001). [20] Under the ATSA, the liability of New York City for suits arising out of the World Trade Center attacks is limited to the greater of its insurance coverage or $350 million. P.L. 107-71 § 201(a)(3). [21] Milo Geylin, Lawyers Wonder, Who is Liable for Sept. 11, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at B1. [22] 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2002). [23] The United States does not recognize the Taliban, and thus Afghanistan is not included on the list. [24] Jerry Adler, Suing Bin Laden, The American Lawyer, Nov. 2001, at 32. [25] 01 CIV 9074 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 11, 2001). [26] 01 CIV 1013`(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 14, 2001). [27] Adler, supra note 24. [28] Neely Tucker, Bin Laden, Other Terrorists Sued, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 2002, at A10. [29] See, e.g., Gregory Keisch, ‘Little Old Lady’ Denies Terrorizing Man, Portland Press Herald, Dec. 5, 2001, at 1B (reporting notice of claim filed with the City of Portland by a victim of the attack on the World Trade Center. Two of the hijackers boarded flights in Portland and the city retains some control over airport security); Seth Stern, Justice is Blind After All, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 27, 2001, at 19 (mentioning Florida flight schools and architects of World Trade Center as defendants). [30] Worth, supra note 18. [31] See In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 660 F. Supp. 522 (D. Nev. 1987). [32] See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912 (D. P.R. 1991). [33] See Clarendon Place Corp. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 587 N.Y.S.2d 311 (App. Div. 1992). [34] See Bob Van Voris, Are Toxic Lawsuits in the Air after Sept 11?, Nat’l L. J., Feb. 18, 2002, at A1; Associated Press, NYC Faces Trade Center Lawsuits, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/08/national/printable328742.shtml. [35] Van Voris, supra note 34. [36] See http://www.epa.gov/epahome/wtc/headline_092101.htm (last visited, April 5, 2002). [37] Van Voris, supra note 34. [38] 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001). [39] Milken & Co. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 644 N.E.2d 268, 271 (N.Y. 1994). [40] Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d 522 (N.Y. 1987). [41] Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1980). [42] Waters, 505 N.E.2d 522. [43] 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985). [44] Alexander v. Eldred, 72 N.E.2d 996 (N.Y. 1984). [45] Ferrer v. Harris, 434 N.E.2d 1342 (N.Y. 1982). [46] Huber v. Malone, 645 N.Y.S.2d 526 (App. Div. 1996). [47] Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (applying New York law). [48] 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998). [49] Id. at 621. [50] 89 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996). [51] Id. at 120-22. (Author’s Bio) Mr. Thurm, who is counsel to the firm of Molod, Spitz, DeSantis & Stark, P.C. in New York City, has been associated with the insurance industry as a practicing lawyer defending companies and their insureds for over 40 years. He is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School (1958) and is admitted to practice in New York (1959) and Florida (1975). He is also admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and all four federal district courts in the State of New York. He has actively litigated a broad spectrum of insurance-related matters including: primary and excess policies; direct and reinsurance contracts and coverage issues dealing with allocation of loss; late notice of claim and suit; and the assault and battery exclusion. He has defended dozens of municipal entities in all types of civil rights cases including land use, excessive force and employment discrimination. He has been a member of the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel since 1984 and is the immediate past Chair of its Excess and Surplus Line Section. He is an associate member of the Excess and Surplus Line Claims Association and NAPSLO. He also holds membership in the Defense Research Institute, the New York State Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Legal Offices Section). He is a frequent speaker and contributor of articles on insurance-related matters.
Curious. In what you posted, there is no mention of ANYTHING concerning the MANDATORY retention of documents for any period of time. Isn't that what RickyJ claimed and what started this little discussion? As far as negligence is concerned, just how is the builder or owner of the WTC negligent with regards to whether or not the towers were designed or analyzed in 1963-64 for a plane crash or plane crash induced fire? Afterall, that is also the issue that started this discussion. The issue was not whether the owner was negligent because he failed to evacuate people soon enough or allowed folks to breath harmful dust or had asbestos in the building. I think any plaintiff would have a difficult time proving negligence in the design for the issue that started this discussion ... since I know of no building code in existence in 1963 or 1964 that required such a plane crash load nor was it common practice to include one. It seems to me that only product liability (in other words, defective materials, defective design, etc) applies as far as the DESIGN of the towers (the issue at hand) was concerned. And so far nothing indicates the use of defective materials or defective design (for the loads that skyscrapers were supposed to be designed to resist back in the 1960s). You misunderstood, NC (although its difficult to see how). I said all along that the statute of repose would normally (in most states) prevent an action for product liability against the builders. But I pointed out that in cases of personal injury, NY state law has allowed (at least until recently) an indefinite period before the injury takes place before starting the clock on the statute of repose. You apparently overlooked that fact. And apparently you've overlooked the fact that nothing in what you posted talked about suing the builder or owner for not designing against a plane crash and plane crash induced fire. Now back to the original claim by RickyJ. Prove that it is MANDATORY (by law) that design calculations be kept any length of time (such as 40 years). Because that's the issue that started this little exchange. Don't take us off on another spam-filled detour. Prove what Ricky claimed. Say ... I notice he's left the thread. Wonder why?
[BAC-side #129] Now back to the original claim by RickyJ. Prove that it is MANDATORY (by law) that design calculations be kept any length of time (such as 40 years). RickyJ said it. Take it up with RickyJ. For my part, I would presume that the design calculations, if any existed, would have been retained by the corporate entity and not by the employee of the corporate entity. It may be that that particular corporate entity no longer exists. Skilling is dead so we cannot very well ask him about it. [BAC-side #129] Say ... I notice he's left the thread. Wonder why? RickyJ posted on 4/22 (#55) and on 4/24 (#102 #106 #107 #108). That is not exactly prolific. Perhaps he left because he does not find you as entertaining as I do, perhaps he is laughing at you too hard to type, or perhaps he just does not like to debate someone who gets his "facts" from a magic 8-ball. [BAC-side #129] Because that's the issue that started this little exchange. Don't take us off on another spam-filled detour. Prove what Ricky claimed. ----- No, that is NOT the bullshit that got this started. Let us review to remind you how you got this started. ----- [nc #86] ROBERTSON now claims he cannot find the ROBERTSON study analysis report. ----- [BAC-side #87] It's been 40 years. Do you keep everything you've ever written, Nolu? Really? ----- [nc #101] Had I done an analysis 40 years ago proving that the WTC, the most important project of my lifetime, could withstand a hit by a Boeing 707 traveling at 600 mph, and "that such collision would result in only local damage which could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building and would not endanger the lives and safety of occupants not in the immediate area of impact," if I could not find the paperwork today, I would be able to replicate the analysis and prove the point again. The towers withstood the impact just as Titanic withstood the impact with the iceberg. Aye cap'n, it wasn't the iceberg got 'er, it was the water! It's been 40 years. Do you believe that Robertson not only lost the report but has forgotten how to do the analysis? ----- [RickyJ #106] For such a project it is mandatory BAC. If you knew much about the legal requirements of such projects you would know this. ----- [BAC-side #109] It's probably a good idea to keep such documents, but I challenge you to prove there is any legal requirement that calculations in the design phase of a skyscraper must be kept at all or kept indefinitely. And have you ever heard of a "statute of repose"? It's the number of years after a project is completed after which the designers and contractors cannot be held responsible for damages or problems that may subsequently occur. THAT is the period during which engineering firms PROBABLY SHOULD (again, show me where it says MUST) keep all records if they are smart. Now for New York the statute of limitations/repose on product liability is 3 years, however, personal injury cases currently have an indefinite liability in that for three years after an injury the building builder/owners can be sued. However, that has been successfully contested in court cases recently and architects in New York are currently trying to get a maximum 10 year repose statute passed for personal liability cases. So yes, it would be smart if builders under the current NY laws kept important design documents for a long time ... perhaps indefinitely ... but I know of no laws that state it is mandatory. Go ahead, Ricky ... prove me wrong. So, this got started by my questioning Robertson's "The dog ate my homework" explanation, and your defense of his Gonzo-like explanation. And we got off on this detour by your inane injection of a Statute of Repose. I will note that in my #101 is questioned you as follows, "Do you believe that Robertson not only lost the report but has forgotten how to do the analysis?" The silence is deafening. WHY has Robertson not simply recreated the analysis? I guess we will just have to go with the White Paper and the New York Times article. They actually seem to exist.
The original corporation was named Worthington, Skilling, Helle and Jackson. That became Skilling, Helle, Christiansen & Robertson. And that became Skilling Ward Christiansen Robertson And that became Skilling Ward Magnusson Barkshire Inc. And that became Magnusson Klemencic Associates And you can contact them here: http://en.structurae.de/firms/data/index.cfm?id=f005335 So I'm not surprised if some documents have gotten lost in all the intervening years. It's not the conspiracy Ricky and you have made it out to be. Did he ever supply any proof, whatsoever, that it is legally mandated that documents like design calculation be retained for 40 years like he claimed? No???? To which Ricky claimed it was mandatory, by law. Which it isn't. You are presuming the assertion that the analysis assumed the plane impacted at 600 mph is correct. But Robertson said it is not. And indeed, the only plane to hit a building in NY did so at a much lower speed because it was lot in fog. And that's the situation Robertson said he assumed in his analysis. Which seems rational. Furthermore, you are unable to name an instance where commercial jets fly 600 mph at 1000 feet altitude ... unless they are crashing ... which is a VERY rare event. And we know they weren't considering the possibility of hijackers deliberately crashing a plane into structures at full speed back in 1964. But we do know that commercial jets fly at lower speeds ... landing speeds ... over large cities when at low altitude. So Robertson's assertion that he assumed that makes sense ... whereas the claim the building was analyzed for 600 mph impacts back in 1964 simply does not. No matter how much you want to pretend it does.
#142. To: BeAChooser, RickyJ (#140)
Are you SURE you are from New York and know New York history??? When last I checked, New York City included Manhattan, Staten Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. Where you get the notion that only one plane ever hit a building in New York is beyond me. It is just about impossible to crash a jetliner in New York City and not hit a building. Just last year, New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle flew into a building between the 39th and 40th floor. In 2001, there was the flight that crashed in Queens. And who could forget the story of Stephen Baltz who initially survived the midair collision which crashed one jetliner in Staten Island and the other in Brooklyn. That was in 1960 and would have been bright in the memories of all New Yorkers in 1964. http://www.fdnewyork.com/lidle.asp On October 11, 2006, New York Yankee baseball player Cory Lidle crashed into a building in New York between the 39th and 40th floors. http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/12/newyork.crash/index.html Feds eye engines in air crash November 12, 2001 Posted: 10:07 p.m. EST (0307 GMT) NEW YORK (CNN) -- Investigators suspect a catastrophic engine event as the likely cause of an airline crash Monday in New York that likley claimed the lives of everyone on board, a Transportation Department official told CNN. Investigators have not definitively ruled out terrorism in the crash American Airlines flight 587, but think some sort of engine failure caused the disaster, the official said. Officials said the flight, which crashed in Rockaway, a Queens neighborhood, carried 260 people - 246 ticketed passengers, nine crewmembers and five unticketed infants sitting on their parents' lap. At least six to eight people in Rockaway also have been reported missing immediately following the crash, New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani said. By late Monday, searchers had recovered 265 "relatively intact bodies," police said. The flight was an Airbus A300-600. The jet was propelled by General Electric engines that have been the subject of past National Transportation Safety Board recommendations. Last December, the agency recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require airlines with the same GE engines as those on flight 587 to review repairs made on cracked engine blades. That recommendation followed an incident in which an engine erupted and caught fire during maintenance on a U.S. Airways plane. A year earlier, the NTSB recommended that airlines with Airbus A300s improve their engines' fire detection system. An engine on an American Airlines flight that caught fire on takeoff from Puerto Rico prompted that recommendation. This June, the FAA issued an airworthiness directive, telling airlines to examine specific parts of the GE engine. A GE spokesman told CNN the company complied with the directive, but could find nothing to change. New York Gov. George Pataki said there were "inconclusive" reports the pilot dumped fuel into Jamaica Bay, an indication he may have known of a problem on board. Officials said the Coast Guard had found no evidence of a fuel slick in the waters off John F. Kennedy Airport, which would indicate flight 587's pilot deliberately dumped fuel from the aircraft as it headed toward earth. Just before the crash, the Airbus broke up in mid-air. A sizable portion of the vertical stabilizer from the tail section landed in Jamaica Bay, while most of the fuselage plunged into Rockaway. One engine landed at a gas station, while other engine pieces crushed a boat parked in the driveway of a home that caught fire. Giuliani said the fuselage destroyed up to six houses and severely damaged another six. Pataki said the main crash site suggested the plane dropped at a steep angle, if not vertically. "It's clear that the plane did come down very much in a straight level, which was horrible for that particular site, but minimized what could have happened had the plane glided across the Rockaways," he said. The cockpit voice recorder from American Airlines Flight 587 has been recovered and was flown to Washington for analysis, the National Transportation and Safety Board said. Investigators are still searching for the flight data recorder that will give information about how the different systems, including the engines, were performing. The plane was en route to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. American Airlines said the plane was carrying 251 passengers and nine crewmembers. The plane had not been delayed by mechanical problems, said American Airlines Chairman Don Carty. http://psreader.com/article44.html Pillar of Fire Recalling the Day the Sky Fell, December 16, 1960 by Nathaniel Altman Few Park Slope residents know that our neighborhood was once the scene of the country’s worst air disaster. At about 10:30 in the morning, on Friday, December 16, 1960, a United Airlines DC-8 jet en route from Chicago to Idlewild (now JFK) airport collided with a TWA Super Constellation propeller plane flying from Columbus to LaGuardia. The TWA plane broke into pieces and plunged onto Miller Field, a former military airport in the New Dorp section of Staten Island, killing all 44 on board. The crippled United plane managed to remain in the air for another eight and a half miles before crashing onto Sterling Place and Seventh Avenue, setting fire to over a dozen buildings and killing five pedestrians. In all, 135 people died as a result of the crash. The crash and its aftermath bore the traits of a classic American tragedy: tremendous loss of life and homes and businesses destroyed. It was also a time of individual acts of kindness and powerful heroism. Many also believed that it was a day of miracles, as the two crashes could have been far worse. Government investigations sought to pinpoint the reason for the collision, but were accused of mounting a coverup. The real story remains unresolved to this day. Ironically, the crash was also a possible turning point for a declining Brooklyn neighborhood, and sparked a preservation movement that grew to include much of the city. The Neighborhood While still similar to the neighborhood that today’s residents would recognize, at the time the area around Sterling Place and Seventh Avenue was called “a neighborhood in transition.” While good shopping could be found on Seventh Avenue, middle-income families were moving out and banks began redlining the neighborhood, making it difficult for people to buy homes here. While some neighbors would still visit on their stoops during the warmer months, dozens of buildings-mostly between Fifth and Seventh avenues-were abandoned by their owners, who boarded them up and fled to suburbia. Commenting on the neighborhood in Brooklyn Heights Paper in 1995, Joe Ferris wrote, “There were abandoned and derelict buildings on every block from Flatbush Avenue to 15th Street. St. John’s Place between 5th and 6th Avenues looked as if it had been hit by heavy artillery.” Many of the brownstones became rooming houses, and once-large apartments were divided into smaller ones. On the morning of December 16, the snow on the ground had turned to slush. The grey sky was heavy with low clouds and a wet snow was falling throughout the area. The New York Times reported that “about the only sound on Sterling Place from Sixth to Seventh avenues was the slushing passage of an occasional car.” Due to the bad weather, few pedestrians made their way along Seventh Avenue and Sterling Place, where two men were selling Christmas trees for the upcoming holiday. The Aircraft Trans World Airlines N6907C was a Lockheed Super Constellation delivered to TWA in 1952. Considered one of the most beautiful airliners ever built, the graceful “Super Connie” was powered by four propeller engines and featured a slightly serpentine shape and a unique tri-rudder tail section. The plane’s cruising speed was 325 mph and it could carry 64 passengers nonstop for 3250 miles. United Airlines N8013U was a new Douglas DC-8 jet delivered to United Airlines barely a year before the crash. At that time the largest commercial jet in the air, the DC-8 was equipped with four turbojet engines. This long-range (5720 mile) transport had a cruising speed of 579 mph and could carry up to 189 passengers. The Events TWA flight 266 originated in Dayton, Ohio and stopped in Columbus, where a change of aircraft took place and most of the passengers boarded for the trip to New York. Leaving Columbus at 9 in the morning under the command of Capt. David A. Wollam, the Super Constellation carried five crew and 39 passengers, including two infants. Among the passengers were seven specialists in missile and aircraft development from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton; Richard Bitters, an Ohio University executive; four Ohio State University athletes; Gary Myers, president of the magazine Highlights for Children and his wife Mary, parents of five; and Louella Bricker, who was traveling to the Perkins Institute in Watertown, MA to bring her deaf son George back to Ohio for the holidays. At least one of the passengers had a premonition of death. Before she boarded the plane, Nancy Briggs, a student at Ohio State University, told her boyfriend Leonard Hart that she had a dream she was going to die and was afraid that she would never see him again. As his plane approached the New York area in limited visibility, Air Traffic Control advised Capt. Wollam to stand by in an area known as the Linden Intersection (a five-by-ten mile oval-shaped holding area stretched from East to West above Linden, NJ and the northwest section of Staten Island) before heading towards LaGuardia at an altitude of 5000 feet. Like the route of many of today’s flights into LaGuardia, the plane would have crossed Staten Island into Brooklyn, turned left and flown over Prospect Park and into the airport. After being given permission to land at 10:33:14, the captain began heading toward LaGuardia. Twelve seconds later, LaGuardia Approach Control advised that there “appears to be jet traffic off your right.” Communications with TW 266 then abruptly ended. United flight 826 was on nonstop service between Chicago’s O’Hare Airport and New York’s Idlewild. It left Chicago at 9:11 with 76 passengers and seven crew members under the command of Capt. Robert H. Sawyer. The best-known passengers included Dr. Jonas Kamlet, a leading chemist; Raymond Walsh, President of Wesleyan University Press; and Allen E. Braun, Vice President of North Advertising. Dorothy Miner, head nurse at the University of Illinois Hospital in Chicago, was flying here to assist her stepmother who was to undergo surgery, and Elsie Platt was traveling from Illinois to see her newborn granddaughter for the first time. Many others were coming home for the holidays, like Frank R. Dileo, a senior at the University of Utah; Darnell Mallory, a student at Omaha University, and Enrique Bustos, Jr., son of the former Consul General of Chile. Some were on trips abroad, like Edwige Dumalskis and her children Patrick and Joelle, who were en route to France to visit relatives. At approximately 10:21, the crew reported to Aeronautical Radio, Inc., operator of United’s aeronautical communications system, that one of their navigation receiver units was inoperative, which was relayed to United Airlines. Unfortunately, the crew failed to report the problem to Air Traffic Control, which probably would have provided extra radar assistance. At 10:32, the crew was told to enter the Preston intersection, an oval-shaped holding area 10 miles west of Red Bank, NJ, and well to the south of Linden. Its border was separated from the Linden intersection by five miles. The last transmission from the United crew was at 10:33:33. “Idlewild Approach Control, United 826, approaching Preston at 5000 [feet].” “I think we have trouble...” An instant later, at 10:33:34, LaGuardia radar observations showed that two targets merged over Miller Army Air Field, in New Dorp, Staten Island. The controller exclaimed, “I think we have trouble here with a TWA Connie...He’s not moving or anything. He might have got hit by another airplane.” Flying 11 miles off course and traveling at a speed of 500 mph- far faster than permitted by Air Traffic Control-the United jet slammed into the slower Super Constellation before the TWA pilot was able to react to the warning from the LaGuardia tower. The right wing of the DC-8 sheared through the upper right section of the Connie’s passenger compartment, causing the smaller plane to break into three pieces and spin out of control. Rev. Milton Perry, a Staten Island resident, told a reporter from the New York Times that he “felt the earth shake” and saw the plane fall in flames and smoke. At that moment, a Mrs. Weber of New Dorp heard an explosion, went to her window, and witnessed the crash. “It seemed to fall a few feet and there was another huge burst of flame... It went down in a terrible way, one wing gone, and it turned over very slowly. You could watch it all the way and it was always red from the flames.” Others reported that the plane had broken into “millions of pieces,” with both airplane debris and bodies falling from the sky. One TWA passenger was sucked into an engine of the DC-8. Narrowly missing a housing development, what was left of TWA plane and its occupants (along with the engine and wing debris from the United jet) fell onto the vacant airfield, recently abandoned by the Army (it is now part of the Gateway National Park). Local residents rushed to the scene and began pulling bodies from the flaming wreckage until rescue workers and soldiers arrived. Pillar of Fire While the tragedy was over for the TWA passengers and crew, the terrible events awaiting those on the United flight and residents of Park Slope were still unfolding. Losing altitude, the crippled DC-8, which was missing its right engine and part of the right wing, managed to continue northeast in the direction of LaGuardia airport and towards Prospect Park, where witnesses speculated that the pilot was attempting to make an emergency landing. Slope residents first saw the plane heading directly for St. Augustine’s Academy on Sterling Place below Sixth Avenue, with over a hundred students in class, when it was able to bank to the right. After barely clearing the school, the jet lost altitude above Sterling Place between Sixth and Seventh avenues. At an estimated speed of 200 mph, the plane’s right wing struck the roof of a brownstone at 126 Sterling Place, causing the fuselage of the plane to veer to the left and crash directly, with tragic irony, into Pillar of Fire Church across the street. The aircraft and the church exploded in flames, killing dozens of passengers and Wallace E. Lewis, the church’s 90-year-old caretaker, as he lay in bed. The left wing, now on fire, sheared into an apartment building next door to the church, while another section of the cabin, filled with screaming passengers, crashed into McCaddin’s Funeral Home on the corner of Seventh Avenue and Sterling Place. The severed tail section, mostly intact, fell upright into the intersection of Seventh Avenue and Sterling Place. Several buildings were totally destroyed and at least ten were damaged. For those on the ground, the scene was as if taken from a horror movie. Interviewed by a reporter from The New York Times, a Mr. Manza said, “All of a sudden, the right wing dipped: It hooked into the corner of the apartment house [122 Sterling Place], and the rest of the plane skimmed into the church and the apartment house across the street. All at once everything was on fire, and the fire from the plane in the street was as high as the houses.” Mrs. Robert Nevin lived at 122, and was in her nightgown standing in the front room of her top floor apartment doing her hair when she heard a shattering crash. “The roof caved in and I saw the sky.” Henry and Pauline McCaddin, owners of the McCaddin Funeral Home, were enjoying a mid-morning cup of coffee in their second-floor kitchen while their one-year-old daughter played under the table. Ms. McCaddin reported, “We were having our coffee and I said to Henry, ‘My goodness, that plane sounds awfully low!’ And just then the whole house shook like it had been hit by a bomb, and the room was all in flames.” The McCaddins escaped with the help of Robert Carter, owner of a hairdressing establishment on Seventh Avenue, who ran into the burning building to rescue them. A burning section of the plane’s left wing landed on top of 124 Sterling Place, and soon a fire spread to the roofs of numbers 122, 120 and 118. The jet also set fire to six buildings on Seventh Avenue, including numbers 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 28. Repairs can still be seen on the upper floors of many of these buildings. The crash scene was described by reporters as “an orderly kind of pandemonium,” with screaming residents rushing from their shattered buildings into the snow, sirens wailing, emergency radios crackling, and firefighters spraying water on the flaming wreckage. Members of Fire Department Rescue Company No. 2 worked continuously for almost 72 hours at the crash scene, deploying their specialized equipment to both combat the fire and search through the wreckage for bodies. In addition to chunks of airplane and brick, the debris included broken dolls and wrapped presents destined as Christmas gifts, as well as mailbags bulging with holiday cards. In addition to Mr. Lewis, five people on the ground were killed. The unlucky five were Charles Cooper, a sanitation worker who was shoveling snow, Joseph Colacano and John Opperisano, who were selling Christmas trees on the sidewalk, Dr. Jacob L. Crooks, who was out walking his dog, and an employee at a butcher shop located on Sterling Place. About a dozen others were injured, including several firefighters and residents of neighborhood buildings. The Brave Little Boy All of the occupants of the DC-8 were killed instantly, except Stephen Baltz, an 11-year old redhead from Wilmette, Illinois, who planned to spend Christmas with relatives in Yonkers. His father delivered him to O’Hare that morning, and he was to meet his mother and sister at Idlewild; they had flown in the day before. As the plane hit the ground and exploded in flames, Stephen was thrown from the tail section and onto a snowbank, where residents rolled him in the snow to put out his burning clothing. Though conscious and repeatedly calling for his mother and father, Stephen had inhaled flames and smoke, and also sustained severe burns and broken bones. Dorothy M. Fletcher, who lived at 143 Berkeley Place, rushed to Stephen’s side. Knowing that he was in shock, she called on neighbors to throw down some blankets, and was photographed in a leopard-patterned coat holding an umbrella over the boy to shield him from the falling snow. The photo appeared on the front pages of both the New York Times and the Daily News the following morning. It was Ms. Fletcher who brought Stephen to Methodist Hospital. (See sidebar interview.) Still conscious after his ordeal, Stephen Baltz later described the crash to doctors at the hospital. “I remember looking out the plane window at the snow below covering the city. It looked like a picture out of a fairy book. Then all of a sudden there was an explosion. The plane started to fall and people started to scream. I held on to my seat and then the plane crashed. That’s all I remember until I woke up.” Newspaper reports said that people all over the country prayed for Stephen, whose courage and sweet disposition won the hearts of everyone who met him. In spite of heroic efforts by doctors and nurses at Methodist, Stephen Baltz died peacefully at 1 o’clock the following afternoon, his mother and father by his side. A small bronze memorial to the crash victims containing the boy’s blackened pocket change-65 cents-was set up at the hospital, where Ms. Fletcher places flowers on the Sunday closest to the anniversary of Stephen’s death. (The memorial is now in storage, to be reinstalled after new construction at the hospital is complete). Recalling the event recently, the 91-year-old great-grandmother said, “What broke my heart was when he asked me if he was going to die. I couldn’t do all I wanted to do. I couldn’t save him.” Cause and Responsibility Faced with the biggest air disaster in American history, the Civil Aeronautics Board (now the National Transportation Safety Board) undertook an extensive investigation into the causes of the crash and made recommendations so that similar events never happened again. On June 18, 1962-about a year and a half after the crash-the CAB released its report, which stated that the probable cause of the accident was that United 826 proceeded beyond the clearance limit allocated by Air Traffic Control, with contributing factors including a high rate of speed and a change of clearance which reduced the en route distance by approximately 11 miles. Critics of the report called it a whitewash designed to prevent lawsuits resulting in punitive damages not covered by the airlines’ insurance. In an updated edition of Unfriendly Skies: Revelations of a Deregulated Airline Pilot, by “Captain X” and Reynolds Dodson (Doubleday, 1989), the authors wrote that FAA inspectors had previously complained that the United Airlines training program was dangerously unsatisfactory, that many crew members were denied training, and that United routinely falsified air safety records. Those who were critical of airline policy and government collusion were often transferred. “FAA inspectors who discovered serious fraud relating to violations of the government air safety requirements were blocked from taking corrective actions. Obstructing compliance with the air safety laws were FAA and United Airlines officials, and pressure from members of Congress.” Documentation related to these earlier charges were suppressed from the CAB report. Overall, verdicts concerning the lawsuits (which exceeded $300 million) stipulated that United was responsible for 61 percent of the claims, Trans World Airlines 15 percent, and the U.S. government 24 percent, because the planes’ instrument landing approaches were being guided by FAA controllers. In addition to the families of the deceased passengers and crew, local residents received settlements from United Airlines, some of which were considered unsatisfactory. Mr. And Mrs. Andrew Boyle, who owned a brownstone at 130 Sterling Place, received $3,700 in compensation, less $900 in lawyers’ fees. In an interview with the New York Times four months after the crash, Mrs. Boyle said, “We settled for peanuts. We’ll be in debt for the next ten years over that crash.” One woman told a different story. Her husband was also given a settlement of several thousand dollars, and the windfall (remember that $3000 went a lot farther in 1960 than it does today) caused him to go on a spending spree. “He went haywire with it-bought a television set, snappy clothes. Then he took off with the rest. He hasn’t been around for two months.” The four-story building containing the McCaddin Funeral Home was demolished and was soon replaced with a nondescript one-story building; it is now the site of a new multi-story construction that will contain both commercial and living space. While other families eventually moved back to the site of the crash, others simply left the area. Jimmy Moy, who owned a laundry on the parlor floor at 26 Seventh Avenue, decided to move to Manhattan. The vacant lot on which the building housing his laundry once stood is now also the site of new construction. Saving the Neighborhood In his article in Brooklyn Heights Paper, Joe Ferris addressed the danger the neighborhood faced after the crash: the government’s answer to dealing with damaged buildings in an already declining neighborhood was urban renewal: level the area and construct high-rise housing projects. This threat was a wake-up call for many local residents. Though many worked to save the neighborhood, Ferris cited a number of community leaders who helped save Park Slope at that critical time: Robert Makla, who helped found the Park Slope Civic Council; Irene Wilson, publisher of the monthly Park Slope Civic Council News; Evelyn and Everett Ortner, founders of the Brownstone Revival Movement and who helped secure landmark status for many local buildings; Herb Steiner, whose organization helped force the banks to stop redlining urban neighborhoods; and George Lovgren, who saved a local firehouse from closing. Today, the area around Seventh Avenue and Sterling Place is one of the most vital in the neighborhood. Though scars from the crash still can be seen on some of the buildings and a vacant lot remains where Pillar of Fire Church and an apartment house once stood on Sterling Place, few would recognize the quiet intersection as a scene of the nation’s worst aircraft disaster. With each new family that moves to Park Slope, the memory of the crash fades from the neighborhood’s collective consciousness. Yet the memories remain for many of the neighborhood’s long-time residents. Dorothy Fletcher, recalling the events over coffee at a neighborhood restaurant, said, “The crash remains so vivid in my mind. It’s like it happened just this morning.” PSR http://history1900s.about.com/od/1940s/a/empirecrash.htm The Plane That Crashed Into the Empire State Building On the foggy morning of Saturday, July 28, 1945, Lt. Colonel William Smith was piloting a U.S. Army B-25 bomber through New York City. He was on his way to Newark Airport to pick up his commanding officer, but for some reason he showed up over LaGuardia Airport and asked for a weather report. Because of the poor visibility, the LaGuardia tower wanted to him to land, but Smith requested and received permission from the military to continue on to Newark. The last transmission from the LaGuardia tower to the plane was a foreboding warning: "From where I'm sitting, I can't see the top of the Empire State Building." Avoiding Skyscrapers Confronted with dense fog, Smith dropped the bomber low to regain visibility, where he found himself in the middle of Manhattan, surrounded by skyscrapers. At first, the bomber was headed directly for the New York Central Building but at the last minute, Smith was able to bank west and miss it. Unfortunately, this put him in line for another skyscraper. Smith managed to miss several skyscrapers until he was headed for the Empire State Building. At the last minute, Smith tried to get the bomber to climb and twist away, but it was too late. The Crash At 9:49 a.m., the ten-ton, B-25 bomber smashed into the north side of the Empire State Building. The majority of the plane hit the 79th floor, creating a hole in the building eighteen feet wide and twenty feet high. The plane's high-octane fuel exploded, hurtling flames down the side of the building and inside through hallways and stairwells all the way down to the 75th floor. World War II had caused many to shift to a six-day work week; thus there were many people at work in the Empire State Building that Saturday. The plane crashed into the offices of the War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Catherine O'Connor described the crash: Joe Fountain died several days later. Eleven of the office workers were burned to death, some still sitting at their desks, others while trying to run from the flames. One of the engines and part of the landing gear hurtled across the 79th floor, through wall partitions and two fire walls, and out the south wall's windows to fall onto a twelve-story building across 33rd Street. The other engine flew into an elevator shaft and landed on an elevator car. The car began to plummet, slowed somewhat by emergency safety devices. Miraculously, when help arrived at the remains of the elevator car in the basement, the two women inside the car were still alive. Some debris from the crash fell to the streets below, sending pedestrians scurrying for cover, but most fell onto the buildings setbacks at the fifth floor. Still, a bulk of the wreckage remained stuck in the side of the building. After the flames were extinguished and the remains of the victims removed, the rest of the wreckage was removed through the building. The plane crash killed 14 people (11 office workers and the three crewmen) plus injured 26 others. Though the integrity of the Empire State Building was not affected, the cost of the damage done by the crash was $1 million.
BAC, you're doing a great job of wasting everyone's time with your hair splitting trivia - drawing energy away from the important truth. The fact of the matter is that a stopwatch says that the WTC buildings were brought down with controlled demolition, add the corroborating video captures and witness testimony. That's all that's important, here. The forum deserves much more than you and your damned spamming!
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest After the 1993 car bomb explosion destroyed columns in the North Tower, John Skilling, the head structural engineer for the Twin Towers, was asked about an airplane strike. He explained that the Twin Towers were originally designed to withstand the impact of a Boeing 707 (similar in size to the Boeing 767).
He went on to say that there would be a horrendous fire from the jet fuel, but “the building structure would still be there.”
The 10,000 gallons of jet fuel (half capacity) in each jetliner did cause horrendous fires over several floors, but it would not cause the steel members to melt or even lose sufficient strength to cause a collapse.
This is because the short-duration jet fuel fires and office combustible fires cannot create (or transmit to the steel) temperatures hot enough.
If a structural steel building could collapse because of fire, it would do so slowly as the various steel members gradually relinquished their structural strength.
However, in the 100-year history of structural-steel framed buildings, there is no evidence of any structural steel framed building having collapsed because of fire.
Let’s assume the unlikelihood that these fires could weaken all of the columns to the same degree of heat intensity and thus remove their structural strength equally over the entire floor,
The interesting fact is that each of these 110-story Twin Towers fell upon itself in about ten seconds at nearly free-fall speed.
Contrary to the sudden collapse of the Twin Towers and Building #7
The buildings had no pools of molten metal (a byproduct of explosives) at the base of their elevator shafts.
only explosives will pulverize concrete into a fine dust cloud
William Rice, P.E., is a registered professional civil engineer who worked on structural steel (and concrete) buildings in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. He was also a professor at Vermont Technical College where he taught engineering materials, structures lab, and other building related courses.
#15. To: BeAChooser, Minerva, Paul Revere, tom007, SKYDRIFTER, Critter (#1)
To fulfill all the functional, aesthetic, and economic desires for this concent, innovative archetecture was needed, In 1962, the firm of Minoru Yamasaki & Associates was hired to perform the architectural desighn which was first unveiled in 1964. The team also involved Emory Roth & Sons, P.C., as the architect of record. The structural engineering was by Worthington, Skilling, Helle and Christiansen. (Some time after completion of the construction, Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, and Robertson, and then Leslie E. Robertson Associates (LERA) assumed that role.)
Skilling and his team rose to the challenge of providing the required load capacity within Yamasaki's design concept. They incorporated an innovative framed-tube concept for the structural system.
A three-page white paper, dated February 3, 1964, described its findings: “The buildings have been investigated and found to be safe in an assumed collision with a large jet airliner (Boeing 707—DC 8) traveling at 600 miles per hour. Analysis indicates that such collision would result in only local damage which could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building and would not endanger the lives and safety of occupants not in the immediate area of impact.”
In the wake of the WTC bombing, the Seattle Times interviews John Skilling who was one of the two structural engineers responsible for designing the Trade Center. Skilling recounts his people having carried out an analysis which found the Twin Towers could withstand the impact of a Boeing 707. He says, “Our analysis indicated the biggest problem would be the fact that all the fuel (from the airplane) would dump into the building. There would be a horrendous fire. A lot of people would be killed.” But, he says, “The building structure would still be there.” [Seattle Times, 2/27/1993]
#18. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#15)
[BAC] First of all John Skilling was NOT the head structural engineer for the WTC towers. Leslie Robertson is the head structural engineer of record. He was the one who moved to New York to do the design. Mr Skilling remained in Seattle.
As usual, BAC's source is missing. My source is not.
NIST Report, Chapter 1, page 1, paragraph 1.1, reads in relevant part:
NIST Report, Chapter 1, page 6, reads in relevant part:
[BAC] did Mr Rice fail to note the difference in the speed of the planes assumed in the design and the ones that hit the towers? That difference corresponds to a factor of 7 (or more) difference in the impact energy of the planes.
BAC, exactly how much in excess of 600 mph did you determine that the planes were moving when they struck the towers?
A three-page white paper, dated February 3, 1964, described its findings: “The buildings have been investigated and found to be safe in an assumed collision with a large jet airliner (Boeing 707—DC 8) traveling at 600 miles per hour.
[BAC] He went on to say that there would be a horrendous fire from the jet fuel, but “the building structure would still be there.”
There was NO consideration of fire after the plane impact in the design. Leslie Robertson stated that fire resulting from a plane impact was NOT considered in the design. If Mr Rice thinks otherwise, he is wrong.
He says, “Our analysis indicated the biggest problem would be the fact that all the fuel (from the airplane) would dump into the building. There would be a horrendous fire. A lot of people would be killed.” But, he says, “The building structure would still be there.” [Seattle Times, 2/27/1993]
[BAC] The 10,000 gallons of jet fuel (half capacity) in each jetliner did cause horrendous fires over several floors, but it would not cause the steel members to melt or even lose sufficient strength to cause a collapse.
Melting of steel is not the theory of NIST.
Melting steel happened.
#28. To: BeAChooser (#18)
This was a back of the envelope calculation done AFTER the design was complete.
Buildings are not designed to withstand the impacts of fuel laden commercial airliners. However, in the case of the World Trade Center, it was a consideration. The structural safety of the towers in an aircraft collision was considered in the original design.
#34. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#28)
"This was a back of the envelope calculation done AFTER the design was complete."
It is a White Paper from 1964. Groundbreaking occurred two years later in 1966.
#36. To: BeAChooser (#34)
Yamasaki's design for the World Trade Center was unveiled to the public on January 18, 1964, with an eight-foot model.[27]
http://911research.wtc7.net/mirrors/guardian2/wtc/eng-news-record.htm
#38. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#36)
"Yamasaki's design for the World Trade Center was unveiled to the public on January 18, 1964, with an eight-foot model.[27]"
[BAC] - So there is NO POSSIBLE WAY that any White Paper from 1964 affected the DESIGN.
Yamasaki was the architect. He did not do the engineering.
The design of the building did not end with the display of an 8-foot model.
The concept was explained to the New York Architectural League by John Skilling, a partner in Worthington, Skilling, Helle and Jackson, of Seattle, consulting structural engineers on the World Trade Center (see p. 124).
April 2, 1964
#39. To: BeAChooser (#38)
http://tinyurl.com/2vm8fu
The New York Times, Sunday Edition
September 8, 2002
The Height of Ambition: Part Four
By JAMES GLANZ and ERIC LIPTON
#45. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#39)
In your idiocy, you asserted that prior to the White Paper in 1964, the design had been COMPLETED.
Referring to the White Paper of February 3, 1964, you blathered at #18, "This was a back of the envelope calculation done AFTER the design was complete."
AFTER 1964, Robertson's original engineering design plan had to be scrapped because tests in 1965 showed the buildings would sway beyond the limits of human tolerance. As Glanz and Lipton wrote in the New York Times, "Even today, Robertson has no trouble conjuring what two towers full of seasick office workers would have meant: 'A billion dollars right down the tube.' So he went back to work."
What he did not take into account was the extraordinary conditions of an intense, violent fire. Girders and beams would be far superior under those circumstances. Thin steel elements heat up and soften faster than thick ones.
They chose not to use thick masonry or cement to encase the three escape stairways in each tower but rather light sheets of gypsum. Although the gypsum was extremely resistant to fire, and less likely than masonry to crack when the building swayed in the wind, it would work only if it remained intact -- and it was much more susceptible to being shaken loose or damaged by an explosion or any other kind of unexpected impact.
Wind-tunnel experiments in Fort Collins, Colo., confirmed that Robertson's initial design would sway far beyond those human tolerances,
Still, he recalls that he addressed the question of an airplane collision, if only to satisfy his engineer's curiosity. For whatever reason, Robertson took the time to calculate how well his towers would handle the impact from a Boeing 707, the largest jetliner in service at the time. He says that his calculations assumed a plane lost in a fog while searching for an airport at relatively low speed, like the B-25 bomber. He concluded that the towers would remain standing despite the force of the impact and the hole it would punch out.
The new technologies he had installed after the motion experiments and wind-tunnel work had created a structure more than strong enough to withstand such a blow.
Robertson's assertion of being unaware of the Wein ad and the political battle is not credible. Perhaps Robertson performed only an imaginary study consisting of nothing more than some propaganda released to the press, or he blew smoke at the architect.
#49. To: BeAChooser (#45)
If you want to claim that no study of the tower's resistance to aircraft impact was performed, that's ok with me. Because I thought it is the CT community that insists the towers were DESIGNED to survive multiple high speed plane crashes.
#51. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#49)
They claimed that the building would withstand a hit by a Boeing 707 at 600 mph.
Maybe they lied,
or maybe they actually designed the WTC to sustain a hit by the largest jetliner then in the sky going at 600 mph.
#82. To: BeAChooser (#51)
Maybe they lied, or maybe they actually designed the WTC to sustain a hit by the largest jetliner then in the sky going at 600 mph.
----- Maybe they lied,
Maybe they lied, or maybe they actually designed the WTC to sustain a hit by the largest jetliner then in the sky going at 600 mph.
Read again my statement, and what you quoted of it, and then your preposterous response. They [Lawrence Wein, then owner of the Empire State Building, and committee] ran a nearly full-page ad in The Times with an artist's rendition of a commercial airliner about to ram one of the towers. "Unfortunately, we rarely recognize how serious these problems are until it's too late to do anything," the caption said.
Robertson's story is less convincing than an Alberto Gonzales performance.
But when the towers were built, the people were publicly assured, in the New York Times, that Robertson's study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 mph... much as they would later be assured that the air atop Robertson's Rubble, at ground zero, did not pose a health hazard.
#84. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#82)
maybe they actually designed the WTC to sustain a hit by the largest jetliner then in the sky going at 600 mph.
Robertson says he never saw the ad but just out of his engineer's curiosity calculated that the towers would handle the impace from a Boeing 707, the largest jetliner then in service.
* A prominent story appears in the New York Times explains that Robertson's study proved that the towers could withstand the impact of a jetliner moving at 600 miles an hour.
* When the towers are hit by a plane and fall to the ground, Robertson says he cannot find a copy of his precious report.
* The director of Robertson's computer department has no recollection of any such study.
* The dog ate his homework.
#86. To: BeAChooser (#84)
"7. The design has been reviewed by some of the most knowledgeable people in the construction industry. In a letter to John Skilling, the Structural Engineer for the World Trade Center, the Chief Engineer of the American Division of U.S. Steel Corporation said: ...."
#87. To: nolu_chan, ALL (#86)
"SKILLING's White Paper says "the buildings have been investigated." It does not say SKILLING performed the investigation."
SKILLING's White Paper says "Analysis indicates...." It does not say SKILLING performed the analysis.
The New York Times report, sourced to an architect working on the WTC, attributes the study to ROBERTSON.
ROBERTSON now claims he cannot find the ROBERTSON study analysis report.
#106. To: BeAChooser (#87)
It's been 40 years. Do you keep everything you've ever written, Nolu? Really?
#109. To: RickyJ, ALL (#106)
"It's been 40 years. Do you keep everything you've ever written, Nolu? Really?"
For such a project it is mandatory BAC.
#112. To: BeAChooser, RickyJ (#109)
Now for New York the statute of limitations/repose on product liability is 3 years, however, personal injury cases currently have an indefinite liability in that for three years after an injury the building builder/owners can be sued. However, that has been successfully contested in court cases recently and architects in New York are currently trying to get a maximum 10 year repose statute passed for personal liability cases.
#113. To: nolu_chan, RickyJ (#112)
BAC does not believe the claim of the Port authority architect
cited as a source for the NYT article, which just happens to be corroborated
by the White Paper of Project Manager Robertson's boss, Chief Engineer John
Skilling.
However, BAC believes
that Robertson did a study and the dog ate it.
"So do commercial jets fly
at 600 mph at a 1000 feet altitude ANYTIME they are flying"
So do commercial jets fly at any speed at 1000 feet over
Manhattan? Or possibly into Manhattan. Hmmmmmmm????
After all, you are the
one claiming that Robertson did not consider a jetliner's cruising speed, but
that he was considering a jetliner at slow speed coming in for a landing so he
can go take a physical at 90 Church Street or something.
You do not seriously purport that there is a product liability
issue, do you?
#114. To: BeAChooser, RickyJ (#113)
#115. To: nolu_chan, RickyJ (#114)
BeAChooser - But at least it appears you've now dispensed with
the claim they were "designed" rather than just analyzed after the fact. And
that they were designed to survive the fires from a plane crash. Or do you
wish to contest that further? ROTFLOL!
Before the building was built, the PANYNJ and the public were assured
1964 is before the buildings were built.
Counselor, you do not know what you are talking about. All
cases brought in court will use a theory of NEGLIGENCE.
#117. To: BeAChooser (#115)
I suggest you look up the term "statue of repose".
#128. To: bluedogtxn, BeAChooser (#117)
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/Thurm-F02.htm
Statute of Repose. "Statutes of limitations" extinguish, after period of time, right to prosecute accrued cause of action; "statute of repose," by contrast, limits potential liability by limiting time during which cause of action can arise. Kline v. J.I. Case Co., D.C.Ill., 520 F.Supp. 564, 567. It is distinguishable from statute of limitations, in that statute of repose cuts off right of action after specified time measured from delivery of product or completion of work, regardless of time of accrual of cause of action or of notice of invasion of legal rights. Universal Engineering Corp. v. Perez, Fla., 451 So.2d 463, 465.
http://www.nspe.org/liability/in2-repos.asp
Statute of Repose Model
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/Thurm-F02.htm
#129. To: nolu_chan, RickyJ, ALL (#128)
After a specified period of time following construction, the statute of repose will cut off a cause of action against an architect or engineer for product liability.
THAT is WHY the actions regarding the WTC will not be brought against the architect or engineer for product liability. I suggest that beachy read about the statute of repose and learn why his purported cause of action is impossible.
#131. To: BeAChooser, bluedogtxn, RickyJ, THE SKYDRIFTER, christine, robin (#129)
#140. To: nolu_chan, RickyJ, ALL (#131)
For my part, I would presume that the design calculations, if any existed, would have been retained by the corporate entity and not by the employee of the corporate entity. It may be that that particular corporate entity no longer exists.
[BAC-side #129] Say ... I notice he's left the thread. Wonder why?
RickyJ posted on 4/22 (#55) and on 4/24 (#102 #106 #107 #108).
Let us review to remind you how you got this started.
-----
[nc #86] ROBERTSON now claims he cannot find the ROBERTSON study analysis report.
-----
[BAC-side #87] It's been 40 years. Do you keep everything you've ever written, Nolu? Really?
-----
[nc #101] Had I done an analysis 40 years ago proving that the WTC, the most important project of my lifetime, could withstand a hit by a Boeing 707 traveling at 600 mph,
Replies to Comment # 140. [BAC]
The plane exploded within the building. There were five or six seconds - I was tottering on my feet trying to keep my balance - and three-quarters of the office was instantaneously consumed in this sheet of flame. One man was standing inside the flame. I could see him. It was a co-worker, Joe Fountain. His whole body was on fire. I kept calling to him, "Come on, Joe; come on, Joe." He walked out of it.
#146. To: beachooser, Christine, Jethro Tull, nolu_chan, Robin, Minerva, Honway, Aristeides, Red Jones, Diana, Kamala, All (#140)
End Trace Mode for Comment # 140.