Following is the text of a written statement issued by George J. Tenet, the former Director of Central Intelligence, regarding the public release today of the executive summary of the June 2005 report by the Office of the Inspector General concerning the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001:

In August of 2001, the Office of the Inspector General produced an insightful and valuable review of CIA’s counterterrorism efforts. Unfortunately, it is not the one released today.

Just weeks before 9/11, the Office of the IG reported that “The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) is a well-managed component that successfully carries out the Agency’s responsibilities to collect and analyze intelligence on international terrorism and to undermine the capabilities of terrorist groups.” The report went on to say: “CTC fulfills interagency responsibility for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning and promoting effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues.” The report noted that “CTC’s resources have steadily increased over the last five years with personnel growing by 74 percent during that period and the budget more than doubling. The Center’s comparatively favorable resource situation allows it not only to expand its own programs but also to support operations against terrorists and liaison relationships that DO (Directorate of Operations) area divisions otherwise could not fund.”

The August 2001 report stated that “relationships with the FBI have been vastly improved” and further informed us “CTC’s relationship with NSA has improved dramatically since the last inspection.”

The IG recommended no actions to me to improve our operations against terrorism. It did correctly note that the people of CTC were extraordinarily hard working and were facing a monumental task combating the tide of terrorism. The August 2001 report is sharply at odds with what is being released today.

After 9/11, with the clarity of hindsight, the IG, while acknowledging that “the DCI was actively and forcefully engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA . . . [and] was personally engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many different audiences,” nevertheless criticized me for not having a strategic plan to fight terrorism and inadequately marshalling resources for such an effort. In these later judgments, the IG is flat wrong.

There was in fact a robust plan, marked by extraordinary effort and dedication to fighting terrorism, dating back to long before 9/11. Without such an effort, we would not have been able to give the President a plan on September 15, 2001 that led to the routing of the Taliban, chasing al Qa’ida from its Afghan sanctuary and combating terrorists across 92 countries. The IG report rightly praises the “most effective interagency effort against UBL [Usama Bin Laden]” as the work of the Assistant DCI for Collection from the early months of 1998 to 9/11. But it fails to note that this effort was at my direction and was regularly monitored by me. This plan was based on actions that were taken over a sustained period using the assets of the Intelligence Community to collect intelligence against al Qa’ida, to develop relationships with key foreign intelligence services, to develop networks of assets inside the Afghan sanctuary, and to develop innovative technologies to deal with an illusive target. All of this was done pursuant to my direction, as quoted in the IG report, that there be “no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside the CIA or the Community.”

The latest IG report is equally wrong regarding resources. Although resources available for everything else at CIA went down or stayed flat, counterterrorism resources were going up. The IG report fails to understand where we were starting from or the geopolitical context that the intelligence community faced. We had to try to rebuild a seriously under-funded intelligence community across the board. During the 1990s, as a Community, we had lost 25 percent of our people and tens of billions of dollars in investment compared to the 1990 baseline. The rebuilding of the entire Community was essential to bolstering our counterterrorism efforts and enabling us to address all the intelligence priorities established by the President. For me, however there was no priority higher than fighting terrorism. The IG fails to understand how intensely I pushed the counterterrorism issue because he failed to interview either me or policymakers from either the Clinton or Bush Administrations on this matter. Had he done so he might have learned that I was relentless in seeking additional funding for the Intelligence Community in general and counterterrorism in particular. I wrote the Administration in 1998 and 1999 imploring for more money to rebuild U.S. intelligence. When only a small portion of what I requested was made available, I went outside established channels to work with then-Speaker Gingrich to obtain a $1.2 billion budgetary supplemental for the intelligence community.

The IG’s report released today also vastly under appreciates the challenges faced and heroic performance of the hard working men and women of the CIA in general and CTC in specific. As the 9/11 Commission report says: “Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qa’ida than the CIA.” The hard work, skill and selfless dedication of Agency officers saved countless lives and enhanced the security of our country. No IG Report will ever change that reality.

I do not want my comments here to be misconstrued as saying that CIA’s performance prior to 9/11 was beyond reproach. We did not obtain the tactical information which may have allowed us to thwart the 9/11 attacks. As I said to the 9/11 Commission: “No matter how hard we worked — or how desperately we tried — it was not enough. The victims and the families of 9/11 deserved better.”

But just as we owed it to the country to do better — the CIA IG owed it to the nation and the men and women of the intelligence community to do a better job in reviewing the circumstances that led to the tragedy of September 11th.

This is in rebuttal to the following from ABC:

CIA Report Points 9/11 Finger Former Director Tenet Held Accountable for Intelligence Failures By LUIS MARTINEZ

Aug. 21, 2007 —

An internal CIA review recommends that former CIA director George Tenet face disciplinary action for failing to use more of his agency's resources against al Qaeda and for failing to develop a strategic plan against al Qaeda in the years before Sept. 11.

Tenet's successor, Porter Goss, declined the CIA inspector general's recommendation when the report was written in 2005 to convene "accountability boards" that would have recommended personnel actions against Tenet and a dozen other current and former CIA officials cited in the report who "did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner."

In a statement issued today, Tenet refuted the inspector general's conclusions, calling them "flat wrong."

The CIA declassified the Executive Summary of the 2005 Inspector General's report today in compliance with recent congressional legislation that mandated its release.

In a statement, current CIA director Gen. Michael Hayden said he supports Goss' decision not to pursue punishments against the individuals cited in the report. He also notes releasing the report was not his preference and that its release could be distracting for CIA employees as it revisits "ground that is already well plowed."

The inspector general review found that though agency officers "from the top down worked hard against al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets," it also concluded they did "not work effectively and cooperatively."

While the report determines there was "neither 'a single point of failure,' nor a 'silver bullet' that would have enabled the Intelligence Community to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks" it is also critical of failures. Namely, failures "to implement and manage important processes, to follow through with operations, and to properly share and analyze critical data... that could have developed a more informed context in which to assess the threat reporting" in the months prior to the attacks.

The report found that the intelligence community "did not have a documented, comprehensive approach to al Qaeda and that the DCI (Tenet) did not use all of his authorities in leading the Intelligence Community's strategic effort against Usama bin Laden."

Tenet is faulted for having identified the need to mobilize and maximize the intelligence community's efforts and resources to counter al Qaeda, yet he did not follow up. Tenet "by nature of his position bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be done." At the time, the CIA director was in charge of all the intelligence agencies in the federal government.

In a statement, Tenet disagreed with that assessment, saying, "There was in fact a robust plan, marked by extraordinary effort and dedication to fighting terrorism, dating back to long before 9/11. Without such an effort, we would not have been able to give the president a plan on Sept. 15, 2001, that led to the routing of the Taliban, chasing al Qaeda from its Afghan sanctuary and combating terrorists across 92 countries."

He also faults Inspector General John Helgerson for not having interviewed "me or policymakers from either the Clinton or Bush administrations on this matter." He continued, "Had he done so he might have learned that I was relentless in seeking additional funding for the intelligence community in general and counterterrorism in particular."

In releasing today's documents, CIA director Hayden expresses concerns about the potential "chilling effect" the report's release could have on the IG's future work, which has always remained confidential.

Since Tenet and some of the other top officials had already left the agency by the time the report was finished they likely would have faced letters of reprimand. Not identified by name in the report, but identified by the positions they held at the time are James Pavitt, former deputy director of operations, and J. Cofer Black, former director of the agency's counterterrorist center.

And this from the AP in Forbes:

WASHINGTON -

The CIA's top leaders failed to use their available powers, never developed a comprehensive plan to stop al-Qaida and missed crucial opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the agency's own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday.

Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page executive summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA leaders and others beneath them. "The agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," the CIA inspector general found.

"They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report stated.

Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found neither a "single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have stopped the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

In a statement, CIA Director Michael Hayden said the decision to release the report was not his choice or preference, but that he was making the report available as required by Congress in a law President Bush signed earlier this month.

"I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the front lines of a global conflict," Hayden said. "It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed."

The report does cover terrain heavily examined by a congressional inquiry and the Sept. 11 Commission. However, the CIA watchdog's report goes further than previous reviews to examine the personal failings of individuals within the agency who led the pre-9/11 efforts against al-Qaida.

Helgerson's team found that no CIA employees violated the law or were part of any misconduct. But it still called on then-CIA Director Porter Goss to form accountability boards to look at the performance of specific individuals to determine whether reprimands were called for.

The inquiry boards were recommended for officials including former CIA Director George Tenet, his deputy director for operations Jim Pavitt, Counterterrorism Center Chief Cofer Black, and agency Executive Director A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard.

In October 2005, Goss rejected the recommendation. He said he had spoken personally with the current employees named in the report, and he trusted their abilities and dedication. "The report unveiled no mysteries," Goss said.

Hayden stuck by Goss's decision.

Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer, still-classified report, the executive summary says:

_ U.S. spy agencies, which were overseen by Tenet, lacked a comprehensive strategic plan to counter Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11. The inspector general concluded that Tenet "by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created."

_ The CIA's analysis of al-Qaida before Sept. 2001 was lacking. No comprehensive report focusing on bin Laden was written after 1993, and no comprehensive report laying out the threats of 2001 was assembled. "A number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all," the report found.

_ The CIA and the National Security Agency tussled over their responsibilities in dealing with al-Qaida well into 2001. Only Tenet's personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution, the report concluded.

_ The CIA station charged with monitoring bin Laden - code-named Alec Station - was overworked, lacked operational experience, expertise and training. The report recommended forming accountability boards for the CIA Counterterror Center chiefs from 1998 to 2001, including Black.

_ Although 50 to 60 people read at least one CIA cable about two of the hijackers, the information wasn't shared with the proper offices and agencies. "That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown.... Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watch-listing program," the report said. The report again called for further review of Black and his predecessor.

While blame is heaped on Tenet and his deputies, the report also says that Tenet was forcefully engaged in counterterrorism efforts and personally sounded the alarm before Congress, the military and policymakers. In a now well-known 1998 memo, he declared, "We are at war."

The trouble, the report said, was follow-up.

In a statement, Tenet said the inspector general is "flat wrong" about the lack of plan.

"There was in fact a robust plan, marked by extraordinary effort and dedication to fighting terrorism, dating back to long before 9/11," he said. "Without such an effort, we would not have been able to give the president a plan on Sept. 15, 2001, that led to the routing of the Taliban, chasing al-Qaida from its Afghan sanctuary and combating terrorists across 92 countries."

The inspector general did take exception to findings of Congress' joint inquiry into 9/11. For instance, the congressional inquiry found that the CIA was reluctant to seek authority to assassinate bin Laden. Instead, the inspector general believed the problem was the agency's limited covert-action capabilities.

The CIA's reliance on a group of sources with questionable reliablity "proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against bin Laden," the report said. "Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior to 9/11."

WASHINGTON -

"They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report stated.

Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found neither a "single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have stopped the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

Hayden stuck by Goss's decision.

Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer, still-classified report, the executive summary says:

The trouble, the report said, was follow-up.

In a statement, Tenet said the inspector general is "flat wrong" about the lack of plan.

CIA executive summary:

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive%20Summary_OIG%20Report.pdf

And Hayden's statement:

Director's Statement on the Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary

Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General Michael V. Hayden on the Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary

August 21, 2007

Earlier this month, Congress passed a bill implementing some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The legislation, lengthy and complex, includes a provision dealing with the report that CIA’s Office of Inspector General prepared on the performance of our agency prior to September 11^th. The act gave me 30 days to make available to the public a version of the report’s executive summary, declassified to the maximum extent possible. Today, well within deadline, I am releasing that material.

While meeting the dictates of the law, I want to make it clear that this declassification was neither my choice nor my preference. Two Directors of National Intelligence have supported the agency’s position against release.

The long, grueling fight against terrorism, which depends in very real part on the quality of our intelligence, demands that we keep our focus on the present and the future. We must draw lessons from our past—and we have—without becoming captive to it. I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the frontlines of a global conflict. It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed. I also remain deeply concerned about the chilling effect that may follow publication of the previously classified work, findings, and recommendations of the Office of Inspector General. The important work of that unit depends on candor and confidentiality.

In keeping with the letter and spirit of the law, CIA has in its declassification process removed relatively little from the report’s executive summary. We focused chiefly on the protection of essential sources and methods. I also thought it unnecessary and unwise to permit identification of officers below the level of Center Chief, even if only by title, and those passages have been deleted, as well.

There is some background that I believe you need to know. In 2002, the Joint Inquiry Committee of Congress instructed our Office of Inspector General to determine if any agency officers should be rewarded for outstanding service in the run-up to 9/11 or held accountable for the unsatisfactory discharge of their duties. In June 2005, the Inspector General presented my predecessor, Porter Goss, with a final report answering that specific mandate. The summary, like the complete report, is a very human document. In it, one group of agency officers—dedicated to their task—looks back to examine and judge the actions of another group of agency officers—dedicated to their task, the task of understanding and combating al-Qai’da.

You should also know that there are very different perspectives on this report. It was important for us to conduct our own review—that is something on which most, if not all of us, can agree. But our colleagues referred to in the document, and others who have read it, took strong exception to its focus, methodology, and conclusions. In October 2005, Director Goss declined to accept its primary recommendation—the creation of an Accountability Board to consider disciplinary action against a handful of individuals at different levels of command. I have re-read the report, carefully evaluated what it says, and have found no reason to revisit his decision.

Director Goss noted at the time that the officers cited include some of our finest. With inadequate resources, they and those they led worked flat out against a tough, secretive foe. As the executive summary points out, there was never a question of misconduct. While they, and our government as a whole, were unable despite their best efforts to shield our nation from attack, their skill, wisdom, energy, and leadership were key elements in the agency’s victories over al-Qai’da before and after 9/11. They have made powerful contributions to our national security. They have prevented other acts of terrorism, and they have saved innocent lives, in our country and overseas.

This is not about avoiding responsibility. In fact, the opposite is true. CIA has for years spoken publicly, openly, and explicitly about shortcomings in its counter-terror programs before 9/11. Those shortcomings have been the subject of hearings, studies, panels, press reports, books, and critiques of all kinds, some fair, some not. As you will see, the Inspector General found no “silver bullet” that would have prevented the terror attacks of September 11^th. There was, in the words of the summary, “no single point of failure.”

Nor did CIA wait for this formal review to begin identifying and correcting the systemic flaws discussed in the report. This is an organization that is self-aware, self-critical, and, to a great degree, self-improving. The Inspector General’s report, like others before it, found areas in which CIA could do better, and, in the intervening years, we have worked hard to do just that.

Counter-terrorism is an exceptionally difficult challenge. The risks, and the stakes, are extremely high. The enemy is adaptive, resilient, and determined to strike us again here at home. There are limits to what intelligence can accomplish, and there can be no guarantee of perfect security. But the talented, motivated officers who work against this threat day and night give our nation a strong advantage. Together, we recognize that the finest tribute we can pay to the victims of terrorism is a redoubled effort to rip that scourge out by the roots. We can, and should, be proud of the many great things CIA has done, and will do, to defend the United States in a very dangerous world.

Mike Hayden

To access the declassified Executive Summary of the Office of Inspector General report, click here. [PDF Only 989KB*]

Blah, blah "we are not to blame", blah blah "we need more funding" blah, blah "we are amazing" blah, blah