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Editorial See other Editorial Articles Title: The World After George W. Bush The world after George W. Bush July 22, 2007 PRESIDENT BUSH has hinted more than once that he expects to leave to his successor the task of ending America's military occupation of Iraq. His reasons for doing so may go beyond calculations about the time needed to establish security and a functioning government in Iraq, beyond a reluctance to enter history as a president who presided over the retreat from a lost war. Perhaps Bush senses that the change of direction required to cut the nation's losses in Iraq would expose the flagrant misconceptions on which his conduct of the Iraq war was based. If Bush were to accept the need to cut deals with Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as part of the price of containing the chaos in Iraq, he would be conceding that his grandiose notions of bestowing democracy on a key Arab country by force were delusional. Were a realistic exit strategy to be carried out on Bush's watch, it would become apparent -- while he was still in office -- that instead of implanting democracy in Iraq and conferring security on the oil-rich Gulf region, he has wrought almost the exact opposite. A pattern of disasters Bush called for a humble foreign policy as a candidate. But he and his advisers -- especially Vice President Dick Cheney -- believed from the start that America was so much stronger than all possible competitors that it need not be constrained from acting unilaterally whenever it saw the need. Bush has broken with predecessors of both parties, who sought security in strong alliances, support for the United Nations, diplomatic engagement with dangerous rivals, and respect for international treaties. And when deciding on fateful policies, Bush has often disdained to take into account the cultural and historical conditions specific to key countries. In practice, that attitude has resulted in one calamity after another: the breakout of Iranian influence, unnecessary tensions with Russia, Bush's refusal to demand a quick halt to last summer's war between Israel and Hezbollah, US disavowal of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Kyoto protocol, and six years of declining to stem the tide of extremism by actively seeking to broker a peace accord between Israelis and Palestinians. Clearly Iraq is Bush's greatest failure. Whether the many-sided conflicts raging there are the inevitable consequence of the US invasion or whether they stem from incoherent post-invasion policies, the result is the same: Sunni Arabs and Shi'ites are slaughtering each other. Al Qaeda in Iraq, an affiliate of Osama bin Laden's gang, is sending suicide bombers to blow up mosques and markets, police stations, and US vehicles. With jihadist partners, the group has declared an Islamic State of Iraq in the west of the country. Disparate Shi'ite militias, each with its own source of Iranian backing, are killing Sunnis and Americans and fighting each other for local dominance.Continued... A more dangerous world Bush will be leaving his successor a strategic situation, in a wide arc around Iraq, that is far more dangerous than the one he inherited. Iran and its ally of convenience, Syria, have their hands at the throat of Lebanon. Iran is projecting its power not only through Shi'ite Hezbollah in Lebanon but also through its support for Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. As Tehran pursues a nuclear weapons capability, frightened Sunni Arab states are considering problematic options: to develop their own nuclear capabilities or to reach accommodations with an ascendant Iran. Simultaneously, there has been an ominous decline in America's reputation throughout much of the Muslim world and even in Europe. The horrors of Abu Ghraib, the rendition of terrorist suspects to countries that torture, the lack of legal protections for captives in Guantanamo: These and other panicky reactions to the threat of terrorism have made American preaching about the rule of law seem hypocritical. Bush has played into the hands of propagandists who portray America as hostile to all Muslims or a threat to world peace. The result is a loss of soft power, the good will that inclines foreign states and populations to give America the benefit of the doubt. To cope with the strategic situation Bush will be leaving, his successor will have to disavow the false assumptions underlying many of his policies. On one key issue, Bush himself has actually begun to show the way -- by departing from Cheney's obtuse refusal to negotiate with North Korea. Originally, Bush and Cheney disdained Bill Clinton's 1994 deal with the North as appeasement. They criticized South Korea's "sunshine policy" of reconciliation with the North, refused to negotiate, and included that despotic regime in a purely rhetorical "axis of evil." And they watched as the North produced enough new plutonium for eight to 10 bombs. The false hope of regime change The lesson of North Korea should be that false premises produce failed policies. There never was any realistic prospect that regime change would annul the threat of nuclear weapons in the North. By the same token, regime change in Iraq -- particularly when accompanied by an abhorrence of nation-building -- could hardly establish a stable power balance in the Gulf region, the flourishing of democracy, the encirclement of Iran, or long-term security for oil supplies. And there is virtually no chance that regime change could be the way to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. In Iraq and elsewhere, Bush's successor will be called on to clean up a staggering mess. Above all, this will mean returning to the principles of US foreign policy as practiced by every other president since FDR. Particularly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Bush and his advisers presumed that this hoary old approach was no longer relevant. But the record shows that Bush has not succeeded in rewriting the rules of statecraft. Proceeding from false premises, he came to false conclusions. His successor, whether a Democrat or a Republican, will need to revive the internationalist traditions of his predecessors to clean up the mess he is leaving behind. A more dangerous world Bush will be leaving his successor a strategic situation, in a wide arc around Iraq, that is far more dangerous than the one he inherited. Iran and its ally of convenience, Syria, have their hands at the throat of Lebanon. Iran is projecting its power not only through Shi'ite Hezbollah in Lebanon but also through its support for Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. As Tehran pursues a nuclear weapons capability, frightened Sunni Arab states are considering problematic options: to develop their own nuclear capabilities or to reach accommodations with an ascendant Iran. Simultaneously, there has been an ominous decline in America's reputation throughout much of the Muslim world and even in Europe. The horrors of Abu Ghraib, the rendition of terrorist suspects to countries that torture, the lack of legal protections for captives in Guantanamo: These and other panicky reactions to the threat of terrorism have made American preaching about the rule of law seem hypocritical. Bush has played into the hands of propagandists who portray America as hostile to all Muslims or a threat to world peace. The result is a loss of soft power, the good will that inclines foreign states and populations to give America the benefit of the doubt. To cope with the strategic situation Bush will be leaving, his successor will have to disavow the false assumptions underlying many of his policies. On one key issue, Bush himself has actually begun to show the way -- by departing from Cheney's obtuse refusal to negotiate with North Korea. Originally, Bush and Cheney disdained Bill Clinton's 1994 deal with the North as appeasement. They criticized South Korea's "sunshine policy" of reconciliation with the North, refused to negotiate, and included that despotic regime in a purely rhetorical "axis of evil." And they watched as the North produced enough new plutonium for eight to 10 bombs. The false hope of regime change The lesson of North Korea should be that false premises produce failed policies. There never was any realistic prospect that regime change would annul the threat of nuclear weapons in the North. By the same token, regime change in Iraq -- particularly when accompanied by an abhorrence of nation-building -- could hardly establish a stable power balance in the Gulf region, the flourishing of democracy, the encirclement of Iran, or long-term security for oil supplies. And there is virtually no chance that regime change could be the way to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. In Iraq and elsewhere, Bush's successor will be called on to clean up a staggering mess. Above all, this will mean returning to the principles of US foreign policy as practiced by every other president since FDR. Particularly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Bush and his advisers presumed that this hoary old approach was no longer relevant. But the record shows that Bush has not succeeded in rewriting the rules of statecraft. Proceeding from false premises, he came to false conclusions. His successor, whether a Democrat or a Republican, will need to revive the internationalist traditions of his predecessors to clean up the mess he is leaving behind.
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