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War, War, War See other War, War, War Articles Title: Iraqi Perspectives Project (This is for REAL) Executive Summary The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) review of captured Iraqi documents uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism. Despite their incompatible long-term goals, many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability. In the period after the 1991 Gulf War, the regime of Saddam Hussein supported a complex and increasingly disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements. The relationship between Iraq and forces of pan-Arab socialism was well known and was in fact one of the defining qualities of the Ba'ath movement. But the relationships between Iraq and the groups advocating radical pan-Islamic doctrines are much more complex. This study found no "smoking gun" (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relationships with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks. A review of available Iraqi documents indicated the following: The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The predominant tar- The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classification. gets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq. On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence servIces directly targeted the regime's perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups. Saddam's regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq's long-term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos. One such example documents Iraqi financial support to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor progress and accountability in the recruiting, training, and resourcing of terrorists. Examples include the regime's development, construction, certification, and training for car bombs and suicide vests in 1999 and 2000. From the beginning of his rise to power, one of Saddam's major objectives was to shift the regional balance of power favorably towards Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War, pursuing this objective motivated Saddam and his regime to increase their cooperation with-and attempts to manipulate-Islamic fundamentalists and related terrorist organizations. Documents indicate that the regime's use of terrorism was standard practice, although not always successful. From 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power. Methodology This paper summarizes a detailed review of a unique source-the captured documents and media files from the Harmony database, which have been translated and analyzed. s While Harmony holds most of the documents captured ES- in Iraq, it is not an exhaustive list. Other documents were not available for this phase of the IPP study, e.g., those under the control of other US government agencies or others still being processed. In complying with one of the original purposes for the IPP study, four volumes of primary source materials accompany Volume 1 (this paper). Volumes 2 though 5 contain the "raw" Harmony files cited in Volume 1, allowing further review and study by other researchers. 6 As new materials become available from captured documents and media and secondary (non-Iraqi) sources, alternative explanations may result from reviewing this material. The Harmony database cannot address all questions relating to Iraq and terrorism: many potentially relevant documents were either inadvertently destroyed by Coalition forces during major combat actions or else were hidden or destroyed by members of the former regime. It should not be surprising, therefore, that some topics or events are lightly addressed or not covered at all. Despite these and other reasons, the number of relevant documents available to, and reviewed for, this project remains impressive. This paper examined the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global contexts. It is not a study of terrorism in general or of any specific terrorist group. Our research approaches this question from a unique source-the regime's own archives. About Harmony Database Each Harmony document folder has its own unique document number. It may contain more than one item, e.g., a collection of memoranda on a single topic or a series of related documents, but individual items within the folder do not have their own unique numbers. The reader will often see the same document number for citations with different titles or subjects. A Harmony media file (e.g., audio or video) does have its own number; rarely will there be additional material, e.g., a transcript with the video. Volumes 2 through 5, the primary sources materials, have a generic metadata reference sheet as part of their front matter. We have highlighted certain elements in the generic example to help explain certain highlevel information about the structure and contents found in a Harmony document folder and a media file. ES-
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