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Title: Obama's Eligibility in Question
Source:
Chicago Tribune newspaper ad
URL Source: http://www.wethepeoplefoundation.or ... oTribune-ObamaLtr-Nov-2008.pdf
Published: Dec 3, 2008
Author: Robert L. Schulz
Post Date: 2008-12-03 14:34:40 by Phant2000
Keywords: None
Views: 1225
Comments: 35
Maybe if all those NOT voting for Mr. Obama had signed the subject letter, he might not have ignored it. http://www.wethepeoplefoundation.org/UPDATE/misc2008/ChicagoTribune-ObamaLtr-Nov-2008.pdf
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 30.
#2. To: Phant2000 (#0)
Documents nonsense aside, was Obama's mother also not American born? I think not. Then no matter where he was born, is he not just as American as John McCain who was born in Panama? Thanks for the link to "We the Bigots Foundation". Not unexpectedly I found no reference at this site to any individual connected to the "organization". Not the first time I've encountered this with such sites! How puzzling! These types seem inclined to wear a hood! No?
No, it is not that simple. If McCain was born off-base in Colon, Republic of Panama of two U.S. citizen parents, he was a natural born citizen. If McCain was born on base, the complicated laws in effect in 1936 (changed in 1937) would appear to indicate he did not become a citizen until 1937. While the laws subsequent to 1936 would retrooactively make McCain a citizen, it could not make him a citizen at birth, i.e., a natural born citizen. If Obama was born in the U.S., he would be a natural born citizen pursuant to the Fourteenth amandment. If Obama was born in Kenya to a U.S. citizen mother and a Kenyan father, then there were certain residency requirements his mother had to meet which apparently were not met resulting in his not being born a citizen. Current law at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) provides: An amendment provided: Had Obama been born in Kenya, the law required his citizen mother "prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years...." Regarding McCain, the Act of May 24, 1934 granted citizenship to "[a]ny child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States...." Assuming birth on base in the Canal Zone, McCain was in a legal no-man's land. He was not born within the territory of the U.S. so the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply. He was not born out of the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States, so the Act of May 24, 1934 did not cover him either. The loophole was closed by legislation in 1937 but that could not retroactively make him a natural born citizen. The Canal Zone was an unincorporated territory of the U.S. and not considered part of the U.S. for citizenship purposes. Overseas military bases are not part of the United States and birth on such bases does not confer citizenship. Colon, Panama was specified as not being included in the Canal Zone. While McCain held for many years that he was born in the hospital on the military base, that hospital was built in the 1940's and did not exist when McCain was born in 1936. The birth record produced for McCain indicates he was born in Colon, in the Republic of Panama and not on base or in the Canal Zone. If McCain was born in Colon, Republic of Panama he was born outside the territory and jurisdiction of the U.S. and was a citizen at birth pursuant to the Act of May 24, 1934. However, this is not an official government record, purports to be from the records of the Panama Railroad Company, and is certifed by a company employee, and generally lacks official government indicia. McCain's birth is not reflected in the Canal Zone birth registry. As the base hospital had not yet been built, it is likely that McCain really was born off base in the Colon hospital and that he was a natural born U.S. citizen. NATURAL BORN CITIZEN SOURCE MATERIAL For various points of view, see: http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/chin.pdf Gabriel J. Chin, Commentary, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 1 (2008). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133663 Bonner, J. Rebekka Susan,Who May Be President? Constitutional Reinterpretation of Article II's 'Natural Born' Presidential Eligibility Clause. [2008] http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/pryor_note.pdf Pryor, Jill A., The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 97 [1988] http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art2frag5_user.html#art2_sec1cl5 Qualifications, Congressional Research Service Annotated Constitution
Additionally, if there were even a breath of truth to this nonsense, can anyone suggest that the odious Clintons would not have brought this forward months ago?
Well, it's true nonsense. I have yet to see any credible evidence put forth.
You are a blind de constructionist. Probably an at-torn-ey wannabe that failed the bar a few times.
If you think the court will rule in favor of Berg or Donofrio you must be a blind optimist. How do you propose either overcomes the obstacle of the constitutional requirement for standing in a case or controversy? Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition "Standing to sue" means that party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636. Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court; it is the right to take the initial step that frames legal issues for ultimate adjudication by court or jury. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, Okl., 653 P.2d 1230, 1232. The requirement of "standing" is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectible and tangible interest at stake in the litigation. Guidry v. Roberts, La.App., 331 So.2d 44, 50. Standing is a jurisdictional issue which concerns power of federal courts to hear and decide cases and does not concern ultimate merits of substantive claims involved in the action. Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, D.C.Pa., 358 F.Supp. 684, 695. The doctrine emanates from the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution and from general principles of judicial administration, and seeks to insure that the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, D.C.Va., 361 F.Supp. 689, 692. Standing is a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured or been threatened with injury by governmental action complained of, and focuses on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the lawsuit, not whether the issue itself is justiciable. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Comm., D.C.N.C, 431 F.Supp. 203, 218. Essence of standing is that no person is entitled to assail the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute except as he himself is adversely affected by it. Sandoval v. Ryan, Colo.App., 535 P.2nd 244, 247. CITIZEN STANDING http://supreme.justia.com/us/418/208/case.html Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War No. 72-1188 Argued January 14, 1974 Decided June 25, 1974 418 U.S. 208 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondents -- an association of present and former members of the Armed Forces Reserve opposing United States involvement in Vietnam, and five association members who were United States citizens and taxpayers -- brought a class action on behalf, inter alia, of all United States citizens and taxpayers against petitioners, the Secretary of Defense and the three Service Secretaries, challenging the Reserve membership of Members of Congress as violating the Incompatibility Clause of Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." The District Court held that respondents had standing to sue as citizens but not as taxpayers, and, on the merits, granted partial relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. Respondents had no standing to sue as citizens, since the claimed nonobservance of the Incompatibility Clause which they assert deprives citizens of the faithful discharge of the legislative duties of reservist Members of Congress implicates only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance, and is thus merely an abstract injury, rather than the concrete injury that is essential to satisfy Art. III's "case or controversy" requirement. Pp. 418 U. S. 216-227. 2. Respondents also lacked standing to sue as taxpayers, since they failed to establish the required "logical nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 392 U. S. 102. Pp. 418 U. S. 227-228. 162 U.S.App.D.C. 19, 495 F.2d 1075, reversed and remanded. BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 228. DOUGLAS, J., Page 418 U. S. 209 filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 418 U. S. 229. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 418 U. S. 235, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 418 U. S. 238, filed dissenting opinions. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. [...] Respondents' motivation has indeed brought them sharply into conflict with petitioners, but, as the Court has noted, motivation is not a substitute for the actual injury needed by the courts and adversaries to focus litigation efforts and judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, the evaluation of the quality of the presentation on the merits was a retrospective judgment that could have properly been arrived at only after standing had been found so as to permit the court to consider the merits. A logical corollary to this approach would be the manifestly untenable view that the inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for denying standing. Furthermore, to have reached the conclusion that respondents' interests as citizens were meant to be protected by the Incompatibility Clause because the primary purpose of the Clause was to insure independence of each of the branches of the Federal Government similarly involved an appraisal of the merits before the issue of standing was resolved. All citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of each branch of Government. In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution Page 418 U. S. 227 was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a "case or controversy" appropriate for judicial resolution. [Footnote 16] The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries. Closely linked to the idea that generalized citizen interest is a sufficient basis for standing was the District Court's observation that it was not irrelevant that, if respondents could not obtain judicial review of petitioners' action, "then, as a practical matter, no one can." Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. The assumption that, if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing is not a reason to find standing. See United States v. Richardson, ante at 418 U. S. 179. - - - - - http://supreme.justia.com/us/418/166/case.html, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) United States v. Richardson No. 72-885 Argued October 10, 1973 Decided June 25, 1974 418 U.S. 166 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent, as a federal taxpayer, brought this suit for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency Act, which permits the CIA to account for its expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director. . . ." 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b). The complaint alleged that the Act violated Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, of the Constitution insofar as that clause requires a regular statement and account of public funds. The District Court's dismissal of the complaint for, inter alia, respondent's lack of standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. That court held that respondent had standing as a taxpayer on the ground that he satisfied Flast's requirements that the allegations (1) challenge an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art I, § 8, and show (2) a "nexus" between the plaintiff's status and a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power. Held: Respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit. Pp. 418 U. S. 171-180. (a) Flast, which stressed the need for meeting the requirements of Art. III, did not "undermine the salutary principle . . . established by Frothingham [v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447] . . . that a taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.'" Pp. 418 U. S. 171-174. (b) Respondent's challenge, not being addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA's accounting and reporting procedures, provides no "logical nexus" between his status as "taxpayer" and the asserted failure of Congress to require more detailed reports of expenditures of the CIA. Pp. 418 U. S. 174-175. (c) Respondent's claim that, without detailed information on the CIA's expenditures, he cannot properly follow legislative or executive action, and thereby fulfill his obligations as a voter, is a generalized grievance insufficient under Frothingham or Flast to show that "he has sustained or is immediately in danger of Page 418 U. S. 167 sustaining direct injury as the result" of such action. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634. Pp. 418 U. S. 176-178. 465 F.2d 844, reversed. BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 180. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 197. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 235. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 418 U. S. 202. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. [...] Page 418 U. S. 179 It can be argued that, if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The Constitution created a representative Government, with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the "ground rules" established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them. As our society has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our lives more varied, and our resources more strained, citizens increasingly request the intervention of the courts on a greater variety of issues than at any period of our national development. The acceptance of new categories of judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic principle that, to invoke judicial power, the claimant must have a "personal stake in the outcome," [...] - - - - - http://supreme.justia.com/us/454/464/case.html, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. No. 80-327 Argued November 4, 1981 Decided January 12, 1982 454 U.S. 464 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Syllabus Pursuant to its authority under the Property Clause, Congress enacted the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to provide an economical and efficient system for the disposal of surplus Federal Government property. Under the statute, property that has outlived its usefulness to the Government is declared "surplus" and may be transferred to private or other public entities. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now the Secretary of Education) to assume responsibility for disposing of surplus real property for educational use, and he may sell such property to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institutions for consideration that takes into account any benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the United States from the transferee's use of the property. Property formerly used as a military hospital was declared to be "surplus property" under the Act and was conveyed by the Department of HEW to petitioner church-related college. The appraised value of the property, $577,500, was discounted by the Secretary of HEW's computation of a 100% public benefit allowance, thus permitting petitioner to acquire the property without making any financial payment. Respondents, an organization dedicated to the separation of church and State and several of its employees, brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the conveyance on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and alleging that each member of respondent organization "would be deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollars." The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that respondents lacked standing to sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, and failed to allege any actual injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the conveyance, they had standing merely as "citizens," claiming "injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a government that `shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion,'" which standing was sufficient to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III. Page 454 U. S. 465 Held: Respondents do not have standing, either in their capacity as taxpayers or as citizens, to challenge the conveyance in question. Pp. 454 U. S. 471-490. (a) The exercise of judicial power under Art. III is restricted to litigants who can show "injury in fact" resulting from the action that they seek to have the court adjudicate. Pp. 454 U. S. 471-476. (b) Respondents are without standing to sue as taxpayers, because the source of their complaint is not a congressional action but a decision by HEW to transfer a parcel of federal property, and because the conveyance in question was not an exercise of Congress' authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause, but by the Property Clause. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, supra. Pp. 454 U. S. 476-482. (c) Nor have respondents sufficiently alleged any other basis for standing to bring suit. Although they claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III. While respondents are firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy. Pp. 454 U. S. 482-487. (d) Enforcement of the Establishment Clause does not justify special exceptions from the standing requirements of Art. III. There is no place in our constitutional scheme for the philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors, and that "cases and controversies" are at best merely convenient vehicles for doing so, and, at worst, nuisances that may be dispensed with when they become obstacles to that transcendent endeavor. And such philosophy does not become more palatable when the underlying merits concern the Establishment Clause. Pp. 454 U. S. 488-490. 619 F.2d 252, reversed. REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 454 U. S. 490. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 454 U. S. 513. Page 454 U. S. 466 JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. [...]
Far from my point. I don't have any faith in your Kangaroo Courts.
The Obamites are the same mindset that would have backed the Crown during the 1770's-1780's.
Yeah, sure, and McKook was George Washington reincarnated.
#31. To: iconoclast (#30)
McCain and Obama are two ends of the same stale-ass bale of hay served up to the sheep by the Money Shepherds. Why do you keep bleating for more?
Slamming the Obummer-nutters is every patriotic Americans' duty, considering that Obummer is the most politically degenerate American to ever aspire to sit in the Oval Office. Obama is just a Robert Mugabe-lite, his white half will temper that savage African streak that always lurks beneath the thin veneer of civilization. And I do mean "thin".
Great. More binary thinking.. Gawd I miss Uncle Polak, wish he were here..
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#13. To: iconoclast, TwentyTwelve, X-15, IndieTX, farmfriend (#2)
Documents nonsense aside, was Obama's mother also not American born? I think not. Then no matter where he was born, is he not just as American as John McCain who was born in Panama?
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or periods of employment with the United States Government or with an international organization as that term is defined in section 288 of title 22 by such citizen parent, or any periods during which such citizen parent is physically present abroad as the dependent unmarried son or daughter and a member of the household of a person (A) honorably serving with the Armed Forces of the United States, or (B) employed by the United States Government or an international organization as defined in section 288 of title 22, may be included in order to satisfy the physical-presence requirement of this paragraph. This proviso shall be applicable to persons born on or after December 24, 1952, to the same extent as if it had become effective in its present form on that date;
1986--Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 99-653 substituted "five years, at least two'' for "ten years, at least five''.
#16. To: nolu_chan (#13)
#21. To: iconoclast (#16)
Additionally, if there were even a breath of truth to this nonsense...
#23. To: nolu_chan (#21)
I have yet to see any credible evidence put forth.
#24. To: Rotara (#23)
You are a blind de constructionist.
Standing to sue doctrine.
U.S. Supreme Court
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) U.S. Supreme Court
Valley Forge Coll. v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)
#25. To: nolu_chan (#24)
If you think the court will rule in favor of Berg or Donofrio you must be a blind optimist.
#29. To: Rotara, nolu_chan (#25)
I don't have any faith in your Kangaroo Courts.
#30. To: bluegrass (#29)
The Obamites are the same mindset that would have backed the Crown during the 1770's-1780's.
Replies to Comment # 30.
#32. To: iconoclast (#30)
Yeah, sure, and McKook was George Washington reincarnated.
#33. To: iconoclast, bluegrass (#30)
Yeah, sure, and McKook was George Washington reincarnated.
End Trace Mode for Comment # 30.