There were five emergency power systems in WTC 7. Three of them (American Express, OEM, U.S. Secret Service) drew fuel from the other two and larger systems (Salomon Smith Barney, Silverstein Properties). (1c), (8)
The emergency power for the building (Silverstein Properties) was provided by two 900 kW generators on the southwest corner of Floor 5. They drew fuel from a 275 gallon tank nearby, and this was replenished by pumps drawing from two 12,000 gallon tanks at ground level under the loading dock, at the southwest corner of the building.
The SSB emergency power system used nine 1,725 kW generators on Floor 5: three in the southwest corner, two near the west end of the north face, four at the east end of the north face. Louvers for air intake and exhaust were situated on the building faces near the generators. Because there was already a 275 gallon "day tank" on this floor, the SSB system pumped on demand from their own pair of 6,000 gallon storage tanks, also situated under the loading dock, under the southwestern part of the building.
The fuel supplier was contracted to keep the tanks full, and they were full that day.
Fuel pipes for all systems except SSB ran up the western side of the core of the building, along elevator shafts. The SSB pipes ran up a shaft through mechanical spaces near the southwest corner of the building.
Kindling
After 1 p.m. on September 11, 2001, WTC 7 was an evacuated, stricken building. The southwest corner and central third of the south face had been ripped open by the cascading debris from the collapse of WTC 1. Fires burned in sections of Floors 6 through 30 at different times, and they migrated along their floors independently, seeking new sources of fuel. From the street the fires on Floors 11 and 12 appeared most intense. Many fires in the area went unchecked because utility power for electrical pumps, and water pressure for fire engines had either diminished or been lost.
This is what happened.
A Pumped Oil Spill
The debris fall ripping into the southwest corner ruptured the oil pipes of the SSB pressurized fuel distribution system. Operating as intended -- the lack of utility power triggering the "need", and the lack of pressure due to a severed pipe signaling the "demand", the SSB system pumped oil up from its 12,000 gallon basement reservoir, maximally with a pressure of 50 psi (pounds per square inch) and flow rate of 75 gpm (gallons per minute), onto Floor 5.
Pumping would have started at 9:59 a.m., when Con Ed cut utility power to WTC 7; and the spilling would have started a half hour later when the pressurized pipe was cut. The SSB pumps could have drained the two 6,000 gallon tanks in 2 hours and 40 minutes. Engineers from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation found that "there was a maximum loss of 12,000 gallons of diesel from two underground storage tanks registered as 7WTC." (10)
Additionally, "Both tanks were found to be damaged by debris and empty several months after the collapse. Some fuel contamination was found in the gravel below the tanks and the sand below the slab on which the tanks were mounted, but no contamination was found in the organic marine silt/clay layer underneath." (7)
By contrast, 20,000 gallons of oil was recovered from the two 12,000 gallon tanks of Silverstein Properties. (10)
Pulled up by the emergency pumps, the SSB diesel fuel went , from the 6,000 gallon storage tanks, under the loading dock, under the southwestern part of the building, to floor 5.
It may all have been pumped out by 1 p.m., or it may have been pumped out at a rate as low as 29 gpm for 7 hours. Since this fuel was absent from the wreckage, it was burned. You can see it as the huge plume of black smoke rising from the World Trade Center, in panoramic photographs of that day. Diesel fuel can supply 2.13 MW of power per gpm given an air supply of 1333 cfm (cubic feet per minute). (11)
Thus, a diesel fuel gusher of 75 gpm burning with excess air would produce 160 MW of heat; a total energy of 1536 GJ for the 12,000 gallons. This energy is equivalent to that released by an explosion of 367 tons of TNT. If the pumping rate is lower, or the air supply is throttled, then the burning would occur at a lower rate. Since the louver system along Floor 5 was designed to supply each of the nine SSB engines with 80,000 cfm, it seems likely that a fuel oil fire there would find sufficient air for combustion.
For a discussion of heat at 9/11, and energy units, CounterPunchers will soon be able to have my study, "the Thermodynamics of 9/11", to be published shortly on the CounterPunch website as part of our final package on the actual physics and engineering realities of the collapse of the WTC buildings.
Pulled up by the emergency pumps, the SSB diesel fuel went , from the 6,000 gallon storage tanks, under the loading dock, under the southwestern part of the building, to floor 5.
The problem with your theory is the diesel fuel tanks were underground below the loading dock and on the ground floor. No fires were reported in these locations.
The tanks were below. However the generators they supplied were on the 5th floor. Therefore pressurized fuel lines were necessary.
Furthermore the 5th floor had "louvers" to insure an adequate supply of air to the generators.
Since these systems are designed to start automatically when power fails, the pumps started the minute the building's elecricity went off. The pressurized fuel fed the fires along the path(s) of the fuel lines wherever they were ruptured.
What's so special about floors 1-5 that there were fires elsewhere but not on those floors?
And if I do show there were fires on those floors are you going to admit you've been rebutted, or are you going to come up with some other explanation that they weren't important?
The fuel lines described in your reply did not extend above floor five.
That is correct. And also, if there were no fires below Floor 6 then this theory is not viable.
So it should be fairly easy to prove or disprove this hypothesis. If it can be demonstrated there were no fires below Floor 6, I will not put forth any further argument.
However, I'm fairly certain that there were fires everywhere both above and below Floor 5. So I will do some checking and get back to you.
That is correct. And also, if there were no fires below Floor 6 then this theory is not viable.
So it should be fairly easy to prove or disprove this hypothesis. If it can be demonstrated there were no fires below Floor 6, I will not put forth any further argument.
While it is not proof of the absence of fires not seen, NIST reported as follows:
Photographs and videos were used to determine fire locations and movement within WTC 7. Most of the available information is for the north and east faces of WTC 7. Information about fires in other areas of the building was obtained from interviews, and is summarized as follows:
From 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.:
No diesel smells reported from the exterior, stairwells, or lobby areas
No signs of fire or smoke were reported below the 6th Floor from the exterior, stairwells or lobby areas
In the east stairwell, smoke was observed around Floors 19 or 20, and a signs of a fully involved fire on the south side of Floor 23 were heard/seen/smelled from Floor 22.
Interviews place a fire on Floor 7 at the west wall, toward the south side, at approximately 12:15 p.m.
No diesel smells reported from the exterior, stairwells, or lobby
No signs of fire or smoke below floor 6 from stairwell and lobby areas
Fire reported at west wall of floor 7 around 12:15 pm
In east stairwell, smoke was observed near floors 19-20; signs of a fire observed on floor 23
Looking from southwest corner to the south face
Fire in SW corner near floors 10 or 11
Fire on floors 6, 7, 8, 21, 30
Multiple fires observed on floors numbered 20’s and 30’s
Heavy black smoke coming out of south face gash; no fire observed
Looking from southeast corner to the south face
Fire on floor 12; [1] area above covered with smoke
Fire on floors 11-12 [1] moved to east face and progressed to the north
[1] fires reported on floor 14, but photographs showed east face fires on floor
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Observed Fires
East Face Fires on Floors 11-12 near 2 PM
Fires in WTC 7 -- which began soon after WTC 1 collapsed -- were observed on Floors 7, 8, 9, and 11 near the middle about half an hour before collapse; Floor 12 was burned out by this time.
Fires were also seen on Floors 12, 13, 22, 29, and 30 at various times during the day.
Fire in SW corner near floors 10 or 11 Fire on floors 6, 7, 8, 21, 30 Multiple fires observed on floors numbered 20’s and 30’s Heavy black smoke coming out of south face gash; no fire observed
I believe the south face gash is where Manuel Garcia, who came up with this theory of the collapse, believes the smoke from the burning diesel fuel was exiting the building.
I believe the south face gash is where Manuel Garcia, who came up with this theory of the collapse, believes the smoke from the burning diesel fuel was exiting the building.
No diesel smells reported from the exterior, stairwells, or lobby
The theory purports that diesel fuel was being pumped out of a compromised fuel line from about the time that WTC-1 fell.
The lack of any observed smell of diesel fuel argues against there being thousands of gallons of diesel sloshing around on the floor to ignite hours later.
Having warned the Port Authority in 1998 and 1999 about the diesel tank, the FDNY was clearly aware of its existence and danger.
December 20, 2001 A NATION CHALLENGED: THE TRADE CENTER; City Had Been Warned of Fuel Tank at 7 World Trade Center By JAMES GLANZ AND ERIC LIPTON
Fire Department officials warned the city and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey in 1998 and 1999 that a giant diesel fuel tank for the mayor's $13 million command bunker in 7 World Trade Center, a 47-story high-rise that burned and collapsed on Sept. 11, posed a hazard and was not consistent with city fire codes.
The 6,000-gallon tank was positioned about 15 feet above the ground floor and near several lobby elevators and was meant to fuel generators that would supply electricity to the 23rd-floor bunker in the event of a power failure. Although the city made some design changes to address the concerns -- moving a fuel pipe that would have run from the tank up an elevator shaft, for example -- it left the tank in place.
But the Fire Department repeatedly warned that a tank in that position could spread fumes throughout the building if it leaked, or, if it caught fire, could produce what one Fire Department memorandum called "disaster."
Putting a tank underground typically protects it from falling debris, and impedes leaks or tank fires from spreading throughout the building.
Engineering experts have spent three months trying to determine why 7 World Trade Center, part of the downtown complex that included the 110-story towers, collapsed about seven hours after being damaged and set on fire by debris from the damaged landmark buildings.
Some of the experts, who said that no major skyscraper had ever collapsed simply because of fire damage, have recently been examining whether the diesel tanks -- there were others beneath ground level -- played an important role in the building's stunning demise.
The Port Authority, which owns the land on which the building stood and issued the building permit for the tank and its fireproof enclosure, said yesterday that it believed the structure had in fact met the terms of the city's fire code. Though the tank was on a tall fireproof pedestal, it was still effectively on the lowest floor of the building, as the code requires, said Frank Lombardi, the Port Authority's chief engineer.
The authority also worked with Fire Department officials to eliminate the department's original objections, Mr. Lombardi said.
"We made sure that it was in agreement with the code," Mr. Lombardi said, adding that the tank was placed in an eight-inch-thick masonry enclosure.
A spokesman for the Fire Department said yesterday that he could not authoritatively say whether all the concerns of its officials had been addressed by the Port Authority. But when reached yesterday, the department official who wrote several of the warning memorandums said he regarded the Port Authority's interpretation of the code to be "a stretch." The official, Battalion Chief William P. Blaich, said he still considered the tank's placement to have been unsafe.
The Port Authority has long held that, as a matter of law, it does not have to abide by city fire codes. But after the 1993 bombing of the towers, the Port Authority signed a memorandum of understanding with the city pledging to not only meet the city's fire codes, but also to often take additional precautions.
A spokesman for the city's office of emergency management, Francis E. McCarton, said the city accepted the Port Authority's determination that the tank and its placement were properly safe. He said it was essential that the mayor's command center have a backup energy source and placing it on ground floor was unacceptable because the area was deemed to be susceptible to floods.
"We put it in the area where we needed to put it," Mr. McCarton said. Any suggestion that the tank's position was a factor in the collapse of the building was ''pure speculation,'' he said.
He added that the tank had fire extinguishers and was surrounded by the thick, fire-resistant containment system, and that the fiery collapse of the towers could never have been anticipated in the city's planning.
No one is believed to have died in the collapse of 7 World Trade Center. But its collapse did further complicate the rescue and recovery efforts under way at the scene.
The engineering and fire experts who have been examining the collapse of 7 World Trade Center have not settled on the final cause of the disaster. But they have seen evidence of very high temperatures typical of fuel fires in the debris from the building and have raised questions about whether the diesel accounted for those conditions.
At least two firefighters who were at the scene, Deputy Chief James Jackson and Battalion Chief Blaich, said that the southwest corner of the building near the fuel tank was severely damaged, possibly by falling debris, and that the tank might have been breached.
Mr. Jackson said that about an hour before the building's collapse, heavy black smoke, consistent with a fuel fire of some sort, was coming from that part of the building.
The Port Authority said it was unlikely the heavy masonry surrounding the tank could have been breached, and its officials have raised the possibility that the two diesel tanks buried just below the ground floor of the building might have contributed to the fire. They have also asserted that structural damage from falling debris is a more likely culprit in the collapse.
Several fire experts said that, whatever the questions surrounding the city's code, installing giant fuel tanks above the occupied spaces of a building posed serious risks.